Posts tagged "Shea"

Shea v. Cameron (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-016-18)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   16-P-1479                                       Appeals Court   SUSAN SHEA  vs.  MICHAEL CAMERON.     No. 16-P-1479.   Essex.     October 4, 2017. – February 9, 2018.   Present:  Agnes, Sacks, & Lemire, JJ.     Practice, Civil, Report, Summary judgment, Stipulation, Fraud.  Divorce and Separation, Annulment, Jurisdiction.  Probate Court, Divorce.  Jurisdiction, Divorce proceedings.  Fraud.  Emotional Distress.  Undue Influence.  Unjust Enrichment.       Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on July 24, 2014.   The case was heard by Timothy Q. Feeley, J., on a motion for summary judgment, and the case was reported by him to the Appeals Court.     John Taylor for the plaintiff. Mikalen E. Howe (Alan K. Posner also present) for the defendant.     LEMIRE, J.  This appeal concerns whether a defendant’s alleged fraudulent inducement to marry constitutes a valid civil cause of action.  The plaintiff, Susan Shea, and the defendant, Michael Cameron, were married before receiving a judgment of annulment which incorporated their joint stipulation of Cameron’s fraud.  Following the annulment, Shea filed a civil action relating to Cameron’s marriage fraud in Superior Court.  Cameron filed counterclaims alleging fraud by Shea regarding entry of the stipulation and annulment.  Cameron moved for summary judgment on all of Shea’s claims.  After granting Cameron’s motion for summary judgment, the judge reported his order to this court pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 64(a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1403 (1996), and stayed Cameron’s counterclaims.  We affirm. Background.  Shea began a consensual romantic relationship with Cameron in June, 2005.  By October, 2005, Cameron had moved into Shea’s home, and soon thereafter, the two became engaged.  Shea and Cameron married on September 22, 2007.  In 2010, Shea transferred title to her home from herself individually to Shea and Cameron as joint tenants and Cameron was added to the mortgage.  Over the course of their relationship, Shea and Cameron exchanged money, shared bank accounts, and worked together professionally. In 2011, Shea discovered that Cameron was having an affair and subsequently filed for divorce on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown.  On April 30, 2012, Shea withdrew her complaint for divorce and filed a complaint for annulment.  At a deposition related to the annulment proceeding, Cameron admitted to being “unable to love [Shea] very early in the marriage” and that he did not ever believe that Shea was his “one true love.” On June 7, 2013, Shea and […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - February 9, 2018 at 11:57 pm

Categories: News   Tags: , , , ,

Shea v. Federal National Mortgage Association, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-012-15)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   13-P-1630                                       Appeals Court   PAUL SHEA  vs.  FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION & others.[1] No. 13-P-1630.     February 18, 2015. Real Property, Mortgage.  Assignment.  Mortgage, Real estate, Assignment, Foreclosure.  Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss.      At issue is whether a judge properly dismissed[2] the plaintiff’s claims[3] attacking the validity of a mortgage foreclosure to which Eaton v. Federal Natl. Mort. Assn., 462 Mass. 569 (2012), does not apply.[4]  The plaintiff contends that the foreclosure was void because the mortgage was not validly assigned to OneWest Bank FSB (OneWest), the foreclosing mortgagee.  He argues that the assignment was invalid because (1) the assignor never held the underlying note, and (2) the assignment was not specifically authorized by the owner of the debt.[5]  We affirm.[6]   Background.[7]  The plaintiff (and another person who is not a party to this case) purchased the property at issue in April 2005.  In 2007, as part of a refinancing of the property, the plaintiff granted a mortgage to IndyMac Bank, FSB (IndyMac) to secure a loan in the amount of $ 281,600.  In pertinent part, the 2007 mortgage contained the following provisions.   The mortgage defines IndyMac, which is the owner of the debt, as the “Lender.”  The mortgage defines Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. (MERS), as “a separate corporation that is acting solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns.  MERS is the mortgagee under this Security Instrument” (emphasis in original).   A section entitled “TRANSFER OF RIGHTS IN THE PROPERTY” provides that the mortgage secures both the repayment of the loan and the borrower’s performance of covenants and agreements to the Lender.  That section continues as follows:   “Borrower does hereby mortgage, grant and convey to MERS (solely as nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns) and to the successors and assigns of MERS, with power of sale . . . .   . . .   “Borrower understands and agrees that MERS holds only legal title to the interests granted by Borrower in this Security Instrument, but, if necessary to comply with law or custom, MERS (as nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns) has the right:  to exercise any or all of those interests, including, but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the Property; and to take any action required of Lender including, but not limited to, releasing […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - February 18, 2015 at 10:48 pm

Categories: News   Tags: , , , , , , ,

Commonwealth v. Shea (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-069-14)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750;  (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us     SJC‑11412 COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DONNA SHEA.       Norfolk.     January 7, 2014.  ‑  April 14, 2014. Present:  Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ.     Protective Order.  Abuse Prevention.  Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury, Contempt, Law of the case.  Intent.  Statute.       Complaint received and sworn to in the Quincy Division of the District Court Department on May 11, 2010.   The case was tried before Robert P. Ziemian, J.   The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court.   Jin-Ho King for the defendant. Pamela Alford, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.         GANTS, J.  A District Court jury convicted the defendant, Donna Shea, of violating a protection order issued by a judge in New Hampshire, which is a crime under G. L. c. 209A, § 7.[1]  The primary issue presented on appeal is whether the judge was correct in using Massachusetts law, rather than the law of New Hampshire, to instruct the jury regarding the intent required for a finding of a violation of the protection order.  Given that G. L. c. 209A, § 5A, requires that a protection order issued by another jurisdiction be “enforced as if it were issued in the commonwealth,” we conclude that Massachusetts law governs the violation of such protection orders where the violation occurred in Massachusetts.  We also conclude that no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice arose with regard to the instructions to the jury. Background.  We briefly summarize the evidence at trial. The victim, Christine Frawley, is the widow of the defendant’s nephew.[2]  The victim applied for a restraining order against the defendant from a court in New Hampshire, where the victim lived, because she “was in fear for [her] life and [her] children’s lives.”  At the hearing on March 30, 2010, at which the defendant failed to appear despite receiving notice, the judge issued an order of protection on behalf of the victim against the defendant, which was effective until March 29, 2011.  The protection order prohibited the defendant, among other things, from abusing the victim, having any contact with her, and coming within one hundred yards of her.  The defendant was served with the protective order at her residence in Weymouth on April 5, 2010.     Less than one month later, the defendant sought a temporary abuse […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - April 14, 2014 at 9:03 pm

Categories: News   Tags: , , , ,