Commonwealth v. Buckley (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-029-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12344 COMMONWEALTH vs. ROGELIO R. BUCKLEY. Plymouth. October 5, 2017. – February 14, 2018. Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. Controlled Substances. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Reasonable suspicion, Investigatory stop. Search and Seizure, Threshold police inquiry, Reasonable suspicion, Consent, Motor vehicle. Threshold Police Inquiry. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on April 19, 2013. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Cornelius J. Moriarty, II, J., and the cases were tried before Richard J. Chin, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Matthew Malm for the defendant. Mary E. Lee, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Ivan Espinoza-Madrigal, of New York, Oren M. Sellstrom, & Oren N. Nimni for Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Economic Justice & others. Rebecca Kiley, Committee for Public Counsel Services, & Derege B. Demissie for Committee for Public Counsel Services & another. Jeff Goldman, Vanessa M. Brown, Matthew R. Segal, Rahsaan D. Hall, Jessie J. Rossman, & Carlton E. Williams for American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts. Daniel F. Conley, District Attorney, & John P. Zanini, Cailin M. Campbell, & David D. McGowan, Assistant District Attorneys, for District Attorney for the Suffolk District. CYPHER, J. In this appeal we are asked to reconsider one tenet of our search and seizure jurisprudence: that a traffic stop constitutes a “reasonable” “seizure” for purposes of art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights where a police officer has observed a traffic violation, notwithstanding the officer’s underlying motive for conducting the stop. See Commonwealth v. Santana, 420 Mass. 205 (1995). For the sound legal and practical reasons discussed below, we decline to depart from that tenet as the general standard governing the validity of traffic stops under art. 14. We affirm the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress, and we also affirm the judgment of conviction. Facts. We recount the facts found by the motion judge, supplemented by uncontroverted testimony at the motion hearing. Commonwealth v. Cordero, 477 Mass. 237, 238 (2017). On January 25, 2013, Whitman police Detectives Joseph Bombardier and Eric Campbell were conducting surveillance of a three-unit apartment building out of […]
Commonwealth v. Buckley (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-119-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-734 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, THIRD. No. 15-P-734. Berkshire. June 1, 2016. – September 8, 2016. Present: Katzmann, Meade, & Agnes, JJ. Restitution. Practice, Criminal, Restitution, Findings by judge. Larceny. Motor Vehicle, Theft. Negligence, Economic loss, Causation, Proximate cause, Intentional conduct. Proximate Cause. Intentional Conduct. Complaint received and sworn to in the Pittsfield Division of the District Court Department on July 15, 2014. A proceeding to determine restitution was had before William A. Rota, J. Matthew J. Koes for the defendant. Megan L. Rose, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. AGNES, J. Victims of crime have the right to request that the sentence in a criminal case include an order that the defendant pay restitution to make up for the economic loss they suffered as a result of the defendant’s criminal conduct.[1] “[T]he scope of restitution is limited to ‘loss or damage [that] is causally connected to the offense and bears a significant relationship to the offense.’”[2] Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 436 Mass. 829, 835 (2002), quoting from Glaubius v. State, 688 So. 2d 913, 915 (Fla. 1997). In the present case, the defendant, Thomas E. Buckley, III, pleaded guilty to one count of larceny of a motor vehicle in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 28(a). After a hearing, the judge ordered the defendant to pay restitution in the amount of $ 3,000 for the loss of the victim’s vehicle. On appeal, the defendant raises two issues relating to the restitution order: (1) whether intervening acts of negligence by third parties following the commission of the crime broke the causal chain and should relieve the defendant of the obligation to pay restitution; and (2) whether an agreement between the parties as to the approximate amount of economic loss is a sufficient basis upon which the judge may make an order of restitution. We answer the first question “no,” and the second question “yes.” Accordingly, we affirm. Background. The essential facts are not in dispute. On July 14, 2014, the defendant was in the parking lot of a grocery store when he took possession of the victim’s vehicle. The defendant claimed that someone had paid him to move a vehicle to an automobile wrecker, and he had mistakenly taken the defendant’s vehicle. The defendant drove the vehicle first […]