Commonwealth v. Shea (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-069-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11412 COMMONWEALTH vs. DONNA SHEA. Norfolk. January 7, 2014. ‑ April 14, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Protective Order. Abuse Prevention. Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury, Contempt, Law of the case. Intent. Statute. Complaint received and sworn to in the Quincy Division of the District Court Department on May 11, 2010. The case was tried before Robert P. Ziemian, J. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Jin-Ho King for the defendant. Pamela Alford, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. GANTS, J. A District Court jury convicted the defendant, Donna Shea, of violating a protection order issued by a judge in New Hampshire, which is a crime under G. L. c. 209A, § 7.[1] The primary issue presented on appeal is whether the judge was correct in using Massachusetts law, rather than the law of New Hampshire, to instruct the jury regarding the intent required for a finding of a violation of the protection order. Given that G. L. c. 209A, § 5A, requires that a protection order issued by another jurisdiction be “enforced as if it were issued in the commonwealth,” we conclude that Massachusetts law governs the violation of such protection orders where the violation occurred in Massachusetts. We also conclude that no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice arose with regard to the instructions to the jury. Background. We briefly summarize the evidence at trial. The victim, Christine Frawley, is the widow of the defendant’s nephew.[2] The victim applied for a restraining order against the defendant from a court in New Hampshire, where the victim lived, because she “was in fear for [her] life and [her] children’s lives.” At the hearing on March 30, 2010, at which the defendant failed to appear despite receiving notice, the judge issued an order of protection on behalf of the victim against the defendant, which was effective until March 29, 2011. The protection order prohibited the defendant, among other things, from abusing the victim, having any contact with her, and coming within one hundred yards of her. The defendant was served with the protective order at her residence in Weymouth on April 5, 2010. Less than one month later, the defendant sought a temporary abuse […]
May v. SunTrust Mortgage, Inc. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-070-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11439 KENNETH D. MAY & another[1] vs. SUNTRUST MORTGAGE, INC. Suffolk. December 3, 2013. ‑ April 14, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Massachusetts Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure Act. Limitations, Statute of. Statute, Construction. Mortgage, Loan commitment. Contract, Rescission. Practice, Civil, Statute of limitations. Words, “Recoupment,” “Rescission.” Certification of a question of law to the Supreme Judicial Court by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts. Kenneth D. Quat for the plaintiffs. Nathalie K. Salomon for the defendant. Jeremiah Battle of New Jersey, & Stuart Rossman, for National Consumer Law Center, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. BOTSFORD, J. The Massachusetts Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure Act (MCCCDA), G. L. c. 140D, §§ 1- 35, governs the rights and duties of creditors and obligors (borrowers, or consumers) engaged in consumer credit transactions. One type of consumer credit transaction to which the MCCCDA applies is the refinancing of a consumer’s home where the consumer grants a mortgage to the creditor to secure the refinancing loan. Pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 1:03, as appearing in 382 Mass. 700 (1981), a judge in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts[2] has certified the following question: “May an obligor [borrower] who grants a mortgage in a consumer credit transaction rescind the transaction under the Massachusetts Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure Act, [G. L. c.] 140D, § 1 et seq. (the ‘MCCCDA’), defensively by way of common law recoupment after the expiration of the four year statute of limitations set forth in [§] 10 (f) of the MCCCDA?” For the reasons we discuss hereafter, we answer no to the question.[3] 1. Background. The essential background facts are undisputed by the parties. On October 7, 2005, Kenneth May and Valerie Corbin-May, the plaintiffs, refinanced their home in Brockton in a mortgage loan transaction with Summit Mortgage (Summit), for $ 300,000. The mortgage later was assigned to and is held currently by the defendant here, SunTrust Mortgage, Inc. (SunTrust).[4] On January 28, 2010, the plaintiffs, facing foreclosure, filed a petition under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq., in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts. In response, SunTrust filed a proof of claim alleging that the plaintiffs owed $ […]
Commonwealth v. Duncan (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-067-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11373 COMMONWEALTH vs. HEATHER M. DUNCAN. Essex. December 3, 2013. ‑ April 11, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Animal. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure. Search and Seizure, Emergency. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress. Complaint received and sworn to in the Lynn Division of the District Court Department on April 19, 2011. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Ellen Flatley, J., and a question of law was reported by her to the Appeals Court. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Paul C. Wagoner, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Travis J. Jacobs for the defendant. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Virginia F. Coleman for Animal Legal Defense Fund & others. Michael W. Morrissey, District Attorney, & Tracey A. Cusick, Assistant District Attorney, for the Attorney General & others. John M. Collins for Massachusetts Chiefs of Police Association, Inc. Carolyn C. Van Tine for Animal Control Officers Association of Massachusetts. Kate M. Fitzpatrick, of New York; Jonathan R. Lovvorn, Kimberly D. Ockene, & Aaron D. Green, of the District of Columbia, Elise VanKavage, of Utah; & Michael G. Bongiorno for Humane Society of the United States & another. Stacy Wolf & Jennifer H. Chin for American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. LENK, J. This case presents the question whether the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights extends to police action undertaken to render emergency assistance to animals.[1] After receiving a telephone call from the defendant’s neighbor, police entered the defendant’s front yard without a warrant and seized three dogs that had been left outside in severely inclement winter weather. Two of the dogs appeared to be dead, and one was extremely emaciated. The defendant was charged with three counts of animal cruelty under G. L. c. 272, § 77. A Superior Court judge granted the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless search but subsequently reported a question of law, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 34, as amended 442 Mass. 1501 (2004): “Does the ‘pure emergency’ exception to the warrant requirement extend […]
Sheehan v. Weaver, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-066-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11395 WILLIAM SHEEHAN vs. DAVID B. WEAVER & another.[1] Essex. December 2, 2013. ‑ April 10, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. State Building Code. Building. Strict Liability. Statute, Construction. Civil action commenced in the Northeast Division of the Housing Court Department on July 14, 2008. The case was tried before David D. Kerman, J., and a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial was heard by him. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Peter C. Kober for the defendants. Louis J. Muggeo (Stephen M. Zolotas with him) for the plaintiff. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: John F. Brosnan for Massachusetts Defense Lawyers Association. J. Michael Conley, Thomas R. Murphy, & Jeffrey Petrucelly for Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys. Carol A. Kelly for Property Casualty Insurers Association of America. Martin J. Rooney for Boston Housing Authority. DUFFLY, J. After spending an evening drinking with a friend, the plaintiff, William Sheehan, returned to his apartment on Rantoul Street in Beverly, which he rented from the defendants, Jean C. Weaver and David B. Weaver, the owner and manager of the property, respectively. Sheehan ascended an exterior staircase leading to an outer door on the second floor landing, where he leaned against the staircase guardrail. The guardrail broke, and Sheehan fell to the pavement below, suffering serious injuries as a result. Sheehan filed a complaint against the Weavers in the Housing Court. A jury found both parties negligent and apportioned to Sheehan forty per cent of the comparative negligence. The jury found also that, pursuant to G. L. c. 143, § 51 (§ 51), the Weavers were strictly liable for Sheehan’s injuries because they were caused by various violations of the State building code. Section 51 imposes strict liability on an owner, or other party, in control of “a place of assembly, theatre, special hall, public hall, factory, workshop, manufacturing establishment or building” for damages caused by a violation of “the provisions of [G. L. c. 143] and the state building code.” The Weavers filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial, arguing in part that § 51 did not apply in the circumstances. This motion was […]
Plourde v. Police Department of Lawrence (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-037-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13‑P‑650 Appeals Court RONALD PLOURDE vs. POLICE DEPARTMENT OF LAWRENCE. No. 13‑P‑650. Essex. January 7, 2014. ‑ April 9, 2014. Present: Katzmann, Fecteau, & Milkey, JJ. Massachusetts Wage Act. Governmental Immunity. Public Employment, Collective bargaining, Compensatory time. Employment. Contract, Employment, Collective bargaining contract. Labor, Collective bargaining, Failure to pay wages. Police, Collective bargaining, Compensation, Municipality’s liability. Municipal Corporations, Police, Governmental immunity, Special act. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on September 26, 2011. The case was heard by Robert A. Cornetta, J., on motions for summary judgment, and a motion for reconsideration was considered by him. Corinne Hood Greene for the plaintiff. Charles D. Boddy, Jr., City Attorney, for the defendant. Harold Lichten, for Professional Firefighters of Massachusetts, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. FECTEAU, J. The plaintiff, Ronald Plourde, a former captain of the Lawrence police department (department or defendant), appeals from the denial of his motion for summary judgment and the allowance of the department’s motion for summary judgment, by a judge in the Superior Court. The plaintiff had sued the city of Lawrence for the value of compensatory time that he had earned and accrued prior to being injured on duty in 2006. He retired due to his disability in 2010 without ever having returned to active duty. In granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the motion judge dismissed the plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract, breach of good faith and fair dealing, and a claim under G. L. c. 149, § 148, and G. L. c. 151 (collectively, Wage Act). Following the allowance of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, which the judge denied, confirming his previous ruling that the plaintiff’s Wage Act claim was barred by sovereign immunity and the provisions of St. 1990, c. 41 (Lawrence Act), which established financial conditions for Lawrence. Because sovereign immunity is inapplicable to this case and because the Lawrence Act cannot be read to negate the defendant’s obligations under the Wage Act, we reverse. 1. Background. The summary judgment records contain the following undisputed facts. The plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a police officer from 1985 through 2010. The plaintiff was promoted to captain in 2002 and remained in that position until he retired in […]
Harrington v. Costello, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-065-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11383 JOHN P. HARRINGTON vs. WILLIAM M. COSTELLO & another.[1] Norfolk. December 2, 2013. ‑ April 9, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Libel and Slander. Limitations, Statute of. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 1, 2010. A motion to dismiss was heard by Renée P. Dupuis, J. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. Frank L. McNamara, Jr., for the plaintiff. Ross A. Kimball for the defendants. BOTSFORD, J. This is a defamation action, before us on further appellate review. The plaintiff, John P. Harrington, and the two defendants, William M. Costello and John A. Perry, are Roman Catholic priests. Harrington claims that the defendants published, in the parish where Harrington was serving, a false and defamatory statement to the effect that a parishioner had accused Harrington of stalking her minor son, and that Harrington suffered substantial personal harm as a result. A judge of the Superior Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint on statute of limitations grounds. A divided panel of the Appeals Court affirmed. Harrington v. Costello, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 812 (2012). Harrington argues that under proper application of the so-called discovery rule, the statute of limitations is tolled until the plaintiff knows the identity of the defendant. He claims that here, although he knew that Costello and Perry had published the defamatory[2] stalking accusation in 2005, he reasonably could believe they were privileged or entitled to do so; and that he did not know that they were the proper defendants until he discovered, in November of 2007 (within the limitations period), that Costello, with Perry’s knowledge, had fabricated completely the defamatory stalking accusation. We agree with Harrington that under the discovery rule, knowledge of the identity of the defendant is necessary for a cause of action to accrue — in addition to knowledge of the harm for which recovery is sought and of the cause of that harm. In the case of defamation, however, the harm for which recovery is sought, at its core, is the publication of the defamatory material, and therefore it is knowledge of the publisher’s identity that is required; whether the publisher can claim a qualified or […]
Commonwealth v. Forbes (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-036-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 12‑P‑1712 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. JASON FORBES. No. 12‑P‑1712. Hampden. November 5, 2013. ‑ April 8, 2014. Present: Cypher, Brown, & Fecteau, JJ. Search and Seizure, Warrant, Affidavit, Probable cause. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure. Practice, Criminal, Warrant, Affidavit, Motion to suppress. Probable Cause. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on July 28, 2010. Pretrial motions to suppress evidence were heard by C. Jeffrey Kinder, J., and Cornelius J. Moriarty, II, J. An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal was allowed by Ralph D. Gants, J., and the appeal was reported by him to the Appeals Court. John M. Thompson (Vincent A. Bongiorni with him) for the defendant. Marcia B. Julian, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. CYPHER, J. In this interlocutory appeal, the defendant, Jason Forbes, seeks reversal of orders by two different judges in the Superior Court, one denying the defendant’s motion to suppress and the other denying the defendant’s request for a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (Franks). The defendant argues that the judge deciding the motion to suppress erred in concluding that a second search warrant affidavit established independent probable cause to search the defendant’s apartment. He further argues that the police’s exploitation of an improper search requires suppression of evidence in order to deter future police misconduct. We affirm. Background. The defendant was charged with trafficking in cocaine, distribution of a class D substance, a drug violation near a school or park, possession of a firearm without a firearm identification card, possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony, improper storage of a firearm, and two counts of assault and battery on a police officer. The defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence in which he also sought disclosure of the identity of an informant, and a Franks hearing regarding alleged police misconduct. On July 28, 2011, a Superior Court judge conducted a limited, in camera hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v. Amral, 407 Mass. 511 (1990). The judge denied the defendant’s request for a Franks hearing. A different Superior Court judge subsequently allowed that portion of the defendant’s motion seeking to suppress the evidence of a firearm but denied the motion with regard to the remaining evidence. A single […]
Commonwealth v. Johnston (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-063-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑09919 COMMONWEALTH vs. BRYAN R. JOHNSTON. Hampshire. December 6, 2013. ‑ April 8, 2014. Present: Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Homicide. Burglary. Firearms. Mental Impairment. Evidence, Field sobriety test, Admissions and confessions, Cross‑examination, Redirect examination, Hearsay, Relevancy and materiality. Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel, Admissions and confessions. Due Process of Law, Assistance of counsel. Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Assistance of counsel, Argument by prosecutor, Instructions to jury, Admissions and confessions, Opening statement, Hearsay, Conduct of prosecutor. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on January 19, 2005. The cases were tried before Bertha D. Josephson, J., and a motion for a new trial, filed on February 17, 2011, was considered by her. David J. Nathanson (Dan A. Horowitz with him) for the defendant. Steven Greenbaum, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. SPINA, J. The defendant was convicted of (1) murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder; (2) armed burglary; (3) possession of a large capacity firearm in the commission or attempted commission of a felony; and (4) possession of a large capacity firearm without a license. He filed a motion for a new trial that was denied without an evidentiary hearing. His appeal from the denial of his motion for a new trial has been consolidated with his direct appeal. The defendant asserts that the judge erred in several evidentiary rulings, that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to inadmissible evidence and by offering inadmissible evidence, that the prosecutor made improper closing argument, and that the judge gave erroneous instructions to the jury — particularly as to the issue of lack of criminal responsibility. We affirm the judgments of conviction and decline to reduce the degree of guilt or order a new trial pursuant to our power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 1. Background. a. The offenses. We summarize facts the jury could have found and reserve other details for discussion of particular issues. The defendant and the victim were members of a large circle of friends who had graduated from the same high school in June, 2000, and remained close. Both men attended a friend’s wedding in June, 2004. The defendant became drunk and told the victim’s girl friend that […]
Commonwealth v. Hearns (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-064-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11419 COMMONWEALTH vs. TIMOTHY HEARNS. Suffolk. January 7, 2014. ‑ April 8, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Search and Seizure, Electronic surveillance, Reasonable suspicion, Warrant, Affidavit. Eavesdropping. Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, Search and seizure, Reasonable suspicion, Waiver of constitutional rights. Practice, Criminal, Admissions and confessions, Interlocutory appeal, Motion to suppress, Warrant, Affidavit. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on September 28, 2010. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Maureen B. Hogan, J. An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal was allowed by Gants, J. in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by him. Daniel Beck for the defendant. Allison Callahan, Assistant District Attorney, (Mark Hallal, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the Commonwealth. CORDY, J. On September 27, 2010, a Suffolk County grand jury indicted the defendant, Timothy Hearns, for the May 8, 2010, murder of fourteen year old Jaewon Martin and wounding of fifteen year old Dejontre Bell, in the Jamaica Plain section of Boston.[1] The defendant was known to be associated with the H-Block gang (H-Block), which was engaged in a feud with the Heath Street gang (Heath Street), on whose turf the shooting took place. The Commonwealth believed that H-Block and Heath Street were highly organized and disciplined groups engaged in the supply and sale of illegal goods in adjoining neighborhoods in Boston, and that the murder was committed in connection with H-Block’s criminal activities. Consequently, during the course of the investigation, it sought to record conversations of those H-Block members whose involvement in the murder was suspected. A cooperating witness consented to the recording of his conversations with the defendant and other H-Block members, and subsequently recorded a conversation with the defendant in which he admitted to the killing. Although this recorded conversation ultimately took place in an automobile and not in a home, out of an abundance of caution the Commonwealth had obtained a warrant, as provided for in Commonwealth v. Blood, 400 Mass. 61, 77 (1987) (warrant required, pursuant to art. 14 of Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, for surreptitious recording of oral communication in private home even if it comes within “one-party consent” exception of G.L. c. 272, § 99 B […]
Bakwin v. Mardirosian, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-060-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11393 MICHAEL BAKWIN vs. ROBERT M. MARDIROSIAN & others.[1] Barnstable. December 3, 2013. ‑ April 2, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. Judgment. Practice, Civil, Judgment. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on February 13, 2007. The case was tried before Christopher A. Muse, J., and a motion for entry of judgment was heard by him. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Thomas J. Carey, Jr. (Michael A. Collora with him) for the plaintiff. Cynthia B. Hartman for the defendants. SPINA, J. The plaintiff in the civil action below, having prevailed on the merits of his claims in Superior Court, appealed the form of the judgment ordered by the trial judge with respect to the remedies granted against certain relief defendants[2] pursuant to the plaintiff’s claims under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), G. L. c. 109A. We granted the plaintiff’s application for direct appellate review, and we affirm in part and reverse in part. 1. Background. This case arises out of a thirty-year-old art theft in Berkshire County and the plaintiff’s eventual recovery of seven stolen paintings from the defendant, Robert M. Mardirosian, a Massachusetts attorney who had represented the suspected thief, David Colvin, prior to Colvin’s death in 1979. The facts surrounding the defendant’s botched attempts to profit from having found the paintings, and the circuitous path to their recovery, from Stockbridge, to London, to Geneva, and eventually back to the plaintiff, are set forth in detail in United States v. Mardirosian, 602 F.3d 1, 4, 5, 6 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 287 (2010). Suffice it to say, Robert Mardirosian was convicted by a jury in Federal court of one count of possessing, concealing, or storing the stolen paintings in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (2006). Id. at 4. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed both his conviction and his sentence of seven years in prison and three years of supervised release. Id. at 4, 6-7. Mardirosian also was ordered to pay a $ 100,000 fine and to return the paintings still in his possession. Id. at 7. The case before us arises not from this criminal prosecution, but from civil […]