Quinn v. Gjoni (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-055-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-540 Appeals Court ZOË TIBERIUS QUINN[1] vs. ERON GJONI. No. 15-P-540. Suffolk. March 18, 2016. – May 19, 2016. Present: Milkey, Agnes, & Meade, JJ. Abuse Prevention. Protective Order. Practice, Civil, Appeal, Moot case. Jurisdiction. Moot Question. Complaint for protection from abuse filed in the Dorchester Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department on September 16, 2014. A hearing to extend an abuse prevention order was had before Serge Georges, Jr., J., and a motion to vacate the order was heard by James W. Coffey, J. Jeffrey G. Harris for the defendant. Felicia H. Ellsworth (Tasha J. Bahal & Daniel C. Wewers with her) for the plaintiff. Daniel J. Lyne & Theodore J. Folkman for Eugene Volokh & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. MILKEY, J. The plaintiff, Zoë Quinn, obtained an abuse prevention order against her ex-boyfriend, Eron Gjoni. That order included a provision restricting Gjoni’s ability to post information about Quinn online. On appeal, Gjoni principally argues that this provision impermissibly interfered with his rights pursuant to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and he urges us to reach those arguments even though the order is no longer in effect. For the reasons set forth below, we decline to do so. Background. Quinn is a designer of video games who — as both parties appear to agree — has become a controversial figure in gaming circles. The parties dated for several months. In seeking an abuse prevention order pursuant to G. L. c. 209A, § 3, Quinn alleged that Gjoni abused her in various respects, including through being violent toward her on one occasion. She also alleged that after she and Gjoni broke up, he published online a lengthy screed that included highly personal information about her, and that this in turn incited many third parties to harass her, including through making numerous “death and rape threats” to her. Gjoni concedes that he posted information about Quinn online, and he does not appear to contest that third parties have heaped significant abuse on her. Rather, the parties appear to dispute the extent to which Gjoni should be deemed legally responsible for causing the third parties to act as they have.[2] Quinn originally obtained the abuse prevention order (order) at an ex parte hearing held in the Dorchester Division […]
DeMayo v. Quinn (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-015-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-398 Appeals Court CAROL DEMAYO vs. DAVID QUINN. No. 14-P-398. Berkshire. November 3, 2014. – February 24, 2015. Present: Green, Wolohojian, & Blake, JJ. Harassment Prevention. Civil Harassment. Protective Order. Words, “Specific person.” Complaint for protection from harassment filed in the Northern Berkshire Division of the District Court Department on December 13, 2013. The case was heard by Michael J. Ripps, J. Mark J. Pasquariello for the defendant. BLAKE, J. On December 17, 2013, following an ex parte hearing, a harassment prevention order (order) was issued against the defendant pursuant to G. L. c. 258E. A further evidentiary hearing was held, at which the plaintiff testified, and the order was extended for one year. The defendant appeals from the extension of the order, claiming that his conduct was neither “willful or malicious,” nor “aimed at a specific person,” as required by the statute. We agree as to the latter point, and accordingly vacate the order. 1. Background. The undisputed facts are as follows. The plaintiff owns a horse boarding facility; she also resides at the same property with her husband. In late August, 2013, the plaintiff discovered that particular items in the horse barn were either missing or had been rearranged. When the episodes continued, and a horse’s allergy medication and needles disappeared, the plaintiff set up a video camera and contacted the police. The police then set up their own surveillance camera, which captured an unauthorized individual, eventually identified as the defendant, engaging in various activities inside the barn on five different occasions. The videotape recording of those incidents showed the defendant taking items from the barn’s refrigerator, rearranging hay bales, and throwing items into a horse’s stall.[1] Although the plaintiff is not the legal owner of the horse involved, the facility was responsible for its care. 2. Legal requirements. “An Act relative to harassment prevention orders,” codified as G. L. c. 258E, was enacted to: (1) provide protection to victims of sexual assault, stalking, and criminal harassment that is unavailable under the domestic abuse prevention law, G. L. c. 209A; and (2) make violations of these orders punishable as a crime. Seney v. Morhy, 467 Mass. 58, 60 (2014).[2] In order to obtain a c. 258E order, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she is suffering from harassment. ”Harassment,” insofar as relevant here, […]
Commonwealth v. Quinn (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-158-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11554 COMMONWEALTH vs. KEVIN QUINN. Essex. May 6, 2014. – September 11, 2014. Present: Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Rape. Practice, Criminal, Cross-examination by prosecutor. Evidence, Cross-examination, Expert opinion, Communication with social worker, Relevancy and materiality. Rape-Shield Statute. Witness, Expert. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on August 29, 2007. The cases were tried before Leila R. Kern, J. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. Eric S. Brandt, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the defendant. Catherine Langevin Semel, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. GANTS, J. This case requires us to examine the line that separates permissible expert testimony regarding the behavioral characteristics of sexually abused children from impermissible expert testimony that implicitly vouches for the credibility of the victim witness. Because we conclude that the prosecutor in this case, over objection, elicited expert testimony during cross-examination of the victim’s therapist that crossed that line, and because we conclude that the error was prejudicial, we vacate the defendant’s convictions and remand for a new trial. Background. A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant on one indictment alleging forcible rape of a child under sixteen years of age and two indictments alleging indecent assault and battery of a child under the age of fourteen.[1],[2] The Appeals Court affirmed the convictions. Commonwealth v. Quinn, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 759 (2013). We granted the defendant’s application for further appellate review. We summarize the evidence presented at trial. The defendant, the boy friend of the victim’s mother, lived with the victim and her mother for approximately ten years from July, 1997, to June, 2006. The victim testified that, in a short period of time after her seventh birthday in September, 1997, the defendant sexually abused her on three occasions. The incidents occurred in largely the same way: when her mother was not home in the evening, the defendant entered the victim’s playroom, grabbed her and reached under her nightgown and underwear, touched her chest, put his hands “all over [her] body,” and inserted his finger into her vagina. In the last of these incidents, the defendant forced her hand onto his penis and moved it up and down. She told the defendant that she was “going […]
Commonwealth v. Quinn (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-077-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 11‑P‑1910 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. KEVIN QUINN. No. 11‑P‑1910. Essex. December 7, 2012. ‑ June 19, 2013. Present: Cypher, Brown, & Cohen, JJ. Rape. Practice, Criminal, Cross‑examination by prosecutor. Evidence, Cross‑examination, Communication with social worker, Expert opinion, First complaint, Relevancy and materiality. Rape‑Shield Statute. Witness, Expert. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on August 29, 2007. The cases were tried before Leila R. Kern, J. Eric S. Brandt, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the defendant. Catherine L. Semel, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. CYPHER, J. After a mistrial, the defendant, Kevin Quinn, was retried before a jury and the same Superior Court judge and was convicted of forcible rape of a child and two counts of indecent assault and battery on a child. On appeal, the defendant argues, first, that the prosecutor’s cross-examination of the victim’s therapist exceeded the permissible bounds of expert testimony; and second, that it was error to exclude evidence that the victim was pregnant when she made her first complaint of sexual assault by the defendant. We affirm. Factual background. We summarize the facts the jury could reasonably have found, reserving certain details for discussion with the specific issues raised. The victim was about seven years old at the time of the incidents. The defendant was her mother’s boyfriend, and the three lived together for a total of about ten years. The abuse occurred when they were living on Spruce Street in Lawrence from about July, 1997, until December, 1998. The victim testified that during this period, three incidents occurred, all in the evening before bedtime, and all in largely the same way. The defendant would join the victim in her playroom, which was a long, large closet off the kitchen where the victim could play with and store her toys. The defendant would grab her under her nightclothes, touch her chest, and put his hands in her underwear and “all over [her] body.” She testified that on each of the three occasions, the defendant put his finger in her vagina. She said it hurt and that she cried and tried to push him away. During the last incident, the victim testified that the defendant forced her hand onto his penis and moved it up and down […]