Gangi v. Massachusetts Parole Board (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-100-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11505 DAVID GANGI vs. MASSACHUSETTS PAROLE BOARD. Suffolk. November 5, 2013. ‑ June 11, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Sex Offender. Community Parole Supervision for Life. Constitutional Law, Sentence, Sex offender, Parole. Due Process of Law, Sentence, Sex offender, Parole. Practice, Criminal, Sentence, Parole. Practice, Civil, Sex offender. Parole. Imprisonment, Parole. Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on May 30, 2013. The case was reported by Duffly, J. John Fennel, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the plaintiff. Ryan E. Ferch, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant. CORDY, J. In 2013, while serving a sentence of community parole supervision for life (CPSL), the petitioner, David Gangi, produced a positive drug test result in violation of a condition of his CPSL. During the CPSL revocation proceedings that followed, he was confined pursuant to parole board regulations authorizing temporary custody pending a hearing on the violation. While he was so confined, the Commonwealth filed a petition in the Superior Court alleging that the petitioner was a sexually dangerous person (SDP), pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 12 (b). After a CPSL violation was found by the parole board, the petitioner’s confinement continued as a sanction for the CPSL violation, and at the conclusion he was civilly committed pending the outcome of the SDP petition. The petitioner then filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief with the single justice of the county court, pursuant to G. L. c. 231A, § 1, seeking a declaration that his due process rights were violated in the CPSL revocation proceeding because the parole board did not disclose the evidence against him, that his CPSL sentence was unconstitutional under the separation of powers principles of art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and that because his CPSL sentence was unconstitutional he was not a prisoner for purposes of the SDP statute when the SDP petition was filed. After a hearing, the single justice reserved and reported the case to the full court. We heard the case concurrently with other cases also raising questions regarding the constitutionality of the CPSL sentence. We conclude that the petitioner’s CPSL sentence and his confinement pursuant to G. L. c. 127, § 133D (c), were unlawful. See Commonwealth v. Cole, ante (2014). As a […]