Latest: MISTRIAL: the emergency SJC petition and what it is really for
Twice in two days, Kevin Reddington has asked Judge William Sullivan to remove a juror from the Lindsay Clancy deliberations. Twice Sullivan has refused, and the second refusal produced a heated exchange in open court Friday morning.
There is still no verdict. The jury is in a seventh day, past 36 hours of deliberation.
Sullivan’s refusals are the most legally significant thing that has happened in this case since the trial ended, and they are not hesitation. Massachusetts law on removing a deliberating juror is unusually strict, and a 2019 SJC decision holds that getting this wrong requires reversal.
What the foreperson’s note said
At roughly 3:50 Thursday afternoon, the foreperson sent Sullivan a note. Not a third collective deadlock note, and not a note from the juror at issue.
Its reported content is that one juror “refuses to listen to the law that [Sullivan has] given him or her on reasonable doubt.”
That rendering is partly bracketed in the coverage, which means it is not a clean transcription. We have not obtained the note’s complete text, and the exact wording matters enormously here for reasons the law makes clear below. Treat it as a partial quote.
What followed was a sidebar that Clancy herself joined, reportedly for the first time in the trial.
Reddington, seeking removal: “The court has an instruction from the foreperson of that jury that’s been working for a week now saying that there’s one juror who refuses to listen to the law.” He warned: “If we come back here in a half an hour with a mistrial, it’s a shame.”
Prosecutor Jennifer Sprague, opposing removal: “There is no way to determine who in the deliberation room is correct.” And: “Nor should we attempt to, because that’s part of deliberations.”
Sullivan, declining: “I don’t feel that it is proper for me to side with one side or the other.” And: “I don’t feel it’s appropriate for me to say, ‘I agree with one juror or the 11.'”
He reread the reasonable doubt instruction and sent the jury back. They deliberated about 45 more minutes before being excused.
Friday: the second refusal
Reddington told reporters Thursday evening that there would be “an inquiry by the judge tomorrow at 9 o’clock,” adding, “I don’t know what his question is going to be yet.”
That was Reddington’s expectation, not an order from the bench. Sullivan had already declined to question the juror.
Friday morning he declined again:
“I see no need for the inquiry of this particular juror. That note does not indicate this is a person who has refused to follow the law.”
A second outlet renders the same ruling as: “In this case here, I see no showing of the need for an inquiry of this particular juror,” and the note “does not indicate that this is a person who has refused to follow the law.” The substance matches; the wording differs. Without a transcript, neither should be treated as the definitive quote.
Reddington escalated his theory. He argued the juror “has made a false statement under oath to this court,” that the juror had “looked you in the eye and lied” during jury selection, and that “there is one person who is refusing to apply the law to the facts determined for reasons not arising out of the case.” A defendant, he said, “is entitled to have a juror who is true to their oath.”
Sprague’s answer was that the jurors “have not indicated any lack of impartiality or inability to deliberate,” and that disagreement is what deliberation looks like.
Sullivan sided with the Commonwealth. Reddington accused him of “glossing over” the problem, and the exchange grew heated.
Separately, Reddington filed an emergency motion Friday morning asking for a standing order that “there will be no further side bars and this trial and all related proceedings will be handled in open court.” We could not confirm how Sullivan ruled on it.
Why the judge is almost certainly right
This is the part worth understanding, because Sullivan’s rulings look passive and are not. They track the case law closely enough to suggest he is reading from it.
The governing rule is that a deliberating juror may be discharged only for reasons personal to that juror, having nothing to do with the case or with the juror’s relationship to the other jurors. That comes from Commonwealth v. Connor, 392 Mass. 838 (1984), and it is still the law.
The Supreme Judicial Court restated it in Commonwealth v. Tiscione, 482 Mass. 485 (2019):
“The discharge of a deliberating juror is a sensitive undertaking and is fraught with potential for error. It is to be done only in special circumstances, and with special precautions.”
And then, on facts close to these, the SJC reversed a conviction:
“Thus, as ‘uncomfortable’ as the juror may have felt in the jury room, our law does not allow for the removal of a dissenting juror to resolve an impasse in deliberations… Here, reversal is required.”
That is the risk Sullivan is managing. Removing this juror would hand the defense a powerful appellate issue in the event of a conviction. Which is what makes Reddington’s position unusual: he is asking for the thing that would most likely get a conviction reversed.
The footnote that describes exactly what Sullivan did
Connor anticipated this scenario in a footnote:
“In most circumstances it may well be a mistake for the judge to conduct a personal interview with a juror, based on messages of alarm from the jury room. A more orthodox approach would be to decline to take at face value any message which does not describe difficulties which are personal to a juror, and to treat the problem as one of a deadlocked jury.”
And the sentence that goes directly to the foreperson’s note here:
“A juror’s mere assertion of inability to abide by his oath does not establish the ‘good cause’ required by the statute. Representations of the kind made in this case by the problem juror or the other jurors may be mere euphemisms for the truth: that the juror was persistent in asserting a minority position during deliberations.“
A note reporting that one juror will not accept the majority’s view of reasonable doubt is precisely the kind of message the SJC has said a judge should not take at face value.
Commonwealth v. Francis, 432 Mass. 353 (2000), states the concern plainly: a judge must scrutinize the reasons offered for discharging a juror “to ensure that a lone dissenting juror is not permitted to evade [the] responsibilities” of the oath, or to escape the stress of holding a minority position.
Even the questioning is constrained
Had Sullivan agreed to question the juror, the inquiry itself would have been hemmed in. Under Tiscione, “because the inquiry may well lead to a conclusion that the juror cannot be discharged, the judge must scrupulously avoid any questioning that may affect the juror’s judgment.”
Commonwealth v. Webster, 391 Mass. 271 (1984), adds that questioning “must be neutral and not coercive,” and that Massachusetts law does not permit inquiry into “the subjective mental processes of jurors, such as the reasons for their decisions.”
So a judge asking why a juror is holding out would be asking a question the law forbids. That is the box Sullivan is in, and the reason “I see no need for the inquiry” is a considered ruling rather than an evasion.
Reddington’s one viable theory
His strongest argument is the one he reached Friday: not that the juror disagrees, but that the juror lied during jury selection.
That theory has legal traction, because dishonesty at empanelment is a reason personal to the juror and unrelated to the merits, which is exactly what Connor requires. It is the one path around the bar.
The difficulty is proof. Connor requires that a juror’s inability appear “in the record as a demonstrable reality.” A foreperson’s note describing disagreement about reasonable doubt is not evidence that anyone lied in July, and establishing that it was would require the very inquiry the law discourages.
What has not happened
Worth stating plainly, because several of these have been reported loosely:
- No juror has been removed and no alternate has been seated at any point in deliberations.
- The juror has not been questioned about the holdout allegation. The individual questioning earlier this week concerned the woman arrested for allegedly filming jurors, a separate matter.
- Deliberations have not begun anew, which would be required under G.L. c. 234A, § 68 if an alternate were substituted. After 36 hours, that would be close to starting over.
- No mistrial has been declared or moved for, and we found no reporting of any partial verdict discussion.
On the reported 11 to 1 split
Several outlets have reported the jury is split 11 to 1. No such split has been confirmed in open court.
The figure appears to derive from Sullivan’s own phrasing, “I agree with one juror or the 11,” and from Reddington, who told the court Friday: “I have never seen a situation like this where a foreperson on the jury is so courageous as to speak on behalf of 11 jurors.”
Neither is a judicial finding about the numerical division. And nothing in the public record establishes which way any division runs. A single outlet has reported the juror is male; the note as rendered says “him or her,” which cuts against it.
Juries are not asked to disclose their divisions, and inferences drawn from a judge’s shorthand are not evidence.
If it ends in a mistrial
The jury received the Tuey-Rodriquez charge Wednesday after its second deadlock note. In Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 364 Mass. 87 (1973), the SJC noted the charge “has a sting” and cautioned that approving it “is not to be taken as an indication that it may be used prematurely or without evident cause.” It is the last lever short of discharge.
On partial verdicts, the constraint is firm. As the SJC restated in the Karen Read decision, a judge “is not required to accept a partial verdict before declaring a mistrial, and is prohibited from doing so on a single indictment that contains lesser included offenses.”
Each of Clancy’s three indictments charges first-degree murder with second-degree murder and manslaughter as lesser included offenses. So no partial verdict is possible within any single count. Across the three counts, separate indictments, one is theoretically available, though the judge is not obliged to take it.
A hung jury is the traditional example of the manifest necessity that permits a mistrial without barring retrial. The charges would remain and the Commonwealth could try the case again.
Connor also answers the cost argument Reddington pressed Thursday:
“Although a mistrial may be expensive in both human and monetary costs, it is not to be avoided by intrusion into the jury’s domain. The possibility that an unreasonably stubborn or eccentric juror will be seated is an unavoidable risk of the jury system.”
Common questions
Can a Massachusetts judge remove a juror for refusing to agree?
No. A deliberating juror may be discharged only for reasons personal to that juror, unrelated to the case or to relations with other jurors. In Commonwealth v. Tiscione the SJC held that removing a dissenting juror to break an impasse required reversal of the conviction.
Why won’t the judge even question the juror?
Because the questioning itself is constrained. A judge may not inquire into jurors’ reasons for their decisions, and must avoid anything that could affect a juror’s judgment. Commonwealth v. Connor advises judges not to take alarm notes from the jury room at face value and to treat the situation as a deadlock instead.
Is the jury really split 11 to 1?
No split has been confirmed in open court. The figure derives from the judge’s phrasing and from defense counsel’s remarks, not from a judicial finding. Nothing public establishes which way any division runs.
What happens if a juror is replaced with an alternate?
Under G.L. c. 234A, § 68 the reconstituted jury must begin its deliberations anew. After more than 36 hours, that would mean starting over.
Could the jury return a verdict on some counts only?
Not within a single count. A partial verdict is prohibited on an indictment containing lesser included offenses, and each of the three indictments carries second-degree murder and manslaughter as lesser includeds. Across the three separate indictments a partial verdict is theoretically possible, but the judge is not required to take one.
Courtroom quotations, the foreperson’s note, and deliberation status as reported by Boston.com and NBC10 Boston, September 3 and the morning of September 4, 2026; the note is rendered in part in brackets in the source and no complete text has been published. Legal standards from Commonwealth v. Connor, 392 Mass. 838 (1984); Commonwealth v. Tiscione, 482 Mass. 485 (2019); Commonwealth v. Francis, 432 Mass. 353 (2000); Commonwealth v. Webster, 391 Mass. 271 (1984); Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 364 Mass. 87 (1973); Commonwealth v. Roth, 437 Mass. 777 (2002); Daniels v. Commonwealth, 441 Mass. 1017 (2004); Read v. Commonwealth, SJC-13663 (2025); G.L. c. 234A, §§ 39, 68, and 68C; and Mass. R. Crim. P. 20(d)(3) and 27(b). Chapter 234 of the General Laws was repealed in 2016; pre-2016 standards remain applicable under c. 234A per Tiscione. The charges are unproven and Lindsay Clancy is presumed innocent. General legal information, not legal advice.