Posts tagged "Central"

Central Ceilings, Inc. v. Suffolk Construction Company, Inc., et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-036-17)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   15-P-1117                                       Appeals Court   CENTRAL CEILINGS, INC.  vs.  SUFFOLK CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. & others.[1]     No. 15-P-1117.   Suffolk.     October 7, 2016. – March 29, 2017.   Present:  Agnes, Maldonado, & Desmond, JJ.     Contract, Construction contract, Subcontractor, Damages.  Damages, Breach of contract, Attorney’s fees.  Practice, Civil, Attorney’s fees, Discovery.     Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on October 3, 2006.   The case was heard by S. Jane Haggerty, J.; an award of attorney’s fees was entered by her; and a motion for reconsideration was considered by Judith Fabricant, J.     Joel Lewin (John P. Connelly also present) for the defendants. Paul R. Mordarski (Thomas J. Fullam also present) for the plaintiff.     DESMOND, J.  After a jury-waived trial, a Superior Court judge entered judgment awarding the plaintiff, Central Ceilings, Inc. (Central), $ 321,315 on its breach of contract claim for damages for loss of productivity incurred while acting as a subcontractor for defendant Suffolk Construction Company, Inc. (Suffolk), on a large construction project.  This case is before us on cross appeals. Suffolk challenges the judgment,[2] claiming, inter alia, that Central’s claim was barred by the “no-damages-for-delay” clause in the subcontract between the parties, and that the judge erred in ruling that Central had established its claim for damages by the “total cost” method.  Suffolk further challenges the judge’s award of $ 471,682 in attorney’s fees to Central, claiming that it was wrongfully denied discovery and a hearing prior to the entry of that award. On its cross appeal, Central challenges the judge’s holding that the “pay-if-paid” clause in the subcontract barred it from recovering $ 82,538 from Suffolk for unpaid change order requests (CORs).  For the reasons set forth herein, the judgment on the merits entered on December 20, 2013, and the amended judgment for attorney’s fees entered on September 9, 2014, are affirmed. Background.  First, we set forth the basic material facts, drawing extensively from the trial judge’s thoughtful and thorough findings of fact, rulings of law, and decision.  The Massachusetts State College Building Authority (MSCBA) hired Suffolk to serve as general contractor on the construction of three interconnected dormitories at what is now known as Westfield State University (the project).  As the dormitories were to be ready for occupancy by students arriving for the fall semester in 2005, the contract […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - March 29, 2017 at 6:26 pm

Categories: News   Tags: , , , , , , , ,

Moroney Body Works, Inc. v. Central Insurance Companies (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-093-15)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   14-P-422                                        Appeals Court   MORONEY BODY WORKS, INC.  vs.  CENTRAL INSURANCE COMPANIES. No. 14-P-422. Worcester.     January 12, 2015. – August 6, 2015.   Present:  Fecteau, Wolohojian, & Massing, JJ.     Insurance, Fire, Property damage, Construction of policy, Coverage, Amount of recovery for loss.  Contract, Insurance.  Damages, Breach of contract, Repairs.  Practice, Civil, Damages.       Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on February 13, 2012.   The case was heard by Richard T. Tucker, J., on motions for summary judgment.     William A. Schneider for the defendant. David K. McCay for the plaintiff.        WOLOHOJIAN, J.  We consider whether a commercial property insurance policy issued by Central Insurance Companies (Central) provides coverage and, if so, to what extent, for damage to a bookmobile caused by a fire at its insured, Moroney Body Works, Inc. (Moroney).  Central relies principally on two provisions of its policy to support its denial of coverage.  First, it contends that the “other insurance” provision means that Central’s coverage does not come into play until the policy limit of a Massachusetts garage insurance policy issued to Moroney by Pilgrim Insurance Company (Pilgrim) is exhausted.[1]  Second, Central argues, in the alternative, that its liability is limited to the cost of repairing the bookmobile.  We conclude that because the two policies insured the same interest in the same property against the same risk, Central’s “other insurance” provision applies.  We also conclude that the “loss payment” provision of Central’s policy limits its liability, at its election, to the cost of repair.  We accordingly reverse the summary judgment in favor of Moroney on its breach of contract claim. 1.  Background.  The facts are undisputed.  Moroney manufactures specialized truck bodies in Worcester.  On April 7, 2011, a fire began in one vehicle at Moroney’s facility and spread to a custom-built bookmobile that had just been completed for the city of Beverly (city).  The city refused to accept delivery of the bookmobile after the fire. Moroney had two insurance policies at the time of the fire: a commercial property policy issued by Central, and a garage insurance policy issued by Pilgrim.  Moroney demanded payment under both.  Central denied liability.  Pilgrim’s policy provided primary coverage, and Pilgrim agreed that its policy covered the cost of repairing the bookmobile.  It paid $ 12,449.82 based on its appraiser’s estimate of […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - August 6, 2015 at 8:25 pm

Categories: News   Tags: , , , , , , , , ,

Central Mutual Insurance Company v. True Plastics, Inc., et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-091-13)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750;  (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us       12‑P‑439                                        Appeals Court   CENTRAL MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY  vs.  TRUE PLASTICS, INC., & another.[1]     No. 12‑P‑439. Worcester.     January 14, 2013.  ‑  July 10, 2013. Present:  Cypher, Rubin, & Wolohojian, JJ.   Insurance, General liability insurance, Insurer’s obligation to defend, Coverage.  Indemnity.  Practice, Civil, Presumptions and burden of proof.  Words, “Temporary worker.”       Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on September 5, 2006.   The case was heard by Douglas H. Wilkins, J.     Richard W. Jensen (William A. Schneider with him) for the plaintiff. Paul F. Leavis for Marciala Sanchez.     WOLOHOJIAN, J.  At issue is whether a worker supplied to an insured by a labor leasing firm was “furnished . . . to meet . . . short-term workload conditions” such that she was a “temporary worker” within the meaning of the commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy issued by the insurer Central Mutual Insurance Company (Central Mutual), to the insured, True Plastics, Inc. (True Plastics).  We agree with the trial judge’s determination that the particular worker at issue in this case was furnished to meet short-term workload conditions and, therefore, that she was a “temporary worker” within the meaning of the policy.  A worker is a “temporary worker” within the meaning of the policy if the insured holds (at the time the worker is furnished) an objectively reasonable expectation that the worker is furnished to meet a short-term workload condition.  We reject Central Mutual’s argument that a short-term workload condition must necessarily be of finite duration.   Background.  Marciala Sanchez was injured on October 14, 2004, while operating a molding machine at True Plastics.  Sanchez was not an employee of True Plastics; she had been assigned to True Plastics by an employment agency, Dynamic Staffing, Inc.[2]  Because of the accident, Sanchez made a claim for, and received, workers’ compensation benefits under Dynamic Staffing’s workers’ compensation insurance policy.  As was her right (and as contemplated under the workers’ compensation scheme, G. L. c. 152, § 15[3]), she also sued True Plastics to recover for her injuries.  True Plastics sought indemnification and a defense from Central Mutual, which brought the underlying action seeking a judgment declaring that it owed no duty under its CGL policy.[4]   In essence, Central Mutual’s position is that Sanchez was a leased employee (excluded under the policy), rather than a temporary employee (included under […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - July 10, 2013 at 4:53 pm

Categories: News   Tags: , , , , , , , , ,