Posts tagged "Construction"

Omega Demolition Corp. v. Walsh Construction Company, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 09-024-18)

(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({});

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

 

SUFFOLK, ss.                                                                       SUPERIOR COURT

                                                                                                CIVIL ACTION

  1. 2017-1736-BLS 2

 

 

OMEGA DEMOLITION CORP.,

Plaintiff

 

vs.

 

WALSH CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 

MCCOURT CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., WALSH-MCCOURT JV1,

TRAVELERS CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY OF AMERICA and

CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY,

Defendants

 

 

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON

DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS

 

This dispute arises out of a subcontract for bridge demolition between Plaintiff Omega Demolition Corp. (Omega) and Defendants Walsh Construction Company (Walsh) and Walsh-McCourt JV1, (WMJV), a joint venture between Walsh and Defendant McCourt Construction Company, Inc. (McCourt).  Omega, the subcontractor, alleges, among other things, that Walsh and WMJV breached the subcontract by failing to furnish so-called “shielding and containment” for Omega’s use in performing its demolition work.  Walsh, WMJV, McCourt and their sureties, Defendants Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America and Continental Casualty Company, now move to dismiss those portions of Counts I through V which are based on this allegation, arguing that it is clear from the language of the subcontract that neither Walsh nor WMJV had any obligation to provide shielding and containment for Omega.  This Court disagrees and concludes that the Motion must be DENIED. read more

Read more...

Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - March 9, 2018 at 5:25 pm

Categories: News   Tags: , , , , , , , ,

Suffolk Construction Company, Inc. v. Benchmark Mechanical Systems, Inc., et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-045-17)

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT.
1384CV01463-BLS2
____________________
SUFFOLK CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.
v.
BENCHMARK MECHANICAL SYSTEMS, INC. and READING CO-OPERATIVE BANK
____________________
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ALLOWING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This case arises from Suffolk Construction Company’s mistaken payment of monies to Benchmark Mechanical Systems rather than to Benchmark’s lender, Reading Co-Operative Bank. Suffolk had hired Benchmark as a subcontractor on a large construction project. Benchmark secured a line of credit by assigning to the Bank all money that Benchmark stood to collect from Suffolk under its subcontract. Suffolk mistakenly made payments totaling $ 3,822,500.49 to Benchmark instead of to the Bank. Benchmark held and spent those monies, rather than forward them to the Bank. After Benchmark went out of business, the Bank sued Suffolk. The Supreme Judicial Court ordered Suffolk to pay the Bank the full amount it should have paid under Benchmark’s assignment. See Reading Co-Operative Bank v. Suffolk Constr. Co., 464 Mass. 543, 557 (2013). With statutory interest included, Suffolk paid the Bank a judgment totaling $ 7,640,907.45.
Suffolk brought this action seeking to recover the surplus held by the Bank that was left after the Bank deducted its reasonable costs of collection and the principal and interest owed by Benchmark from the amount paid by Suffolk. In addition, Suffolk asserted common law claims against Benchmark seeking to recover the $ 3,822,500.49 in subcontract payments that Suffolk was compelled to pay a second time to the Bank. The Supreme Judicial Court recently held that Suffolk had stated viable claims against the Bank, but that its claims against Benchmark are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Benchmark Mechanical Systems, Inc., 475 Mass. 150 (2016).
Suffolk now moves for summary judgment as to its right to collect the surplus of roughly $ 1.35 million being held by the Bank. The Court will ALLOW this motion.
– 2 –
This resolves all remaining claims. Suffolk and the Bank report that they have settled Suffolk’s claim that the Bank’s costs of collection were unreasonable, and that this settlement will take effect if the Court were to rule (as it does) that Suffolk is entitled to receive the full surplus amount that the Bank owes to Benchmark.
The SJC has held that under the circumstances of this case Suffolk is entitled to equitable subrogation as against Benchmark, meaning that it may “stand in Benchmark’s shoes as to the surplus” held by the Bank. Suffolk Constr., 475 Mass. at 156. This holding is the law of the case, is binding on all parties, and may not be reconsidered now that the case has been remanded to the Superior Court. See City Coal Co. of Springfield, Inc. v. Noonan, 434 Mass. 709, 712 (2001).1 It necessarily follows that Suffolk is therefore the “debtor” for purposes of G.L. c. 106, § 9-608(a)(4), and thus by law is entitled the full amount of the surplus held by the Bank. See Suffolk Constr., 475 Mass. at 155-156. Suffolk’s alternative theories as to why it is entitled to recover the surplus are therefore moot.
Benchmark’s claim that Suffolk owes it $ 964,642.51 for change orders that Benchmark carried out on the project, and that Benchmark should be able to recoup this amount from the surplus held by the Bank, is without merit. The summary judgment record demonstrates that the Bank, as Benchmark’s assignee, settled and resolved these claims against Suffolk. In exchange for a $ 35,000 payment by Suffolk, the Bank (acting as Benchmark’s assignee) executed a settlement agreement providing that this payment “constitutes full and final satisfaction, discharge and payment for any monies owed to Benchmark by Suffolk. The settlement agreement also expressly released “any rights Benchmark may have against Suffolk” arising out of or with respect to any work by Benchmark for Suffolk on this project. This release and settlement agreement did more than merely extinguish any right by Benchmark
1 The Court recognizes that an issue decided on appeal may be reopened by a trial judge after remand “if the evidence on a subsequent trial was substantially different, controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of the law applicable to such issues, or the decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.” Kitras v. Town of Aquinnah, 474 Mass. 132, 146 (2016), quoting King v. Driscoll, 424 Mass. 1, 8 (1996), quoting in turn United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d 148, 151 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 862 (1991). None of these circumstances is present here, however.
– 3 –
to assert a claim directly against Suffolk for further payment; it also extinguished any debt owed to Benchmark by Suffolk.
ORDER
Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims is ALLOWED. Final judgment shall enter: (1) in favor of Suffolk Construction Company, Inc., on Counts VII and XI of its amended complaint by (a) Declaring that Suffolk is the equitable subrogee of Benchmark Mechanical Systems, Inc., with respect to the surplus remaining after Reading Co-Operative Bank applied Suffolk’s judgment payment to Benchmark’s outstanding debt to the bank, Suffolk is therefore the “debtor” for purposes of G.L. c. 106, § 9-608(a)(4), and Suffolk is entitled to recover the full amount of that surplus held by the Bank, and (b) Ordering Reading Co-Operative Bank to pay the full amount of that surplus to Suffolk Construction Company, Inc., forthwith; and (2) Dismissing all other remaining claims, counterclaims, and cross-claims with prejudice.
25 April 2017
___________________________
Kenneth W. Salinger
Justice of the Superior Court read more

Read more...

Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - April 26, 2017 at 7:04 pm

Categories: News   Tags: , , , , , , , , ,

Turner Construction Company v. MJ Flaherty Company (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-028-17)

1
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 13-2308
TURNER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
vs.
MJ FLAHERTY COMPANY
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON
PLAINTFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT and PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE THE EXPERT REPORT OF JACK GRANT
INTRODUCTION
This case arises out of a subcontract between the plaintiff, Turner Construction Company (Turner), and the defendant MJ Flaherty Company (Flaherty). Turner was the general contractor on the construction of a 23 story commercial building at 157 Berkeley Street and certain related remodeling of an adjacent building for Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (the Project). Flaherty entered into a subcontract with Turner to perform the HVAC work on the Project (the Subcontract). The initial value of the Subcontract was $ 12,462,252. Turner brought this action against Flaherty to recover damages that it alleges that it suffered when Flaherty failed to complete its work on the Project and Turner had to hire another subcontractor to complete the HVAC work.1
Flaherty has asserted counterclaims against Turner. Some of these claims are based on Turner’s failure to pay Flaherty for all of the work that it performed. Here, the amount in dispute
1 Turner’s complaint also includes allegations concerning subcontracts that Turner entered into with Flaherty on two other projects, a new building at University of Massachusetts at Lowell and a Liberty Mutual Conference Center. Turner alleges that Flaherty also failed to complete these projects causing it damage; however, the focus of this litigation appears to be the 157 Berkeley Project. It seems that Flaherty is no longer in business.
2
is complicated by the fact that in early 2013 several sub-subcontractors and material suppliers to Flaherty were not being paid and began to file notices of contract in anticipation of asserting mechanics’ liens on the Project. In response, Turner entered into a series of agreements with Flaherty pursuant to which it issued checks to Flaherty for subcontracted work that were made jointly payable to Flaherty and the vendors to insure that they were being paid out of the sums Turner was disbursing to Flaherty.
Flaherty, however, also has alleged that as a result of the manner in which Turner ran the Project, Flaherty was so adversely affected that the value of Flaherty as a going concern was adversely impacted and this resulted in a $ 6.4 million reduction in Flaherty’s “new worth.” This is, of course, a paradigm claim for consequential damages. This claim is the subject of the motion now before the court.
It would be an extraordinary understatement to say that this case has a tortured procedural history. Turner has filed two previous motions for summary judgment that the court was unable to decide on their merits because they were premature or otherwise not properly before the court. It is treating this motion as a motion for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of so much of the counterclaims as assert claims for consequential damages, and, to that extent, Turner’s motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED.
ADDITIONAL FACTS
There are only a few additional facts that need be recited in connection with Flaherty’s claim for consequential damages.
As is typical of subcontracts for large, commercial building projects, the Subcontract contained a clause eliminating Flaherty’s right to recover consequential damages.
3
Notwithstanding and term or provision herein to the contrary, Subcontractor expressly waives and releases all claims or rights to recover lost profit (except for profit on work actually performed), recovery of overhead (including home office overhead), and any other indirect damages, costs or expenses in any way arising out of or related to the Agreement, including the breach thereof by Contractor, delays, charges, acceleration, loss of efficiency or productivity disruptions and interference with the performance of the work.
A number of change orders were issued for the HVAC work which increased the project price by something in excess of 20%. Flaherty asserts, and for purposes of this motion it is accepted as true, that Turner’s project schedule was very aggressive. Additionally, changes to the schedule and project sequencing “negatively impacted . . . Flaherty’s manner and method of performance and this increased Flaherty’s costs” and made the project much more difficult for Flaherty to perform.
DISCUSSION
Summary Judgment
Flaherty contends that the project changes were cumulatively of such a scope and consequence that they caused “ a Cardinal Change or Abandonment of the [Subcontract].”
As will be seen, whether a question of fact exists concerning whether Turner caused a cardinal change in the Subcontract, or the Subcontract was abandoned, need not be decided to conclude that the limitation on consequential damages set out in the Subcontract continues to be binding on Flaherty.
At oral argument, the court noted that, before this case, it had never encountered the concept of cardinal change in a contract, and the few cases that Flaherty cited in support of this doctrine were federal government contracting cases. The court questioned whether the doctrine would be applied by Massachusetts courts to private contracts. In a post-hearing supplemental brief, Flaherty directed the court to Superior Court Judge Lloyd MacDonald’s (now retired)
4
excellent and comprehensive decision: Certified Power Systems, Inc. v. Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC, 2012 WL 384600 (Jan. 3, 2012). In that case, J. MacDonald described this doctrine as follows:
The Court was unable to find a Massachusetts case that referred directly to the cardinal change doctrine. However, it is referred to be commentators on Massachusetts law and the concept embodies familiar contract principals.
A cardinal change is a change outside the general scope of the contract which constitutes such a substantial deviation that it alters the nature of the bargain and constitutes a material breach. . . . (cardinal change is drastic and fundamental modification in the work which requires contractor to perform duties materially different from those originally bargained for.)
Although a cardinal change generally represents a large increase in one party’s contract burdens, there is no precise formula for determining whether a change is within the scope of the contract or a cardinal change. . . . Each case must be analyzed on its own facts and circumstances giving fair consideration to the magnitude and quality of the changes ordered and their cumulative effect on the project as a whole. . . . Numerous changes, none of which individually may be deemed cardinal, may create a cardinal change when considered as a whole.
(Internal citations and quotations omitted for simplicity). This court finds this reasoning persuasive and concludes that, under Massachusetts law, the cardinal change doctrine may be applied to a private construction contract when the facts warrant it. It is, however, worth noting that, in Certified Power Systems, Inc., Judge MacDonald concluded that change orders that increased the subcontract price by more than 50% did not constitute a cardinal change: “the enlarged work crew, the insistence on substantial overtime as a means to recover schedule and the winter conditions together presented a markedly different contract environment from what CPS reasonably anticipated. However, the essence of the work required by the Subcontract remained the same. Further, the change order procedure of the Subcontract provided a structure for the orderly accommodation of the altered conditions without undue disruption.”
It seems likely that Judge MacDonald’s conclusions will apply to the present case as
5
well, but the court’s decision on consequential damages does not rest on that factual conclusion. As Judge MacDonald notes, if a cardinal change were established that might constitute a material breach of the Subcontract. However, proof of a breach of contract on the part of Turner would not be a basis for the court to write a new subcontract for the parties that did not include any limitation on consequential damages. Proof of a cardinal change constituting a breach would permit recovery of direct damages occasioned by that breach.
Indeed, none of the cases that Flaherty has submitted that mention cardinal change or contract abandonment, touch on the issue of consequential damages or even suggest a theory that would support a contract based (or any other claim) for consequential damages.
Flaherty submitted to the court copies of several cases that address the concepts of cardinal change or contract abandonment without any analysis of how these cases apply to its version of the facts underlying its dispute with Turner. The cases that seem closest to the issue presented by the instant case are those in which the court concluded that the contracting parties had departed so significantly from the terms of their contract that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the fair value of its services instead of under the contract, i.e., a quantum meruit recovery.
For example, in J.J. Jones Const. Co. v. Lehrer McGovern Bovis, Inc., 83 P.3d 1009 (Nev. 2004), the court considered the claims of a subcontractor asserted under theories of abandonment and cardinal change, applying Nevada law. “Generally, contract abandonment occurs when both parties depart from the terms of the contract by mutual consent. The consent may be express, or it may be implied by the parties’ actions, such as when the acts of one party inconsistent with the contract’s existence are acquiesced in by the other.”2 Id. at 1019-1020
2 The court does not see any evidence of contract abandonment in this case, as it appears that Turner and Flaherty continued to make use of the change order process until Flaherty stopped working. However, the state of the
6
(internal citations and quotations omitted). The Nevada court then went on to consider the cardinal change doctrine. It commented that although this doctrine was generally applied only in government contracting cases, it would be recognized under state law. “[A] cardinal change occurs when the work is so drastically altered that the contractor effectively performs duties that are materially different from those for which the contractor originally bargained. The contractor must prove facts with specificity that support its allegations that a cardinal change occurred.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). The court went on to note that “the evidence required to demonstrate the occurrence of cardinal change is similar to that required by the contract-abandonment theory.” Id. at 1021. It then concluded that, under either theory, the measure of recovery for the subcontractor was the true value of the services performed, i.e., quantum meruit. See also O’Brien & Gere Technical Services, Inc. v. Fru-Con/Fluor Daniel Joint Venture, 380 F.3d 447 (8th Cir. 2004) (applying a theory of abandonment under Missouri law and allowing recovery for the reasonable value of the services performed); C. Norman Peterson Co. v. Container Corp. of Am., 172 Cal. App. Ed 628 (1985) (finding evidence sufficient to establishment abandonment of contract under California law and permitting recovery of the reasonable value of services on a quantum meruit basis).
None of this group of cases provides support for a claim for indirect, consequential damages under a theory of cardinal change or contract abandonment.3 Rather, they apply traditional concepts of equitable relief to situations in which a contract should be set aside because the work performed was different than the work bargained for under the contract. In
summary judgment record is such that the court cannot reach that conclusion as a matter of law.
3 Many of the cardinal change cases to which Flaherty has directed the court are completed inapposite. These are cases in which the plaintiff is a disappointed bidder for a publicly bid contract and argues that, under the cardinal change doctrine, the contract was so amended after it was awarded that it is a different contract than that which was publicly bid and that the plaintiff was never given the opportunity to bid on it. See, e.g., Cardinal Maint. Serv. V. United States, 63 Fed.Cl. 98 (2004) (determining that a series of changes amounted to a cardinal change and therefore a violation of public bidding laws).
7
each case, the court concludes that the party performing the work should be given the opportunity to recover the fair value of its labors. The same concepts apply under Massachusetts law. See, e.g., Bosewell v. Zephyr Lines, Inc. 414 Mass. 241, 250 (1993).
To the contrary, under Massachusetts law, clauses in construction contracts limiting the right to recover consequential damages have long been recognized and enforced as an appropriate means to “limit the expense and unpredictability of construction contract litigation.” Costa v. Brait Builders Corp., 463 Mass. 65, 78 n. 22 (2004). Indeed, the SJC has reflected on the utility of such clauses as means to protect against claims just like those that Flaherty attempts to assert in this case: “Some of the consequential damages claimed by the plaintiff here, including his going out of business, . . . , may provide a case in point.” Id.
In consequence, Flaherty’s claims for indirect or consequential damage fail, as a matter of law, even if he there is evidence to support a theory of cardinal change or contract abandonment in the summary judgment record.
Motion to Strike Expert Testimony
Because the single issue actually before the court on the motion for summary judgment does not turn on whether there is evidence in the summary judgment record that would support claims of cardinal change, the court need not address Turner’s motion to strike the John Grant Report. However, a few comments on the report may prove useful as the parties prepare for trial.
In his report, Grant offers the opinion: “When all of the above Project Information, Circumstances, and Events are considered as a whole, it is JCCMI’s fair and reasonable professional conclusion that there was a Cardinal Change in Flaherty’s Scope of Work and accordingly an Abandonment of the Contract.” That is not an opinion that an expert may render
8
in this case. His opinion offers a conclusion on a mixed question of law and fact to be addressed by a court or, perhaps, a jury on proper instructions on the law. Grant may have expert testimony that would be useful for a fact finder in making that decision, but that will be determined by the trial judge on pretrial motions or during trial.
Moreover, at present, the court does not believe that the issue of cardinal change, much less contract abandonment, can be presented without testimony from witnesses who performed or observed the work being done by Flaherty and can provide competent evidence of the effect that Project changes had on Flaherty, if they had any at all. Having reviewed, as best it can, the Grant Report., the court finds many of the opinions expressed to be in the nature of a description of how the changes might have affected Flaherty. Perhaps, some of what Grant has to say might serve as corroboration of testimony from percipient witnesses concerning how the changes actually affected Flaherty’s work on the Project. Again, the admissibility of any of the opinions expressed in the Report, and whether the report is sufficient to prove cardinal change without a percipient witness, are matters for the trial judge to decide.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, Turner’s motion for Summary Judgment is ALLOWED to the following extent: Flaherty’s counterclaims for consequential or indirect damages are dismissed. The court makes no ruling on Turner’s Motion to Strike the Expert Report of Jack
9
Grant. This is without prejudice to Turner’s right to file pretrial motions concerning the admissibility of testimony based on the Report or to object to such testimony at trial.
_______________________
Mitchell H. Kaplan
Justice of the Superior Court
Dated: March 7, 2017 read more

Read more...

Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - April 4, 2017 at 9:08 pm

Categories: News   Tags: , , , , , ,

Turner Construction Company v. MJ Flaherty Company (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-028-17)

1
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 13-2308
TURNER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
vs.
MJ FLAHERTY COMPANY
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON
PLAINTFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT and PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE THE EXPERT REPORT OF JACK GRANT
INTRODUCTION
This case arises out of a subcontract between the plaintiff, Turner Construction Company (Turner), and the defendant MJ Flaherty Company (Flaherty). Turner was the general contractor on the construction of a 23 story commercial building at 157 Berkeley Street and certain related remodeling of an adjacent building for Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (the Project). Flaherty entered into a subcontract with Turner to perform the HVAC work on the Project (the Subcontract). The initial value of the Subcontract was $ 12,462,252. Turner brought this action against Flaherty to recover damages that it alleges that it suffered when Flaherty failed to complete its work on the Project and Turner had to hire another subcontractor to complete the HVAC work.1
Flaherty has asserted counterclaims against Turner. Some of these claims are based on Turner’s failure to pay Flaherty for all of the work that it performed. Here, the amount in dispute
1 Turner’s complaint also includes allegations concerning subcontracts that Turner entered into with Flaherty on two other projects, a new building at University of Massachusetts at Lowell and a Liberty Mutual Conference Center. Turner alleges that Flaherty also failed to complete these projects causing it damage; however, the focus of this litigation appears to be the 157 Berkeley Project. It seems that Flaherty is no longer in business.
2
is complicated by the fact that in early 2013 several sub-subcontractors and material suppliers to Flaherty were not being paid and began to file notices of contract in anticipation of asserting mechanics’ liens on the Project. In response, Turner entered into a series of agreements with Flaherty pursuant to which it issued checks to Flaherty for subcontracted work that were made jointly payable to Flaherty and the vendors to insure that they were being paid out of the sums Turner was disbursing to Flaherty.
Flaherty, however, also has alleged that as a result of the manner in which Turner ran the Project, Flaherty was so adversely affected that the value of Flaherty as a going concern was adversely impacted and this resulted in a $ 6.4 million reduction in Flaherty’s “new worth.” This is, of course, a paradigm claim for consequential damages. This claim is the subject of the motion now before the court.
It would be an extraordinary understatement to say that this case has a tortured procedural history. Turner has filed two previous motions for summary judgment that the court was unable to decide on their merits because they were premature or otherwise not properly before the court. It is treating this motion as a motion for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of so much of the counterclaims as assert claims for consequential damages, and, to that extent, Turner’s motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED.
ADDITIONAL FACTS
There are only a few additional facts that need be recited in connection with Flaherty’s claim for consequential damages.
As is typical of subcontracts for large, commercial building projects, the Subcontract contained a clause eliminating Flaherty’s right to recover consequential damages.
3
Notwithstanding and term or provision herein to the contrary, Subcontractor expressly waives and releases all claims or rights to recover lost profit (except for profit on work actually performed), recovery of overhead (including home office overhead), and any other indirect damages, costs or expenses in any way arising out of or related to the Agreement, including the breach thereof by Contractor, delays, charges, acceleration, loss of efficiency or productivity disruptions and interference with the performance of the work.
A number of change orders were issued for the HVAC work which increased the project price by something in excess of 20%. Flaherty asserts, and for purposes of this motion it is accepted as true, that Turner’s project schedule was very aggressive. Additionally, changes to the schedule and project sequencing “negatively impacted . . . Flaherty’s manner and method of performance and this increased Flaherty’s costs” and made the project much more difficult for Flaherty to perform.
DISCUSSION
Summary Judgment
Flaherty contends that the project changes were cumulatively of such a scope and consequence that they caused “ a Cardinal Change or Abandonment of the [Subcontract].”
As will be seen, whether a question of fact exists concerning whether Turner caused a cardinal change in the Subcontract, or the Subcontract was abandoned, need not be decided to conclude that the limitation on consequential damages set out in the Subcontract continues to be binding on Flaherty.
At oral argument, the court noted that, before this case, it had never encountered the concept of cardinal change in a contract, and the few cases that Flaherty cited in support of this doctrine were federal government contracting cases. The court questioned whether the doctrine would be applied by Massachusetts courts to private contracts. In a post-hearing supplemental brief, Flaherty directed the court to Superior Court Judge Lloyd MacDonald’s (now retired)
4
excellent and comprehensive decision: Certified Power Systems, Inc. v. Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC, 2012 WL 384600 (Jan. 3, 2012). In that case, J. MacDonald described this doctrine as follows:
The Court was unable to find a Massachusetts case that referred directly to the cardinal change doctrine. However, it is referred to be commentators on Massachusetts law and the concept embodies familiar contract principals.
A cardinal change is a change outside the general scope of the contract which constitutes such a substantial deviation that it alters the nature of the bargain and constitutes a material breach. . . . (cardinal change is drastic and fundamental modification in the work which requires contractor to perform duties materially different from those originally bargained for.)
Although a cardinal change generally represents a large increase in one party’s contract burdens, there is no precise formula for determining whether a change is within the scope of the contract or a cardinal change. . . . Each case must be analyzed on its own facts and circumstances giving fair consideration to the magnitude and quality of the changes ordered and their cumulative effect on the project as a whole. . . . Numerous changes, none of which individually may be deemed cardinal, may create a cardinal change when considered as a whole.
(Internal citations and quotations omitted for simplicity). This court finds this reasoning persuasive and concludes that, under Massachusetts law, the cardinal change doctrine may be applied to a private construction contract when the facts warrant it. It is, however, worth noting that, in Certified Power Systems, Inc., Judge MacDonald concluded that change orders that increased the subcontract price by more than 50% did not constitute a cardinal change: “the enlarged work crew, the insistence on substantial overtime as a means to recover schedule and the winter conditions together presented a markedly different contract environment from what CPS reasonably anticipated. However, the essence of the work required by the Subcontract remained the same. Further, the change order procedure of the Subcontract provided a structure for the orderly accommodation of the altered conditions without undue disruption.”
It seems likely that Judge MacDonald’s conclusions will apply to the present case as
5
well, but the court’s decision on consequential damages does not rest on that factual conclusion. As Judge MacDonald notes, if a cardinal change were established that might constitute a material breach of the Subcontract. However, proof of a breach of contract on the part of Turner would not be a basis for the court to write a new subcontract for the parties that did not include any limitation on consequential damages. Proof of a cardinal change constituting a breach would permit recovery of direct damages occasioned by that breach.
Indeed, none of the cases that Flaherty has submitted that mention cardinal change or contract abandonment, touch on the issue of consequential damages or even suggest a theory that would support a contract based (or any other claim) for consequential damages.
Flaherty submitted to the court copies of several cases that address the concepts of cardinal change or contract abandonment without any analysis of how these cases apply to its version of the facts underlying its dispute with Turner. The cases that seem closest to the issue presented by the instant case are those in which the court concluded that the contracting parties had departed so significantly from the terms of their contract that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the fair value of its services instead of under the contract, i.e., a quantum meruit recovery.
For example, in J.J. Jones Const. Co. v. Lehrer McGovern Bovis, Inc., 83 P.3d 1009 (Nev. 2004), the court considered the claims of a subcontractor asserted under theories of abandonment and cardinal change, applying Nevada law. “Generally, contract abandonment occurs when both parties depart from the terms of the contract by mutual consent. The consent may be express, or it may be implied by the parties’ actions, such as when the acts of one party inconsistent with the contract’s existence are acquiesced in by the other.”2 Id. at 1019-1020
2 The court does not see any evidence of contract abandonment in this case, as it appears that Turner and Flaherty continued to make use of the change order process until Flaherty stopped working. However, the state of the
6
(internal citations and quotations omitted). The Nevada court then went on to consider the cardinal change doctrine. It commented that although this doctrine was generally applied only in government contracting cases, it would be recognized under state law. “[A] cardinal change occurs when the work is so drastically altered that the contractor effectively performs duties that are materially different from those for which the contractor originally bargained. The contractor must prove facts with specificity that support its allegations that a cardinal change occurred.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). The court went on to note that “the evidence required to demonstrate the occurrence of cardinal change is similar to that required by the contract-abandonment theory.” Id. at 1021. It then concluded that, under either theory, the measure of recovery for the subcontractor was the true value of the services performed, i.e., quantum meruit. See also O’Brien & Gere Technical Services, Inc. v. Fru-Con/Fluor Daniel Joint Venture, 380 F.3d 447 (8th Cir. 2004) (applying a theory of abandonment under Missouri law and allowing recovery for the reasonable value of the services performed); C. Norman Peterson Co. v. Container Corp. of Am., 172 Cal. App. Ed 628 (1985) (finding evidence sufficient to establishment abandonment of contract under California law and permitting recovery of the reasonable value of services on a quantum meruit basis).
None of this group of cases provides support for a claim for indirect, consequential damages under a theory of cardinal change or contract abandonment.3 Rather, they apply traditional concepts of equitable relief to situations in which a contract should be set aside because the work performed was different than the work bargained for under the contract. In
summary judgment record is such that the court cannot reach that conclusion as a matter of law.
3 Many of the cardinal change cases to which Flaherty has directed the court are completed inapposite. These are cases in which the plaintiff is a disappointed bidder for a publicly bid contract and argues that, under the cardinal change doctrine, the contract was so amended after it was awarded that it is a different contract than that which was publicly bid and that the plaintiff was never given the opportunity to bid on it. See, e.g., Cardinal Maint. Serv. V. United States, 63 Fed.Cl. 98 (2004) (determining that a series of changes amounted to a cardinal change and therefore a violation of public bidding laws).
7
each case, the court concludes that the party performing the work should be given the opportunity to recover the fair value of its labors. The same concepts apply under Massachusetts law. See, e.g., Bosewell v. Zephyr Lines, Inc. 414 Mass. 241, 250 (1993).
To the contrary, under Massachusetts law, clauses in construction contracts limiting the right to recover consequential damages have long been recognized and enforced as an appropriate means to “limit the expense and unpredictability of construction contract litigation.” Costa v. Brait Builders Corp., 463 Mass. 65, 78 n. 22 (2004). Indeed, the SJC has reflected on the utility of such clauses as means to protect against claims just like those that Flaherty attempts to assert in this case: “Some of the consequential damages claimed by the plaintiff here, including his going out of business, . . . , may provide a case in point.” Id.
In consequence, Flaherty’s claims for indirect or consequential damage fail, as a matter of law, even if he there is evidence to support a theory of cardinal change or contract abandonment in the summary judgment record.
Motion to Strike Expert Testimony
Because the single issue actually before the court on the motion for summary judgment does not turn on whether there is evidence in the summary judgment record that would support claims of cardinal change, the court need not address Turner’s motion to strike the John Grant Report. However, a few comments on the report may prove useful as the parties prepare for trial.
In his report, Grant offers the opinion: “When all of the above Project Information, Circumstances, and Events are considered as a whole, it is JCCMI’s fair and reasonable professional conclusion that there was a Cardinal Change in Flaherty’s Scope of Work and accordingly an Abandonment of the Contract.” That is not an opinion that an expert may render
8
in this case. His opinion offers a conclusion on a mixed question of law and fact to be addressed by a court or, perhaps, a jury on proper instructions on the law. Grant may have expert testimony that would be useful for a fact finder in making that decision, but that will be determined by the trial judge on pretrial motions or during trial.
Moreover, at present, the court does not believe that the issue of cardinal change, much less contract abandonment, can be presented without testimony from witnesses who performed or observed the work being done by Flaherty and can provide competent evidence of the effect that Project changes had on Flaherty, if they had any at all. Having reviewed, as best it can, the Grant Report., the court finds many of the opinions expressed to be in the nature of a description of how the changes might have affected Flaherty. Perhaps, some of what Grant has to say might serve as corroboration of testimony from percipient witnesses concerning how the changes actually affected Flaherty’s work on the Project. Again, the admissibility of any of the opinions expressed in the Report, and whether the report is sufficient to prove cardinal change without a percipient witness, are matters for the trial judge to decide.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, Turner’s motion for Summary Judgment is ALLOWED to the following extent: Flaherty’s counterclaims for consequential or indirect damages are dismissed. The court makes no ruling on Turner’s Motion to Strike the Expert Report of Jack
9
Grant. This is without prejudice to Turner’s right to file pretrial motions concerning the admissibility of testimony based on the Report or to object to such testimony at trial.
_______________________
Mitchell H. Kaplan
Justice of the Superior Court
Dated: March 7, 2017 read more

Read more...

Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - April 4, 2017 at 5:33 pm

Categories: News   Tags: , , , , , ,

Central Ceilings, Inc. v. Suffolk Construction Company, Inc., et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-036-17)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us

15-P-1117                                       Appeals Court

CENTRAL CEILINGS, INC.  vs.  SUFFOLK CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. & others.[1]

No. 15-P-1117.

Suffolk.     October 7, 2016. – March 29, 2017.

Present:  Agnes, Maldonado, & Desmond, JJ.

Contract, Construction contract, Subcontractor, Damages.  Damages, Breach of contract, Attorney’s fees.  Practice, Civil, Attorney’s fees, Discovery.

Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on October 3, 2006. read more

Read more...

Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - March 29, 2017 at 6:26 pm

Categories: News   Tags: , , , , , , , ,

Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Tenacity Construction, Inc. (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-161-16)

1
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
SUFFOLK, SS. SUPERIOR COURT
CIV. NO. 15-1589 BLS 2
CUMBERLAND FARMS, INC.,
Plaintiff
vs.
TENACITY CONSTRUCTION, INC.
Defendant
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This case arises from a project for the construction of facilities located in Rhode Island and Massachusetts. The plaintiff Cumberland Farms, Inc. (CFI) is the owner of the properties on which the facilities were built. The defendant Tenacity Construction, Inc. (Tenacity) was the general contractor. CFI instituted this action to recover the difference between what it believes that it was obligated to pay Tenacity for its work and what it ended up paying, taking into account those amounts that CFI paid to Tenacity’s subcontractors on Tenacity’s behalf. Tenacity counterclaimed, maintaining that CFI wrongfully failed to pay Tenacity for costs attributable to winter conditions and that, to the extent it could not pay its subcontractors, this was due to CFI’s breach of contract. CFI now moves for summary judgment as to Tenacity’s counterclaims against it. Tenacity has cross moved as to the same claims, asking this Court to enter judgment in its favor. This Court concludes that CFI’s Motion must be Allowed and that Tenacity’s Motion must be Denied.
BACKGROUND
The following facts in the summary judgment record are undisputed.1 CFI owns properties
1 As CFI points out in its Reply Memorandum, Tenacity’s response to several of CFI’s fact allegations contain improper argument or unsupported denials. This does not comply with Rule 9(A)(b)(5). This approach is also not effective advocacy, since it obscures rather than illuminates the summary judgment record without advancing Tenacity’s position on the issues in any respect.
2
located at 15 Main Street in Northborough, Massachusetts (the Northborough Property) and at 2643 Hartford Avenue in Johnston, Rhode Island (the Johnston Property). CFI retained Tenacity as general contractor for the construction of a gas station/convenience store on the Northborough Property (the Northborough Project) and construction of a similar facility together with office space on the Johnston Property (the Johnston Project). On September 23, 2013, the parties entered into two construction contracts (the Master Contract) that governed Tenacity’s work. Ex. 8 of Joint Appendix. Under the Master Contract, Tenacity was responsible for paying the subcontractors on both Projects.
The Master Contract expressly incorporated two Work Orders, one for each Project. The Northborough Project Work Order provided that work was to start at the Northborough Property on October 7, 2013 and be completed within 112 days (January 27, 2014). The Johnston Project Work Order stated that work was to begin November 4, 2013, and was to be completed within 140 days (March 24, 2013). Both projects were substantially delayed: the Johnston Project was completed May 6, 2014 and the Northborough Project completed on April 28, 2014.
Tenacity’s counterclaim concerns the additional costs it alleges that it was forced to incur as a result of harsh winter conditions. and is based on its assertion that CFI is responsible for those additional expenses. According to the summary judgment record, the parties met in January 30, 2014 to discuss the impact that these winter conditions were having on completion of the projects. CFI agreed at that meeting that Tenacity would be paid for additional work due to winter conditions on a “time and materials” basis, as provided by the Master Contract. In the winter and spring of 2014, Tenacity submitted change order requests for time and materials due to winter conditions and CFI approved and paid all of them. Those requests included a markup for Tenacity’s overhead and profit. Every request was paid in full.
In a May 30, 2014 letter to CFI, Tenacity stated that it was entitled to an “equitable adjustment” to the Master Contract price for certain indirect costs attributable to winter conditions —
3
namely, those associated with diminished productivity and decreased efficiency in performing the work. Tenacity had expressed concern at the earlier meeting on January 30 that these indirect costs would not be covered by compensating it on strictly a time and materials basis. Other than CFI’s indicating that it would “wait and see how it goes,” there is nothing in the summary judgment record to show that CFI at any time agreed to compensate Tenacity for these indirect costs.
On June 6, 2014, Tenacity submitted a breakdown of costs that it sought in connection with this request to adjust the contract price. CFI asked for backup information on June 17, 2014 and on June 25, 2014. On July 8, 2014, CFI sent an email to Tenacity denying any responsibility for lost productivity costs but offered some amount in an effort to settle the dispute. Shortly thereafter, however, Tenacity informed CFI that it had been unable to make final payments to subcontractors and suppliers due to cash flow issues.
At CFI’s request, Tenacity provided CFI with a list of those subcontractors and suppliers who had not been paid, together with an amount believed to be due to each. Pursuant to 8(i) of the Master Contract, CFI had the right to pay off these obligations directly, upon notice to Tenacity. This notice was given by an August 1, 2014, letter to Tenacity. On August 8, 2014, CFI sent an email to Tenacity’s subcontractors and suppliers directing them to submit claims for outstanding payments to CFI. Over the next six months, CFI personnel reviewed and processed requests for payment from dozens of subcontractors and suppliers, confirming that there was backup documentation for them and that Tenacity had approved the work performed before any payment was made.
CFI made payments directly to subcontractors and suppliers in the total amount of $ 790,650.64. CFI made payments to Tenacity pursuant to the Master Contract (together with change orders) in the total amount of $ 2,983,261.92.2 Because the sum of these two figures exceeded that amount CFI believed that it was obligated to pay Tenacity, it refused to release retainage funds. It also brought this
2 Tenacity does not appear to dispute these figures except to insist that it is entitled to an adjustment of the contract price and that if that adjustment were made, it would have been able to pay its subcontractors.
4
lawsuit seeking to recover the difference between that amount it alleges that it was obligated to pay pursuant to the Master Contract and that amount it actually paid, taking into account the subcontractor payments. In counterclaiming, Tenacity asserts that CFI’s wrongful refusal to adjust the contract price for winter conditions and its retention of retainage amounts has caused Tenacity to suffer damages.
DISCUSSION
Tenacity’s counterclaim alleges the following: breach of contract (Count I), unjust enrichment/quantum meruit (Count II), detrimental reliance/promissory estoppel (Count III), declaratory judgment (Count IV) and a violation of G.L.c. 93A (Count V). Each of these counts depends upon Tenacity’s theory that it is entitled to an equitable adjustment to the Master Contract price for the loss of productivity due to winter conditions. In moving for summary judgment in its favor on all counts, CFI contends that the damages that Tenacity seeks to recover are expressly precluded by the Master Contract, and that the undisputed facts show that there was no modification of this provision. This Court is convinced that CFI’s position is the correct one.
Tenacity acknowledges that a claim for an equitable adjustment does not lie where the contract itself limits the remedies or prevents the recovery sought. That is precisely the case here. The Master Contract contains a broad “no damages for delay” clause that applies not only where the work force is idle and cannot perform any work but also where there is interference with or obstructions to the work so as to delay its completion. Specifically, Section 6(e) of the Master Contract states:
Except as otherwise provided by law, should contractor’s performance in whole or in part be interfered with, delayed, resequenced or disrupted, or be suspended in the commencement, prosecution or completion for reasons beyond Contractor’s control…Contractor’s sole remedy shall be an extension of time in which to complete the Work order…”
Section 6(e ) goes on to state that even if this provision is determined to be legally unenforceable so that Tenacity is not limited in its remedy to an extension of time, Tenacity may not recover from CFI any damages due to work inefficiency or loss of productivity, among other things. This limitation on
5
remedies is underscored by other provisions of the Master Contract. For example, Section 7(c ) states: “Any overruns or underruns in the amount of Work actually performed will not cause any price adjustments, unless mutually agreed upon, and will not relieve Contractor of its responsibility to perform the Scope of Work.” The undisputed facts show that Tenacity was allowed an extension of time to complete both the Northborough and the Johnston Projects. It is also clear that the basis for its theory calling for an equitable adjustment of the contract price rests on its contention that it must be compensated for loss of productivity and work inefficiencies – damages that are expressly ruled out by Section 6(e).
Tenacity cites Superior Court decisions in support of its position that its claim is not barred by Section 6(e). None of these decisions has any precedential value. As explained in CFI’s reply at pages 7 through 9, they are also factually distinguishable. For example, some of those decisions involved contractual provisions which prohibited damages for delay but did not directly address — as Section 6(e) does– damages occurring as a result of hindrances or disruptions. Still others involve situations where there was active interference by the contractor. The Appeals Court has suggested in dictum that these additional factors could permit a plaintiff contractor to recover even in the face of a “no damages for delay” provision. See B.J. Harland Elec. Co., Inc. v. Granger Bros, Inc. 24 Mass.App.Ct. 506, 509 (1987), citing John E. Green Plumbing & Heating Co., v. Turner Constr. Co., 742 F.2d 965, 966-967 (6th Cir. 1984) (where it was held that subcontractor was entitled to recover on a theory that the general contractor interfered with the work even though the contract barred delay damages, the court reasoning that the bar there applied only to the cost of an idle workforce). Those additional factors are simply not present in the instant case. The Court also attaches some significance to the fact that the Master Contract expressly addresses the problem of winter conditions—and provides that “any work requiring winter conditions and/or costs shall be completed on a time and material basis.” Section G.5 of Master Contract. Having compensated Tenacity for time and materials attributable to
6
winter conditions, CFI was not required to pay anything more.
Tenacity argues in the alternative that the Master Contract was modified as a result of the May 2014 letter that Tenacity sent to CFI asking to be compensated for the loss of productivity due to winter conditions. See Exhibit 11 of Joint Appendix. Tenacity assets that this letter was the equivalent of a change order and that, pursuant to the Master Contract, any change order that is not rejected within 30 days of receipt will be deemed approved. Section 5(j) of Master Contract. This Court disagrees. The letter is entitled “Request for Equitable Adjustment to Contract Price – Constructive Acceleration.” It was not submitted in accordance with the procedures established by the parties on forms (entitled Change Orders) intended for that purpose. Because Tenacity had not followed established protocols, CFI had no reason to view the letter as a change order. Nor did it at any time suggest that it intended to approve the request. In short, Tenacity has no reasonable expectation of providing that the Master contract was modified either orally or in writing. Because the Master Contract by its express terms bars Tenacity’s recovery for the indirect costs attributable to winter conditions, Tenacity’s counterclaim fails as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For all the foregoing reason, CFI’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Tenacity’s Counterclaim is ALLOWED, and the Counterclaim is DISMISSED with prejudice.
________________________________________
Janet L. Sanders
Justice of the Superior Court
Dated: November 16, 2016 read more

Read more...

Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - December 7, 2016 at 1:39 am

Categories: News   Tags: , , , , , , ,

ZVI Construction Company, LLC v. Levy, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-141-16)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us

15-P-359                                        Appeals Court

ZVI CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, LLC  vs.  FRANKLIN LEVY & another.[1]

No. 15-P-359.

Suffolk.     January 12, 2016. – October 6, 2016.

Present:  Kafker, C.J., Cohen, & Blake, JJ.

Notice, Timeliness.  Conversion.  Evidence, Privileged communication.  Privileged Communication.  Waiver.  Attorney at Law, Attorney-client relationship.  Practice, Civil, Notice of appeal, Appeal, Complaint, Waiver.  Fraud. read more

Read more...

Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - October 6, 2016 at 7:10 pm

Categories: News   Tags: , , , , ,

Suffolk Construction Company, Inc. v. Benchmark Mechanical Systems, Inc., et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-125-16)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us

SJC-12020

SUFFOLK CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.  vs.  BENCHMARK MECHANICAL SYSTEMS, INC., & another.[1]

Suffolk.     May 2, 2016. – August 12, 2016.

Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.[2]

Uniform Commercial Code, Secured creditor.  Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss, Summary judgment, Statute of limitations.  Subrogation.  Indemnity.  Unjust Enrichment.  Restitution.  Limitations, Statute of.

Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on April 22, 2013. read more

Read more...

Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - August 13, 2016 at 2:08 am

Categories: News   Tags: , , , , , , , , ,

N-Tek Construction Services, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-028-16)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us

14-P-1483                                       Appeals Court

N-TEK CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, INC.  vs.  HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 14-P-1483.

Essex.     November 5, 2015. – March 14, 2016.

Present:  Agnes, Sullivan, & Blake, JJ.

Public Works, Payment bond.  Surety.  Notice.  Bond, Public works, Construction contract bond.  Contract, Public works, Construction contract, Bond, Surety.

Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 18, 2010. read more

Read more...

Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - March 14, 2016 at 10:16 pm

Categories: News   Tags: , , , , , , , , , ,

DiCarlo v. Suffolk Construction Co., Inc., et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-019-16)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us

SJC-11854

SJC-11853

ROBERT M. DiCARLO  vs.  SUFFOLK CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., & others;[1] PROFESSIONAL ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS OF CONNECTICUT, INC., third-party defendant.

BERNARD J. MARTIN & another[2]  vs.  ANGELINI PLASTERING, INC., & others.[3]

Suffolk.  Middlesex.     October 8, 2015. – February 12, 2016.

Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ.

Workers’ Compensation Act, Action against third person, Settlement agreement, Insurer.  Lien.  Statute, Construction. read more

Read more...

Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - February 12, 2016 at 10:05 pm

Categories: News   Tags: , , , , , ,

Next Page »