Verdrager v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-074-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11901 KAMEE VERDRAGER vs. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., & others.[1] Suffolk. November 5, 2015. – May 31, 2016. Present: Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Anti-Discrimination Law, Employment, Sex, Termination of employment. Employment, Discrimination, Sexual harassment, Demotion, Retaliation, Termination. Unlawful Interference. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment, Discovery. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 3, 2009. The case was heard by Peter M. Lauriat, J., on motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Kamee Verdrager, pro se. Joan A. Lukey (Justin J. Wolosz with her) for the defendants. Ellen J. Messing, for Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. Ben Robbins & Martin J. Newhouse, for New England Legal Foundation & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. LENK, J. General Laws c. 151B, § 4, prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of gender. It also prohibits them from retaliating against employees for engaging in “protected activity,” i.e., activity undertaken “to protest or oppose statutorily prohibited discrimination” (citation omitted). See Thirkield v. Neary & Hunter OB/GYN, LLC, 76 F. Supp. 3d 339, 350 (D. Mass. 2015) (interpreting G. L. c. 151B). Here, we are asked to determine whether summary judgment should have entered for the employer on an employee’s claims for gender discrimination and retaliation. In addressing the retaliation claim, we confront the novel question whether it is “protected activity” for an employee to search for, copy, and share with the employee’s attorney confidential documents that the employee is authorized to access in the course of employment and that may help prove a discrimination claim. The plaintiff is an attorney who worked for a Boston law firm, defendant Mintz, Levin, Ferris, Cohn, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. (firm). During the course of her employment with that firm, from June, 2004, to November, 2008, she complained to her superiors and, ultimately, to the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD), that she was being subjected to discriminatory treatment on the basis of her gender – treatment that, she believed, led to her demotion in February, 2007. In the wake of this demotion, and on the advice of her attorney, the plaintiff searched the firm’s document management system for items that might prove her assertions of discrimination. […]
Glovsky v. Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Inc. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-167-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11434 STEVEN M. GLOVSKY vs. ROCHE BROS. SUPERMARKETS, INC. Norfolk. February 3, 2014. – October 10, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ.[1] Massachusetts Civil Rights Act. Elections, Ballot. Constitutional Law, Elections. Civil Rights, Coercion. Practice, Civil, Election case, Civil rights, Motion to dismiss. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on April 2, 2012. A motion to dismiss was heard by Renée P. Dupuis, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Steven M. Glovsky, pro se. Mark W. Batten for the defendant. John Pagliaro & Martin J. Newhouse, for New England Legal Foundation & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. Adam J. Kessel, Frank L. Gerratana, & Sarah R. Wunsch, for American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. DUFFLY, J. Steven M. Glovsky sought to solicit signatures for his nomination to public office outside the entrance to a supermarket owned by the defendant, Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Inc. (Roche Bros.), but was informed that Roche Bros. prohibited this activity on its property. Glovsky filed suit in the Superior Court claiming that Roche Bros. had violated his right to equal ballot access under art. 9 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. He requested relief under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, G. L. c. 12, § 11I (act), for a violation of his rights “by threats, intimidation or coercion.”[2] Roche Bros.’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), was allowed. Glovsky appealed, and we granted his application for direct appellate review. We conclude that Glovsky adequately has alleged a right under art. 9 to solicit nominating signatures outside Roche Bros.’ supermarket, but that Roche Bros. did not violate this right “by threats, intimidation or coercion.”[3] Background. The complaint sets forth the following allegations. In early 2012, Glovsky undertook a bid for election to the second district seat on the Governor’s Council. To place his name on the September 6, 2012, State primary ballot, Glovsky needed to submit, by May 29, 2012, nomination papers containing at least 1,000 certified names. On February 7, 2012, Glovsky obtained nomination papers from the office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth and began collecting signatures. On the afternoon of March 14, 2012, Glovsky traveled to a location […]