Bassett, et al. v. Triton Technologies, Inc., et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 09-022-18)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION No. 16-3475 BLS 2 LAURA BASSETT, JAMIE ZELINSKAS, ALYSSA WRIGHT, and ALEXIS CRAMER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated Plaintiffs vs. TRITON TECHNOLOGIES, INC., S. JAY NALLI, and ANDREW S. BANK, Defendants MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO COUNT III OF THE COMPLAINT This class action raises the novel question of whether a call-in center where defendant’s employees take orders for goods sold by others is a “store or shop” engaged in the “sale at retail of goods” such that the employees must be paid time and half for work on Sundays. See G.L.c. 136 §6(50). This Court concludes that it is not. As a consequence, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor on Count III of the Complaint, which alleges that the failure to pay for Sunday work violates the Massachusetts Wage Act, G.L.c. 149 §§148 and 150. BACKGROUND The following facts are not in dispute. The defendant Triton Technologies, Inc. (Triton) is a Massachusetts corporation that operates a call in center in Mansfield. It provides “teleservices” to various companies located throughout the country (Triton’s “Clients”) which produce goods ranging from exercise videos to garden tools. Triton is not involved in the manufacture, design, production or shipping of any of its Clients’ goods. There is no evidence that it stores or at any time takes possession of its Clients’ inventory or that any Client goods are available for purchase at any of its locations, including the Mansfield call center. Typically, customers interested in a Client product reach Triton (or another call center elsewhere in the country) after calling a toll free number that appears on an advertisement for the goods that appears in a variety of media, including television and the internet. That advertising is paid for by the Client. Calls are routed to a Triton employee – called an “Inbound Sales Agent” – who works from a script developed by the Client. The Sales Agents sit at assigned workstations within the call center, which is not open to the public. The Sales Agent takes the caller’s order and payment information, all of which is transmitted to the Client for processing. The Client ships the product directly to the customer. Triton does not receive money from the sales and does not collect sales tax on the goods sold. It does not pay any sale taxes. The Mansfield call center operates 24 hours a day, 365 days per year. Triton’s Sales Agents are scheduled to work based on call volume demand. The Sales Agents are paid an […]
Bassett, et al. v. Triton Technologies, Inc., et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-074-17)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT. 1684CV03475-BLS2 ____________________ LAURA BASSETT, JAMIE ZALINSKAS, ALYSSA WRIGHT, and ALEXIS CRAMER, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. TRITON TECHNLOGIES, INC., S. JAY NALLI, and ANDREW S. BANK ____________________ MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ALLOWING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION The four named plaintiffs used to work for Triton Technologies, Inc., as “inside sales” employees. They assert two distinct claims for unpaid wages. The first claim alleges that Defendants violated the overtime statute, G.L. c. 151A, § 1A, by not paying Plaintiffs time-and-a-half for working more than forty hours per week. The second claim alleges that Defendants violated the Sunday pay law, G.L. c. 136, § 6(50), by not paying Plaintiffs time-and-a-half for working on Sundays. Plaintiffs have now moved to certify a class consisting of two distinct subclasses—one comprised of sales employees at Triton who have not received time-and-a-half for working more than forty hours in any given week, and another comprised of all sales employees who have not received time-and-a-half for hours worked on a Sunday. The Court finds that class certification is appropriate because both sub-classes are so numerous that it is not practical to join all class members, there are questions of law or fact that are common to all members of each subclass and that predominate over questions of fact that affect only individual members, the claims of the named Plaintiffs are representative of the claims of each subclass, the named Plaintiffs and their counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class, and a class action would permit the most fair and efficient adjudication of this dispute. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 23. Although Defendants do not oppose certification of the overtime subclass, they argue that the class should be limited to salespeople who claim to be owed overtime by Triton for work performed after November 13, 2013. Defendants point out that the – 2 – overtime claim is subject to a three-year statute of limitations, see G.L. c. 151, § 20A,1 and this action was filed on November 14, 2016. Plaintiffs agree that it is appropriate to limit the overtime class to this three-year period. The Court will do so. Defendants do oppose certification of the Sunday subclass. They argue that this claim is subject to a six-month statute of limitations under G.L. c. 136, § 9, and that none of the named Plaintiffs worked for Triton within six months before this lawsuit was filed (i.e. after May 13, 2015). The Court disagrees. The Sunday claim is not governed by the six-month limitations period invoked by Defendants. That statute provides that “Prosecution for violations of sections two, three, or five [of chapter 136] […]
Bassett, et al. v. Triton Technologies, Inc., et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-032-17)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT. 1684CV03475-____________________ BLS2 LAURA BASSETT, JAMIE ZALINSKAS, ALYSSA WRIGHT, and ALEXIS CRAMER, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. TRITON TECHNLOGIES_, _I_N_C__.,_ S__. _J_A_Y__ N__A_L__L_I , and ANDREW S. BANK MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT III Plaintiffs claim that they and other employees of Triton Technologies, Inc., are owed unpaid wages. Part of their claim, in Count III of the complaint, is that Triton breached its statutory obligation, as a business that sells goods at retail, to pay employees who work on Sunday “one and one-half times the employee’s regular rate.” See G.L. c. 136, § 6(50). Defendants move to dismiss Count III under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). They argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring this claim, and the Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear it, because the Legislature did not create any private right of action to enforce the Sunday pay statute. This framing of the issues is not quite right; the jurisdictional question of whether a plaintiff has standing is separate and distinct from whether they have stated a viable claim. In any case, both parts of Defendants’ argument are without merit. The Legislature created a private right of action under the Wage Act to enforce all of an employer’s legal obligations to pay wages earned by an employee. That right of action encompasses claims for non-payment of extra wages earned by working on a Sunday. And Plaintiffs have standing because they are seeking payment of wages they say are owed but have not been paid by Triton. 1. Framing the Issues. Defendants mistakenly conflate the question of whether there is a private right of action to recoup unpaid Sunday premium pay with the separate issue of whether particular plaintiffs have standing to assert, and thus a court has the power to resolve, such a claim against a particular defendant. Whether a complaint states a cognizable cause of action goes to the ultimate merits of the claim. If a plaintiff asserts a statutory rather than a common law claim, as in this case, a motion to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff has no – 2 – valid cause of action is still an assertion that the plaintiff has not alleged facts plausibly suggesting that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. See Swartz v. Department of Banking and Ins., 376 Mass. 593, 600 (1978); Whitehall Co. Ltd. v. Merrimack Valley Distributing, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 853, 853-856 (2002). Indeed, the specific question raised by this motion to dismiss—whether an employee can bring a private right of action under the Wage Act to enforce a duty created to employees […]
Lightlab Immaging, Inc. v. Axsun Technologies, Inc., et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-130-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11374 LIGHTLAB IMAGING, INC. vs. AXSUN TECHNOLOGIES, INC., & another.[1] Suffolk. December 2, 2013. – July 28, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Contract, Performance and breach, Implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Interference with contractual relations, Construction of contract. Unlawful Interference. Trade Secret. Unjust Enrichment. Consumer Protection Act, Unfair act or practice. Evidence, Expert opinion. Witness, Expert. Damages, Future damages, Loss of profits. Declaratory Relief. Injunction. Practice, Civil, Injunctive relief. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on January 7, 2009. The case was tried before Margaret R. Hinkle, J.; a motion for summary judgement was heard by her; and entry of final judgment was ordered by Peter M. Lauriat, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Kenneth R. Berman (Cynthia M. Guizzetti with him) for the plaintiff. William F. Lee (Felicia H. Ellsworth & Laurence A. Schoen with him) for the defendants. SPINA, J. The plaintiff, Lightlab Imaging, Inc. (LightLab), prevailed in much of the litigation below, which involved claims of breach of contract and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference with contractual and advantageous business relations, misappropriation of trade secrets and confidential information, unjust enrichment, and violations of G. L. c. 93A. LightLab appeals from three aspects of the judgment pertaining to relief. First, the judge excluded opinion testimony from LightLab’s expert economist on the question of future lost profits for twenty years beyond the term of the parties’ contract based on yet-to-be conceived future products. Second, the judge denied permanent injunctive relief that LightLab sought for protection against future misappropriation of its trade secrets where, although LightLab had established past misappropriation, it offered no proof of a likely reoccurrence. Third, the judge who entered the amended final judgment declined to include in that judgment a declaration of LightLab’s contract rights that mirrored the language of the order for summary judgment concerning contract interpretation. We affirm, but order the inclusion of the declaration sought by LightLab. 1. Background. The trial of this action was conducted in multiple phases. We summarize the various phases. a. Liability phase. The liability claims, except for the G. L. c. 93A claim and certain of the trade secret claims, were tried to a jury. The jury could have […]