Commonwealth v. Muckle (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-157-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12269 COMMONWEALTH vs. PAUL MUCKLE. October 6, 2017. Intimidation of Witness. District Court, Jurisdiction. Boston Municipal Court. Practice, Criminal, Sentence, Mittimus. Paul Muckle was convicted in the Boston Municipal Court Department (BMC) of intimidating a person furthering a court proceeding, see G. L. c. 268, § 13B, and other offenses. The alleged victim of Muckle’s intimidation was opposing counsel in a civil action commenced by Muckle in Federal court. His posttrial motion to vacate the intimidation conviction was allowed, and that charge was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in the BMC. On the parties’ cross appeals, the Appeals Court reversed the dismissal of the intimidation charge and affirmed the convictions. Commonwealth v. Muckle, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 384 (2016). A dissenting Justice would have affirmed the dismissal. See id. at 397-402 (Rubin, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). We granted Muckle’s application for further appellate review, 476 Mass. 1111 (2017), limited to the issue of whether, under G. L. c. 218, § 26, the BMC and the District Court have jurisdiction over prosecutions under G. L. c. 268, § 13B, for intimidation of persons other than a witness or juror. For essentially the reasons stated by the dissenting Appeals Court Justice, we conclude that such jurisdiction was absent. We therefore affirm the order dismissing the intimidation charge. The underlying facts of the case are fully set forth in the Appeals Court’s opinion and need not be repeated here. Muckle, 90 Mass. App. Ct. at 385-387. Before us is a purely legal question concerning the correct interpretation of G. L. c. 218, § 26.[1] We begin with the “general and familiar rule . . . that a statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished.” Meikle v. Nurse, 474 Mass. 207, 209-210 (2016), quoting Lowery v. Klemm, 446 Mass. 572, 576-577 (2006). The statute at issue provides that the BMC and the District Court have jurisdiction, concurrent with the Superior Court, over numerous offenses, including “intimidation of a witness or juror under [G. L. c. 268, § 13B].” G. L. c. 218, § 26. General Laws c. 268, § 13B, […]
Commonwealth v. Muckle (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-139-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-1283 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. PAUL MUCKLE. No. 14-P-1283. Suffolk. September 10, 2015. – October 3, 2016. Present: Green, Rubin, & Hanlon, JJ. Intimidation of Witness. Threatening. Stalking. District Court, Jurisdiction. Boston Municipal Court. Practice, Criminal, Duplicative convictions, Lesser included offense, Instructions to jury. Complaint received and sworn to in the Central Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department on April 12, 2012. The case was tried before Annette Forde, J., and a motion to vacate was heard by her. Edward Gauthier for the defendant. Zachary Hillman, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. HANLON, J. After a jury trial in the Boston Municipal Court, the defendant was convicted of intimidating a person furthering a court proceeding in violation of G. L. c. 268, § 13B (count 1); stalking in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 43 (count 2); threatening to commit a crime in violation of G. L. c. 275, § 2 (count 3); and unlawful wiretapping in violation of G. L. c. 272, § 99 (count 4). Afterwards, he filed a motion to vacate his conviction on count 1, which was allowed, and that count was dismissed. We have before us the Commonwealth’s appeal of that dismissal, and the defendant’s cross appeal of his remaining convictions on all counts except count 4. We reinstate the defendant’s conviction on count 1 and affirm the other judgments. We remand the case to the trial court for imposition of the original sentences imposed after trial. Background. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the jury could have found the following facts:[1] At some point prior to 2009, the defendant’s mother, Irene Wood, obtained a loan from Wells Fargo Bank (Wells Fargo). Subsequently, the defendant filed suit against Wells Fargo in Superior Court, alleging that his mother’s loan was predatory, fraudulent, and unenforceable. Thereafter, the defendant filed another suit against Wells Fargo, among others, in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Wells Fargo retained the law firm of Nelson, Mullens, Riley and Scarborough (Nelson, Mullens) as defense counsel, and when Sean Higgins joined Nelson, Mullens in February, 2009, he was assigned to work on the ongoing case. Because the defendant was representing himself pro se in the Federal suit, he and Higgins communicated […]