Commonwealth v. Reavis (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-134-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑10395 COMMONWEALTH vs. NILE REAVIS. Suffolk. March 8, 2013. ‑ July 16, 2013. Present: Ireland, C.J., Cordy, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Homicide. Constitutional Law, Confrontation of witnesses. Practice, Criminal, Confrontation of witnesses, Voir dire, Capital case. Evidence, Expert opinion, Intent, Intoxication. Witness, Expert. Jury and Jurors. Malice. Intoxication. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on January 26, 2007. The case was tried before Patrick F. Brady, J., and a motion for a new trial was heard by him. Willie J. Davis for the defendant. Zachary Hillman, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. LENK, J. The defendant appeals from his conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation for the stabbing death of his wife. The identity of the defendant as the person who stabbed the victim was not a live issue at trial. The defense was based on the theory that the stabbing was not premeditated, and that the defendant should be found guilty of murder in the second degree, both because he was intoxicated at the time of the stabbing and because he was under extreme provocation, having learned that his wife had been unfaithful. The defendant argues that the admission of testimony by a substitute medical examiner violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and that the judge abused his discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for individual voir dire of the venire with respect to their experience with domestic violence. The defendant argues also that it was an abuse of discretion to deny his motion under Mass. R. Crim. P. 25 (b) (2), 378 Mass. 896 (1979), to reduce the verdict to murder in the second degree. Concluding that there was no error, and, after review of the entire record pursuant to our responsibility under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, no reason to exercise our power to reduce the defendant’s conviction to a lesser degree of guilt or to order a new trial, we affirm. Background and prior proceedings. The defendant and the victim were involved in a romantic relationship for seventeen years and had five children. The defendant was the biological father of the victim’s three […]