Trychon v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-124-16)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   15-P-1316                                       Appeals Court   STEPHEN TRYCHON  vs.  MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSPORATION AUTHORITY.     No. 15-P-1316.   Suffolk.     May 16, 2016. – September 15, 2016.   Present:  Agnes, Massing, & Kinder, JJ.     Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority.  Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss.  Employment, Termination, Retaliation.     Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on February 11, 2014.   A motion to dismiss was heard by Heidi E. Brieger, J.     Kevin G. Powers for the plaintiff. Jeffrey A. Dretler for the defendant.     AGNES, J.  In this appeal, we must determine the legal sufficiency of Stephen Trychon’s complaint charging the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) with violations of G. L. c. 149, § 185, the Massachusetts public employee whistleblower statute (whistleblower statute).  A Superior Court judge allowed the MBTA’s motion, pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 755 (1974), to dismiss the complaint.[1]  We conclude that Trychon has stated a plausible claim for relief.  See Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008).  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment. Standard of review.  We review the order dismissing the complaint de novo, accepting the truth of all factual allegations and drawing all reasonable inferences in Trychon’s favor.  See Glovsky v. Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Inc., 469 Mass. 752, 754 (2014).  A complaint is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss if the factual allegations “plausibly suggest” an entitlement to relief, raising the right to relief “above the speculative level.”  Harrington v. Costello, 467 Mass. 720, 724 (2014), quoting from Iannacchino, supra.  See Mass.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1), 365 Mass. 749 (1974).  The factual content is sufficient if it “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Garayalde-Rijos v. Municipality of Carolina, 747 F.3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 2014), quoting from Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), and “it . . . raise[s] a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence [of the alleged misconduct].”  Lopez v. Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 696, 712 (2012), quoting from Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). In conducting the “context-specific” inquiry required by the plausibility standard, we must “draw on [our] judicial experience and common sense.”  Lopez, supra, quoting from Ashcroft, supra at 679.  “The critical question is whether the claim, viewed holistically, is made plausible by ‘the cumulative effect of the factual allegations’ […]

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