Chin v. Commonwealth (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-196-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11860 ALAN CHIN vs. COMMONWEALTH. December 10, 2015. Supreme Judicial Court, Appeal from order of single justice. Alan Chin appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying, without a hearing, his petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. A petition for Chin’s civil commitment as a sexually dangerous person is pending in the Superior Court. Chin waived his right to a probable cause hearing, assented to a finding of probable cause, and was temporarily committed to the Massachusetts Treatment Center for examination and diagnosis by two qualified examiners. The qualified examiners submitted their reports, and the Commonwealth petitioned for trial. Chin filed a motion in limine to preclude the Commonwealth from calling certain witnesses. The motion was denied. Chin’s G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition sought relief from that ruling. We affirm the judgment. Because Chin’s petition sought relief from an interlocutory ruling of the trial court, he is obligated to submit a record appendix and memorandum of law “set[ting] forth the reasons why review of the trial court decision cannot adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other available means.” S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001). Chin has filed a brief and record appendix, which we are treating as a memorandum pursuant to rule 2:21.[1] He has failed therein to carry his burden under the rule. If the witnesses’ testimony is improperly admitted against him, he can raise that issue on appeal from any adverse judgment, as the admissibility of a witness’s testimony is a matter routinely addressed in the ordinary appellate process. He can limit and challenge their testimony at trial as well, through the use of objections and cross-examination. Because Chin has these alternative remedies available to him, the single justice neither erred nor abused his discretion by denying extraordinary relief. Judgment affirmed. The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum of law. John S. Day for the petitioner. [1] We note that the record appendix is incomplete, as it fails to include the entire record before the single justice. In particular, it omits Chin’s memorandum in support of his G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition and the Commonwealth’s opposition. Full-text Opinions
Koll v. Edelstein (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-197-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11868 FRANK KOLL vs. RISA EDELSTEIN. December 10, 2015. Supreme Judicial Court, Appeal from order of single justice. Practice, Civil, Interlocutory appeal. The petitioner, Frank Koll (husband), appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying, without a hearing, his petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. We affirm. In the course of what appear to be very contentious divorce proceedings, the parties signed a stipulation that they would sell the marital home. After they were unable to agree on the details, a judge in the Probate and Family Court appointed a special master to sell the home as well as to oversee the removal of personal property from it as necessary for purposes of sale. Shortly thereafter, the husband filed a petition with a single justice of the Appeals Court pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 118, first par., seeking relief from the order appointing the special master and arguing that he is against the sale of the marital home because he “maintains significant personal and business equipment” there. The Appeals Court justice summarily denied the petition. The husband then filed his G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition in the county court, pressing the same arguments.[1] The case is now before us pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), which requires a showing that “review of the trial court decision cannot adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other available means.” S.J.C. Rule 2:21 (2). The husband has not made, and cannot make, such a showing. He has already sought interlocutory review of the trial judge’s rulings under G. L. c. 231, § 118, first par., and has been denied relief by a single justice of the Appeals Court. He is not entitled to any additional review at this juncture. See Iagatta v. Iagatta, 448 Mass. 1016 (2007); Greco v. Plymouth Sav. Bank, 423 Mass. 1019, 1019-1020 (1996). Furthermore, there is no reason why the husband cannot adequately obtain review of the judge’s order in a direct appeal from a final divorce judgment. He argues that selling the home will cause him irreparable harm because he relies on the home for both residential and commercial purposes. We note, however, that he has vacated the marital home, has been living in a […]
Brea v. Commonwealth (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-195-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11845 ELIS BREA vs. COMMONWEALTH. December 9, 2015. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts, Appeal from order of single justice. Practice, Criminal, Interlocutory appeal, Complaint, Dismissal. Elis Brea appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying, without a hearing, his petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. A complaint charging Brea with distribution of heroin and conspiracy to violate the drug laws issued in the District Court. Brea moved to dismiss the complaint prior to arraignment. A judge in the District Court denied the motion and ruled that there was probable cause to issue the complaint. Brea’s G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition sought relief from this ruling.[1] We affirm. The case is before us pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), which requires a petitioner seeking relief from an interlocutory ruling of the trial court to “set forth the reasons why review of the trial court decision cannot adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other available means.” Brea has not carried his burden under the rule. He argues that arraignment would appear on his criminal record regardless of the outcome of the case, causing harm that cannot be remedied on appeal. Cf. Commonwealth v. Humberto H., 466 Mass. 562, 575 (2013) (Juvenile Court judge has discretion to dismiss delinquency complaint before arraignment of juvenile). He further argues that, even if the charges are resolved favorably to him, sealing of his record would be an inadequate remedy because even a sealed record “can form a cloud of prosecution.” Commonwealth v. S.M.F., 40 Mass. App. Ct. 42, 46 (1996). These arguments are unavailing. “The denial of a motion to dismiss in a criminal case is not appealable until after trial, and we have indicated many times that G. L. c. 211, § 3, may not be used to circumvent that rule. Unless a single justice decides the matter on the merits or reserves and reports it to the full court, neither of which occurred here, a defendant cannot receive review under G. L. c. 211, § 3, from the denial of his motion to dismiss.” Jackson v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 1008, 1009 (2002), and cases cited. We have recognized “[a] very limited exception . . . where, before a trial […]
Commonwealth v. Johnson (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-185-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-1400 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. CAJOU JOHNSON. No. 14-P-1400. Essex. September 14, 2015. – December 9, 2015. Present: Green, Wolohojian, & Hanlon, JJ. Firearms. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Findings by judge. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Investigatory stop, Reasonable suspicion. Search and Seizure, Reasonable suspicion, Clothing. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on November 8, 2012. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Timothy Q. Feeley, J, and the cases were heard by Howard J. Whitehead, J. Patrick Levin for the defendant. Philip Anthony Mallard, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. WOLOHOJIAN, J. At issue is whether there was reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk the defendant, who did not match the particularized aspects of the descriptions provided by eyewitnesses who called 911 to report that there had been a shoot-out on a residential street. The defendant was, however, among the trees in a closed public park well after dark, close to the scene of the crime within minutes of its occurrence, wearing a “hoodie” pulled tightly around his face. In the circumstances presented, as described more fully below, we conclude that the seizure was reasonable and therefore there was no error in the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress.[1] Background. We recite the facts as found by the motion judge. “On October 19, 2012, the [Lynn police department (LPD)] received eight 911 calls within a four minute span of time, starting at 10:09 pm. Each of the calls related to a ‘shots fired’ incident on Harwood Street. Several reported hearing the shots fired, but reported no observations of the actual shooting. Those calls could not pinpoint the exact location of the shooting. As many as twelve discharges were reported, involving at least two different weapons. A caller from Harwood Street reported seeing people shooting on that street. He reported the people to include black and/or Spanish, with a shooter observed to run toward Common Street. A caller from 82 Harwood Street reported guys in her backyard shooting guns, but it appeared that her neighbor had actually made the observations. Another caller reported observing shots fired at 66 Harwood Street. He observed the shooter as being a black male, wearing a black jacket and red bandana, shooting at another black male, and then […]
Boston edvelopment Authority v. Pham, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-184-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-1734 Appeals Court BOSTON REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. JEFFREY PHAM & another.[1] No. 14-P-1734. Suffolk. October 1, 2015. – December 9, 2015. Present: Kafker, C.J., Katzmann, & Rubin, JJ. Housing. Redevelopment Authority. Deed. Real Property, Deed, Condominium. Condominiums, By-laws, Master deed. Practice, Civil, Findings by judge, Attorney’s fees. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on December 1, 2010. The case was heard by Bonnie H. MacLeod, J., and a motion for attorney’s fees and costs was heard by her. Edward S. Englander (Shannon F. Slaughter with him) for the plaintiff. James A. Schuh for Jeffrey Pham. KAFKER, C.J. In this case we must decide whether Jeffrey Pham violated affordable housing restrictions established by the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) that (1) required Pham to maintain his condominium unit as his principal residence, and (2) prohibited him from leasing his unit for business or investment purposes. As we discern no error in the Superior Court judge’s determination that Pham continued to occupy his condominium unit as his principal residence despite his extensive work-related travel, and that he did not violate any deed or other covenants when he took in a succession of roommates to share the space and defray the carrying costs of the unit, we affirm. 1. Background.[2] a. 2007 purchase of affordable housing unit. Having won a housing lottery and been approved by the BRA, on June 1, 2007, Jeffrey Pham purchased unit 413, a two-bedroom affordable condominium unit at 2400 Beacon Street in the Chestnut Hill section of Boston (unit or premises). His application stated that his sister, a college student, would live in the unit with him. Pham signed a number of documents relative to his purchase of the unit, including the unit deed, a deed rider covenant for affordable housing (covenant), a note, and a mortgage identifying the BRA as the mortgagee. In addition, recorded with the unit deed is an affirmation signed by Pham accepting the unit deed and agreeing to its provisions along with the provisions of the master deed and declaration of trust,[3] including the by-laws and rules and regulations adopted by the trustees of the condominium. Both as part of his application and yearly thereafter, Pham executed an affidavit averring that he occupied the unit as his principal residence. The purpose of the covenant, […]
Sliney v. Previte, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-194-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11844 ROSANNE SLINEY vs. DOMENIC A. PREVITE, JR., & others.[1] Middlesex. October 8, 2015. – December 9, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Child Abuse. Limitations, Statute of. Due Process of Law, Child abuse, Statute of limitations, Retroactive application of statute. Practice, Civil, Statute of limitations. Statute, Retroactive application. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on January 30, 2012. The case was heard by Thomas R. Murtagh, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. Carmen L. Durso (Mark F. Itzkowitz with him) for the plaintiff. Sylvia Katsenes for the defendant. Marci A. Hamilton, of Pennsylvania, & Erin K. Olson, for National Center for Victims of Crime & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. BOTSFORD, J. Until June, 2014, civil actions alleging sexual abuse of a minor, which may be brought pursuant to G. L. c. 260, § 4C (§ 4C), were governed by a three-year statute of limitations. G. L. c. 260, § 4C, as amended through St. 2011, c. 178, § 19. Section 4C was amended effective June 26, 2014, to extend the limitations period from three years to thirty-five years; the amending act contained a retroactivity provision, and an emergency preamble. St. 2014, c. 145, §§ 5, 8. The plaintiff, Rosanne Sliney, filed an action in 2012 alleging that her uncle, the defendant Domenic A. Previte, Jr., had sexually abused her between 1968 and 1977, when she was a child. Judgment entered in the Superior Court in June, 2012, dismissing the complaint on statute of limitations grounds. We consider here two questions: whether, in the circumstances presented, § 4C’s extended statute of limitations applies to the plaintiff’s case, and, if so, whether the retroactive application is constitutional. We answer both questions yes and, as a consequence, vacate the Superior Court judgment.[2] Background. 1. Factual background. In the Superior Court, this case was decided on Previte’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (c), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). We recite here the facts alleged in Sliney’s complaint and for purposes of this appeal we assume the facts to be true. Jarosz v. Palmer, 436 Mass. 526, 529-530 (2002) (motion for judgment on […]
Commonwealth v. Coutu (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-183-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 08-P-986 Appeals Court 13-P-1363 COMMONWEALTH vs. DAVID COUTU. Nos. 08-P-986 & 13-P-1363. Middlesex. September 17, 2015. – December 8, 2015. Present: Katzmann, Meade, & Rubin, JJ. Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon. Burning of Property. Attempt. Evidence, Identification, Scientific test. Practice, Criminal, Failure to object, Identification of defendant in courtroom, Argument by prosecutor, Instructions to jury, New trial, Assistance of counsel, Collateral estoppel, Postconviction relief. Collateral Estoppel. Deoxyribonucleic Acid. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on March 23 and August 15, 2006. The cases were tried before S. Jane Haggerty, J., and motions for a new trial, for postconviction discovery, and for reconsideration, filed on April 26, 2012, June 7, 2012, and June 23, 2014, respectively, were heard by her. Amy M. Belger for the defendant. Randall F. Maas & Bethany Stevens, Assistant District Attorneys, for the Commonwealth. MEADE, J. After a jury trial in 2007, the defendant was convicted of aggravated rape, home invasion, mayhem, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing serious bodily injury, armed robbery, kidnapping, and attempt to burn personal property. The events leading to these convictions occurred in 2006, when the defendant, a stranger to the victim, broke into her apartment by tunneling through the wall with a crowbar, and then beat and raped the victim with the crowbar before burning a box of items. On appeal, the defendant claims the judge improperly permitted the victim to testify that she recognized the defendant by his “energy,” the prosecutor’s closing argument was improper, the judge erred in her jury instruction on identification, the evidence was insufficient to support the attempt to burn personal property conviction, the convictions of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing serious bodily injury and mayhem were duplicative, and the judge abused her discretion by denying the defendant’s second motion for new trial based on a claim of ineffective assistance and newly discovered evidence. We reverse the convictions of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing serious bodily injury and of attempt to burn personal property, affirm the remaining judgments of conviction, and remand the case for resentencing. We affirm the order denying the second motion for new trial. In a separate appeal, the Commonwealth claims error in […]
Commonwealth v. Hardin (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-182-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-1470 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. JAMES C. HARDIN. No. 14-P-1470. Suffolk. September 10, 2015. – December 7, 2015. Present: Green, Rubin, & Hanlon, JJ. Breaking and Entering. Larceny. Practice, Criminal, Complaint, Dismissal, Appeal by Commonwealth. Jurisdiction. Complaint received and sworn to in the Roxbury Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department on March 19, 2014. Dismissal of two counts of the complaint was ordered by Franco J. Gobourne, J. Zachary Hillman, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Timothy St. Lawrence for the defendant. GREEN, J. The Commonwealth and the defendant agree that the grounds on which a judge of the Boston Municipal Court dismissed two counts of the complaint against the defendant were invalid.[1] The defendant nonetheless contends that the dismissal should be affirmed, based on his claim (raised for the first time in his appellate brief) that the complaint was deficient on its face. To be specific, the defendant observes that the complaint failed to specify that the vehicles into which the defendant broke and entered, and the property he stole, were owned by someone other than the defendant.[2] Since an element of the crime of breaking and entering is that the defendant broke into property “owned by someone other than the defendant,” Commonwealth v. Kalinowski, 360 Mass. 682, 684 (1971), and an element of the crime of larceny is that “the property stolen must be ‘the property of another,’” Commonwealth v. Souza, 397 Mass. 236, 238 (1986), quoting from G. L. c. 266, § 30(1) (1984 ed.), the defendant suggests that the order of dismissal was appropriate. We decline to affirm dismissal on the alternative ground now raised by the defendant, and remand the matter to the Boston Municipal Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. To be sure, “[a]n appellate court is free to affirm a ruling on grounds different from those relied on by the [trial court] judge if the correct or preferred basis for affirmance is supported by the record.” Commonwealth v. Va Meng Joe, 425 Mass. 99, 102 (1997). However, we are not required to do so, and we decline in the present circumstances to exercise our discretion to consider in the first instance the alternative ground now suggested by the defendant. Put simply, we see no benefit in the interest either of justice or of judicial economy […]
Commonwealth v. Tejeda (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-193-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11858 COMMONWEALTH vs. ROBINSON TEJEDA. Suffolk. September 10, 2015. – December 2, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Homicide. Felony-Murder Rule. Joint Enterprise. Robbery. Home Invasion. Practice, Criminal, Required finding, Motion for a required finding. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on April 27, 2012. The cases were tried before Janet L. Sanders, J., and a motion for a required finding of not guilty was heard by her. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Dana Alan Curhan (Robert S. Sinsheimer with him) for the defendant. Vincent J. DeMore, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. GANTS, C.J. The primary issue in this appeal is whether a defendant who joins with others to commit an armed robbery may be found guilty of murder on the theory of felony-murder for the killing of his accomplice by someone resisting the armed robbery. We conclude that he may not. Background. We recite the facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving certain details for our analysis of the issues raised on appeal. On January 14, 2012, the defendant and two friends, Christopher Pichardo and Stephane Etienne, met with Frederick Reynoso, who was to sell them one-half pound of marijuana for $ 2,200. Together, they traveled in a vehicle the defendant had borrowed from his girl friend to a residence in the Dorchester section of Boston, where the transaction was to take place. Pichardo, Etienne, and Reynoso entered the home through a basement door; the defendant remained outside in the parked vehicle. Reynoso’s cousin, Jonathan Santiago, was waiting for them in the basement. Once inside, Santiago weighed the marijuana, placed it into eight one-ounce bags, and handed the bags to Pichardo. Pichardo told Santiago that Etienne would pay him for the marijuana. Etienne dropped his cellular telephone to distract Santiago, and Pichardo then pulled out a .40 caliber semiautomatic handgun from his waistband and told Santiago, “You know what time it is.” Reynoso responded by pulling out his own .32 caliber revolver, and a gun battle between Pichardo and Reynoso followed in which shots were fired from both weapons. A bullet struck Pichardo on the right side of his chest. Etienne and Pichardo attempted to […]
Union, et al. v. Bloomberg, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-181-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-1719 Appeals Court LAURI UNION & another[1] vs. SAMUEL BLOOMBERG & others,[2] trustees.[3] No. 14-P-1719. Norfolk. October 19, 2015. – December 2, 2015. Present: Berry, Green, & Blake, JJ. Contract, Settlement agreement. Condominiums, Common area, Management of trust. Real Property, Condominium. Damages, Attorney’s fees. Practice, Civil, Attorney’s fees, Trustee of condominium management trust. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on July 7, 2009. The case was heard by Patrick F. Brady, J., on a motion for summary judgment, and a motion for attorney’s fees and costs was heard by him. Thomas O. Moriarty for the defendants. Arthur P. Kreiger for the plaintiffs. BERRY, J. This action concerns a settlement agreement between a condominium trust, among others, and the owners of property that abuts the condominium. The defendants, trustees of the Longyear at Fisher Hill Condominium Trust (collectively, the trust), appeal from summary judgment entered in favor of the plaintiffs, Lauri Union and Stanley Rosenzweig, whereby a Superior Court judge ruled that the settlement agreement obligated the trust to plant and to maintain a number of trees between the condominium buildings and the plaintiffs’ property.[4] On appeal, the trust claims that the settlement agreement is invalid because it violates certain provisions of the condominium statute, see G. L. c. 183A, §§ 1-23, and that the attorney’s fees awarded by the judge pursuant to the settlement agreement are excessive. We affirm. Background. The undisputed facts relevant to this appeal are taken from the parties’ joint statement of material facts, which we supplement somewhat, from the record. In 1999, Longyear Properties, LLC (Longyear), the condominium declarant and developer, began construction of four condominium buildings on an eight-acre parcel in Brookline (town), pursuant to a special permit issued by the town board of appeals (the board). CCCT, Inc. (CCCT), was established by Longyear as the initial condominium trustee, pursuant to a June 28, 1999, declaration of trust, recorded in the Norfolk County registry of deeds. Robert S. Roth and John J. Sullivan controlled both Longyear and CCCT. The plaintiffs own property across the street from two of the condominium buildings, referred to as buildings C and D. After completion of the first two buildings in the development, Longyear began construction on building C. The plaintiffs claimed that the location of building C was closer to […]