Commonwealth v. Pagan (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-088-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11714 COMMONWEALTH vs. JUAN PAGAN. Middlesex. January 6, 2015. – June 1, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Homicide. Evidence, Intent, Motive, Age. Intent. Mental Impairment. Practice, Criminal, Verdict, Lesser included offense, Instructions to jury. Malice. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on June 22, 2006. The case was tried before S. Jane Haggerty, J.; a motion to reduce the verdict was heard by her; and a motion for a new trial, filed on June 13, 2012, was also heard by her. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. John F. Palmer for Juan Pagan. Bethany Stevens, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Afton M. Templin, for Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. HINES, J. On July 24, 2007, a jury convicted the defendant, Juan Pagan, of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation. At trial, there was no dispute that the defendant, when he was sixteen years of age, stabbed Alex Castro Santos (victim) to death. His defense was that he was not guilty of murder because he had acted in self-defense and with a mental impairment, namely attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and depression, which when viewed in the context of his age, caused him to act reflexively and instinctively. One month following his conviction, the defendant filed a motion pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 25 (b) (2), 378 Mass. 896 (1979), to reduce the verdict to murder in the second degree, which the trial judge granted and from which the Commonwealth appeals. After he was resentenced, the defendant filed a notice of appeal. Subsequently, on June 13, 2012, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial in the Superior Court, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), arguing that the court room had been closed during jury empanelment in violation of his right to a public trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Following a hearing, a judge denied the motion.[1] The defendant thereafter filed a separate appeal from this order. The defendant’s direct appeal[2] and his appeal from the denial of his motion for a new trial were consolidated […]
Commonwealth v. Pagan (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-191-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11456 COMMONWEALTH vs. NOEL PAGAN. November 21, 2013. “School Zone” Statute. Statute, Emergency law, Retroactive application, Amendment. Due Process, Retroactive application of statute. On August 19, 2009, Marlborough police officers executed a search warrant at the defendant’s residence and discovered a quantity of cocaine and drug-dealing paraphernalia. The defendant’s residence was located approximately 700 feet from an accredited preschool facility. The next day, the defendant was charged by criminal complaint in the District Court with possession of a class B substance (cocaine) with intent to distribute, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (a); and committing this violation of § 32A (a) within 1,000 feet of a preschool facility, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32J, commonly known as a “school zone” violation. On August 2, 2012, the Governor signed into law St. 2012, c. 192, entitled “An Act relative to sentencing and improving law enforcement tools” (Crime Bill), which contained an emergency preamble that made it effective immediately on enactment. Section 30 of the Crime Bill amended G. L. c. 94C, § 32J, by reducing the radius of the school zone from 1,000 feet to 300 feet. On September 13, 2012, the defendant moved to dismiss the school zone violation, claiming that § 30 of the Crime Bill applies to all cases alleging a school zone violation that had not been adjudicated before August 2, 2012, and that his alleged violation occurred outside the amended school zone.[1] The judge initially allowed the defendant’s motion to dismiss but reconsidered his decision on motion of the Commonwealth and issued a new order denying the motion to dismiss. The judge later reported the following question to the Appeals Court: “Are violations of G. L. c. 94C[, § 32J,] that occur prior to August 2, 2012, the effective date of the Crime Bill, governed by the element of the cause in effect at the time of the offense or at the time of trial”? We allowed the defendant’s application for direct appellate review. The reported question is effectively the same as that asked in the case of Commonwealth v. Bradley, ante (2013), which we paired for oral argument with this case, and our answer is the same. Section 30 of St. 2012, c. 192, applies to all cases alleging a school zone violation for which a guilty plea had not been […]