Commonwealth v. Morales (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-011-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11867 COMMONWEALTH vs. NELSON MORALES. February 3, 2016. Bail. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. This case is before us on a reservation and report from a single justice of the county court. It concerns a court’s authority to revoke a defendant’s bail pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58, where the defendant who was “on release” defaulted by failing to appear in court and later was charged with committing a new crime. A judge in the Boston Municipal Court concluded that a defendant in these circumstances is no longer “on release” and denied the Commonwealth’s motion to revoke his bail. The same question is raised in two other cases, Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 473 Mass. (2016), and Commonwealth v. Jaiman, 473 Mass. (2016), which we also decide today. Because we hold that the judge had the authority under § 58 to revoke the defendant’s bail, we reverse. Background. On August 22, 2014, the defendant was arraigned in the Boston Municipal Court on the charge of larceny of property over $ 250, in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 30. The court gave the defendant the bail revocation warning pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58, and released him on personal recognizance. At a subsequent pretrial hearing, the defendant failed to appear. The court found him in default and issued a default warrant. That warrant was still outstanding when the defendant was charged with committing a new crime in April, 2015. At his arraignment on the new charge — assault and battery of a family or household member, G. L. c. 265, § 13M (a)– the Commonwealth filed a motion to revoke the defendant’s bail or recognizance in the larceny matter pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58. The Commonwealth also requested bail in the new assault and battery matter. A judge of the Boston Municipal Court denied the Commonwealth’s motion on the ground that the defendant was no longer subject to bail revocation under G. L. c. 276, § 58, sixth par. The judge reasoned that because he defaulted in the prior larceny matter he was no longer “on release” and, consequently, did not commit the new crime during the period of release. The judge did not take any action on the outstanding default warrant. In the new assault and battery matter, the judge set bail in the amount of $ 500 and […]
Morales v. Morales (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-037-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11104 MARLENE MORALES vs. RICHARD LOUIS MORALES. Worcester. November 5, 2012. ‑ March 12, 2013. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Divorce and Separation, Modification of judgment, Child support. Parent and Child, Child support. Complaint for divorce filed in the Worcester Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on April 28, 2006. A complaint for modification, filed on April 29, 2009, was heard by Susan D. Ricci, J. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. Ruthanne Withers for the plaintiff. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Marilyn Ray Smith, pro se. Stephanie E. Goldenhersh, Shira C. Hoffman, & Jennifer Ramos for Harvard Legal Aid Bureau. Martha Coakley, Attorney General, & Iraida J. Álvarez, Assistant Attorney General, for Department of Revenue. BOTSFORD, J. This case concerns the modification of a child support order, and in particular, the standard to be used by a Probate and Family Court judge in reviewing a complaint for modification. The child support order at issue is included in a 2008 divorce judgment that requires the defendant, Richard Louis Morales (father),[1] to make weekly child support payments to the plaintiff, Marlene Morales (mother), for support of their minor child. In 2009, approximately one year after the divorce judgment, and following the father’s job promotion, the mother filed a complaint requesting the modification of the child support order to reflect the father’s increase in income. Following a trial before a judge in the Probate and Family Court, the judge found that there was no “material and substantial change of circumstances and no modification [was] warranted,” and dismissed the complaint. We conclude that the trial judge, in ruling on the mother’s modification complaint, erred in applying a standard requiring a material and substantial change in circumstances (material and substantial change standard) rather than the standard set forth in G. L. c. 208, § 28, as amended through St. 1998, c. 64, §§ 194, 195 (§ 28),[2] which provides that a child support order shall be modified “if there is an inconsistency between the amount of the existing order and the amount that would result from application of the child support guidelines”[3] (inconsistency standard). Accordingly, we remand […]
Commonwealth v. Morales (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-017-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11084 COMMONWEALTH vs. ARCANGEL MORALES. Essex. October 1, 2012. ‑ February 7, 2013. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Homicide. Self‑Defense. Evidence, Self‑defense, Prior violent conduct, Reputation, Relevancy and materiality. Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury. Notice. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on November 20, 2002. The case was tried before Howard J. Whitehead, J. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Richard B. Klibaner for the defendant. Catherine Langevin Semel, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. BOTSFORD, J. The defendant, Arcangel Morales, appeals from his conviction of manslaughter. The principal question before us concerns the rule adopted by this court in Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 443 Mass. 649 (2005) (Adjutant). The question is this: during a trial where the defendant raises a claim of self-defense and, pursuant to Adjutant, has been permitted to introduce evidence of the victim’s prior violent acts on the issue of the identity of the first aggressor, may the Commonwealth introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior violent acts on that same issue — to be followed by an instruction that the jury may consider the evidence of both parties’ violent acts on the findings of who was the first aggressor? We answer the question “Yes,” provided that the Commonwealth gives the defendant notice appropriately in advance of its intent to introduce such evidence and the trial judge determines that introduction of such evidence is more probative of its intended purpose than prejudicial to the defendant. 1. Background. a. Prior proceedings. On September 26, 2002, the defendant was involved in a confrontation that culminated in his stabbing Michael Carey, the victim, with a knife and inflicting wounds from which the victim died. Thereafter, the defendant was indicted on a charge of murder in the first degree and a separate charge of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon against Leola Thomas; this second charge related to an incident that had occurred on September 22, 2002. The defendant was tried in the Superior Court in the spring of 2004. The jury convicted him of murder in the second degree and found him not guilty of the assault and battery charge. The defendant appealed, and the […]