Silva-Santiago v. Commonwealth (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-049-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13‑P‑1192 Appeals Court JESUS SILVA-SANTIAGO vs. COMMONWEALTH. No. 13‑P‑1192. May 22, 2014. Erroneous conviction. The plaintiff, whose conviction of murder in the first degree was reversed after several years of incarceration, appeals from the dismissal of his claim for damages against the Commonwealth pursuant to the “Compensation for Certain Erroneous Felony Convictions” statute, G. L. c. 258D, for failure to state a claim. We affirm. Background. On June 16, 2006, the plaintiff, Jesus Silva-Santiago, was convicted of murder in the first degree in the June 28, 2003, shooting death of Eugene Monteiro, which took place in the parking lot of a bar. See Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 783-785 (2009). On direct appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court rejected his appellate arguments. However, the court, pursuant to its supervisory powers under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, reviewed for errors not raised and reversed his conviction, holding that two statements made by the prosecutor during his closing argument, and the judge’s failure to correct them, constituted reversible error. Id. at 805-810. The first erroneous statement concerned the initial inability of the victim’s friends, who witnessed the shooting, to identify the defendant as the shooter when they had the opportunity to view him, and approximately forty-one others, in a secured area shortly after the shooting. Id. at 785-786, 806, 808-809. In his closing argument, the prosecutor, as to the nonidentification, told the jury: “Doesn’t it make sense that maybe, just maybe, they weren’t in a position, given their frame of minds, to calmly look around the bar that had about thirty-five, forty, forty-five people in it to try to make an identification? Doesn’t it make sense that even if they did, even if they saw everybody in the bar and saw the shooter, they were maybe too scared to identify him, given what they had just seen?” Id. at 806. Defense counsel objected to this argument, but the objection was overruled. Ibid. The court held that this was error because no evidence had been introduced that the friends had recognized the defendant as the shooter, but were so afraid or overwhelmed that they were less than candid with the police until they tentatively identified him in a photographic array on July 7, 2003. Id. at 786-790, 808-809. The second erroneous statement concerned the […]
Categories: News Tags: 1104914, Commonwealth, Lawyers, SilvaSantiago, Weekly
Commonwealth v. Jackson (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-090-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11308 COMMONWEALTH vs. DAVID JACKSON. May 21, 2014. Practice, Criminal, Capital case, New trial. Evidence, Cumulative evidence, Impeachment of credibility. Witness, Impeachment. The defendant, David Jackson, was convicted of murder in the first degree, armed robbery, and burglary arising out of events occurring in April, 1990. We affirmed the defendant’s convictions and the denial of his first motion for a new trial. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 428 Mass. 455 (1998). His second motion for a new trial also was denied, and he was denied leave to appeal, pursuant to the gatekeeper provisions of G. L. c. 278, § 33E.[1] In July, 2009, the defendant filed a third motion for a new trial, and a Superior Court judge who was not the trial judge ordered the Commonwealth to provide additional discovery. Thereafter, the judge denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. Less than one month later, on April 13, 2011, the defendant filed a gatekeeper petition for leave to appeal, pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. A single justice of this court allowed the appeal to proceed. Background. According to the evidence at trial, a key Commonwealth witness, Steven Olbinsky, was present on the night of the crimes, directed the defendant to the location where they occurred, and witnessed him loading a weapon before prying opening the front door at that location. Commonwealth v. Jackson, supra at 456-457. Olbinsky left before any violence occurred, but was indicted for the same crimes. Id. at 458. The record shows that the defendant’s counsel sought to impeach Olbinsky in myriad ways, which we need not detail here. In summary, however, he elicited testimony that Olbinsky also faced murder charges for the same killing; that there were some discrepancies between the statements Olbinsky made to police in July, 1990, and his trial testimony; and that, at the time he made those statements, he was facing unrelated charges in Massachusetts. Although defense counsel additionally sought to introduce evidence of drug charges pending against Olbinsky in Oregon, the evidence was excluded on the ground that the charges were brought long after Olbinsky made his original statements to the police, and his trial testimony had not deviated from his original statements “in any substantial and material way.” See Commonwealth v. Haywood, 377 Mass. 755, 762 (1979). Olbinsky additionally testified […]
Commonwealth v. Rosa (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-089-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11377 COMMONWEALTH vs. DANIEL ROSA. Hampden. January 10, 2014. ‑ May 20, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Cordy, Botsford, Gants, & Duffly, JJ. Homicide. Firearms. Evidence, Constructive possession, Telephone conversation, Relevancy and materiality, Joint venturer, Expert opinion. Imprisonment, Inmate telephone calls. Telephone. Joint Enterprise. Constitutional Law, Privacy. Privacy. Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Verdict, Instructions to jury. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on March 29, 2011. The cases were tried before Peter A. Velis, J. Stewart T. Graham, Jr., for the defendant. Marcia B. Julian, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. BOTSFORD, J. A Superior Court jury found the defendant, Daniel Rosa, guilty of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation and of possession of a firearm without a license. The defendant appeals, arguing that: (1) the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of bullet shell casings and live ammunition because the Commonwealth failed to prove that the defendant constructively possessed these items; (2) it was unduly prejudicial and violative of due process to admit the recording of a jailhouse telephone call made by the defendant in which he used street jargon and offensive language; (3) the defendant’s constitutional rights were violated by the monitoring of his telephone calls from jail and a jail officer’s sending to law enforcement authorities information derived from the calls; (4) the evidence was insufficient to prove the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on a joint venture theory; and (5) the trial judge erred in failing to provide a special verdict slip and special jury instruction requiring the jury to determine separately whether the defendant was guilty of murder in the first degree as a principal or as an accomplice. We affirm the defendant’s convictions and decline to grant relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 1. Background. We recite the facts as the jury could have found them at trial, reserving certain details for later discussion. On January 26, 2011, at approximately noon, the victim, David Acevedo, was killed by a single gunshot wound to the back. The shooting occurred on Riverton Road in Springfield, near the home of Eric Caraballo, Sr., a mutual friend of the victim’s and the defendant’s. Earlier that morning, at 9:30 or 10 A.M., the defendant had gone to […]
Commonwealth v. Figueroa (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-085-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11189 COMMONWEALTH vs. RICHARD FIGUEROA. Essex. January 10, 2014. ‑ May 19, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Cordy, Botsford, Gants, & Duffly, JJ. Homicide. Search and Seizure, Probable cause, Search incident to lawful arrest, Exigent circumstances, Standing to object. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Instructions to jury, Presumptions and burden of proof, Deliberation of jury, Question by jury, Verdict, Lesser included offense, Capital case. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Identification, Burden of proof. Due Process of Law, Identification, Burden of proof. Evidence, Identification, Presumptions and burden of proof, Intent, Intoxication. Identification. Jury and Jurors. Intent. Intoxication. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on April 25, 2008. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Howard J. Whitehead, J.; a second pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Richard E. Welch, III, J., and the case was tried before him. Donald A. Harwood for the defendant. Marcia H. Slingerland, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. GANTS, J. On the evening of January 31, 2008, the defendant walked into a Lawrence restaurant and shot and killed Luis Alex Alcantara (victim), with whom he had been feuding. A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 1. On appeal, the defendant raises five claims: (1) that a motion judge erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized during warrantless entries into two apartments; (2) that a different motion judge erred in denying a motion to suppress a showup identification of the defendant; (3) that the trial judge’s instruction on proof beyond a reasonable doubt requires reversal of his conviction; (4) that the judge erred in instructing the jury on intoxication; and (5) that the judge erred in furnishing the jury with an instruction in accordance with Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 364 Mass. 87, 101-102 (1973), and Commonwealth v. Tuey, 62 Mass. 1, 2-3 (1851) (Tuey–Rodriquez instruction), limited to their consideration of murder in the first degree, in response to a note from the jury asking whether they were a “hung jury” because some jurors “feel it is first degree, some feel it is second degree.” The defendant also contends that we should exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce […]
Commonwealth v. DeJesus (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-086-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11392 COMMONWEALTH vs. ELAN DeJESUS. Suffolk. January 7, 2014. ‑ May 19, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Controlled Substances. Practice, Criminal, Plea, Assistance of counsel. Constitutional Law, Plea, Assistance of counsel. Due Process of Law, Plea, Assistance of counsel. Alien. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on February 3, 2009. A motion for a new trial, filed on February 27, 2012, was heard by Charles J. Hely, J. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Zachary Hillman, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Eduardo Antonio Masferrer (Oriosto Medrano Santana with him) for the defendant. Emma Winger & Wendy Wayne, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for Committee for Public Counsel Services Immigration Impact Unit, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. DUFFLY, J. We are asked in this case to consider whether defense counsel’s advice to his noncitizen client that if the client pleaded guilty to drug possession charges he would be “eligible for deportation” was constitutionally deficient. Because, under applicable immigration law, the conviction of a noncitizen of possession with intent to distribute cocaine makes deportation or removal from the United States automatic or “presumptively mandatory,” see Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 368-369 (2010) (Padilla), citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006), we conclude that counsel’s advice was constitutionally deficient and that the defendant suffered prejudice as a result. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Superior Court judge allowing the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. Background. The defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute a class B substance (cocaine), G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (a), and received a sentence of probation. After a subsequent arrest for driving without a license, the defendant was taken into custody by immigration authorities; he then filed a motion for a new trial in the Superior Court seeking to withdraw his guilty plea. A Superior Court judge, who also had been the plea judge, conducted an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s motion, at which the defendant and his plea counsel both testified. The judge thereafter made detailed findings and issued a comprehensive memorandum of decision and order allowing the motion. He determined that, under applicable immigration law, it is clear […]
Commonwealth v. Sepheus (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-087-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11380 COMMONWEALTH vs. CARL SEPHEUS. Hampden. January 7, 2014. ‑ May 19, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Controlled Substances. Practice, Criminal, Assistance of counsel, Confrontation of witnesses, Required finding. Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel, Confrontation of witnesses. Due Process of Law, Assistance of counsel. Evidence, Expert opinion, Intent. Witness, Expert. Intent. Drug Paraphernalia. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on November 18, 2009. The case was heard by C. Brian McDonald, J. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. Leslie H. Powers for the defendant. Bethany C. Lynch, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. SPINA, J. The defendant was convicted at a jury-waived trial of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (c). A divided panel of the Appeals Court affirmed the conviction. See Commonwealth v. Sepheus, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 765 (2012). We granted the defendant’s application for further appellate review. On appeal the defendant argues that (1) his motion for a required finding of not guilty should have been allowed as to the element of intent to distribute, (2) his right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution was violated by the admission of hearsay evidence during cross-examination of the Commonwealth’s expert witness, and (3) counsel was ineffective for failing to move to strike a portion of the testimony of the Commonwealth’s expert witness. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to warrant conviction of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. We also conclude that there was no Sixth Amendment violation. However, we conclude that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to strike a portion of the testimony of the Commonwealth’s expert witness because it was nonresponsive. Had counsel so moved, the testimony should have been stricken and the motion for a required finding of not guilty should have been allowed as to so much of the indictment that alleges intent to distribute. The conviction must be reversed, but the defendant is entitled to a new trial because the Commonwealth may present the testimony of a witness whose statements were allegedly relied on by the Commonwealth’s expert. 1. Facts. We summarize the evidence […]
Sorenti Bros., Inc. v. Commonwealth (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-088-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11420 SORENTI BROS., INC. vs. COMMONWEALTH. Barnstable. January 9, 2014. ‑ May 19, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Eminent Domain, Damages, Extent of taking. Damages, Eminent domain. Way, Public: access. Practice, Civil, Eminent domain proceeding, Instructions to jury. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on September 26, 2006. The case was tried before Christopher J. Muse, J. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. John E. Bowen, Assistant Attorney General (Joseph Callanan, Assistant Attorney General, with him) for the Commonwealth. Nelson G. Apjohn (Robyn Smith Maguire with him) for the plaintiff. BOTSFORD, J. This eminent domain case involves the Sagamore Bridge Flyover Project (flyover project) in Bourne that, among other changes, eliminated the Sagamore traffic rotary (rotary) just north of the bridge. The plaintiff, Sorenti Bros., Inc. (Sorenti), owns parcels of land near the former rotary; it operates a gasoline station on one of them. Sorenti commenced this action in the Superior Court, seeking damages from the Commonwealth on account of the temporary and permanent land takings that the Commonwealth made in connection with the flyover project. At the conclusion of a jury trial, judgment entered awarding Sorenti almost $ 3 million in damages. The Commonwealth appealed, and the Appeals Court, in an unpublished memorandum and order issued pursuant to its rule 1:28, affirmed. Sorenti Bros., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 1123 (2012). The case is before us on further appellate review. At issue is the applicability of G. L. c. 81, § 7C (§ 7C), to Sorenti’s gasoline station parcel (Shell parcel), and whether the elimination of a portion of Canal Street as part of the flyover project resulted in a substantial, and compensable, impairment of access to that parcel. We conclude that (1) under § 7C, for a property owner to be entitled to damages on account of the construction of a limited access highway, the highway must be constructed in whole or in part over the public way on which the owner’s property directly fronts or abuts; and (2) under G. L. c. 79, § 12 (§ 12), when a partial taking of property has been made, the property owner is entitled to recover damages for loss of access to […]
In the Matter of: Haese, Glenn H. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-084-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11510 IN THE MATTER OF GLENN H. HAESE. May 16, 2014. Attorney at Law, Disciplinary proceeding, Disbarment, Misuse of client funds. Board of Bar Overseers. Due Process of Law, Continuance. Administrative Law, Substantial evidence. Evidence, Administrative proceeding. The respondent, Glenn H. Haese, appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court disbarring him from the practice of law for multiple violations of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct.[1] We affirm. 1. Procedural background. Bar counsel filed a petition for discipline with the Board of Bar Overseers (board) on March 4, 2011. After requesting and receiving at least three extensions of time to answer while he sought counsel, the respondent filed an answer, pro se, on May 20, 2011. On May 26, 2011, the board notified the parties of a prehearing conference on June 28, 2011, and hearing dates in September, 2011. On June 24, 2011, the respondent filed his first request for a continuance of the hearing. At the prehearing conference, the hearing was continued to October, 2011, and the respondent was given until July 28, 2011, to obtain counsel and file an amended answer conforming to the board’s rules. In early August, the respondent, represented by counsel, moved for an extension of time to file an amended answer, and filed his second motion to continue the hearing dates, this time requesting that the hearing be continued to January, 2012. A second prehearing conference was held on August 23, 2011. The hearing committee postponed the hearing, but only until December, 2011. The respondent, through counsel, filed an amended answer on September 13, 2011. On October 26, 2011, the respondent moved to amend the hearing schedule to accommodate his and his counsel’s schedule, and an accommodation was made. Then, seven business days before the hearing was scheduled to begin, on November 22, 2011, the respondent filed his third motion to continue the hearing, accompanied by the appearance of successor counsel. Prior counsel’s notice of withdrawal followed. The respondent requested that the hearing be continued until late January or February, 2012, so that successor counsel could prepare for the hearing, and to accommodate successor counsel’s planned vacation. The hearing committee denied the motion but, on reconsideration, permitted the parties, at their option, to elect to try […]
Estate of Gavin v. Tewksbury State Hospital, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-082-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11422 ESTATE OF STEVEN GAVIN vs. TEWKSBURY STATE HOSPITAL & another.[1] Middlesex. January 6, 2014. ‑ May 15, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. Wrongful Death. Practice, Civil, Presentment of claim under Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, Wrongful death, Standing. Negligence, Wrongful death. Executor and Administrator, Governmental claims. Words, “Claimant.” Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on March 24, 2011. A motion to dismiss was heard by Garry V. Inge, J. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. Robert S. Sinsheimer for the plaintiff. Mark P. Sutliff, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendants. J. Michael Conley, Thomas R. Murphy, & Elizabeth N. Mulvey, for Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. BOTSFORD, J. The estate of Steven Gavin (estate) commenced this action for wrongful death in the Superior Court against the Commonwealth and Tewksbury State Hospital (hospital) under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (act), G. L. c. 258. The estate seeks to recover damages on account of the death of Steven Gavin (decedent), a death allegedly caused by negligent conduct on the part of hospital staff members. The primary issue before us is whether the statutory requirements for presentment of a claim under the act, see G. L. c. 258, § 4 (§ 4), were met when the presentment was made by the estate (through its attorney), and not by the duly appointed executor or administrator of the estate. Ruling on the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, a judge concluded that the presentment requirement was not met in these circumstances, and allowed the motion. A divided panel of the Appeals Court affirmed. Estate of Gavin v. Tewksbury State Hosp., 83 Mass. App. Ct. 139 (2013). The case is before us on further appellate review. We conclude that in the circumstances of this case, the presentment made by the estate was proper. We therefore vacate the judgment of the Superior Court. 1. Background. The decedent died on August 11, 2008. In the weeks preceding his death, he was receiving inpatient care at the hospital for Huntington’s disease; the estate claims that his death was caused by a bacterial infection due to the improper reinsertion of […]
New England Forestry Foundation, Inc. v. Board of Assessors of Hawley (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-083-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11432 NEW ENGLAND FORESTRY FOUNDATION, INC. vs. BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF HAWLEY. Suffolk. January 6, 2014. ‑ May 15, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Administrative Law, Agency’s interpretation of statute, Findings, Judicial review, Appellate Tax Board: final decision. Taxation, Real estate tax: charity, Real estate tax: exemption, Appellate Tax Board: appeal to Supreme Judicial Court, Appellate Tax Board: findings, Judicial review. Charity. Corporation, Non‑profit corporation. Statute, Construction. Appeal from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Douglas Hallward‑Driemeier (Jesse Mohan Boodoo & Jacob Scott with him) for the plaintiff. Rosemary Crowley (David J. Martel with her) for the defendant. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Robert H. Levin, of Maine, for Massachusetts Land Trust Coalition, Inc., & another. Gregor I. McGregor & Luke H. Legere for Massachusetts Association of Conservation Commissions, Inc., & another. James F. Sullivan for Massachusetts Association of Assessing Officers. Robert E. McDonnell & Patrick Strawbridge for The Nature Conservancy, & another. Lisa C. Goodheart, Susan A. Hartnett, Phelps T. Turner, & Joshua D. Nadreau for The Trustees of Reservations. SPINA, J. This case comes to us on direct appellate review from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board (board). The taxpayer, New England Forestry Foundation, Inc. (NEFF), is a nonprofit corporation organized under G. L. c. 180. NEFF is the record owner of a 120-acre parcel of forest land in the town of Hawley. In 2009, NEFF applied to the board of assessors of Hawley (assessors) for a charitable tax exemption on the parcel under G. L. c. 59, § 5, Third (Clause Third). The assessors denied NEFF’s application, and NEFF appealed to the board. The board likewise denied the application on the basis that NEFF had failed to carry its burden to show that it occupied the land in Hawley for a charitable purpose within the meaning of Clause Third. NEFF again appealed, and both NEFF and the assessors filed applications for direct appellate review. We granted the parties’ applications, and we reverse the board’s decision. 1. Background. The taxpayer, NEFF, is a Massachusetts nonprofit corporation organized under G. L. c. 180, and it has received tax-exempt status from the Federal government under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). NEFF was incorporated in […]