Amaral v. Seekonk Grand Prix Corp. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-008-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1848 Appeals Court SUSAN M. AMARAL vs. SEEKONK GRAND PRIX CORP. No. 13-P-1848. Bristol. October 6, 2014. – January 14, 2016. Present: Cypher, Grainger, & Maldonado, JJ. Negligence, One owning or controlling real estate. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on May 2, 2012. The case was heard by Richard T. Moses, J., on a motion for summary judgment. Melody A. Alger for plaintiff. Jacqueline L. Allen for the defendant. MALDONADO, J. The Massachusetts recreational use statute[1] provides that those who make their land available to the public for “recreational . . . purposes without imposing a charge or fee therefor, . . . shall not be liable for personal injuries . . . sustained by such members of the public . . . in the absence of wilful, wanton, or reckless conduct by [the landowner].” G. L. c. 21, § 17C(a), as appearing in St. 1998, c. 268. In this case, we are asked whether the statute bars a claim of negligence asserted by a mother (the plaintiff) who was injured by an errant “go-cart” while watching her sons drive go-carts at the defendant’s recreational facility. The facility does not charge an admission onto the grounds but sells tickets for its rides, and the plaintiff had purchased tickets for use by her sons. We conclude that the statute does not bar relief for injuries caused by negligence in these circumstances. Background. Seekonk Grand Prix Corp.[2] (Grand Prix) is a Massachusetts corporation that operates a commercial recreational facility offering, among other activities, go-cart races. Grand Prix charges a fee for the go-carts, miniature golf, bumper cars, and other similar activities. It does not charge a fee to watch these activities, nor does it charge a fee to enter the facility. On May 25, 2009, the plaintiff took her two sons, ages eleven and thirteen years of age, to Grand Prix’s facility. She purchased six tickets for her sons’ use. At the time of the injury, she was standing behind a chain link fence as she watched her sons drive the go-carts. After the other drivers had returned to the station, a go-cart driven by a young girl went through the fence and struck the plaintiff, causing a number of injuries, including a pulmonary embolism that resulted from a blood clot in her left leg. The plaintiff filed a negligence action […]
Miles-Matthias, et al. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Seekonk, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-010-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13‑P‑635 Appeals Court PAUL MILES-MATTHIAS & another[1] vs. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF SEEKONK & another.[2] No. 13‑P‑635. Bristol. November 14, 2013. ‑ February 11, 2014. Present: Rapoza, C.J., Cypher, & Fecteau, JJ. Zoning, Timeliness of appeal, Accessory building or use, Board of appeals: decision, By‑law. Notice, Timeliness. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on August 16, 2010. The case was heard by Robert J. Kane, J. Marc E. Antine for John Dias. Gregory D. Lorincz (John Jacobi, III with him) for the plaintiffs. FECTEAU, J. Defendant John Dias appeals from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Paul Miles-Matthias and Linda Coffin, which overturned a zoning board decision that Dias’s proposed common driveway was permissible under the town of Seekonk’s zoning by-law. Specifically, Dias claims the judge erred in finding (1) that the Superior Court and the zoning board had jurisdiction because the plaintiffs’ appeal to the zoning board was timely, (2) that the plaintiffs, as abutters, had the requisite standing to bring the action, and (3) that Seekonk’s zoning by-law prohibits common driveways. The judge correctly concluded that the plaintiffs, as abutters, have standing to prosecute the appeal. However, because the plaintiffs’ appeal was untimely and the decision below relied upon misinterpretation of the zoning by-law, we reverse. 1. Background. The basic facts found by the judge and which underlie this appeal are not disputed. The plaintiffs own and reside at premises known as 363 Ledge Road in the town of Seekonk, which they purchased on June 28, 1985. The plaintiffs and another neighbor share an easement in common over a pathway of land owned partially by the plaintiffs and partially by Dias. This common driveway was in existence before Seekonk adopted its first zoning by-law in 1942. After the plaintiffs purchased their land, a home was constructed on what is now known as lot 4 and on December 21, 2007, Dias purchased property to the south and east of the plaintiffs, including lot 4 and what are now known as lots 1-3. On March 11, 2008, the Seekonk planning board endorsed Dias’s plan to divide his land off Ledge Road into six lots as an approval not required plan (ANR plan) pursuant to G. L. c. 41, § 81P. Although lots […]