Commonwealth v. Reyes (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-012-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11270 COMMONWEALTH vs. AMAURY REYES. Essex. October 1, 2012. ‑ January 29, 2013. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Firearms. Constitutional Law, Vagueness of statute, Right to bear arms. Due Process of Law, Vagueness of statute. Practice, Criminal, Directed verdict, Instructions to jury. Words, “Secured,” “Locked container.” Complaint received and sworn to in the Salem Division of the District Court Department on April 26, 2010. The case was tried before Matthew J. Nestor, J. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Michael A. Laurano for the defendant. Marcia H. Slingerland, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Keith G. Langer, for Commonwealth Second Amendment, Inc., amicus curiae, submitted a brief. CORDY, J. The defendant, Amaury Reyes, was convicted of improperly carrying a firearm in a motor vehicle in violation of G. L. c. 140, § 131C (a) (carrying statute), and unlawfully storing a firearm (after leaving it in his motor vehicle) in violation of G. L. c. 140, § 131L (a) and (b) (storage statute). On appeal, the defendant argues that the storage statute is unconstitutionally vague in violation of his right to due process of law. He also contends that if the storage statute requires that a firearm stored in a locked motor vehicle be rendered further inoperable by locking it in an additional container or through the use of a tamper-resistant trigger lock, it unlawfully hinders his right to use the firearm in self-defense. Additionally, the defendant posits that there was insufficient evidence at trial to support his convictions under both the storage and carrying statutes. Finally, he asserts that the judge’s jury instruction on the elements of the storage statute was deficient in that it failed to provide guidance on what qualifies as a “locked container.” Based on these errors, the defendant asserts that he is entitled to either directed verdicts in his favor or a new trial. We conclude that the defendant’s arguments with respect to the constitutionality of the storage statute are without merit: the statute is neither impermissibly vague nor violative of his right to self-defense under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. We also conclude, however, that the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction under the carrying statute and […]
Commonwealth v. Yardley Y., a juvenile (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-013-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11071 COMMONWEALTH vs. YARDLEY Y., a juvenile. Hampshire. October 1, 2012. ‑ January 29, 2013. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, & Duffly, JJ. Practice, Criminal, Plea, New trial, Interpreter, Transcript of hearing, Affidavit, Juvenile delinquency proceeding, Assistance of counsel. Constitutional Law, Plea, Assistance of counsel. Due Process of Law, Plea, Assistance of counsel. Interpreter. Complaint received and sworn to in the Hampshire County Division of the Juvenile Court Department on August 2, 1995. A motion for a new trial, filed on November 16, 2009, was heard by Lillian Miranda, J., and a motion for reconsideration was heard by her. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. Barbara Kaban for the juvenile. Steven Greenbaum, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. IRELAND, C.J. We granted the defendant’s application for further appellate review to consider whether the Juvenile Court judge properly denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial. The defendant sought to vacate his plea because he did not knowingly and voluntarily admit to sufficient facts where no interpreter was present during his plea colloquy and where he was denied effective assistance of counsel. The Appeals Court, in a memorandum and order issued pursuant to its rule 1:28, Commonwealth v. Yardley Y., 79 Mass. App. Ct. 1123 (2011), affirmed the denial of the defendant’s motion. Because the defendant did not provide sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of regularity of his plea proceedings and did not demonstrate he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, we affirm the denial of the defendant’s motion. Facts and procedure. We present the facts as found by the judge, supplemented by uncontested facts in the record. The defendant and his mother, Cambodian refugees and native Khmai speakers, came to the United States when the defendant was four years old. In 1995, when the defendant was fourteen years old, he was living at a Buddhist monastery with Cambodian monks in Amherst, where Khmai, rather than English, was generally spoken. On August 2, 1995, a complaint issued from the Hampshire County Division of the Juvenile Court Department charging the defendant with assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon and indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen. It appears […]
Commonwealth v. Oquendo (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-016-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 11‑P‑1605 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. JUNNO OQUENDO. No. 11‑P‑1605. Essex. October 2, 2012. ‑ January 29, 2013. Present: Kantrowitz, Sikora, & Rubin, JJ. Rape. Practice, Criminal, Sentence. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on August 27, 2008. The cases were tried before Richard E. Welch, III, J. Samuel B. Goldberg for the defendant. Catherine Langevin Semel, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. RUBIN, J. After a jury trial in the Superior Court, the defendant, Junno Oquendo, was found guilty of rape, see G. L. c. 265, § 22(b), and two counts of indecent assault and battery on a person fourteen years of age or older, see G. L. c. 265, § 13H. He now appeals. 1. Background. Because the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this court must view the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979). Under that standard, the jury could have found the following facts. The victim, Jane,[1] went out with a coworker, Vallejo, on the night of March 28, 2008. The women first drove to the Lynn apartment of one Matos, Vallejo’s boyfriend. Jane had a couple of cocktails there, and the three drove to a nightclub at approximately 10:30 or 11:00 P.M. At the club, they encountered the defendant, a friend of Matos. Jane had another drink and danced with the defendant for a few songs. She then began feeling ill, so she sat at the bar with Vallejo, Matos, and the defendant. While sitting at the counter, the defendant attempted to flirt with Jane. Soon, feeling even worse, Jane ran outside and vomited. Vallejo followed her and suggested that they return to Matos’s apartment. Dizzy and nauseated, Jane agreed, and the defendant rode next to her in the back seat of Matos’s car. The group left the club at approximately midnight. Jane did not remember the car ride, but did recall that she vomited again as she got out of the vehicle and a third time near the front porch outside the apartment. Once inside the apartment, Jane went directly to the bathroom without removing her coat. She stood bent over the toilet, holding onto the tank and throwing up into the bowl. At first, Vallejo, Matos, and […]
Commonwealth v. Tassone (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-017-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 10‑P‑1923 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. WAYNE C. TASSONE. No. 10‑P‑1923. Berkshire. October 11, 2012. ‑ January 29, 2013. Present: Kantrowitz, Sikora, & Rubin, JJ. Robbery. Assault and Battery. Deoxyribonucleic Acid. Constitutional Law, Confrontation of witnesses. Evidence, Identity, Expert opinion, Grand jury proceedings. Witness, Expert. Grand Jury. Practice, Criminal, Confrontation of witnesses, Assistance of counsel. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on July 24, 2009. The cases were tried before John A. Agostini, J. William W. Adams for the defendant. Joseph A. Pieropan, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. RUBIN, J. The defendant was convicted of unarmed robbery and assault and battery arising out of the robbery of a variety store in Pittsfield. The defendant’s primary defense was mistaken identity. A pair of eyeglasses, identified as the defendant’s, was found at the scene. His counsel argued that the defendant’s brother, who owned a similar pair of eyeglasses, had committed the robbery. The defendant’s primary argument here is a challenge under the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965), to the expert testimony here of a chemist at the State police crime laboratory comparing the results of an analysis of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) taken from the defendant prepared by the State police crime laboratory with an analysis of DNA found on the eyeglasses prepared by Orchid Cellmark (Cellmark), a commercial DNA testing facility in Dallas, Texas. The argument in essence is that testimony by an expert comparing these two DNA analyses is improper, and that the confrontation clause requires that the defendant have an opportunity to cross-examine the analysts who prepared these DNA reports. This case is controlled by the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (Williams). In Williams, the Court decided an almost identical case in which an expert testified comparing a DNA profile from a sample of the defendant’s blood with a DNA report generated by Cellmark from semen found on the victim of a rape. The Supreme Court was divided in that case. A plurality of four justices concluded that the expert did not testify to the truth of the underlying analysis, […]
Hello world!
Welcome to WordPress. This is your first post. Edit or delete it, then start blogging!
Categories: Uncategorized Tags:
Categories: News Tags: boston, cases-tuesday, health, judicial, massachusetts, news, prevent-people, second-amendment, state, weapons
Categories: News Tags: change, change-wiretap, coakley, criminal, current, lawberkshire, leaders, leaders-want, magazinemassachusetts, monday
