Anesthesia Associates of Massachusetts, PC v. Plexus Anesthesia Services of Massachusetts, PC (Lawyers Weekly No. 09-016-18)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT. 1884CV00375-BLS2 ____________________ ANAESTHESIA ASSOCIATES OF MASSACHUSETTS, PC v. PLEXUS ANESTHESIA SERVICES OF MASSACHUSETTS, PC ____________________ MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Anaesthesia Associates of Massachusetts, PC (“AAM”) claims that defendant Plexus Anesthesia Services of Massachusetts, PC (“PASM”) owes it at least $ 2.0 million for past anesthesia services. AAM asks the Court to enter a preliminary injunction that would PASM from transferring or encumbering any assets, or from making any payments of any funds except for paying wages to its employees, paying its attorneys, or paying rent, utilities, and taxes. AAM asserts that it will suffer irreparable harm without the requested injunction because PASM has been making and would continue to make preferential payments to entities other than AAM, thereby preventing from receiving money it is still owed for past services rendered. “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). To the contrary, “the significant remedy of a preliminary injunction should not be granted unless the plaintiffs had made a clear showing of entitlement thereto.” Student No. 9 v. Board of Educ., 440 Mass. 752, 762 (2004). “Trial judges have broad discretion to grant or deny injunctive relief.” Lightlab Imaging, Inc. v. Axsun Technologies, Inc., 469 Mass. 181, 194 (2014). The Court will DENY this motion for a preliminary injunction for two reasons: AAM has not met its burden of proving irreparable harm, and the broad relief it seeks is not permitted without a judgment under Massachusetts law.1 1 At the close of the oral argument, the Court stated that it was also persuaded that granting the preliminary injunction sought by AAM would be against the public interest because it would materially interfere with PASM’s ability to provide anesthesiology services to its hospital clients. However, the Massachusetts Appeals Court has held that it is reversible error for a trial court to consider harm to the public interest as a factor in granting or denying a preliminary injunction in a case like this – 2 – 1. Failure to Prove Irreparable Harm. As the moving party, AAM has the “burden of showing it would suffer an irreparable harm absent an injunction.” GTE Products Corp. v. Stewart, 414 Mass. 721, 726 (1993). AAM asserts that it will suffer irreparable harm without the proposed preliminary injunction because PASM has been making preferential payments to another entity. The sole evidence supporting that assertion is a statement made “upon information and belief” by AAM’s chief operating officer. But assertions in an affidavit or verified complaint made on “information and belief” that are not supported by any other evidence […]
Categories: News Tags: 0901618, Anesthesia, Associates, Lawyers, massachusetts, Plexus, Services, Weekly
Commonwealth v. Manha (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-034-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12342 COMMONWEALTH vs. ANTHONY F. MANHA. Suffolk. December 5, 2017. – February 28, 2018. Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Investigatory stop, Reasonable suspicion. Search and Seizure, Reasonable suspicion, Threshold police inquiry, Protective sweep. Threshold Police Inquiry. Complaint received and sworn to in the South Boston Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department on July 10, 2012. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Ernest L. Sarason, Jr., J., and following transfer to the Central Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department, the case was tried before Tracey-Lee Jones, J. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. Leah Hook for the defendant. Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. BUDD, J. Here we address the authority of the police to stop and perform a Terry-type search of a motor vehicle after an anonymous 911 caller reported that the driver of that vehicle threatened the caller, a fellow motorist, with a gun. The driver, defendant Anthony F. Manha, appeals from a conviction of assault with a dangerous weapon. The Appeals Court affirmed in an unpublished memorandum and order pursuant to its rule 1:28. Commonwealth v. Manha, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 1105 (2017). We granted the defendant’s application for further appellate review. He claims that the police lacked probable cause to stop him and that, therefore, the pellet gun found subsequently in his vehicle should have been suppressed. We conclude that, in these circumstances, the information that the police possessed gave them reasonable suspicion to stop and perform a protective sweep of the defendant’s motor vehicle, and that, given the officers’ safety concerns, reasonable suspicion was all that was required. We therefore affirm the conviction. Background. We present the facts as found by the motion judge. On July 9, 2012, while on patrol, Trooper John Guest of the State police received a radio call of a then-ongoing 911 call from a motorist regarding a road rage incident. According to the 911 caller, an individual in another motor vehicle had pointed a gun at her as she traveled southbound on Route 93 in Boston. She described the gunman as a white male in […]
Cormier, et al. v. City of Lynn, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-033-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12323 ALYSSA CORMIER & another[1] vs. CITY OF LYNN & others.[2] Essex. November 9, 2017. – February 27, 2018. Present: Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. Governmental Immunity. Municipal Corporations, Liability for tort, Governmental immunity. School and School Committee, Liability for tort. Negligence, Governmental immunity. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on March 2, 2011. A motion to dismiss was heard by Robert N. Tochka, J. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. Douglas K. Sheff (Sara W. Khan, Frank J. Federico, Jr., & Donald R. Grady, Jr., also present) for the plaintiffs. James P. Lamanna, Assistant City Solicitor (George S. Markopoulos, Assistant City Solicitor, also present) for city of Lynn. Gary Buseck, Patience Crozier, & Joseph N. Schneiderman, for GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. BUDD, J. Bullying is a persistent, pernicious problem in our schools — it can cause emotional and, at times, physical harm. In this case, Matthew Mumbauer suffered both. Matthew was a public elementary school student in Lynn when he was pushed down a stairwell at school by a classmate. Matthew’s fall led to a spinal injury, resulting in permanent paralysis. He and his parents, Alyssa Cormier and James Mumbauer (collectively, plaintiffs), brought claims against a number of defendants in connection with the incident and Matthew’s subsequent medical care. A Superior Court judge allowed a motion to dismiss all claims against the city of Lynn, Lynn Public Schools (school district), and their public employees (collectively, public defendants).[3] The Appeals Court affirmed that decision in an unpublished memorandum and order issued pursuant to its rule 1:28. Cormier v. Lynn, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 1101 (2017). We allowed the plaintiffs’ motion for further appellate review, limited to whether the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (act), G. L. c. 258, § 10 (j), bars the plaintiffs from bringing claims against the public defendants in relation to this incident. Thus, the issue that we must decide is not whether the school was negligent for failing to act reasonably to prevent the bullying that led to Matthew’s injuries; the complaint alleges that it was, and for purposes of this appeal, we accept that allegation as true. Rather, […]
Institution for Savings in Newburyport v. Langis, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-023-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 17-P-4 Appeals Court INSTITUTION FOR SAVINGS IN NEWBURYPORT AND ITS VICINITY vs. MATTHEW LANGIS & another.[1] No. 17-P-4. Essex. November 6, 2017. – February 27, 2018. Present: Kinder, Desmond, & Sacks, JJ. Judgment, Default, Relief from judgment. Practice, Civil, Default, Relief from judgment. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on December 19, 2014. A motion for relief from judgment, filed on February 26, 2016, was heard by Elizabeth M. Fahey. Eric P. Magnuson (Joseph T. Toomey also present) for the plaintiff. Kevin J. O’Connor for Infinex Investments, Inc. SACKS, J. This appeal raises a question regarding the procedure to be followed when a plaintiff files a properly supported application for default judgment for failure to serve interrogatory answers under Mass.R.Civ.P. 33(a)(4), as appearing in 436 Mass. 1401 (2002), but no final judgment can enter because damages have not yet been determined. The question is whether a defendant seeking relief from the initial action on such an application must satisfy the “excusable neglect” standard under Mass.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1), 365 Mass. 828 (1974), requiring “unique or extraordinary” circumstances, Feltch v. General Rental Co., 383 Mass. 603, 614 (1981) (quotation omitted), or merely the less demanding “good cause” standard for removal of a default under Mass.R.Civ.P. 55(c), 365 Mass. 822 (1974), i.e., “a good reason for failing to . . . defend in a timely manner and . . . meritorious defenses.” Johnny’s Oil Co. v. Eldayha, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 705, 708 (2012). Our prior decisions strongly suggest, and we now determine, that rule 55(c)’s good cause standard governs. Background. The case arises out of a complaint filed in the Superior Court involving a commercial dispute. On December 18, 2015, after the defendant Infinex Investments, Inc. (Infinex), missed a previously extended deadline for serving interrogatory answers on the plaintiff, Institution for Savings in Newburyport and its Vicinity (IFS), IFS served a final request for answers pursuant to rule 33(a)(3). On January 28, 2016 — the day after Infinex’s final rule 33(a)(4) deadline for serving such answers expired — IFS filed a properly supported “application for default judgment,” pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 33(a)(6), as appearing in 454 Mass. 1404 (2009), which included a request for a hearing on damages, pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2), as amended, 463 Mass. 1401 (2012). IFS’s application and accompanying […]
Categories: News Tags: 1102318, Institution, Langis, Lawyers, Newburyport, Savings, Weekly
Carey v. Gatehouse Media Massachusetts I, Inc. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-024-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 17-P-82 Appeals Court SUZANNE E. CAREY, personal representative,[1] vs. GATEHOUSE MEDIA MASSACHUSETTS I, INC. No. 17-P-82. Norfolk. September 14, 2017. – February 27, 2018. Present: Green, Sullivan, & Sacks, JJ. Independent Contractor Act. Newspaper. Carrier. Federal Preemption. Statute, Federal preemption. Waiver. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment, Waiver. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on September 22, 2011. Motions for summary judgment were heard by Angel Kelley Brown, J.; the entry of separate and final judgment was ordered by her; and a motion for postjudgment relief was heard by her. Mark W. Batten for the defendant. James W. Simpson, Jr., for the plaintiff. Peter J. Caruso & Robert J. Ambrogi, for Massachusetts Newspaper Publishers Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. SACKS, J. Defendant GateHouse Media Massachusetts I, Inc. (GateHouse), publisher of the Patriot Ledger newspaper, appeals from a separate and final judgment under Mass.R.Civ.P. 54(b), 365 Mass. 821 (1974), declaring that David King, who had delivered the Patriot Ledger by automobile to some of its subscribers, was, under G. L. c. 149, § 148B (§ 148B), GateHouse’s employee rather than an independent contractor. Gatehouse also appeals from the denial of its motion for relief from the rule 54(b) judgment, which asserted that the relevant portion of § 148B is preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA), codified at 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). We affirm.[2] Background. We recount certain undisputed material facts from the summary judgment record, reserving for later discussion the details of GateHouse’s contract with King. GateHouse, a subsidiary of New York-based GateHouse Media, “publishes and distributes” a variety of daily and weekly newspapers within Massachusetts. Gatehouse describes itself as a publisher and distributor of publications in its “Wholesale Agreements” with newspaper delivery drivers such as King. GateHouse employs a sales and advertising department, which works to increase circulation and advertising revenue. Among GateHouse’s newspapers is the Patriot Ledger, published on all five weekday afternoons and on Saturday mornings. GateHouse distributes the Patriot Ledger out of a distribution center in Braintree, employing supervisors, district managers, distribution managers, and others to manage that process. GateHouse has three main distribution methods. First, to distribute the newspaper to residential and business subscribers, GateHouse enters into agreements with individual carriers,[3] whom it classifies as independent contractors. The carriers are required […]
Commonwealth v. Bowen (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-022-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-1413 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. JAMES M. BOWEN. No. 16-P-1413. Norfolk. October 4, 2017. – February 23, 2018. Present: Green, Hanlon, & Neyman, JJ. Due Process of Law, Probation revocation, Hearing. Practice, Criminal, Revocation of probation, Probation, Stipulation, Waiver, Assistance of counsel, Sentence, Waiver. Waiver. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on September 2, 1999. A proceeding for revocation of probation was heard by Thomas A. Connors, J.; a motion to reconsider was considered by Douglas Wilkins, J.; and a motion for a new hearing was heard by Connors, J. Stacey Gross Marmor for the defendant. Tracey A. Cusick, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. NEYMAN, J. In Commonwealth v. Sayyid, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 479 (2014), this court held that a defendant’s agreement to waive a probation violation hearing must be knowing and voluntary. Id. at 480, 489. Here, we are asked to determine whether a defendant’s stipulation during a probation violation hearing to two alleged violations constituted a breach of due process within the meaning of Sayyid. We hold that the stipulation did not fall within the ambit of Sayyid, and we discern no due process violation. Accordingly, we affirm. Background. 1. Convictions and alleged probation violations. In 2001, the defendant pleaded guilty in Superior Court to six counts of aggravated rape. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of eight to ten years in State prison on the first five counts, and a twelve-year sentence of probation to be served from and after the State prison sentences on the sixth count.[1] The defendant was released from custody in September, 2010, and began serving the twelve-year probation sentence. In June, 2013, the defendant was issued a “Notice of Surrender and hearing(s) for alleged violation(s) of Probation” (notice of probation violation). He stipulated that he had violated the probation conditions, and his probation was extended for an additional year with modified conditions. In October, 2013, the defendant was issued another notice of probation violation. Following a probation violation hearing in December, 2013, the defendant was again found to have violated the probation conditions, but he was still not incarcerated. Instead, his probation was further extended to 2030 with added conditions. On April 16, 2014, a third notice of probation violation was issued and […]
WorldWide TechServices, LLC v. Commissioner of Revenue, et al. (and three consolidated cases) (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-032-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12328 WORLDWIDE TECHSERVICES, LLC vs. COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE & another[1] (and three consolidated cases[2]). Suffolk. November 7, 2017. – February 22, 2018. Present: Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. Taxation, Abatement, Sales and use tax. Practice, Civil, Abatement, Intervention. Administrative Law, Intervention. Due Process of Law, Intervention in civil action. Appeal from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Edward D. Rapacki for the intervener. John A. Shope (Michael Hoven also present) for the taxpayers. Daniel J. Hammond, Assistant Attorney General (Daniel A. Shapiro also present) for Commissioner of Revenue. Ben Robbins & Martin J. Newhouse, for New England Legal Foundation, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. KAFKER, J. Fifteen years and three Supreme Judicial Court decisions ago, this protracted case commenced regarding taxes imposed on computer service contracts. The litigation began when purchasers of the service contracts filed a putative class action against the sellers,[3] claiming under G. L. c. 93A that the imposition of these taxes was unlawful and an unfair and deceptive practice. The sellers successfully moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the terms of the computer service contracts, and a judge in the Superior Court eventually confirmed the award. The next chapter in this tax saga, and the one we are required to decide today, then ensued. For the sole and express purpose of hedging their bets in response to the class action, the sellers had applied for tax abatements from the Commissioner of Revenue (commissioner) beginning in 2004. The commissioner denied the applications, and the sellers petitioned the Appellate Tax Board (board). The appellant, Econo-Tennis Management Corp., doing business as Dedham Health and Athletic Complex (Dedham Health), one of the consumers who purchased these service contracts, moved to intervene in the proceedings, which the board allowed. Thereafter, the board, with certain exceptions, reversed the decision of the commissioner and allowed the abatements, ordering the parties to compute the amounts to be abated. Taxes totaling $ 215.55 were imposed on the service contracts purchased by Dedham Health.[4] After the class action litigation on the claims under G. L. c. 93A ended in the sellers’ favor, the sellers withdrew their tax abatement petitions with prejudice. Dedham Health moved to strike the withdrawals. The […]
Categories: News Tags: 1003218, cases, Commissioner, consolidated, Lawyers, Revenue, TechServices, three, Weekly, WorldWide
Commonwealth v. Hilaire (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-021-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-1528 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. JAMES CHARLES HILAIRE. No. 16-P-1528. Plymouth. October 6, 2017. – February 21, 2018. Present: Wolohojian, Maldonado, & Wendlandt, JJ. Armed Home Invasion. Robbery. Firearms. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Reasonable suspicion. Search and Seizure, Reasonable suspicion. Evidence, Judicial notice. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Findings by judge. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on October 29, 2014. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Cornelius J. Moriarty, II, J. An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal was allowed by Fernande R. V. Duffly, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by her to the Appeals Court. David D. Nielson for the defendant. Carolyn A. Burbine, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. WOLOHOJIAN, J. At issue is whether there was reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant and search his backpack several hours after an armed home invasion had occurred nearby. Taking judicial notice of demographic data he located on his own initiative, the Superior Court judge concluded there was reasonable suspicion and denied the defendant’s motion to suppress. The demographic data should not have been relied upon, both because the judge should not have expanded the factual record with independent research taken on his own initiative without notice to the parties and because they were not relevant. Nonetheless, we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress because we conclude that the facts elicited at the evidentiary hearing established reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant.[1] On July 29, 2014, at approximately 3:05 A.M., East Bridgewater police responded to the area of 601 North Central Street to investigate a report of an armed home invasion with shots fired.[2] It was reported that a large amount of cash and jewelry had been taken. The suspects were described as several young black males, two of whom were carrying backpacks. There was no further description of the men, their features, or their appearance, except that they were said to be wearing “regular clothes.” A short time after the home invasion, three black men fled from a red Toyota Camry in front of 505 North Central Street, leaving the doors of the vehicle open as they ran into neighboring woods. […]
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-020-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-1569 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. JUAN CARLOS RODRIGUEZ. No. 16-P-1569. Suffolk. November 3, 2017. – February 20, 2018. Present: Wolohojian, Massing, & Wendlandt, JJ. Controlled Substances. Evidence, Field Drug Test, Scientific test, Indictment. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on August 5, 2009. The case was tried before Linda E. Giles, J. Edward Crane for the defendant. Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. MASSING, J. In yet another case affected by the wrongdoing of former State chemist Annie Dookhan, see generally Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336 (2013); Bridgeman v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 476 Mass. 298 (2017) (Bridgeman), we must reverse a defendant’s conviction of trafficking in heroin. See G. L. c. 94C, § 32E(c). In an effort to cure the taint from Dookhan’s association with the case as primary chemist, a police officer testified that he performed a field test of the substance seized from the defendant, which proved that the substance was heroin. The testimony was admitted, over the defendant’s objection, without establishing the scientific reliability of the field test. We conclude that the admission of this evidence was prejudicial error and that the defendant is entitled to a new trial. Background. We recite the basic facts as the jury could have found them, reserving other facts for later discussion. On April 27, 2009, officers of the Boston police department’s drug control unit went to the housing development where the defendant, Juan Carlos Rodriguez, lived to execute three search warrants: one for the defendant’s apartment, one for his motor vehicle, and one for his person. Once inside the defendant’s apartment, the officers used a key recovered from the defendant’s motor vehicle to open a locked bedroom door. In the bedroom’s closet, the police found a total of $ 13,270, a digital scale, and a small pouch that contained nine individually wrapped packages, or “fingers,”[1] of a substance that resembled sidewalk chalk. A search of the defendant’s person yielded two similar packages. Officer Robert England took the eleven packages to the police station and conducted a field test using a NarcoPouch 924 test kit manufactured by Safariland. The NarcoPouch 924 test kit is a small, sealed rubber pouch that contains three glass vials filled with chemical solutions. England unsealed […]
Commonwealth v. Jones (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-031-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-10944 COMMONWEALTH vs. RYAN JONES. Bristol. November 10, 2017. – February 20, 2018. Present: Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. Homicide. Mental Impairment. Developmentally Disabled Person. Constitutional Law, Sentence, Cruel and unusual punishment. Practice, Criminal, Competency to stand trial, Sentence. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on August 17, 2006. A hearing on the defendant’s competency to stand trial was held before D. Lloyd Macdonald, J., and the case was tried before Gary A. Nickerson, J. Brett J. Vottero for the defendant. Shoshana E. Stern, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Gaziano, J. A Superior Court jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty in the death of Valerie Oransky on July 22, 2006. Prior to and during trial, the defendant maintained that he was not competent to stand trial due to an organic brain injury he had suffered as an infant and a current diagnosis of pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified. The defendant was the subject of competency hearings before five different Superior Court judges, and was found competent to stand trial at the first, third, fourth, and fifth hearings. At trial, his defense was that he was not criminally responsible. On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge who conducted his third competency hearing erred in finding him competent to stand trial notwithstanding testimony from both prosecution and defense experts that the defendant was not competent. He also argues that a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole, imposed on a developmentally disabled individual, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Federal and State constitutional rights. Finally, the defendant asks us to use our extraordinary power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial or reduce the verdict. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the conviction and decline to exercise our authority to grant relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. Procedural history. In August, 2006, a grand jury indicted the defendant on one charge of murder in the first degree. He was arraigned in the Superior Court in September, 2006, and pleaded not guilty. In October, 2007, defense counsel filed a motion seeking an examination of the defendant for […]