Judge William Sullivan extended the seal on the Lindsay Clancy juror records on Wednesday, six days before the hearing at which Kevin Reddington will ask him for one of those records.
The coverage has treated the two things as the same question. They are not, and the statute Sullivan quoted says so in its own text. Nothing he ordered Wednesday decides what happens on September 29.
What the order does
Citing “significant and divisive attention in Massachusetts, nationally and internationally,” Sullivan ordered the confidential juror questionnaires to remain impounded and extended the order preventing release of the full list of jurors’ names.
The original impoundment ran two weeks from the September 4 mistrial. It now runs “until and unless otherwise ordered by the court.” The Boston Globe reports the seal reaches the names of everyone in the pool of potential jurors, not only those who were seated.
On the questionnaires, Sullivan wrote that the “Court concludes that there is a risk of immediate and irreparable injury should the (questionnaires) be made available to the public at this time,” and added that “said questionnaires do not constitute a public record” under Massachusetts law.
And one limit that matters as much as the seal: the order does not “preclude any juror from identifying himself or herself and/or from speaking to the public about his or her jury service.”
The line about public records is not a ruling
It is a quotation.
G.L. c. 234A, § 23 governs juror questionnaires, and the sentence is right there in the statute: “These completed questionnaires shall not constitute a public record.”
So the judge was not exercising discretion on that point. The Legislature decided it in advance. A member of the public who files a public records request for a Massachusetts juror questionnaire loses before the judge reads the request, in every case, in every county, regardless of how much attention the trial got.
What Sullivan exercised discretion over is the separate question of impoundment of the juror names, and the timing.
The sentences in the same statute that decide the September 29 motion
Read § 23 from the beginning and the answer to Reddington’s motion is visible in the first two sentences.
“Unless the court orders otherwise, the clerk of court or an assistant clerk shall provide copies of the appropriate completed questionnaires to the trial judge and counsel for use during voir dire. Except for disclosures made during voir dire or unless the court orders otherwise, the information inserted by jurors in the questionnaires shall be held in confidence by the court, the clerk or assistant clerk, the parties, trial counsel, and their authorized agents.”
Three things follow, and they are not intuitive.
Reddington has already read this questionnaire. Counsel receive the completed questionnaires for use during voir dire. That is how jury selection works. The document he is asking the court for is a document he lawfully possessed in July.
He had to give it back. The statute continues: “Upon completion of voir dire, the parties and their counsel shall return all copies of the completed questionnaire to the clerk or the assistant clerk.” All copies other than the judge’s and the clerk’s original “shall be destroyed as soon as practicable after the completion of voir dire.” The clerk keeps the originals “in a secure place … until final disposition of the case.”
The confidentiality obligation is addressed to the parties, and it bends when the court says so. The phrase “unless the court orders otherwise” appears twice in two sentences. The statute expressly contemplates a judge releasing this material to counsel outside voir dire.
Which means the thing standing between Reddington and that questionnaire is not c. 234A, § 23. It is whether he can justify the inquiry at all, which is a Fidler problem and a different argument entirely.
Public access and party access are separate doors
This is the distinction the coverage keeps collapsing, and it is basic to how impoundment works.
A court can seal a document from the world and hand it to counsel under a protective order in the same breath. It happens constantly. Impoundment restricts public availability. It does not define what a party to the case may obtain.
Sullivan’s stated reason confirms it. He found a risk of irreparable injury if the questionnaires “be made available to the public at this time.” That finding says nothing about giving one questionnaire to the lawyer who already read it, under an order not to disclose it further. If anything, a judge worried about public exposure has a reason to prefer exactly that route.
So Wednesday’s order is not a preview of a denial on September 29. It is a ruling on a question nobody has asked yet.
What the public can still claim
The federal constitutional interest here is real but narrower than people assume.
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984), recognized a First Amendment right of access to jury selection proceedings, and required that closure be supported by findings and be no broader than necessary. That case is about the proceeding, the questioning conducted in open court. Massachusetts voir dire in this case was public, and anyone could attend.
A written questionnaire collected under a statute that declares it not a public record is a different object. The public’s interest in it is weaker precisely because the Legislature substituted a confidential written instrument for questions that would otherwise be asked aloud, in exchange for candor.
That trade is the whole design. Jurors answer questions about mental health history, crime victimization, family members with addiction, and prior involvement with courts because they are told the answers stay confidential. A system that published them would get worse answers, which is a point defense lawyers usually make and which cuts against Reddington here.
The part of the order that is doing the most work
The carve-out.
Sullivan expressly declined to stop any juror from identifying himself or speaking publicly about his service. That is why this case has produced juror interviews, a named holdout, a lawyer speaking for him, and a fundraiser, all while the official record stays sealed.
The court is sealing the documents and leaving the people free. The result is an information environment in which the only accounts available are voluntary ones, from jurors who chose to talk, with no way for anyone to check them against the record. That is not an oversight in the order. It is what the First Amendment requires, because a court cannot gag a discharged juror from talking about his own jury service.
What to watch on September 29
- Whether Sullivan separates the two questions out loud. If he does, the impoundment order becomes irrelevant to the motion.
- Whether any relief is conditioned. Counsel-only review, attorneys’ eyes only, or in camera review by the judge alone are all available and all more likely than handing over a copy.
- Whether the juror’s lawyer is heard. He is not a party and has no filing, but a judge deciding what to do with one person’s questionnaire may want to hear from him.
- The Globe’s detail about the venire. Sealing the names of everyone in the jury pool, not just those seated, is a broader order than has been reported before and reaches people who never served.
Did the judge deny Reddington’s request for the juror questionnaire?
No. Wednesday’s order addresses public access. It extends impoundment of the juror names and keeps the questionnaires sealed from the public. The motion asking the court to release a questionnaire to counsel is scheduled to be heard September 29.
Are juror questionnaires public records in Massachusetts?
No. G.L. c. 234A, § 23 states that completed juror questionnaires “shall not constitute a public record.” That is a statutory rule, not a discretionary ruling by a judge.
Has Reddington seen the questionnaire before?
Section 23 provides that copies go to the trial judge and counsel for use during voir dire, so counsel for both sides had them during jury selection. The statute then requires counsel to return all copies to the clerk afterward, with copies destroyed.
Can a judge give a sealed questionnaire to a lawyer?
Yes. Section 23 twice says “unless the court orders otherwise,” and impoundment from the public does not determine what a party may receive, often under a protective order.
Can the jurors talk about the case?
Yes. The order expressly does not preclude any juror from identifying himself or herself or from speaking publicly about jury service.
How long does the seal last?
Until and unless otherwise ordered by the court. The original impoundment was for two weeks after the September 4 mistrial.
Judge Sullivan’s order and the quoted language, including the “significant and divisive attention” finding, the “risk of immediate and irreparable injury” conclusion and the carve-out permitting jurors to speak, from WCVB, September 23, 2026. The detail that the seal covers the names of everyone in the pool of potential jurors from the Boston Globe, September 23, 2026. Statutory text of G.L. c. 234A, § 23 read in full at malegislature.gov. Citation verified: Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984). We have not seen the order itself. Lindsay Clancy has pleaded not guilty and the mistrial leaves every charge unresolved. General information about Massachusetts law, not legal advice.