Deal, et al. v. Commissioner of Correction, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-135-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12053 TIMOTHY DEAL & others[1] vs. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION & another.[2] Suffolk. May 3, 2016. – August 25, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.[3] Commissioner of Correction. Constitutional Law, Sentence, Parole. Due Process of Law, Sentence, Parole, Prison classification proceedings. Imprisonment, Reclassification of prisoner. Parole. Youthful Offender Act. Practice, Criminal, Sentence, Parole. Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on July 14, 2015. The case was reported by Botsford, J. Barbara Kaban (Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel Services, & James W. Rosseel with her) for the petitioners. Charles Anderson, Jr., for the respondents. David J. Apfel & Eileen L. Morrison, for American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. CORDY, J. This case is before us on the reservation and report of the single justice. The petitioners, Timothy Deal, Siegfried Golston, and Jeffrey Roberio, are juvenile homicide offenders[4] who are serving mandatory indeterminate life sentences and who have a constitutional right to a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 674 (2013) (Diatchenko I), quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010). This right also extends to juveniles convicted of murder in the second degree. See Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass. 12, 32 (2015) (Diatchenko II). This case concerns the manner in which juvenile homicide offenders are classified and placed in Department of Correction (department) facilities. The issue before us is whether the department’s practice of using “discretionary override codes” to block qualifying juvenile homicide offenders from placement in a minimum security facility unless and until the individual has received a positive parole vote violates (1) G. L. c. 119, § 72B, as amended by St. 2014, c. 189, § 2; or (2) their right to a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, arts. 12 and 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, or both Constitutions. We conclude that the department’s current classification practice violates G. L. c. 119, § 72B, as amended by St. 2014, c. 189, § 2, because the department’s failure to consider a juvenile homicide offender’s suitability […]
Categories: News Tags: 1013516, Commissioner, Correction, Deal, Lawyers, Weekly
Gyulakian v. Lexus of Watertown, Inc., et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-134-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11959 EMMA GYULAKIAN vs. LEXUS OF WATERTOWN, INC., & another.[1] Middlesex. March 10, 2016. – August 24, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ.[2] Employment, Sexual harassment. Anti-Discrimination Law, Sex, Attorney’s fees. Practice, Civil, Judgment notwithstanding verdict. Damages, Punitive. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on January 10, 2013. The case was tried before Kimberly S. Budd , J., and postverdict motions for relief were considered by her. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Robert S. Mantell (Lori A. Jodoin with him) for the plaintiff. Christopher J. Sullivan (Tory A. Weigand with him) for the defendants. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Rebecca Pontikes, Katherine Skubecz, Michaela C. May, & Chetan Tiwari for Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association & others. Afton M. Templin for Women’s Bar Association of Massachusetts. Ben Robbins & Martin J. Newhouse for New England Legal Foundation & another. Elizabeth S. Dillon for Massachusetts Defense Lawyers Association. CORDY, J. In December, 2014, a jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, Emma Gyulakian, finding that she had been subjected to a sexually hostile or offensive work environment, in violation of G. L. c. 151B (c. 151B), § 4 (§ 4).[3] The jury, having heard evidence tending to establish that Gyulakian suffered relentless sexual harassment by her direct supervisor, Emmanuel Ferreira, found that the defendants, Lexus of Watertown, Inc., and Post Motors, Inc. (collectively, Lexus), were liable for $ 40,000 in compensatory damages for emotional distress, and, concluding that Lexus acted intentionally or with reckless disregard for Gyulakian’s rights under the discrimination laws, also awarded Gyulakian $ 500,000 in punitive damages. Lexus filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (judgment n.o.v.), or, in the alternative, for a new trial or a remittitur. A judge of the Superior Court allowed the defendant’s motion for judgment n.o.v. in part, denying the motion with respect to the jury’s imposition of compensatory damages but allowing it as to the award of punitive damages. Gyulakian appealed on the issue of punitive damages, and Lexus cross-appealed the award of compensatory damages. We allowed Gyulakian’s application for direct appellate review and affirm the award of compensatory damages. We also reverse the trial judge’s ruling as to the punitive damages award, because, […]
311 West Broadway LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeal of Boston, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-106-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-1227 Appeals Court 311 WEST BROADWAY LLC vs. ZONING BOARD OF APPEAL OF BOSTON & others.[1] No. 15-P-1227. Suffolk. May 13, 2016. – August 23, 2016. Present: Katzmann, Carhart, & Sullivan, JJ. Zoning, Variance, Appeal, Jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, Superior Court, Zoning. Superior Court, Jurisdiction. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on June 13, 2013. A motion to dismiss was heard by Brian A. Davis, J., and a motion to file an amended complaint was also heard by him. Edward J. Lonergan for 311 West Broadway LLC. Kate Moran Carter for Bromfield Development LLC. Adam Cederbaum for zoning board of appeal of Boston. KATZMANN, J. The plaintiff, 311 West Broadway, LLC (311 West Broadway), appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court dismissing its pending appeal pursuant to the Boston zoning enabling act, St. 1956, c. 665, § 11, as amended through St. 1993, c. 461, § 5 (zoning act), from a decision of the defendant zoning board of appeal of Boston (board) in favor of the defendant Bromfield Development, LLC (Bromfield), in the wake of a new decision issued by the board after an assented-to, judicially-ordered remand. The Superior Court had gained jurisdiction when an appeal was filed from the initial decision of the board, the parties agreed after the filing of that appeal to a judicial remand, the order of remand created no scheduling deadlines for the parties, and the parties provided status reports to a judge regarding the proceedings before the board and the further Superior Court litigation that they contemplated following the board’s new decision. 311 West Broadway did not file an appeal from the new decision of the board, and the question is whether the court was deprived of jurisdiction because a new appeal was required. We conclude that, in the circumstances here, a new appeal was not required and the court was not divested of jurisdiction. We reverse. Background.[2] 311 West Broadway owns property at 311-313 West Broadway in the South Boston section of Boston that abuts property owned by Bromfield at 315-319 West Broadway. Starting in 2012, Bromfield sought approval to change the occupancy of its property from a fitness center and private club to a fitness center, offices, and residential units, and to build a new four-story vertical addition over its […]
Goodwin v. Lee Public Schools, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-133-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11977 KATELYNN GOODWIN vs. LEE PUBLIC SCHOOLS & others.[1] Berkshire. March 10, 2016. – August 23, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.[2] School and School Committee, Enforcement of discipline. Education, Disciplinary matter. Practice, Civil, Dismissal. Administrative Law, Exhaustion of remedies. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on December 30, 2014. A motion to dismiss was heard by C. Jeffrey Kinder, J., and a motion for reconsideration was considered by him. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Joseph N. Schneiderman for the plaintiff. David S. Monastersky for the defendants. Sky Kochenour & Jenny Chou, for Center for Law and Education & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. DUFFLY, J. The plaintiff, Katelynn Goodwin, was a high school student at the Lee Middle and High School in the town of Lee (town) when she was suspended from school for conduct that purportedly took place not on school grounds, pursuant to a school policy, based on G. L. c. 71, § 37H1/2 (§ 37H1/2), which provided that students who had been charged with felonies would be suspended. The principal ordered the suspension in the mistaken belief that the plaintiff had been charged with a felony, stealing, or being involved in the theft of, a firearm. Ultimately, the suspension lasted for the entire final semester of what would have been the plaintiff’s senior year, and she was unable to graduate with her class, but eventually obtained her high school diploma. She thereafter commenced this action in the Superior Court against the Lee public schools, the superintendent of the Lee schools, and the town. The question confronting the court is whether the judge erred in allowing the defendants’ motion to dismiss based on the failure to exhaust the administrative remedies available under § 37H1/2. We conclude that, because the tort recovery a student may seek under G. L. c. 76, § 16, provides a separate and distinct remedy from that available under § 37H1/2, a statute that establishes an expedited process by which a student may seek readmission to school, the plaintiff was not obligated to exhaust the statute’s administrative remedies before pursuing a tort claim under G. L. c. 76, § 16. Background. The plaintiff was in her senior year of high school when […]
Commonwealth v. Mayotte (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-131-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11894 COMMONWEALTH vs. LINDA MAYOTTE. Worcester. January 7, 2016. – August 19, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.[1] Rape. Indecent Assault and Battery. Child Abuse. Incest. Reckless Endangerment of a Child. Intimidation of Witness. Evidence, First complaint, State of mind, Impeachment of credibility, Prior inconsistent statement. Witness, Intimidation, Impeachment. Practice, Criminal, Sentence. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on March 18, 2010. The cases were tried before Richard T. Tucker, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Eric S. Brandt, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the defendant. Ellyn H. Lazar-Moore, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. HINES, J. A jury convicted the defendant, Linda Mayotte, of rape of a child, G. L. c. 265, § 23 (three indictments); indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen, G. L. c. 265, § 13B (five indictments); indecent assault and battery on a child over the age of fourteen, G. L. c. 265, § 13H (five indictments); incest, G. L. c. 272, § 17; reckless endangerment of a child, G. L. c. 265, § 13L; intimidation of a witness, G. L. c. 268, § 13B; resisting arrest, G. L. c. 268, § 32B; and unlawful possession of a firearm without a firearm identification card, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h).[2] The victim in each of the charged sex offenses was her adopted son, D.M.[3] The defendant challenges the convictions on three grounds: (1) error in the exclusion of first complaint evidence relating to her defense that she was the victim, not the perpetrator, of rape by the complainant; (2) error in the exclusion of a statement proffered as evidence of the victim’s state of mind; and (3) insufficiency of the evidence to prove the reckless endangerment indictment based on “serious bodily injury.” The defendant also challenges her sentence, claiming that the judge may have been influenced by improper factors argued by the prosecutor. Because the application of the first complaint doctrine to a defendant in a rape prosecution is a question of first impression, we granted the defendant’s application for direct appellate review of all her claims. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the first complaint rule is a neutral rule of evidence that permits such testimony whenever the credibility of a sexual assault allegation is at issue. Although […]
Commonwealth v. Hernandez (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-132-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12089 COMMONWEALTH vs. AARON HERNANDEZ. Suffolk. May 3, 2016. – August 19, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.[1] Cellular Telephone. Search and Seizure, Warrant. Practice, Criminal, Warrant. Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on December 1, 2015. A petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, filed on March 29, 2016, was reported by Botsford, J. Teresa K. Anderson, Assistant District Attorney (Patrick M. Haggan & Janis DiLoreto Smith, Assistant District Attorneys, with her) for the Commonwealth. James L. Sultan (Charles W. Rankin with him) for the defendant. SPINA, J. In this case, here on a reservation and report from a single justice of the county court, we consider whether the Commonwealth, by means of an anticipatory search warrant, can obtain possession of a cellular telephone that the defendant, Aaron Hernandez, gave to his attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that, pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 1, a search warrant may issue for the seizure of the telephone because, absent such issuance, there is probable cause to believe that the telephone will be secreted from view.[2] Accordingly, we vacate the order of the Superior Court that reached a contrary conclusion. Background. On July 16, 2012, Daniel de Abreu and Safiro Furtado were murdered in an alleged drive-by shooting in the South End section of Boston. During the investigation of the crimes, Alexander Bradley stated that he witnessed the defendant shoot at five occupants of a 2003 BMW sedan on the date in question. He further stated that on February 13, 2013, while he and the defendant were on vacation together in Florida, the defendant shot him in the head. Bradley also indicated that, following this incident, he communicated with the defendant on multiple occasions between February 14, 2013, and June, 2013, either by calling the defendant or sending him text messages on his cellular telephone. During these conversations, Bradley threatened to sue the defendant and to publicly expose his violent behavior. Around June 16, 2013, the defendant purportedly delivered his cellular telephone to his attorney at Ropes & Gray LLP (Ropes & Gray) for the purpose of seeking legal advice on several matters.[3] On March […]
Commonwealth v. Brantley (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-105-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-44 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. SEAN BRANTLEY. August 18, 2016. Arrest. Constitutional Law, Arrest, Investigatory stop, Stop and frisk, Assistance of counsel, Search and seizure. Search and Seizure, Arrest, Inventory, Automobile. Name. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Required finding, Instructions to jury, New trial, Assistance of counsel. The defendant, Sean Brantley, appeals from the judgments after his convictions by a Superior Court jury of possession of cocaine and furnishing a false name to a law enforcement officer.[1] The defendant contends that (1) his motion to suppress evidence should have been allowed; (2) the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of furnishing a false name; (3) the jury instructions on furnishing a false name were incorrect; and (4) defense counsel was ineffective because he improperly conceded the defendant’s guilt to furnishing a false name. We discuss the facts where relevant. Motion to suppress. The defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence on the grounds that the search and seizure of the defendant and his vehicle were not based on reasonable suspicion or probable cause. After an evidentiary hearing, the motion judge denied the motion and made the following findings: “In this matter, Commonwealth vs. Sean Brantley, the court finds Sgt. Toledo credible. I credit his testimony in its entirety. I adopt his testimony as the court’s findings of fact. Based on those findings, I find that Sgt. Toledo ha[d] reasonable suspicions, based on specific and articulated facts, to stop the motor vehicle for its failure to stop for a stop sign. “I then find significantly that the officer on multiple occasions ordered the defendant to stop and that the defendant, in fact, fled from that particular location. “Consequently, I find that the search of his person was a valid search, incident to arrest, and that the inventory search was similarly valid, consistent with the written inventory policy of the Springfield Police Department.”[2] The defendant argues that he did not commit an arrestable offense and therefore the search could not be justified as a search incident to arrest. Here, the initial stop of the defendant’s vehicle was valid as a routine traffic stop. The stop was no longer routine once the defendant, after stopping, backed up the vehicle three to five feet in the direction […]
Commonwealth v. Daly (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-104-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 12-P-1811 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. PATRICK DALY. No. 12-P-1811. Norfolk. October 2, 2015. – August 18, 2016. Present: Katzmann, Grainger, & Maldonado, JJ. Animal. Dog. Constitutional Law, Vagueness of statute, Assistance of counsel. Due Process of Law, Vagueness of statute, Assistance of counsel. Evidence, Photograph. Practice, Criminal, Required finding, Instructions to jury, Assistance of counsel, New trial, Affirmative defense, Deliberation of jury. Defense of Others. Jury and Jurors. Complaint received and sworn to in the Quincy Division of the District Court Department on February 23, 2011. The case was tried before Diane E. Moriarty, J., and a motion for a new trial was heard by her. Danielle M. Wood for the defendant. Tracey A. Cusick, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. MALDONADO, J. The defendant appeals from a conviction of animal cruelty, following his jury trial in the Quincy District Court, and from the denial of his motion for a new trial after an evidentiary hearing. The defendant was sentenced to serve from two to two and one-half years in the house of correction, with one year committed and the balance suspended for three years with probation. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the judge (1) erred in denying his new trial motion challenging the constitutionality of the animal cruelty statute; (2) improperly excluded photographic and testimonial evidence of the animal’s aggressive behavior; (3) erroneously admitted an unduly prejudicial photograph of the deceased animal; (4) erred in denying his motion for a required finding; (5) incorrectly instructed the jury; and (6) erred in denying his new trial motion on the basis of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. We affirm. Background. The defendant was living in a duplex in Braintree with his then girl friend Joan Cummins, their four year old daughter, Jamie, and Cummins’s pet dog, a Chihuahua. The dog was fourteen years old and weighed approximately eight pounds. Cummins got him as a puppy for her now adult son. According to Cummins, the dog had been “snippy” since he was a puppy. Once, when Jaime was only eighteen months old, she was playing tug-of-war with the dog and he bit her face, requiring that she obtain stiches. As a result of this incident, Cummins agreed to crate the dog at night and whenever else […]
Commonwealth v. Cruz (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-103-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 11-P-1160 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. MIGUEL CRUZ. No. 11-P-1160. Suffolk. March 1, 2016. – August 18, 2016. Present: Cypher, Cohen, & Neyman, JJ. Controlled Substances. “School Zone” Statute. Practice, Criminal, New trial, Public trial, Assistance of counsel. Constitutional Law, Public trial, Assistance of counsel. Words, “Preschool.” Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on March 6, 2008. The cases were tried before Regina L. Quinlan, J., and a motion for a new trial, filed on August 22, 2012, was heard by Raymond J. Brassard, J. James E. Methe for the defendant. Matthew P. Landry, Assistant Attorney General, for the Commonwealth. CYPHER, J. Following a jury trial, the defendant, Miguel Cruz, was convicted of two counts of trafficking in cocaine, G. L. c. 94C, § 32E(b); two counts of distribution of cocaine, G. L. c. 94C, § 32A(c); and four counts of distributing drugs in a school zone, G. L. c. 94C, § 32J. On the defendant’s consolidated appeal from his convictions of the four school zone violations and the denial of his motion for a new trial, the primary issue is whether a child care facility that enrolls younger than school aged children can qualify as a “preschool” within the meaning of the school zone statute. Concluding that it does, and finding no merit in the defendant’s remaining claims, we affirm. Background. Taken in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence showed that, on four occasions between November 20, 2007, and December 12, 2007, the defendant sold cocaine to a police officer working undercover.[1] Three of the drug transactions occurred at a street address located approximately 259 feet from the parking lot of the East Boston YMCA, and a fourth transaction was conducted in a vehicle parked 173 feet and 4 inches from the same YMCA property.[2] A private, nonprofit social service organization, the East Boston YMCA operates within its building a health center, teen programs, and the East Boston Child Care Center (center). The center is licensed as a child care facility by the Massachusetts department of early education and care. It is also accredited by the National Association for the Education of Young Children, which assesses the center’s staffing levels and the educational capabilities of its teachers. Ninety-three children between the ages of fifteen months […]
MacLaurin, et al. v. City of Holyoke, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-130-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11865 SJC-11866 ROBERT MacLAURIN[1] & another[2] vs. CITY OF HOLYOKE & others.[3] ROBERT MacLAURIN[4] & another[5] vs. CITY OF HOLYOKE & others.[6] Hampden. September 10, 2015. – August 18, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.[7] Fire Prevention. Practice, Civil, Action in nature of certiorari. Administrative Law, Hearing. Civil actions commenced in the Hampden Division of the Superior Court Department on April 26, 2012, and May 14, 2012, respectively. After transfer to the Western Division of the Housing Court Department and consolidation, the case was heard by Robert Fields, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Thomas D. Moore for the plaintiffs. Kara Lamb Cunha for the defendants. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Jason R. Ferenc for Greater Holyoke Rental Housing Association Joseph N. Schneiderman for Fire Chiefs Association of Massachusetts. Maura Healey, Attorney General, Benjamin K. Golden, Assistant Attorney General, Steven P. Rourke, Special Assistant Attorney General, & Peter Senopoulos for the State Fire Marshal. LENK, J. We are called upon in these consolidated cases to construe G. L. c. 148, § 26I, the residential sprinkler provision, one of a number of provisions requiring the installation of automatic sprinkler systems contained in G. L. c. 148, the fire prevention act. The residential sprinkler provision mandates the installation of automatic sprinklers in new residential buildings of four or more units, and in such existing buildings when they are “substantially rehabilitated so as to constitute the equivalent of new construction.” See G. L. c. 148, § 26I. In 2006, the plaintiff, Robert MacLaurin,[8] purchased the second of two vacant apartment buildings in the city of Holyoke (city), which he intended to rehabilitate and return to occupancy. As existing residential buildings of four or more units, the buildings were subject to the residential sprinkler provision. MacLaurin contends that the renovations he undertook on the buildings do not meet the statutory standard triggering the requirement that sprinklers be installed. Concluding, to the contrary, that the two buildings had been substantially rehabilitated within the meaning of the residential sprinkler provision, the city’s fire chief ordered, without a hearing, that automatic sprinkler systems be installed in each building. The residential […]