Commonwealth v. Ramos (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-112-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-1469 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. GOVANNY RAMOS. No. 14-P-1469. Suffolk. March 16, 2015. – August 14, 2015. Present: Katzmann, Milkey, & Agnes, JJ. Search and Seizure, Motor vehicle, Reasonable suspicion. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Reasonable suspicion. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, Records. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Record. Motor Vehicle, Receiving stolen motor vehicle. Complaint received and sworn to in the Chelsea Division of the District Court Department on October 17, 2013. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by D. Dunbar Livingston, J. An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal was allowed by Robert J. Cordy, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by him to the Appeals Court. Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Megan Ruebsamen for the defendant. KATZMANN, J. This appeal by the Commonwealth poses the questions whether police officers may reasonably rely on information from the Registry of Motor Vehicles (RMV) database concerning reports of stolen vehicles and whether a District Court judge erred in employing the Aguilar–Spinelli test in allowing the defendant’s motion to suppress. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). See Commonwealth v. Lopes, 455 Mass. 147, 155-156 (2009) (Lopes). We reverse. Background. After an evidentiary hearing, a District Court judge found the following. On October 17, 2013, State Trooper Edmund Hartwell was assigned alone and in uniform to a cruiser patrol. That morning, Hartwell was parked on Everett Avenue, opposite Chelsea High School, observing traffic. While parked, Hartwell saw a red sport utility vehicle (SUV) go past. Hartwell noticed that the driver, who was later identified as the defendant, Govanny Ramos, was not wearing a seatbelt and appeared to have his hands in his lap. Hartwell “ran” the registration of the SUV using his mobile data terminal (MDT) to query the RMV database. The vehicle “came back stolen.” The description of the motor vehicle in the RMV database matched the SUV Hartwell observed. Hartwell followed the SUV and contacted the dispatch center at the State police headquarters in Danvers to get confirmation that the SUV was stolen. The dispatch center confirmed that the SUV with the particular registration plate and description was reported as stolen. Hartwell followed the […]
Ramos, et al. v. International Fidelity Insurance Company (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-073-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1305 Appeals Court JESSICA RAMOS & others[1] vs. INTERNATIONAL FIDELITY INSURANCE COMPANY (and two companion cases[2]). No. 13-P-1305. Hampden. September 8, 2014. – July 9, 2015. Present: Trainor, Rubin, & Sullivan, JJ. Bail. Consumer Protection Act, Unfair or deceptive act, Vicarious liability, Surety. Agency, Agent’s contract, Liability of agent, Scope of authority or employment. Contract, Performance and breach, Surety, Damages. Judgment, Interest. Damages, Breach of contract, Interest. Interest. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment, Interest. Surety. Civil actions commenced in the Superior Court Department on September 2, 2010, November 17, 2010, and January 3, 2011. After consolidation, the cases were heard by Richard J. Carey, J., on motions for summary judgment, and the entry of judgment was directed by Constance M. Sweeney, J. Peter A. Slepchuk (Peter Slepchuk, Jr., with him) for the plaintiffs. Thomas F. McGuire & Michael J. Serduck for the defendant. RUBIN, J. The plaintiffs commenced these actions against the defendant, International Fidelity Insurance Company (IFIC), to recover cash collateral and certain bail bond insurance premiums collected from each of them by IFIC’s agent William Fiore, who is now deceased. On cross motions for summary judgment, the motion judge allowed the plaintiffs’ motions on their counts alleging breach of contract, and also allowed IFIC’s motions on the counts alleging a violation of G. L. c. 93A. The plaintiffs, with the exception of Ashley M. Keyes, appeal from the dismissal of their 93A claims, and the defendant appeals from the allowance of the plaintiffs’ motions on the breach of contract claims. The defendant also appeals from the calculation of prejudgment interest. Background. William Fiore worked as a bail bondsman in Hampden and Berkshire Counties. It is undisputed that Fiore acted as an agent for IFIC, a New Jersey corporation. IFIC is a successor to Atlas Bonding Agency with whom Fiore had an “Agency Contract.” While that agreement was in effect, Fiore was authorized to act as Atlas’s — and then IFIC’s — agent for the soliciting and writing of bail bonds. Fiore had been approved and registered by the Administrator of Bail as a professional bondsman for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and was authorized to act as an agent for the defendant. That approval and registration were in effect at all times relevant to this case. Fiore was supplied by IFIC with powers […]
Commonwealth v. Ramos (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-031-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11680 COMMONWEALTH vs. ALEX RAMOS. Essex. November 4, 2014. – February 26, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Motor Vehicle, Receiving stolen motor vehicle. Receiving Stolen Goods. Search and Seizure, Exigent circumstances. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress. Evidence, Telephone conversation. Telephone. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on May 2, 2007. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Howard J. Whitehead, J., and the case was tried before David A. Lowy, J. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Todd C. Pomerleau for the defendant. Quentin Weld, Assistant District Attorney (Elin H. Graydon, Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the Commonwealth. DUFFLY, J. The defendant was indicted on a charge of receiving a stolen motor vehicle, G. L. c. 266, § 28; a codefendant was indicted on charges of receiving a stolen motor vehicle and of receiving stolen property with a value exceeding $ 250. The defendant sought to suppress evidence seized as a result of a warrantless search of his garage. A Superior Court judge, who was not the trial judge, denied the motion, concluding that the warrantless search of the defendant’s garage was permissible due to exigent circumstances, and also that the search was permissible under what he termed an “accomplice sweep” exception to the warrant requirement, a concept that has not been adopted in the Commonwealth. Following a joint trial, a Superior Court jury convicted the defendant and acquitted the codefendant. The defendant appealed, and we transferred the case to this court on our own motion. On appeal, the defendant claims error in the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during the warrantless search of his garage, and the admission in evidence of inculpatory statements made during recorded telephone conversations between the defendant and the codefendant. Additionally, the defendant argues that the Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We conclude that there was no error in the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress because police entry into the garage was justified based on exigent circumstances, there was no error in the admission of recordings of the jailhouse telephone calls, and the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction. Evidence at […]