Commonwealth v. Dame (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-010-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11683 SJC-11937 COMMONWEALTH vs. RONALD C. DAME. Worcester. November 6, 2015. – February 3, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Cordy, Botsford, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Homicide. Constitutional Law, Delay in commencement of prosecution, Search and seizure, Probable cause. Due Process of Law, Delay in commencement of prosecution. Deoxyribonucleic Acid. Probable Cause. Search and Seizure, Motor vehicle, Probable cause. Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Indictment, Delay in commencement of prosecution, Motion to suppress, Harmless error, Execution of sentence, Sentence. Error, Harmless. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on November 20, 2006. A motion to dismiss was heard by James R. Lemire, J.; a pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Peter W. Agnes, Jr., J.; and the case was tried before Richard T. Tucker, J. A motion for a stay of sentence filed in the Supreme Judicial Court was referred to Spina, J., and was considered by him. Theodore F. Riordan (Deborah Bates Riordan with him) for the defendant. Donna-Marie Haran, Assistant District Attorney, the Commonwealth. CORDY, J. Clara Provost (victim) was brutally murdered in the bedroom of her apartment sometime after 10:30 P.M. on January 6 or early in the morning hours of January 7, 1974. The subsequent police investigation focused on several potential suspects. A year of investigation produced a circumstantial but not very strong case against the defendant, including a brief prior dating relationship with the victim that apparently ended badly; a flawed alibi; fresh scratches on his face; and a handprint on the outside of the door through which the murderer forced entry into the apartment.[1] No one was indicted for the murder, and the investigation became largely dormant.[2] During the murder investigation in 1974, however, tissue was taken from under the fingernails of both hands of the victim and preserved. More than twenty-five years later, analysis of this evidence proved decisive in the decision to prosecute the case. As increasingly advanced methods of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis became more reliable, accurate, and accepted as evidence admissible in Massachusetts proceedings, Commonwealth v. Vao Sok, 425 Mass. 787, 789 (1997) (finding reliable and approving polymerase chain reaction analysis), a new era of investigation commenced. The samples that had been preserved were analyzed and swabs were taken from the previously identified potential suspects. The analysis identified […]
Commonwealth v. Morales (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-011-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11867 COMMONWEALTH vs. NELSON MORALES. February 3, 2016. Bail. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. This case is before us on a reservation and report from a single justice of the county court. It concerns a court’s authority to revoke a defendant’s bail pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58, where the defendant who was “on release” defaulted by failing to appear in court and later was charged with committing a new crime. A judge in the Boston Municipal Court concluded that a defendant in these circumstances is no longer “on release” and denied the Commonwealth’s motion to revoke his bail. The same question is raised in two other cases, Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 473 Mass. (2016), and Commonwealth v. Jaiman, 473 Mass. (2016), which we also decide today. Because we hold that the judge had the authority under § 58 to revoke the defendant’s bail, we reverse. Background. On August 22, 2014, the defendant was arraigned in the Boston Municipal Court on the charge of larceny of property over $ 250, in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 30. The court gave the defendant the bail revocation warning pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58, and released him on personal recognizance. At a subsequent pretrial hearing, the defendant failed to appear. The court found him in default and issued a default warrant. That warrant was still outstanding when the defendant was charged with committing a new crime in April, 2015. At his arraignment on the new charge — assault and battery of a family or household member, G. L. c. 265, § 13M (a)– the Commonwealth filed a motion to revoke the defendant’s bail or recognizance in the larceny matter pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58. The Commonwealth also requested bail in the new assault and battery matter. A judge of the Boston Municipal Court denied the Commonwealth’s motion on the ground that the defendant was no longer subject to bail revocation under G. L. c. 276, § 58, sixth par. The judge reasoned that because he defaulted in the prior larceny matter he was no longer “on release” and, consequently, did not commit the new crime during the period of release. The judge did not take any action on the outstanding default warrant. In the new assault and battery matter, the judge set bail in the amount of $ 500 and […]
Commonwealth v. Fontanez (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-012-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11887 COMMONWEALTH vs. JOSE M. FONTANEZ. February 3, 2016. Bail. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. This case is before us on a reservation and report from a single justice of the county court. It concerns the same single issue that we address in Commonwealth v. Morales, 473 Mass. (2016), also decided today: whether a court has the authority to revoke a defendant’s bail pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58, where the defendant was “on release,” defaulted by failing to appear, and later was charged with committing a new crime. On May 29, 2014, the defendant was arraigned in the Chelsea Division of the District Court Department on criminal charges in four separate matters. It was alleged that he had assaulted the same victim on different dates. In three matters, he was charged with assault and battery in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13A (a), and in a fourth matter, with assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b). The court gave the defendant the bail revocation warning pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58, and released him on personal recognizance. In January, 2015,[1] the defendant failed to appear in court on the District Court matters. The court found him to be in default and issued default warrants. The defendant subsequently was arraigned, in April, 2015, on a new charge, assault and battery of a family or household member, G. L. c. 265, § 13M (a). At his arraignment, the Commonwealth filed a motion to revoke the defendant’s bail in the Chelsea District Court matters. The court denied the Commonwealth’s motion to revoke the defendant’s bail on the ground that he was no longer subject to bail revocation under G. L. c. 276, § 58, sixth par. Because the defendant defaulted in the prior matters, he was no longer “on release,” and therefore did not commit the new crime “during said period of release.” In the new assault and battery matter, the court set bail in the amount of $ 2,000, and imposed conditions on the defendant’s release. The Commonwealth subsequently filed a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, in the county court seeking relief from the denial of its motion to revoke the defendant’s bail. The single justice reserved and reported the matter to the full court. In Morales, 473 […]
Commonwealth v. Jaiman (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-013-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11888 COMMONWEALTH vs. STEVIE JAIMAN. February 3, 2016. Bail. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. This case is before us on a reservation and report from a single justice of the county court. It concerns the same single issue that we address in Commonwealth v. Morales, 473 Mass. (2016), also decided today: whether a court has the authority to revoke a defendant’s bail pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58, where the defendant was “on release,” defaulted by failing to appear, and later was charged with committing a new crime. On January 19, 2011, the defendant was arraigned in the Boston Municipal Court on charges of possession with intent to distribute marijuana, G. L. c. 94C, § 32C (a), possession with intent to distribute marijuana in a school zone, G. L. c. 94C, § 32J, and possession of a firearm without a firearm identification card, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h). The court gave the defendant the bail revocation warning pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58, and released him on personal recognizance. After he failed to appear at a pretrial hearing, the court found him to be in default and issued a default warrant. The warrant was still outstanding when the defendant was charged with a new crime, aggravated statutory rape, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 23A, in April, 2015. At his arraignment on the new charges, the court denied the Commonwealth’s motion to revoke the defendant’s bail on the ground that he was not subject to bail revocation under G. L. c. 276, § 58, sixth par. Because the defendant defaulted in the prior matter, he was no longer “on release,” and therefore did not commit the new crime “during said period of release.” The court did not take any action on the outstanding default warrant. In the new matter, the court set bail in the amount of $ 10,000, and imposed conditions on his release. The Commonwealth subsequently filed a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, in the county court seeking relief from the denial of its motion to revoke the defendant’s bail. The single justice reserved and reported the matter to the full court. In Morales, 473 Mass. at , we address the reasons why we interpret G. L. c. 276, § 58, sixth par., to mean that a defendant such as one in the circumstances presented here is still […]
Goddard v. Goucher, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-013-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-19 Appeals Court SCOTT GODDARD vs. RICHARD E. GOUCHER, trustee,[1] & another.[2] No. 15-P-19. Plymouth. December 1, 2015. – February 2, 2016. Present: Kafker, C.J., Milkey, & Sullivan, JJ. Real Property, Purchase and sale agreement. Contract, Sale of real estate, What constitutes. Practice, Civil, Stipulation, Findings by judge. Evidence, Credibility of witness, Best and secondary. Witness, Credibility. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on October 25, 2011. The case was heard by Robert J. Kane, J. Isaac H. Peres (Richard W. Bland, II, with him) for the plaintiff. John D. Finnegan for town of Dover. KAFKER, C.J. The plaintiff, Scott Goddard, appeals from a judgment entered against him following a jury-waived trial in the Superior Court on his complaint seeking enforcement of a 2007 purchase and sale agreement. The two issues on appeal are (1) whether the trial judge erred in concluding that Goddard and the defendant Richard Goucher failed to enter into a valid and enforceable purchase and sale agreement despite a pretrial stipulation regarding the contractual negotiations and their legal consequences, and (2) whether the trial judge erred in declining to admit secondary evidence of the purchase and sale agreement, in violation of the best evidence rule. We conclude that the judge correctly distinguished the factual elements from the legal elements in the stipulation. We further discern no error in his additional findings of fact and legal analysis regarding the validity of the purchase and sale agreement or in his weighing of the secondary evidence pursuant to the best evidence rule. We therefore affirm the judgment. Background. The trial judge made extensive findings of fact, which we summarize below. Richard Goucher’s mother, Barbara B. Goucher,[3] owned property located on Wilsondale Street (property) in Dover (town). In 2004, Barbara conveyed the property to herself as trustee of the Salt Marsh Farm Trust and executed a durable power of attorney naming Richard as her agent and attorney-in-fact. Barbara and Richard attempted to sell the property, and in January, 2007, an interested party made an offer.[4] Because of various wetlands on the property, Richard assembled a team, including Goddard, an environmental engineer, and Attorney Vincent O’Brien, to develop a proposal for potential permitting. After the interested party withdrew his offer, Richard offered Goddard the property for one dollar plus the […]