Commonwealth v. Libby (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-108-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11831 COMMONWEALTH vs. BRIAN LIBBY. Suffolk. May 7, 2015. – July 1, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Sex Offender. Due Process of Law, Sex offender, Pretrial detainees. Statute, Construction. Words, “Prisoner.” Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on November 6, 2014. The case was reported by Duffly, J. Eric Tennen (Michael F. Farrington with him) for the defendant. Canan Yesilcimen, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. GANTS, C.J. The issue on appeal is whether the Commonwealth may file a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 12, to civilly commit someone as a sexually dangerous person (SDP) who previously was convicted of a “sexual offense,” as defined under G. L. c. 123A, § 1, but is currently in custody only because he was unable to post bail in a pending criminal case. We conclude that the Commonwealth may file an SDP petition under § 12 against a person who has been convicted of a sexual offense only where the person is in custody because of a criminal conviction, an adjudication as a delinquent juvenile or youthful offender, or a judicial finding that the person is incompetent to stand trial. The Commonwealth may not file such a petition where, as here, the defendant is in custody only because he is awaiting trial, unless a judge has found the defendant incompetent to stand trial. Background. The defendant, Brian Libby, was convicted in 2002 of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen, which qualifies as a “sexual offense” under G. L. c. 123A, § 1, and was sentenced to two and one-half years in a house of correction. He was subsequently convicted of other offenses, but was not serving a sentence on any of these convictions when he was indicted on October 11, 2013, for failure to register as a sex offender, subsequent offense. At his arraignment in the Superior Court, a judge set bail in the amount of $ 5,000. The defendant has been unable to post bail on this pending indictment, and has remained in custody for that reason alone awaiting trial. On May 12, 2014, the Commonwealth filed an SDP petition for civil commitment pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 12. The defendant moved to dismiss the petition […]
Commonwealth v. Libby (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-104-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11749 COMMONWEALTH vs. JEREMY LIBBY. Suffolk. February 4, 2015. – June 26, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, Waiver of constitutional rights. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Waiver. Waiver. Evidence, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on July 31, 2012. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Mary-Lou Rup, J. An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal was allowed by Lenk, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by her. Jane Davidson Montori, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Marissa Elkins for the defendant. CORDY, J. The Commonwealth appeals from the ruling of a Superior Court judge suppressing statements made to police officers by the defendant during the course of two interviews: the first being prearrest and the second following his arrest. The defendant was advised of the Miranda rights at the commencement of both interviews, but, in various ways, those rights were not accurately explained. Among other things, we are required to consider the effect of the inaccurate explanation of those rights in a noncustodial setting on the voluntariness of statements made thereafter, and on the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of those rights in a subsequent custodial interrogation. We reverse the judge’s ruling suppressing the prearrest statement, and affirm her ruling suppressing the postarrest statement. Background. On June 27, 2012, members of the Palmer police department received a complaint regarding the sexual abuse of K.C., a six year old girl who resided in the home where the defendant was living. Shortly after police arrived at the home, the defendant voluntarily[1] accompanied them to the Palmer police station to discuss an allegation that he had inappropriately touched K.C. Sergeant Scott Haley was the only officer present during this conversation, and he began the interview by reading the defendant the Miranda rights. Haley then asked the defendant whether, with those rights in mind, the defendant was willing to talk “about these matters of concern.” After a somewhat lengthy colloquy regarding the appointment of counsel and whether the defendant was under arrest, discussed infra, the defendant signed a Miranda […]