Commonwealth v. Valentin (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-067-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11448 COMMONWEALTH vs. ELVIN VALENTIN. Bristol. January 12, 2016. – May 20, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Homicide. Intoxication. Evidence, Prior misconduct, Relevancy and materiality. Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Argument by prosecutor, Request for jury instructions, Instructions to jury. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on September 28, 2009. The cases were tried before Thomas F. McGuire, Jr., J. John F. Palmer for the defendant. Rachel W. van Deuren, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. DUFFLY, J. The defendant was convicted by a Superior Court jury of murder in the first degree in the shooting deaths of Nettie Becht and Luis Diaz, on theories of premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. On appeal, the defendant asserts error in the judge’s decision to permit the introduction in evidence of weapons and related items that he lawfully owned and that were not alleged to have been used in the shooting. The defendant asserts error also in the denial of his request that the jury be instructed on voluntary manslaughter based on a theory of reasonable provocation, and in the instruction that was given that the jury must “find” the defendant was intoxicated. He also challenges portions of the prosecutor’s closing argument in several respects. Concluding that there was no error, we affirm the defendant’s convictions and decline to exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to grant a new trial or reduce the verdicts to a lesser degree of guilt. 1. Background. a. Commonwealth’s case. We recite the facts the jury could have found, reserving certain facts for later discussion. The defendant and Becht lived in different apartments in the same housing complex in New Bedford. They had been involved in an intermittent relationship that spanned a four-year period; during that period, the defendant and Becht occasionally spent the night at each other’s apartments and the defendant had loaned Becht money. According to the defendant, Becht had “cheated” on him and he felt that she was “using” him. Becht ended the relationship prior to the shootings. Becht was treated at a hospital on the night before she was killed.[1] When the defendant attempted to visit her there, she told him that she did not want to see him. The next […]
Allen v. Allen (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-056-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-643 Appeals Court JULIA ALLEN vs. BARBARA ALLEN. No. 15-P-643. Suffolk. February 24, 2016. – May 19, 2016. Present: Green, Wolohojian, & Henry, JJ. Abuse Prevention. Moot Question. Practice, Civil, Moot case. Domestic Violence Record Keeping System. Complaint for protection from abuse filed in the Central Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department on April 3, 2015. A hearing to extend an abuse prevention order was had before Robert J. McKenna, Jr., J. Kathleen M. McCarthy for the defendant. GREEN, J. Does an appeal lie from an ex parte abuse prevention order issued pursuant to G. L. c. 209A, in circumstances where the order was terminated ten days later at a hearing after notice pursuant to c. 209A, § 4? We conclude that termination of the ex parte order at the hearing after notice, accompanied by an order directing law enforcement agencies “to destroy all record of such vacated order,” renders the defendant’s appeal moot. G. L. c. 209A, § 7, as appearing in St. 1990, c. 403, § 8. We accordingly dismiss the appeal. Background. On April 3, 2015, the plaintiff filed a complaint for protection from abuse pursuant to G. L. c. 209A, seeking a restraining order against the defendant (her mother). In the affidavit filed with her complaint, the plaintiff averred that: “Back in 2008, I cut ties w/ her and asked her to no longer contact me. Since then, I had to change my phone number, I’ve moved multiple times, had to keep an external mailbox in order to keep my residential address private, but she keeps finding me & mailing me things. For years I’ve returned them to the sender. Once I moved to Boston there was no mail until 4/3/15 when she mailed a package to my work address — I’ve never given her the address, but she somehow tracked it down.” A judge of the Central Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department held a hearing that day, at which the plaintiff was the only party present and the only witness. The colloquy at the hearing added little to the averments in the affidavit.[1] On the basis of the plaintiff’s presentation, the judge issued an ex parte order, based on a determination “that there is a substantial likelihood of immediate danger of abuse,” which ordered the defendant (i) not to abuse the plaintiff; (ii) not to […]
Quinn v. Gjoni (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-055-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-540 Appeals Court ZOË TIBERIUS QUINN[1] vs. ERON GJONI. No. 15-P-540. Suffolk. March 18, 2016. – May 19, 2016. Present: Milkey, Agnes, & Meade, JJ. Abuse Prevention. Protective Order. Practice, Civil, Appeal, Moot case. Jurisdiction. Moot Question. Complaint for protection from abuse filed in the Dorchester Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department on September 16, 2014. A hearing to extend an abuse prevention order was had before Serge Georges, Jr., J., and a motion to vacate the order was heard by James W. Coffey, J. Jeffrey G. Harris for the defendant. Felicia H. Ellsworth (Tasha J. Bahal & Daniel C. Wewers with her) for the plaintiff. Daniel J. Lyne & Theodore J. Folkman for Eugene Volokh & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. MILKEY, J. The plaintiff, Zoë Quinn, obtained an abuse prevention order against her ex-boyfriend, Eron Gjoni. That order included a provision restricting Gjoni’s ability to post information about Quinn online. On appeal, Gjoni principally argues that this provision impermissibly interfered with his rights pursuant to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and he urges us to reach those arguments even though the order is no longer in effect. For the reasons set forth below, we decline to do so. Background. Quinn is a designer of video games who — as both parties appear to agree — has become a controversial figure in gaming circles. The parties dated for several months. In seeking an abuse prevention order pursuant to G. L. c. 209A, § 3, Quinn alleged that Gjoni abused her in various respects, including through being violent toward her on one occasion. She also alleged that after she and Gjoni broke up, he published online a lengthy screed that included highly personal information about her, and that this in turn incited many third parties to harass her, including through making numerous “death and rape threats” to her. Gjoni concedes that he posted information about Quinn online, and he does not appear to contest that third parties have heaped significant abuse on her. Rather, the parties appear to dispute the extent to which Gjoni should be deemed legally responsible for causing the third parties to act as they have.[2] Quinn originally obtained the abuse prevention order (order) at an ex parte hearing held in the Dorchester Division […]
Commonwealth v. Nguyen (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-054-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-472 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. SON NGUYEN. No. 15-P-472. May 17, 2016. Practice, Criminal, Plea, Assistance of counsel. Constitutional Law, Plea, Assistance of counsel. Due Process of Law, Plea, Assistance of counsel. Alien. Shoplifting. In 2013, the defendant admitted to facts sufficient to prove three counts of shoplifting. A judge of the Dorchester Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department continued the cases without findings and imposed conditions of probation. After the defendant was found in violation of probation based on a new shoplifting offense, guilty findings were entered on the three underlying charges, and he was sentenced to ten days’ incarceration. The defendant subsequently filed a motion for a new trial seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas. Before us now is the defendant’s appeal of the order denying that motion without an evidentiary hearing, and of the order denying his motion for reconsideration. We affirm. In the defendant’s motion for a new trial, he argued that his plea counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to provide the defendant with adequate advice regarding the immigration consequences of his pleas. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 368-369 (2010). Because the record establishes that plea counsel did discuss with the defendant that his pleas could have negative immigration consequences,[1] the defendant is left to argue that counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him that he presumptively would be deported as a result of the pleas. See Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 468 Mass. 174, 180-182 (2014). As the defendant accurately notes, “[a]ny alien who . . . is convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude . . . is deportable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2008). There is some question, however, whether the defendant is correct in his assertion that the crime of shoplifting is a crime involving moral turpitude. See Mejia v. Holder, 756 F.3d 64, 68-69 (1st Cir. 2014). Compare Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 438, 442-443 (2014), with Commonwealth v. Cano, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 238, 245 n.14 (2015). However, even were we to assume arguendo that shoplifting constitutes such a crime, the defendant is still unable to show that he presumptively would be deported as a result of his pleas.[2] To the contrary, because it is undisputed that the defendant came to the United States from Vietnam prior to 1995, he enjoys a […]
Kain, et al. v. Department of Environmental Protection (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-066-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11961 ISABEL KAIN & others[1] vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION. Suffolk. January 8, 2016. – May 17, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Department of Environmental Protection. Environment, Air pollution. Regulation. Administrative Law, Regulations. Declaratory Relief. Statute, Construction. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on August 12, 2014. The case was heard by Robert B. Gordon, J., on motions for judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Jennifer K. Rushlow (Susan J. Kraham, of New York, & Veronica S. Eady with her) for Conservation Law Foundation & another. Jo Ann Shotwell Kaplan, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant. Phelps Turner & C. Dylan Sanders, for Isabel Kain & others, were present but did not argue. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Stephanie R. Parker for Clean Water Action & others. Edward J. DeWitt for Association to Preserve Cape Cod. Arthur P. Kreiger & Jessica A. Wall for William R. Moomaw & others. Robert J. Muldoon, Jr., & Thomas Paul Gorman for David A. Wirth. CORDY, J. In this case, we are asked to decide whether the Department of Environmental Protection (department) has fulfilled its statutory mandate under G. L. c. 21N, § 3 (d) (§ 3 [d]), which provides that the department “shall promulgate regulations establishing a desired level of declining annual aggregate emission limits for sources or categories of sources that emit greenhouse gas emissions.” By the terms of the enabling legislation, the Global Warming Solutions Act, St. 2008, c. 298 (act), these regulations were to be issued by January 1, 2012, to take effect on January 1, 2013, and to expire on December 31, 2020. See St. 2008, c. 298, § 16. The department failed to take action by the statutory deadline, and in November, 2012, a group of residents submitted a rulemaking petition to the department seeking the issuance of regulations pursuant to § 3 (d) to limit greenhouse gas emissions[2] in the Commonwealth. The department held a public hearing on June 13, 2013, to consider the petition. Shortly thereafter, it issued a written statement addressing the petitioners’ concerns and concluding that it had complied with the requirements of the act, including those set forth in § 3 (d). The statement also referenced […]
Categories: News Tags: 1006616, department, Environmental, Kain, Lawyers, Protection, Weekly
Wilson’s Case (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-053-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-112 Appeals Court DANIEL WILSON’S CASE. No. 15-P-112. Suffolk. March 22, 2016. – May 16, 2016. Present: Cypher, Wolohojian, & Carhart, JJ. Workers’ Compensation Act, Injuries to which act applies, Decision of Industrial Accident Reviewing Board, Findings by administrative judge, Expert opinion. Appeal from a decision of the Industrial Accident Reviewing Board. Sean M. Beagan for the employee. John J. Canniff, III, for the insurer. CYPHER, J. Daniel Wilson appeals from a decision of the reviewing board (board) of the Department of Industrial Accidents (DIA), which reversed a decision of the administrative judge in favor of Wilson, and dismissed his claim. We reverse the dismissal of the claim and reinstate the decision of the administrative judge in favor of Wilson. Wilson worked as a heavy equipment mechanic for Southworth Milton in 2006 when he was injured while repairing a hydraulic pump in a truck. Wilson was on his stomach, lying across the transmission of the truck with both arms fully extended in front of him. While using a pry bar in an attempt to skirt the weight on the back of the ninety-pound pump, he felt a stabbing pain in his neck, upper back, and both shoulders. Approximately nine days later Wilson was treated with a cortisone shot. Wilson testified that at that time his left shoulder felt tender, although his right shoulder was much worse. In September, 2007, surgery was performed on Wilson’s right shoulder. Wilson returned to work five and one-half weeks after his surgery and, as advised by his surgeon, Dr. Peter Noordsij, relied more on his left arm to compensate for lack of use of his right arm. Wilson’s left shoulder pain increased. Wilson filed a claim for worker’s compensation. Sentry Insurance Company (Sentry) settled the claim in 2008 with an approved lump sum payment of $ 2,500 to Wilson and an award of $ 5,000 for attorney’s fees to Wilson’s attorney.[1] See G. L. c. 152, §§ 19, 23. The 2008 settlement agreement specified that it covered injuries to Wilson’s right shoulder, neck, and upper back. Wilson continued to suffer bilateral shoulder pain after the lump sum award but was unable to obtain medical benefits. In 2011, Wilson filed a claim for payment of medical benefits for treatment of his left shoulder, as well as his right shoulder, from […]
Hanlon v. Town of Sheffield (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-052-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-799 Appeals Court JOHN R. HANLON, JR. vs. TOWN OF SHEFFIELD & others.[1] No. 15-P-799. Suffolk. March 7, 2016. – May 13, 2016. Present: Kafker, C.J., Katzmann, & Grainger, JJ. Zoning, Private airstrip, Validity of by-law or ordinance. Statute, Construction. Municipal Corporations, By-laws and ordinances. Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on March 21, 2012. The case was heard by Howard P. Speicher, J., on a motion for summary judgment. Alexandra H. Glover for the plaintiff. Peter Sacks, State Solicitor, for Department of Transportation, amicus curiae. GRAINGER, J. The plaintiff John R. Hanlon, Jr., appeals from summary judgment entered in favor of the defendants, ruling that the town of Sheffield (town) was authorized to regulate the plaintiff’s use of his property as a private noncommercial aircraft landing area notwithstanding the regulatory authority of the Massachusetts Department of Transportation aeronautics division (division).[2] In reversing the judgment we acknowledge that the motion judge was confronted, as are we, with statutory language in G. L. c. 90, § 39B, that undermines the evident purpose of the statute, and we note that this is an appropriate subject for corrective legislation.[3] Background. The facts are undisputed. The plaintiff owns approximately thirty-eight acres of land (property) in the town, containing the plaintiff’s residence and a number of outbuildings suitable for storage of small airplanes. On the property, the plaintiff created a strip eighty feet wide by 1,250 feet long for takeoff and landing of airplanes and, since at least 2006, has operated aircraft from the property as a hobby. In 2006, the plaintiff registered the property with the Federal Aviation Administration as a helipad. Pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 39B, fourth par., he also registered the property as a noncommercial private restricted landing area (PRLA) with the division. He neither sought nor received any approval from the town with respect to the PRLA. The property is located in a rural district under the town zoning by-law. Section 3.1 of the by-law provides that land may not be “used except as set forth in the . . . Table of Use Regulations.” The section further provides that “[a]ny . . . use of premises not herein expressly permitted is hereby prohibited.” Although “commercial airfield” is listed as a prohibited use in rural districts, the Table of Use Regulations contains no mention of noncommercial […]
Commonwealth v. Mattier (and five companion cases) (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-065-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11924 SJC-11960 COMMONWEALTH vs. BRANDEN E. MATTIER (and five companion cases[1]). Suffolk. January 7, 2016. – May 13, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Larceny. False Impersonation & Identity Fraud. Fraud. Conspiracy. Attempt. Search and Seizure, Arrest. Evidence, Identity, Fraud, Conspiracy. Jury and Jurors. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Jury and jurors, Argument by prosecutor. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on August 29, 2013. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Kenneth W. Salinger, J., and the cases were tried before Jeffrey A. Locke, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted applications for direct appellate review. Rebecca A. Jacobstein, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for Branden E. Mattier. William S. Smith for Domunique D. Grice. Randall E. Ravitz, Assistant Attorney General (Gina M. Masotta, Assistant Attorney General, with him) for the Commonwealth. HINES, J. The defendants, Branden E. Mattier and his half-brother Domunique D. Grice, were convicted by a jury on indictments charging one count each of conspiracy to commit larceny, G. L. c. 274, § 7, and attempted larceny, G. L. c. 274, § 6. Mattier also was convicted on an indictment charging one count of identity fraud, G. L. c. 266, § 37E. The charges stemmed from an attempt by the defendants to defraud The One Fund Boston (One Fund) of approximately $ 2 million by claiming that a long-deceased aunt had been injured in the 2013 bombing at the finish line of the Boston Marathon.[2] The judge imposed on each defendant a State prison sentence of from three years to three years and one day on the conspiracy count and three years’ probation on the attempted larceny count, to run from and after the committed sentence. Mattier was sentenced to an additional concurrent probationary term for his conviction of identity fraud. The defendants appealed, and we granted their applications for direct appellate review.[3] Although the appeals were not formally consolidated, we have treated them as such, given the substantial congruence of the issues raised by the defendants.[4] Mattier contends that his conviction of identity fraud fails as a matter of law because the charged conduct is insufficient to meet the elements of the statute. Both defendants claim that the judge erred in (1) denying the motion to suppress evidence obtained […]
Commonwealth v. Miranda (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-064-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12058 COMMONWEALTH vs. WAYNE MIRANDA. May 12, 2016. Practice, Criminal, Postconviction relief. Joint Enterprise. Evidence, Joint venturer. Wayne Miranda was convicted of murder in the second degree and other offenses in 2008, and this court affirmed the convictions. Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458 Mass. 100 (2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011). Miranda has filed a petition in the Federal District Court for a writ of habeas corpus. A Federal judge stayed the petition and held it in abeyance to permit Miranda to exhaust State remedies. Miranda accordingly filed a motion for relief from unlawful restraint pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), and a judge in the Superior Court denied the motion. We granted Miranda’s application for direct appellate review. We affirm. At issue is whether, on direct appeal, we properly applied Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449 (2009), to determine that the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions. In Zanetti, we clarified the legal principles concerning joint venture liability. Id. at 461-468. In particular, we stated that, in an appeal following a conviction, we will “examine whether the evidence is sufficient to permit a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly participated in the commission of the crime charged, with the intent required to commit the crime, rather than examine the sufficiency of the evidence separately as to principal and joint venture liability.” Id. at 468. Miranda argues that this reformulation applies only to cases tried after we decided Zanetti and that our application of it to his case violated ex post facto principles and his due process rights. Since deciding Zanetti, we have made it clear that “[w]e apply the principles clarified in [Zanetti] to claims concerning the sufficiency of the evidence of joint venture, even though the trial preceded that decision.” Commonwealth v. Benitez, 464 Mass. 686, 689 n.5 (2013). “[T]he only prospective application of the principles announced in our Zanetti decision pertains to our recommended jury instruction.” Commonwealth v. Jansen, 459 Mass. 21, 28 n.20 (2011). Moreover, our decision in Zanetti “d[id] not enlarge or diminish the scope of existing joint venture liability,” but was intended simply “to provide clearer guidance to jurors and diminish the risk of juror confusion in cases where two or […]
Commonwealth v. Williams (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-051-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-1111 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. ANTONIO WILLIAMS. No. 14-P-1111. Plymouth. November 17, 2015. – May 12, 2016. Present: Cypher, Trainor, & Rubin, JJ. Practice, Criminal, Plea, Sentence. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on July 26, 2010, and April 22, 2011. Motions to withdraw guilty pleas, filed on June 3, 2013, and January 30, 2014, were heard by Paul A. Chernoff, J., Special Judicial Magistrate, and an order affirming the proposed order of the Special Judicial Magistrate was entered by Frank M. Gaziano, J. Jason Howard for the defendant. Laurie Yeshulas, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. CYPHER, J. The defendant, Antonio Williams, appeals from the denial of his motions to withdraw his guilty pleas pursuant to Mass.R.Crim.P. 30(b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001). The offenses were set forth in two sets of indictments that charged unrelated gun and drug crimes. The defendant argues that because the guilty pleas were based, in part, on drug tests performed by Annie Dookhan at the Hinton State Laboratory Institute (Hinton laboratory), the subsequent discovery of Dookhan’s pervasive wrongdoing requires the reversal of the convictions.[1] The first set of indictments (the gun case) arose after the police responded to a report of domestic violence at the home of the defendant’s girl friend on April 14, 2010. Upon their arrival, the police were informed by the girl friend that the defendant had threatened her. While there, police also saw loose ammunition and a loaded firearm, both of which the defendant admitted were his. The defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm (G. L. c. 269, § 10[a]); unlawful possession of a loaded firearm (G. L. c. 269, § 10[n]); unlawful possession of ammunition without an FID card (G. L. c. 269, § 10[h]); and threat to commit a crime (G. L. c. 275, § 2). The first indictment, charging unlawful possession of a firearm, also alleged that the defendant previously had been convicted of three predicate offenses, namely, armed masked robbery as a juvenile, possession with intent to distribute marijuana and “crack” cocaine on June 21, 2006 (No. 0615CR4295) (the 2006 drug charges), and possession with intent to distribute a class B substance on July 29, 2007 (No. 0715CR005623) (the 2007 drug charges),[2] thus subjecting him to enhanced sentencing […]