Posts tagged "Casey"

Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Casey, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-034-17)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   16-P-32                                         Appeals Court   LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY  vs.  RYAN CASEY & another.[1]     No. 16-P-32.   Essex.     November 7, 2016. – March 29, 2017.   Present:  Cypher, Massing, & Sacks, JJ.     Insurance, Homeowner’s insurance, Insurer’s obligation to defend.  Intentional Conduct.       Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on May 22, 2014.   The case was heard by Robert A. Cornetta, J., on motions for summary judgment.     Richard J. Fallon for Ryan Casey. Joseph M. Orlando, Jr., for Evan Williams. John P. Graceffa for the plaintiff.     SACKS, J.  Twice on the same evening, after consuming alcohol and marijuana, Ryan Casey attacked Evan Williams without warning, punching and kicking him in the face and causing him serious bodily injury.  Casey later admitted that he “intend[ed] to touch” Williams, and that he understood, at least at the time of his deposition, that “[w]hen you hit somebody with a fist . . . you know you’re going to do some level of injury.”  Williams subsequently made a claim under the homeowners insurance policy on Casey’s familial home.  The insurer, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual), responded by commencing this action seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or to indemnify Casey, or to pay medical expenses for Williams, due to an exclusion in the policy for bodily injury “[w]hich is expected or intended by the insured.”  On cross motions for summary judgment, a Superior Court judge ruled in favor of Liberty Mutual, concluding as a matter of law that Casey expected or intended to cause Williams bodily injury.  Williams and Casey appeal, arguing that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding Casey’s intent to injure.[2]  We affirm. Background.  We recount certain undisputed material facts from the summary judgment record, reserving for later discussion the facts concerning Casey’s intent.  On the evening of June 26, 2013, Casey, then seventeen years old, attended the St. Peter’s fiesta celebration (fiesta) in Gloucester with two friends, Dylan Chaney and Forrest Turner.  Prior to arriving, Casey had consumed alcohol and smoked marijuana.[3]  At some point while at the fiesta, Casey encountered Williams, also seventeen years old, and the two left on foot in the company of Chaney and Turner, allegedly to go smoke marijuana.[4]  After the group arrived at a remote location nearby, Casey […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - March 29, 2017 at 10:02 pm

Categories: News   Tags: , , , , , , , ,

Bank of America, N.A. v. Casey (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-083-16)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   SJC-11943   BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.  vs.  DEBORA A. CASEY, trustee.[1]        February 11, 2016. – June 16, 2016.   Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.     Mortgage, Validity.  Real Property, Mortgage.       Certification of questions of law to the Supreme Judicial Court by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.     Adam C. Ponte for the defendant. Mark B. Johnson for the plaintiff. Lawrence P. Heffernan & Danielle Andrews Long, for The Abstract Club & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.     BOTSFORD, J.  We consider two questions certified to this court by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (First Circuit).[2]  The questions, which arise in connection with a bankruptcy proceeding, concern the power and effect of an affidavit of an attorney executed pursuant to G. L. c. 183, § 5B, in relation to a mortgage containing a defective certificate of acknowledgment.  The two questions ask: “1.  May an affidavit executed and recorded pursuant to [G. L. c.] 183, § 5B, attesting to the proper acknowledgment of a recorded mortgage containing a Certificate of Acknowledgment that omits the name of the mortgagor, correct what the parties say is a material defect in the Certificate of Acknowledgment of that mortgage?   “2.  May an affidavit executed and recorded pursuant to [G. L. c.] 183, § 5B, attesting to the proper acknowledgment of a recorded mortgage containing a Certificate of Acknowledgment that omits the name of the mortgagor, provide constructive notice of the existence of the mortgage to a bona fide purchaser, either independently or in combination with the mortgage?”   For the reasons that follow, we answer both questions yes, in certain circumstances.[3] 1.  Background.[4]  By quitclaim deed dated September 29, 1999, Alvaro and Lisa Pereira (collectively, Pereiras) acquired title to the property located at 107 Colonial Drive in New Bedford (property).  On October 1, 1999, the deed was recorded with the Southern Bristol County registry of deeds (registry).  On December 27, 2005, the Pereiras refinanced the property, granting to Bank of America, N.A. (bank), a mortgage in the principal amount of $ 240,000.  The Pereiras individually initialed the bottom of each page of the mortgage agreement except the signature page, on which the full signature of each appears.  Attorney Raymond J. Quintin also signed […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - June 16, 2016 at 4:41 pm

Categories: News   Tags: , , , , , ,

Plumb, et al. v. Casey (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-155-14)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   SJC-11519   EVE PLUMB & others[1]  vs.  DEBORA A. CASEY, trustee.[2]       Suffolk.     April 8, 2014. – September 8, 2014.   Present:  Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ.[3]     Art.  Consignment.       Certification of a question of law to the Supreme Judicial Court by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts.     Andrew Z. Schwartz (Joshua S. Pemstein with him) for the plaintiffs. Kathleen R. Cruickshank for the defendant. Steven B. Levine, Nicolas M. Dunn, William D. Currie, & Jessica T. Lu, for Arts & Business Council of Greater Boston & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.     DUFFLY, J.  The consignment of fine art is governed by G. L. c. 104A, which provides that, upon delivery of a work of fine art to a consignee, the consignor shall provide a written statement with specified information about the work.[4]  See G. L. c. 104A, § 2 (b).  A judge of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts has certified the following question pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 1:03, as appearing in 382 Mass. 700 (1981), concerning the effect of a consignor’s failure to deliver a written statement as required by G. L. c. 104A, § 2 (b): “Under Mass. Gen. Laws. c. 104A, the Massachusetts fine art consignment statute (‘Chapter 104A’), must a consignor transmit a written ‘statement of delivery’ to a consignee as a necessary prerequisite to the formation of a ‘consignment’; or, alternatively, under Chapter 104A does a consignment arise upon the delivery by a consignor, and acceptance by a consignee, of a work of fine art for sale on consignment, regardless of whether a written ‘statement of delivery’ is sent by the consignor?”   For the reasons we discuss, we answer, “No, a written statement of delivery is not a prerequisite for the formation of a consignment under G. L. c. 104A.” Background.  We summarize certain undisputed facts in the order of certification and in the record before us.  Kenneth Wynne, III, and Allison Wynne (the Wynnes) owned and operated Wynne Fine Art, Inc. (Wynne Gallery), in Chatham.  Wynne Gallery accepted art works that the creditor artists delivered to the gallery, and agreed to sell the art works and pay fifty per cent of the proceeds to the creditor artists.  In 2013, the Wynnes filed for personal bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the United […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - September 8, 2014 at 5:09 pm

Categories: News   Tags: , , , ,