Commonwealth v. Cooper (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-067-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-697 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. ROBERT F. COOPER. No. 16-P-697. Middlesex. March 8, 2017. – May 25, 2017. Present: Green, Wolohojian, & Sullivan, JJ. Controlled Substances. “School Zone” Statute. Words, “Accredited.” Complaint received and sworn to in the Cambridge Division of the District Court Department on March 29, 2012. The case was tried before Michelle B. Hogan, J. Kathleen A. Kelly for the defendant. Jason R. Chandler, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. GREEN, J. Among the challenges to his conviction of distribution of a class E substance in a school zone, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, §§ 32D(a) and 32J, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the pills seized at the time of his arrest were a class E substance (gabapentin), or that the school furnishing the basis for his school zone violation was an “accredited private preschool” within the meaning of § 32J. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the pills were a class E substance and, discerning no merit in his other claims of error as to that charge, affirm his conviction on the charge of distribution of a class E substance. However, we reject the Commonwealth’s contention that evidence that the preschool in question was licensed sufficed to establish that it was “accredited” within the meaning of the statute, and accordingly the defendant’s conviction of the school zone violation is reversed, the verdict is set aside, and judgment shall enter for the defendant on that charge. Background. We summarize the facts the jury could have found, reserving other details for discussion of the issues. On the morning of March 16, 2012, undercover Cambridge police Officer Janie Munro entered a fast food restaurant and made eye contact with the defendant; shortly thereafter, the two left the restaurant together. Munro told the defendant that she was looking to buy drugs, and the defendant asked if she was familiar with “Johnnies,” or Neurontins. The defendant explained that the pills were really called gabapentin, and that he had a prescription for that medication, with five refills remaining. During their conversation, the defendant displayed a prescription pill bottle from his backpack, though Munro was not able to read the label. As they ended their conversation, Munro and […]
Cooper v. Commonwealth (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-046-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12024 SCOTT COOPER vs. COMMONWEALTH. April 1, 2016. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Practice, Civil, Notice of appeal. Notice, Timeliness. Scott Cooper appeals from a judgment of the county court denying, without a hearing, Cooper’s petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, or for relief in the nature of mandamus. We affirm. In 2002, Cooper was convicted of forcible rape of a child and other offenses. His convictions were affirmed by the Appeals Court in an unpublished decision. Commonwealth v. Cooper, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 1110 (2007). In 2013, Cooper filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by a judge in the Superior Court (motion judge). He filed a late notice of appeal and was advised that he must file a motion for an extension of time to do so. He filed such a motion shortly thereafter, but apparently it was misplaced in the clerk’s office and was not acted on for over two months. Once it was found, the motion judge allowed the motion and gave him forty-five days to file his notice of appeal. Cooper did not file a new notice of appeal at that point, nor did he request that his original notice of appeal be deemed filed. The record has not been assembled, and no appeal has been docketed in the Appeals Court. It appears that Cooper discovered this when he filed a motion to file his brief late in the Appeals Court and was informed that he had no matter pending in that court. He wrote to the Chief Justice of the Trial Court seeking assistance. His request was forwarded to various court personnel, but no further action on his appeal was taken. Ultimately, Cooper filed his petition in the county court for relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, or for relief in the nature of mandamus pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 5. He subsequently filed a motion in the single justice session to transfer the matter to a single justice of the Appeals Court, stating that he was seeking only leave to file a late notice of appeal. The single justice denied all relief without a hearing. Cooper has filed a memorandum and appendix pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), which requires a petitioner seeking relief […]
Cooper v. Keto (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-083-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 12‑P‑770 Appeals Court LISETTE COOPER vs. ERIC KETO. No. 12‑P‑770. Middlesex. April 2, 2013. ‑ June 26, 2013. Present: Kantrowitz, Brown, & Kafker, JJ. Divorce and Separation, Separation agreement, Foreign judgment, Attorney’s fees. Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. Probate Court, Divorce, Findings by judge, Attorney’s fees. Practice, Civil, Contempt, Findings by judge, Attorney’s fees. Contract, Separation agreement, Offer and acceptance. Parent and Child. Contempt. Registration for enforcement of a foreign order of support in the Middlesex Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on October 22, 2010. A complaint for contempt was heard by Peter C. DiGangi, J. Theresa K. Capobianco for the defendant. John Foskett for the plaintiff. KAFKER, J. The central issue in this case is the correct interpretation of the college expenses provision of a marital separation agreement (agreement) incorporated into a California divorce judgment. We must also resolve choice of law issues, as the California divorce judgment was registered in Massachusetts pursuant to G. L. c. 209D, § 6-601. The defendant, Eric Keto (father), contends that he is not obligated to pay his share of the college expenses because they were not “agreed upon” as provided in the judgment. The plaintiff, Lisette Cooper (mother), contends that the father was properly held in contempt because the father was well aware of the child’s college plans, and the father’s current wife, a teacher at the child’s college preparatory school (prep school), assisted in the child’s college application process by writing a letter of recommendation in support of his successful early decision application. We conclude that the father is contractually bound by California law to pay his share of the college expenses, as his silence throughout the college application and admission process signifies his acceptance or acquiescence in these circumstances. However, the judgment was nonetheless not sufficiently clear and unequivocal to hold him in contempt under Massachusetts law. Background. 1. The marital separation agreement. After a two-day evidentiary hearing, a judge of the Probate and Family Court found that the mother and the father were divorced in California pursuant to a judgment of divorce dated September 6, 1995. The parties had one child, a son born in 1990. The judgment incorporated an agreement that included a section entitled “college expenses,” which provides: “At such time as [the child] […]