Posts tagged "Ramirez"

Ramirez v. Commonwealth (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-060-18)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   SJC-12340   JORGE RAMIREZ  vs.  COMMONWEALTH.       Suffolk.     December 5, 2017. – April 17, 2018.   Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.     Firearms.  Constitutional Law, Right to bear arms, Severability.  Statute, Validity, Severability.       Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on March 21, 2017.   The case was reported by Hines, J.     Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for Jorge Ramirez. Kathryn Leary, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.     GANTS, C.J.  We once again confront the question whether the absolute criminal prohibition of civilian possession of a stun gun, in violation of G. L. c. 140, § 131J, violates the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution, which is applied to the States by its incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment.  In Commonwealth v. Caetano, 470 Mass. 774 (2015) (Caetano I), we held that § 131J did not violate the Second Amendment right to bear arms, as interpreted by District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).  However, the United States Supreme Court, in a brief per curiam opinion, concluded that each of the three explanations we offered to support this holding were inconsistent with propositions stated in Heller, and therefore vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.  See Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016) (Caetano II).  That case was later dismissed as moot after it was “resolved . . . to [the parties’] mutual satisfaction,” so we did not there revisit the question of § 131J’s constitutionality.  But we must revisit it in this case, where the defendant was charged in a criminal complaint with possession of a stun gun, in violation of § 131J, among other crimes, and moved unsuccessfully to dismiss that count of the complaint, arguing that § 131J unconstitutionally infringes on his Second Amendment rights. We conclude that the absolute prohibition against civilian possession of stun guns under § 131J is in violation of the Second Amendment, and we order that the count of the complaint charging the defendant with such possession be dismissed with prejudice. Background.  We summarize the agreed-upon facts relevant to this appeal.  On November 5, 2015, at approximately 2:15 A.M., Officer Sean Matthews of the Revere police department was on patrol when he observed a vehicle with a broken taillight that was […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - April 17, 2018 at 10:23 pm

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Commonwealth v. Ramirez (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-017-18)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   16-P-1580                                       Appeals Court   COMMONWEALTH  vs.  WILLIAM J. RAMIREZ.     No. 16-P-1580.   Essex.     October 6, 2017. – February 9, 2018.   Present:  Wolohojian, Maldonado, & Wendlandt, JJ.     Firearms.  Search and Seizure, Protective frisk, Threshold police inquiry, Reasonable suspicion, Arrest.  Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Investigatory stop, Stop and frisk, Reasonable suspicion, Arrest.  Threshold Police Inquiry.  Arrest.  Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress.     Complaints received and sworn to in the Haverhill Division of the District Court Department on April 2 and 7, 2015.   A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Patricia A. Dowling, J., and the case was heard by Stephen S. Albany, J.     Suzanne Lynn Renaud for the defendant. Philip A. Mallard, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.     MALDONADO, J.  After a bench trial, the defendant was convicted of carrying a loaded firearm without a license and defacing a firearm serial number.[1]  The defendant appeals only from the denial of his motion to suppress the firearm.  The issue before us is whether a police officer was justified in stopping the defendant, who was walking with a man for whom the officer had an active arrest warrant involving the use of a firearm in the commission of a violent felony.  Concluding that under these narrow circumstances police and public safety concerns outweighed the minimal intrusion on the defendant’s liberty for the time it took for police to take control of the scene and effectuate the other individual’s arrest, we affirm. Background.  The judge made the following factual findings.  In the afternoon of March 25, 2015, shots were fired down Winter Street in Haverhill and struck and wounded a passerby.  Haverhill police officers received reports that a man named Joshua Perez had fired the shots, and they obtained a warrant for his arrest.[2] A few days later, on April 1, at approximately 5 P.M., local, State, and Federal law enforcement officers converged on Brook Street and Hilldale Avenue in Haverhill believing that Perez was in that area.  Detective Glen Fogarty, who was alone in an unmarked police cruiser, heard a radio transmission that indicated that Perez was walking toward his position.  Fogarty then saw Perez, who was walking down the street with another man — later identified as the defendant, William Ramirez.  Fogarty drove his cruiser to the side of […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - February 9, 2018 at 4:48 pm

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Ramirez v. Commerce Insurance Company (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-022-17)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   16-P-59                                         Appeals Court   WRBASY RAMIREZ[1]  vs.  COMMERCE INSURANCE COMPANY.     No. 16-P-59.   Suffolk.     November 7, 2016. – March 7, 2017.   Present:  Cypher, Massing, & Sacks, JJ.     Motor Vehicle, Insurance.  Insurance, Motor vehicle insurance, Replacement, Construction of policy.  Contract, Insurance, Construction of contract.  Evidence, Replacement cost.       Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on February 21, 2014.   The case was heard by Janet L. Sanders, J., on motions for summary judgment.     Thomas G. Shapiro for the plaintiff. Nelson G. Apjohn (Eric P. Magnuson also present) for the defendant. Michael Sloman, for Automobile Insurers Bureau, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.     CYPHER, J.  The plaintiff, Wrbasy Ramirez, appeals from a Superior Court judgment entered on a motion for summary judgment filed by Commerce Insurance Company (Commerce).  The plaintiff argues that under the standard Massachusetts automobile insurance policy, Commerce must pay, as damages on his third-party claim for the total loss of his automobile, not only the actual cash value of a replacement vehicle, but also the applicable sales tax — even where he has not purchased a replacement vehicle and incurred the sales tax.  We affirm.[2] Background.  The following undisputed facts are taken from the summary judgment record.  In January, 2014, the plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle collision in Danvers with a vehicle driven by Edith McGuinness.  Commerce insured McGuiness through a 2008 edition of the standard Massachusetts automobile insurance policy (the policy), which contains language approved by the Commissioner of Insurance. The policy included benefits for third-party property damage claims where Commerce determined that its insured was legally responsible for the collision.  Specifically, part 4 of the policy provided:  “[W]e will pay damages to someone else whose auto or other property is damaged in an accident.  The damages we will pay are the amounts that person is legally entitled to collect for property damage through a court judgment or settlement. . . .  Damages include any applicable sales tax and the costs resulting from loss of use of the damaged property.” Under the policy and the regulations at issue here, damages are calculated as follows:  “Whenever the appraised cost of repair plus the probable salvage value may be reasonably expected to exceed the actual cash value of the vehicle, the insurer shall determine the vehicle’s actual cash value.”  […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - March 8, 2017 at 12:07 am

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Ramirez v. Commerce Insurance Company (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-022-17)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   16-P-59                                         Appeals Court   WRBASY RAMIREZ[1]  vs.  COMMERCE INSURANCE COMPANY.     No. 16-P-59.   Suffolk.     November 7, 2016. – March 7, 2017.   Present:  Cypher, Massing, & Sacks, JJ.     Motor Vehicle, Insurance.  Insurance, Motor vehicle insurance, Replacement, Construction of policy.  Contract, Insurance, Construction of contract.  Evidence, Replacement cost.       Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on February 21, 2014.   The case was heard by Janet L. Sanders, J., on motions for summary judgment.     Thomas G. Shapiro for the plaintiff. Nelson G. Apjohn (Eric P. Magnuson also present) for the defendant. Michael Sloman, for Automobile Insurers Bureau, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.     CYPHER, J.  The plaintiff, Wrbasy Ramirez, appeals from a Superior Court judgment entered on a motion for summary judgment filed by Commerce Insurance Company (Commerce).  The plaintiff argues that under the standard Massachusetts automobile insurance policy, Commerce must pay, as damages on his third-party claim for the total loss of his automobile, not only the actual cash value of a replacement vehicle, but also the applicable sales tax — even where he has not purchased a replacement vehicle and incurred the sales tax.  We affirm.[2] Background.  The following undisputed facts are taken from the summary judgment record.  In January, 2014, the plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle collision in Danvers with a vehicle driven by Edith McGuinness.  Commerce insured McGuiness through a 2008 edition of the standard Massachusetts automobile insurance policy (the policy), which contains language approved by the Commissioner of Insurance. The policy included benefits for third-party property damage claims where Commerce determined that its insured was legally responsible for the collision.  Specifically, part 4 of the policy provided:  “[W]e will pay damages to someone else whose auto or other property is damaged in an accident.  The damages we will pay are the amounts that person is legally entitled to collect for property damage through a court judgment or settlement. . . .  Damages include any applicable sales tax and the costs resulting from loss of use of the damaged property.” Under the policy and the regulations at issue here, damages are calculated as follows:  “Whenever the appraised cost of repair plus the probable salvage value may be reasonably expected to exceed the actual cash value of the vehicle, the insurer shall determine the vehicle’s actual cash value.”  […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - March 7, 2017 at 8:31 pm

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