Young v. Young (and a consolidated case) (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-152-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12240 DEREK L. YOUNG vs. JOY G. YOUNG (and a consolidated case[1]). Norfolk. March 6, 2017. – September 25, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ.[2] Divorce and Separation, Alimony, Findings. Complaints for divorce filed in the Norfolk Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on January 29 and February 5, 2013. After consolidation, the case was heard by Jennifer M.R. Ulwick, J. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. David H. Lee (Jessica M. Dubin also present) for the husband. David E. Cherny (Erin M. Shapiro also present) for the wife. Sanford Durland, III, & Glenn M. Schley, amici curiae, submitted a brief. Jennifer C. Roman & Johnathan P. Diggin, for Women’s Bar Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. GANTS, C.J. The Probate and Family Court judge in this divorce action made two rulings that are the primary subjects of this appeal. First, the judge found that, where the husband’s income from his employment was “on an upward trajectory,” the wife may only maintain a standard of living “consistent with the marital lifestyle (which was one where the parties[‘] needs expanded in accordance with the increasingly available income)” by an award of general term alimony that increases commensurate with the increase in the husband’s income. Second, the judge found that, because of “the complex nature of [the husband’s] compensation over and above his base salary and bonus,” and because of “the constantly shifting nature of [the husband’s] compensation,” “it is reasonable and fair in the circumstances” to award alimony to the wife in the amount of thirty-three per cent of the husband’s gross income, rather than a fixed amount. We conclude that, where the supporting spouse (here, the husband) has the ability to pay, the need for support of the recipient spouse (here, the wife) under general term alimony is the amount required to enable her to maintain the standard of living she had at the time of the separation leading to the divorce, not the amount required to enable her to maintain the standard of living she would have had in the future if the couple had not divorced. We also conclude that, although there might be circumstances where it […]
Commonwealth v. Tremblay (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-125-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-981 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. RANDALL TREMBLAY. No. 16-P-981. Suffolk. April 14, 2017. – September 25, 2017. Present: Trainor, Agnes, & Neyman, JJ. Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Waiver of constitutional rights, Search and seizure. Evidence, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Videotape, Intoxication. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Waiver, Findings by judge. Waiver. Intoxication. Search and Seizure, Clothing. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on March 10, 2015. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Kenneth W. Salinger, J. Applications for leave to prosecute interlocutory appeals were allowed by Geraldine S. Hines, J., and Robert J. Cordy, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk, and the appeals were reported by them to the Appeals Court. Zachary Hillman, Assistant District Attorney (Amy J. Galatis, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth. Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the defendant. AGNES, J. The defendant, Randall Tremblay, was arrested and subsequently indicted for the murder of Stephanie McMahon, based on statements he made to the police both at the scene and in two subsequent custodial interrogations, and blood discovered on his clothing, which the police seized when they arrested him. The defendant moved to suppress all statements he made to the police and all evidence seized from him. The judge conducted an evidentiary hearing, during which he heard testimony from three police officers and viewed a videotape recording of the second custodial interrogation of the defendant following his arrest on a warrant for an unrelated offense.[1] Based on the contents of that videotape recording, the judge concluded that the defendant was so intoxicated when he was questioned at the police station that he was incapable of making a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. As a result, the judge ruled that all of the statements made by the defendant at the police station must be suppressed. The judge also ruled that while the police lawfully seized the defendant’s clothing in order to preserve evidence of an apparent homicide, they acted unlawfully in subjecting the clothing to forensic testing without first obtaining a search warrant. Therefore, the judge made a further ruling that all forensic […]
Commonwealth v. O’Leary (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-123-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-557 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. RICHARD O’LEARY. No. 16-P-557. Norfolk. August 16, 2017. – September 22, 2017. Present: Green, Vuono, Meade, Agnes, & Desmond, JJ.[1] Motor Vehicle, Citation for violation of motor vehicle law, Operating under the influence. Practice, Criminal, Citation for violation of motor vehicle laws, Dismissal. Notice. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on September 23, 2014. A motion to dismiss was heard by Beverly J. Cannone, J. Pamela Alford, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Douglas T. Babcock for the defendant. GREEN, J. We are called upon again to consider the circumstances in which the failure to issue a citation at the scene of a motor vehicle infraction does not compel the dismissal of resulting criminal charges. The Commonwealth appeals from an order of the Superior Court, dismissing a multiple-count indictment against the defendant on the ground that the police failed to make a timely delivery of the citation pursuant to G. L. c. 90C, § 2.[2] For the reasons that follow, we reverse. Background. We summarize the judge’s findings of fact, which we accept absent clear error. On the night of April 19, 2014, the defendant was involved in a motor vehicle accident on Route 3 in Braintree. The Jeep Cherokee he was driving left the highway, hit an exit sign, and rolled over five times. State police Trooper Jared Gray responded to the accident scene. The defendant and a woman, Patricia Murphy, were covered in blood and broken glass. Gray observed the defendant and Murphy being treated by emergency personnel; both eventually were taken to South Shore Hospital by ambulance for treatment. Trooper Gray spoke to both the defendant and Murphy briefly before they were taken to the hospital; at that time, each claimed to have been a passenger in the vehicle. From his observations at the scene, Trooper Gray believed the parties had suffered serious injuries.[3] He followed the ambulances to the hospital. When he arrived at the emergency room, he left his citation book in his patrol vehicle. He spoke first with Murphy. She appeared to be intoxicated, but seemed to understand his questions. As she had done at the accident scene, she told Gray that she had been a passenger in the vehicle. Gray next spoke […]
A.S.R. v. A.K.A. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-124-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 17-P-1109 Appeals Court A.S.R. vs. A.K.A. No. 17-P-1109. Middlesex. November 15, 2016. – September 22 , 2017. Present: Trainor, Meade, & Hanlon, JJ. Civil Harassment. Harassment Prevention. Intent. Evidence, Intent. Criminal Harassment. Complaint for protection from harassment filed in the Cambridge Division of the District Court Department on May 27, 2015. A hearing to extend the harassment prevention order was had before James H. Wexler, J. Ruth O’Meara-Costello for the defendant. Martin F. Kane, II, & Joan E. Kolligian, for the plaintiff, submitted a brief. HANLON, J. After a hearing, a judge of the District Court extended a harassment prevention order, pursuant to G. L. c. 258E, against the defendant, A.K.A.[1] She appeals, arguing, among other things, that the judge failed to identify three acts as the basis for the order, failed to make findings supporting A.K.A.’s intent in contacting the plaintiff, A.S.R., and, based on A.S.R.’s testimony that he was not placed in fear of physical harm or property damage as a result of the contact, there was insufficient evidence to extend the order. Finally, she argues that, even if issuing the order was warranted under the statute, the order was unconstitutional because it penalized constitutionally protected speech. We affirm. Background. At the beginning of the extension hearing, the judge carefully reviewed A.S.R.’s initial affidavit and copies of various voice mail, text, and electronic mail (e-mail) messages admitted as an exhibit packet by agreement of the parties.[2] He then heard testimony from A.S.R. and A.K.A.; both were represented by counsel. The parties were in a dating relationship for a little more than one year until September, 2013. They continued to have contact until January, 2014, because A.S.R. “tried to help [A.K.A.] for a while,” but then A.S.R. cut off contact and “made it very clear that [he] didn’t want any contact from her.” Afterwards, A.K.A. began sending A.S.R. “lots of e-mails, phone calls, [and] appearing in person in an attempt to get [him] to resume contact in a way that made [him] feel very afraid and hurt and abused.” Although in March, 2014, A.S.R. threatened to obtain a restraining order, he resumed contact with A.K.A. for a short time in June, 2014, “in an attempt to make things right,” because she had sent him images of her […]
Commonwealth v. O’Donnell (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-122-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-1616 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. MICHAEL W. O’DONNELL. No. 15-P-1616. Bristol. February 14, 2017. – September 21, 2017. Present: Maldonado, Massing, & Henry, JJ. Search and Seizure, Expectation of privacy, Administrative inspection, Warrant. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Privacy. Practice, Criminal, Warrant, Sanitary code violation. Electricity. State Sanitary Code. Municipal Corporations, Building inspector. Complaint received and sworn to in the Taunton Division of the District Court Department on August 8, 2012. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Mary E. Heffernan, J., and the case was tried before Thomas L. Finigan, J. Jane D. Prince for the defendant. Yul-mi Cho, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. MALDONADO, J. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of fraudulent use of electricity, under G. L. c. 164, § 127. On appeal, the defendant contends that the motion judge erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence recovered during a search on his property conducted pursuant to the execution of an administrative inspection warrant. Because we conclude that the authorities exceeded the bounds of the administrative warrant in searching for and seizing evidence of a crime, we reverse. Background. The defendant, who was representing himself, filed a motion to suppress certain evidence. The motion judge first considered the four corners of the administrative warrant application and determined that the warrant was validly issued. The motion judge then heard testimony from Dennis Machado, the building commissioner for the town of Raynham (town), and Sergeant David LaPlante of the Raynham police, both of whom were present when the administrative warrant was executed. The motion judge made no findings of fact; however, consistent with his denial of the motion, we assume the judge credited the testimony of Machado and Sergeant LaPlante, see Commonwealth v. Houle, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 474, 475 (1993), and therefore, we recite the following facts from their testimony. The defendant had received citations from the town for keeping trash and “junk” on a property located at 320 Titicut Road. On July 31, 2012, Machado applied for and obtained an administrative warrant to inspect the property and ensure that it was in compliance with local by-laws and the Massachusetts Sanitary Code. Machado testified that he had been advised by the town’s attorney not to contact the owners of the property […]
Commonwealth v. Brown (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-151-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557- 1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11669 COMMONWEALTH vs. TIMOTHY BROWN. Middlesex. March 10, 2017. – September 20, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ.[1] Homicide. Felony-Murder Rule. Home Invasion. Robbery. Firearms. Joint Enterprise. Accessory and Principal. Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Instructions to jury, Argument by prosecutor, Opening statement, Jury and jurors, Voir dire, Presumptions and burden of proof. Evidence, Joint venturer, Prior misconduct. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on December 22, 2009. The cases were tried before Sandra L. Hamlin, J. David H. Mirsky for the defendant. Melissa Weisgold Johnsen, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. GAZIANO, J. We address, in this opinion, the scope of criminal liability under the common-law felony-murder rule. The charges stem from an attempted armed robbery and home invasion into a Lowell townhouse shared by Hector and Tony Delgado. Two armed gunmen fatally shot the brothers during the botched robbery. The defendant was not present at the scene. The Commonwealth alleged that the defendant was liable as an accomplice to felony-murder because he supplied one of the gunmen with a pistol and provided hooded sweatshirts to the intruders to help them conceal their identities. A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of two counts of felony-murder in the first degree based on the predicate felonies of an attempted commission of armed robbery, home invasion, unlawful possession of a firearm, and unlawful possession of ammunition. The defendant raises the following claims on appeal: (1) the Commonwealth failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove that he was a knowing participant in the felony-murders; (2) the judge provided erroneous instructions on shared intent and accomplice liability; (3) portions of the prosecutor’s opening statement and closing argument were improper; (4) the judge should have excluded prejudicial evidence of prior misconduct; (5) the judge asked improper voir dire questions of potential jurors; and (6) we should abolish the felony-murder rule. The defendant also asks us to order a new trial under our extraordinary authority pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. We conclude that the Commonwealth introduced sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant knowingly participated in the underlying felonies and, therefore, was an accomplice to felony-murder. We conclude also that the defendant’s other challenges do not raise error warranting reversal or a new […]
Commonwealth v. Gerhardt (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-150-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11967 COMMONWEALTH vs. THOMAS J. GERHARDT. Worcester. January 6, 2017. – September 19, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ.[1] Marijuana. Motor Vehicle, Operating under the influence. Evidence, Field sobriety test. Complaint received and sworn to in the Worcester Division of the District Court Department on April 24, 2013. A motion for a hearing to challenge the admissibility of certain evidence was heard by Andrew M. D’Angelo, J., and questions of law were reported by him to the Appeals Court. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Rebecca A. Jacobstein, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the defendant. Michelle R. King, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Steven S. Epstein & Marvin Cable, for National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. Michael A. Delsignore & Julie Gaudreau, for National College for DUI Defense, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. GAZIANO, J. In this case we are asked to consider the admissibility of field sobriety tests (FSTs) where a police officer suspects that a driver has been operating under the influence of marijuana. Police typically administer three FSTs — the “horizontal gaze nystagmus test,” the “walk and turn test” and the “one leg stand test” — during a motor vehicle stop in order to assess motorists suspected of operating under the influence of alcohol or other drugs. These tests were developed specifically to measure alcohol consumption, and there is wide-spread scientific agreement on the existence of a strong correlation between unsatisfactory performance and a blood alcohol level of at least .08%. By contrast, in considering whether a driver is operating under the influence of marijuana, there is as yet no scientific agreement on whether, and, if so, to what extent, these types of tests are indicative of marijuana intoxication. The research on the efficacy of FSTs to measure marijuana impairment has produced highly disparate results. Some studies have shown no correlation between inadequate performance on FSTs and the consumption of marijuana; other studies have shown some correlation with certain FSTs, but not with others; and yet other studies have shown a correlation with all of the most frequently used FSTs. In addition, other research indicates that less frequently used FSTs in the context of alcohol […]
Commonwealth v. Aldana (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-149-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557- 1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12258 COMMONWEALTH vs. MARC ALDANA. Worcester. March 7, 2017. – September 19, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ.[1] Destructive or Incendiary Device or Substance. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on December 20, 2013. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Daniel M. Wrenn, J., and the cases were heard by Richard T. Tucker, J. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Ethan C. Stiles for the defendant. Joseph A. Simmons, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. LENK, J. In the course of arresting the defendant at his apartment on a default warrant, Worcester police officers saw in his kitchen three bags containing unknown powders. One of the bags was labeled “aluminum powder,” another “red iron oxide,” and one bag was not labeled. An unidentified red-brown powder was spilled on the counter and the kitchen window sill, and smudged on the wall around the window. Concerned about the appearance of the bags of powder, given the other circumstances in the apartment, one of the officers undertook an Internet search for information on the labeled substances. On the basis of information derived from that search, a detective requested assistance from the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), the State police, and the local fire department. Representatives of these agencies arrived, seized the bags of powder, and removed them from the apartment. The defendant thereafter was indicted on two charges of possession of the ingredients to make an incendiary device or substance with the intent to do so, in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 102 (a), and a single charge of possession of an incendiary device or substance, in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 102 (c). After a jury-waived trial in the Superior Court, the defendant was convicted of both charges under G. L. c. 266, § 102 (a), and acquitted of the charge under G. L. c. 266, § 102 (c).[2] In this appeal, the defendant argues that the ingredients seized and observations made by police during the search of his apartment should have been suppressed, and that the evidence at trial was in any event insufficient to support his convictions. In the alternative, the defendant contends that his convictions are duplicative and that one must be […]
Perry, et al. v. Aiello, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-121-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-1309 Appeals Court SAMUEL D. PERRY & others,[1] trustees,[2] & another[3] vs. VIRGIL AIELLO & others.[4] No. 16-P-1309. Suffolk. May 3, 2017. – September 19, 2017. Present: Kinder, Henry, & Desmond, JJ. Easement. Way, Private. Real Property, Easement, Restrictions. Adverse Possession and Prescription. Practice, Civil, Injunctive relief. Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on June 11, 2013. The case was heard by Robert B. Foster, J. Diane C. Tillotson for the plaintiffs. Paul Needham for the defendants. HENRY, J. The trustees of the 63 Beacon Street and 64 Beacon Street, Boston, Massachusetts, Trusts for the Benefit of King’s Chapel (the King’s Chapel trustees); 66 Beacon Street, LLC (LLC); and the DeLuca defendants own abutting properties, and dispute the extent of the rights the DeLuca defendants have in a ten-foot wide passageway which runs between the King’s Chapel property on one side, and the DeLuca and LLC properties on the other side. A judge of the Land Court concluded that a 1947 agreement between the parties’ predecessors in interest is partially enforceable and limits the DeLuca defendants’ use of the portion of the passageway they do not own but over which they have a right of passage. The judge rejected the DeLuca defendants’ assertion that they have acquired by prescription the right to park on the passageway, but concluded that they may temporarily stop a truck in the passageway once per day to load trash and transport it off site. We affirm in part and reverse in part. Background. The DeLuca defendants own four lots in the Beacon Hill section of Boston at 7-17 Charles Street which, since before 1920, have housed DeLuca’s Market, a grocery and wine store. DeLuca’s Market is bounded by Charles Street to the west, Branch Street to the north, 65-66 Beacon Street (owned by the LLC) to the south, and the passageway to the east. Across the passageway is 63-64 Beacon Street, owned by the King’s Chapel trustees, which runs the full length of the passageway and abuts Branch Street to the north and Beacon Street to the south. The LLC property, 65-66 Beacon Street, is bounded by the DeLuca defendants’ property to the north, the passageway to the east, and Beacon Street to the south. The judge found and […]
Commonwealth v. Ormond O., a juvenile (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-120-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-840 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. ORMOND O., a juvenile. No. 16-P-840. Norfolk. February 7, 2017. – September 18, 2017. Present: Green, Meade, & Agnes, JJ. Delinquent Child. Controlled Substances. Joint Enterprise. Evidence, Constructive possession. Search and Seizure, Motor vehicle, Plain view. Practice, Criminal, Juvenile delinquency proceeding, Presumptions and burden of proof. Complaint received and sworn to in the Norfolk County Division of the Juvenile Court Department on April 6, 2015. The case was tried before Mary M. McCallum, J. Frank H. Spillane for the juvenile. Varsha Kukafka, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. MEADE, J. After a jury trial in the Juvenile Court, the juvenile was found delinquent by reason of possession of cocaine, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 34.[1] The judge imposed a sentence of six months of probation. On appeal, the juvenile claims there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We affirm. Background.[2] On April 4, 2015, Quincy police Detective Dennis Keenan was patrolling the “South Quincy/Penn Hill” area of Quincy in plain clothes and in an unmarked cruiser. Detective Keenan, a seven-year drug control unit veteran who had been involved in more than one thousand drug cases, had made arrests in that area. Around 5:45 P.M., Keenan witnessed Tyler Mauritson exit a blue Infiniti motor vehicle, registered to a Brockton woman, that was parked in front of 35 Nicholl Street, which is Mauritson’s home. Keenan, who was familiar with Mauritson, watched as Mauritson entered his residence. The Infiniti drove away and turned left onto Franklin Street, traveling into Braintree. The detective followed the car as it went left onto Hayward Street and then right onto Quincy Avenue, traveling south. While Keenan followed the Infiniti, he contacted Detective Michael Duran and requested that he speak to Mauritson and provide Keenan with an update. The Infiniti turned onto the Arborway, which is a residential way that ends at the Fore River with side streets that lead back to Quincy Avenue. Once the vehicle was on the Arborway, it began to slow down before it turned into a driveway located ten to fifteen houses down the street. The car then backed up, turned around, and traveled back on the same route it had just driven. While this was occurring, Keenan “tucked” his unmarked cruiser onto […]