Butler v. Turco, et al. (and a companion case) (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-036-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReportersjc.state.ma.us 17-P-814 Appeals Court 17-P-968 BRIAN BUTLER vs. THOMAS A. TURCO & others[1] (and a companion case[2]). Nos. 17-P-814 & 17-P-968. Worcester. Suffolk. February 5, 2018. – March 30, 2018. Present: Meade, Sullivan, & Wendlandt, JJ. Imprisonment, Grievances. Commissioner of Correction. Constitutional Law, Imprisonment, Ex post facto law, Double jeopardy, Cruel and unusual punishment. Due Process of Law, Prison regulation. Practice, Civil, Dismissal. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on January 5, 2016. A motion to dismiss was heard by David Ricciardone, J. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 13, 2015. A motion to dismiss was heard by Paul D. Wilson, J. Brian Butler, pro se. Owen McCants, pro se. Sheryl F. Grant for the defendants. MEADE, J. The plaintiffs, Brian Butler and Owen McCants, inmates supervised by the Massachusetts Department of Correction (department) and housed at MCI-Norfolk, each brought actions pro se challenging the consequences imposed on them pursuant to the department’s “Program Engagement Strategy” (PES). The defendants filed motions to dismiss both complaints, which were allowed by two different judges. The plaintiffs appeal, alleging what we construe to be[3] various constitutional infirmities in the PES program. We consolidated the cases for hearing in this court, and now affirm. Background. PES program. In accordance with its mission to “promote public safety by managing offenders,” the department established “appropriate programming in preparation for [inmates’] successful reentry into the community,” such as the Sex Offender Treatment Program (SOTP). However, the department is unable to mandate participation in such programs. As a result, by 2012, a high percentage of offenders declined to attend recommended programs, spending their time in ways that did not address “the very issues that [would] decrease the likelihood that they recidivate.”[4] Nevertheless, these inmates enjoyed the same privileges as “program compliant” offenders, such as single rooms, housing seniority, and institutional jobs. In response, in December of 2013, the department announced it would implement PES, an incentivization structure for program participation.[5] Under PES, privileges are awarded as incentives for inmates who voluntarily participate in programs and are withdrawn from inmates who refuse. The department notified inmates about PES by amending its institutional procedures, hosting informational sessions for inmates, and creating informational flyers. PES went into effect on January […]
Commonwealth v. Butler (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-160-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 11-P-729 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. QUINCY BUTLER. No. 11-P-729. Suffolk. November 9, 2015. – November 4, 2016. Present: Cypher, Trainor, & Rubin, JJ. Homicide. Constitutional Law, Jury. Jury and Jurors. Practice, Criminal, Challenge to jurors, Jury and jurors, Capital case, Argument by prosecutor, Witness, Conduct of prosecutor. Evidence, Argument by prosecutor, Cross-examination, Credibility of witness. Witness, Cross-examination, Credibility. Perjury. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on May 4, 2004. The cases were tried before Patrick F. Brady, J. John M. Thompson for the defendant. Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney (Patrick M. Haggan, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the Commonwealth. CYPHER, J. The defendant, Quincy Butler, appeals from his convictions of murder in the second degree (G. L. c. 265, § 1), and eight related offenses.[1] The defendant was tried with a codefendant, William Wood, on a theory of joint venture for crimes committed in the course of a botched kidnapping and robbery attempt.[2] Wood was convicted of murder in the first degree and various other charges.[3] He appealed his convictions to the Supreme Judicial Court which found no reversible error and found no reason to reduce or reverse the conviction of murder in the first degree pursuant to its authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.[4] See Commonwealth v. Wood, 469 Mass. 266 (2014). On appeal, the defendant argues that he was deprived of equal protection and due process because the prosecutor engaged in racial and gender discrimination during jury empanelment. Specifically, he claims that the prosecutor attempted to select jurors who resembled the victim, a white female, and to avoid jurors who resembled the defendants, African American men. The defendant also argues several other issues, some of which were raised by Wood and reviewed and rejected by the Supreme Judicial Court in Wood, supra.[5] We affirm. The Supreme Judicial Court thoroughly explicated the facts of the case in Wood, supra. We will address relevant facts where necessary. Discussion. 1. Jury empanelment. “Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights proscribes the use of peremptory challenges ‘to exclude prospective jurors solely by virtue of their membership in, or affiliation with, particular, defined groupings in the community.’” Commonwealth v. Smith, 450 Mass. 395, 405 (2008), quoting from Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. […]
Commonwealth v. Butler (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-025-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1828 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. LAURA BUTLER. No. 13-P-1828. Suffolk. November 10, 2014. – March 19, 2015. Present: Kantrowitz, Graham, & Katzmann, JJ.[1] Practice, Criminal, Dismissal, Discovery, Disclosure of evidence. Evidence, Certificate of drug analysis, Disclosure of evidence. Controlled Substances. Complaint received and sworn to in the Central Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department on November 15, 2012. Entry of judgment dismissing the complaint was ordered by Raymond G. Dougan, Jr., J. Ryan A. Pavao (Donna Jalbert Patalano, Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the Commonwealth. Kathleen M. Kelly for the defendant. KATZMANN, J. This case is before us on an appeal by the Commonwealth from an order by a Boston Municipal Court judge sua sponte dismissing the drug distribution complaint without prejudice against the defendant, Laura Butler, on all counts and over the objection of the Commonwealth where the Commonwealth had not provided a certificate of drug analysis of the defendant’s prescription medication because no certificate had yet been created. We vacate the order of dismissal. Facts. On November 14, 2012, in the course of a police investigation of drug activity in the area of Haymarket and Government Center in Boston, the defendant was arrested after two police officers observed her providing nineteen prescription pills in exchange for twenty dollars; a prescription bottle obtained from the defendant’s purse had the defendant’s name on it and contained nine white oval tablets with the letters “G 13″ imprinted on them. On November 15, 2012, the Boston Municipal Court issued a criminal complaint against the defendant alleging two counts of distributing a class E controlled substance (gabapentin), and two counts of distributing a controlled substance near a school or park. The matter was originally scheduled for pretrial hearing on January 24, 2013, continued for pretrial hearing to April 12, 2013, and continued a second time for pretrial hearing to July 17, 2013. The reasons for the continuances do not appear on the record. The entirety of the July 17, 2013, pretrial hearing progressed as follows: The clerk: ”Matter of Laura Butler.” The court: ”What are you requesting today, [defense counsel]?” Defense counsel: ”Judge, I used the time to reach out to the D.A.’s office and they indicated they’re going to have to speak to [one of the other prosecutors], […]
Commonwealth v. Butler (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-053-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11073 COMMONWEALTH vs. REGINALD BUTLER. Suffolk. December 3, 2012. ‑ March 26, 2013. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Constitutional Law, Speedy trial, Delay in commencement of prosecution, Assistance of counsel. Practice, Criminal, Speedy trial, Delay in commencement of prosecution, Assistance of counsel. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on March 23, 1999. A motion for a new trial, filed on June 26, 2008, was heard by Margaret R. Hinkle, J. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. Michael J. Fellows for the defendant. Joseph M. Ditkoff, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. SPINA, J. This case presents the central questions for purposes of a defendant’s right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution or art. 11 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights: (1) when the speedy trial clock starts, and (2) whether the speedy trial clock “resumes” or “resets” when, after the right to a speedy trial attached, the Commonwealth dismisses charges and then reinstates the charges at a later date. We conclude, pursuant to art. 11 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, that (1) the speedy trial clock starts when a Massachusetts criminal complaint issues, and (2) the speedy trial clock “resumes” when the Commonwealth reinstates charges following dismissal. After the Appeals Court concluded that the delay in bringing the defendant to trial did not violate Mass. R. Crim. P. 36, 378 Mass. 909 (1979), and affirmed the defendant’s rape conviction, see Commonwealth v. Butler, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 658, 661, 667 (2007) (Butler I), the defendant filed a motion for a new trial alleging that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue to the Appeals Court that the defendant’s motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds should have been allowed under the speedy trial provisions of the State or Federal Constitutions. See id. at 659, n. 2. The motion for a new trial was denied, and the Appeals Court affirmed. See Commonwealth v. Butler, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 751, 759 (2011) (Butler II). We granted the defendant’s application for further appellate review. Like the Appeals Court, we conclude that the defendant was not denied the effective […]