Posts tagged "England"

New England Patriots Fans v. National Football League, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-060-17)

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT. 1684CV03929-BLS2 ____________________ NEW ENGLAND PATRIOTS FANS v. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, ROGER GOODELL, and ROBERT KRAFT ____________________ MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING MOTION SEEKING RECONSIDERATION OF THE ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL Final judgment dismissing this action was entered on February 27, 2017. Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on April 12, 2017. The Court allowed Defendants’ motions to dismiss the appeal as untimely because it was filed more than thirty days after the entry of judgment. See Mass. R. App. P. 4(a). In its prior ruling, the Court explained that Plaintiffs’ post-judgment motion for findings did not toll the deadline for filing a notice of appeal because that motion was not served within ten days of the entry of judgment. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 52(b). The Court has no power to extend this time limit. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 6(b). Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of the order dismissing their appeal. They argue that they are entitled to the benefit of the “mailbox rule” because the final judgment was mailed to their counsel. Plaintiffs contend that their Rule 52(b) post-judgment motion for findings was timely because the deadline for serving that motion was automatically extended by three days under Mass. R. Civ. P. 6(d). This argument is incorrect. Rule 6(d) only adds more time to deadlines that allow or require a party to do something “within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other papers upon him.” But the ten-day deadline for serving post-judgment motions for findings does not start to run upon “service” of anything. Instead, such a motion must be served “not later than 10 days after entry of judgment.” Rule 52(b). The three-day grace period after mailing provided in Rule 6(b) therefore does not apply to Plaintiff’s deadline for filing post-judgment motions under Rule 52(b). See Commonwealth v. White, 429 Mass. 258, 261-262 (1999) (since period for filing notice of appeal starts to run upon entry of judgment, not upon service, mailbox rule in Mass. R. App. P. 14(c) does not apply); Goldstein v. Barron, 382 Mass. 181, 182- – 2 – 185 (1980) (since period for posting medical practice bond starts to run upon entry of tribunal’s finding, not upon service, mailbox rule in Mass. R. Civ. P. 6(d) does not apply); Flint v. Howard, 464 F.2d 1084, 1087 (1st Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (since deadline for filing post-judgment motion for findings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(b) “begins to run from ‘entry of judgment’ rather than from receipt of notice,” mailbox rule in Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 does not apply); see also Smaland Beach Ass’n, Inc. v. Genova, 461 Mass. 214, 228 (2012) (judicial construction of […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - June 1, 2017 at 3:00 am

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Verizon New England Inc. v. Board of Assessors of Boston (and a consolidated case) (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-173-16)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   SJC-12034   VERIZON NEW ENGLAND INC.  vs.  BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF BOSTON (and a consolidated case[1]).       Suffolk.     April 7, 2016. – November 2, 2016.   Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, & Hines, JJ.[2]     Telephone Company.  Taxation, Assessors, Personal property tax: value.  Constitutional Law, Taxation.       Appeal from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board.   The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court.     William Hazel for the taxpayers. Anthony M. Ambriano for board of assessors of Boston. Maura Healey, Attorney General, & Daniel J. Hammond, Assistant Attorney General, for Attorney General & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. Kenneth W. Gurge, for Massachusetts Municipal Association & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.     BOTSFORD, J.  Two telephone companies appeal from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board (board) upholding the property tax assessments by the board of assessors of Boston (assessors) for fiscal year (FY) 2012 on certain personal property each company owns.  At issue is whether the tax assessments, which were based on a “split” tax rate structure determined in accordance with G. L. c. 40, § 56 (§ 56), constituted a disproportionate tax that, as such, violated the Constitution of the Commonwealth.  More particularly, the question is whether the split tax rate structure authorized by § 56 — a rate structure that provides for taxable personal property to be taxed at a rate identical to the rate applied to commercial and industrial real property but higher than the rate that would apply if all taxable property, real and personal, were taxed at a single, uniform rate — violates the proportionality requirement of Part II, c. 1, § 1, art. 4, of the Constitution of the Commonwealth, as amended by art. 112 of the Amendments to the Constitution, as well as art. 10 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  We conclude that the split tax structure authorized by § 56 and related statutes does not violate the Massachusetts Constitution.  We affirm the board’s decision.[3] Background.[4]  a.  Procedural background.  Verizon New England Inc. (Verizon) and RCN BecoCom LLC (RCN) (collectively, taxpayers) are subject to property tax in the city of Boston on personal property consisting primarily of machinery, poles, underground conduits, wires, and pipes (§ 39 property) that they own and use for business purposes.  Pursuant […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - November 2, 2016 at 3:11 pm

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New England Survey Systems, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Accidents (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-076-16)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   15-P-331                                        Appeals Court   NEW ENGLAND SURVEY SYSTEMS, INC.  vs.  DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS.     No. 15-P-331. Suffolk.     December 8, 2015. – June 30, 2016.   Present:  Grainger, Hanlon, & Agnes, JJ. Workers’ Compensation Act, Failure to obtain insurance, Cancellation of insurance.  Department of Industrial Accidents.  Statute, Construction.  Due Process of Law, Administrative hearing.  Administrative Law, Judicial review.       Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on April 26, 2013.   The case was heard by Frances A. McIntyre, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.     Timothy K. Cutler for the plaintiff. Douglas S. Martland, Assistant Attorney General, for Department of Industrial Accidents.        AGNES, J.  The Workers’ Compensation Act, G. L. c. 152 (act), provides that whenever the Commissioner of the Department of Industrial Accidents (the department) determines that an employer has not provided the insurance required by law,[1] “a stop work order shall be served on said employer, requiring the cessation of all business operations at the place of employment or job site.”  G. L. c. 152, § 25C(1), as amended through St. 1989, c. 341, § 82.  The stop work order takes effect upon service on the employer, and remains in effect until the employer satisfies the commissioner that it has obtained the required insurance and paid the $ 100 per day civil penalty for each day it was in violation of the law, beginning with the date of service of the order.  § 25C(1) of the act.  Section 25C also provides for additional civil and criminal penalties against employers who do not obtain the insurance required by law.  See G. L. c. 152, § 25C(5)-(6), (9)-(11).  Subsection (10) of § 25C sets forth one of the additional civil penalties that an employer who fails to obtain the insurance required by the act may face.  It reads as follows: “(10) In addition to being subject to the civil penalties herein provided, an employer who fails to provide for insurance or self insurance as required by this chapter or knowingly misclassifies employees, to avoid higher premium rates, will be immediately debarred from bidding or participating in any state or municipal funded contracts for a period of three years and shall when applicable be subject to penalties provided for in section fourteen”  (emphasis supplied).[2]   The issue before us, which is one of first impression, is […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - June 30, 2016 at 8:35 pm

Categories: News   Tags: , , , , , , , , ,

New England Precision Grinding,l Inc. v. Simply Surgical, LLC, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-026-16)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   14-P-1637                                       Appeals Court   NEW ENGLAND PRECISION GRINDING, INC.  vs.  SIMPLY SURGICAL, LLC[1] & another.[2] No. 14-P-1637. Worcester.     November 2, 2015. – March 9, 2016.   Present:  Milkey, Carhart, & Massing, JJ.     Uniform Commercial Code, Acceptance of goods, Revocation of acceptance.  Indemnity.  Judgment, Interest.  Practice, Civil, Instructions to jury, Judgment notwithstanding verdict, Verdict.       Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on August 7, 2006.   The case was tried before Richard T. Tucker, J., and motions for the entry of separate and final judgment and to reach the proceeds of the judgment were heard by him.     Barry A. Bachrach for the plaintiff. Matthew R. Johnson for Simply Surgical, LLC. Dale C. Kerester for Iscon Surgicals, Ltd.     CARHART, J.  This Superior Court contract action stems from the sale by defendant Simply Surgical, LLC (Simply Surgical) to plaintiff New England Precision Grinding, Inc. (NEPG) of medical device parts manufactured by defendant Iscon Surgicals, Ltd. (Iscon).  All three parties appeal from an amended judgment entered on January 8, 2013, in favor of Simply Surgical; Iscon also appeals from an order entered on January 18, 2013, denying its motion for entry of a separate and final judgment and to reach the proceeds of the judgment due to Simply Surgical from NEPG.[3] On appeal, NEPG argues that the judge wrongly declined to instruct the jury that, under the Uniform Commercial Code   (U.C.C.), codified in Massachusetts at G. L. c. 106, NEPG had the right to revoke its acceptance of parts once they were rejected by its customer Kyphon, Inc. (Kyphon).  It also complains that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence and its award excessive.  Simply Surgical argues that the judge erroneously prevented it from presenting its claim for common-law indemnification against Iscon.  Iscon contends that the judge should have corrected the amount of the damages awarded by the jury to include the total unpaid balance sought by Iscon on its account stated. We affirm the amended judgment, and the order entered January 18, 2013, denying Iscon’s motion. Background.  We summarize the trial evidence.  NEPG is a Massachusetts-based manufacturer of precision medical components.  In or around 2004, NEPG contracted with Kyphon and agreed to supply Kyphon with medical device parts referred to as stylets and nozzles.[4]  In 2005, Kyphon ordered six lots from […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - March 10, 2016 at 3:48 am

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New England Forestry Foundation, Inc. v. Board of Assessors of Hawley (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-083-14)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750;  (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us     SJC‑11432     NEW ENGLAND FORESTRY FOUNDATION, INC.  vs.  BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF HAWLEY. Suffolk.     January 6, 2014.  ‑  May 15, 2014. Present:  Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ.     Administrative Law, Agency’s interpretation of statute, Findings, Judicial review, Appellate Tax Board:  final decision.  Taxation, Real estate tax:  charity, Real estate tax: exemption, Appellate Tax Board:  appeal to Supreme Judicial Court, Appellate Tax Board:  findings, Judicial review.  Charity.  Corporation, Non‑profit corporation.  Statute, Construction.     Appeal from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board.   The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review.     Douglas Hallward‑Driemeier (Jesse Mohan Boodoo & Jacob Scott with him) for the plaintiff. Rosemary Crowley (David J. Martel with her) for the defendant. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Robert H. Levin, of Maine, for Massachusetts Land Trust Coalition, Inc., & another. Gregor I. McGregor & Luke H. Legere for Massachusetts Association of Conservation Commissions, Inc., & another. James F. Sullivan for Massachusetts Association of Assessing Officers. Robert E. McDonnell & Patrick Strawbridge for The Nature Conservancy, & another. Lisa C. Goodheart, Susan A. Hartnett, Phelps T. Turner, & Joshua D. Nadreau for The Trustees of Reservations.       SPINA, J.  This case comes to us on direct appellate review from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board (board).  The taxpayer, New England Forestry Foundation, Inc. (NEFF), is a nonprofit corporation organized under G. L. c. 180.  NEFF is the record owner of a 120-acre parcel of forest land in the town of Hawley.  In 2009, NEFF applied to the board of assessors of Hawley (assessors) for a charitable tax exemption on the parcel under G. L. c. 59, § 5, Third (Clause Third).  The assessors denied NEFF’s application, and NEFF appealed to the board.  The board likewise denied the application on the basis that NEFF had failed to carry its burden to show that it occupied the land in Hawley for a charitable purpose within the meaning of Clause Third.  NEFF again appealed, and both NEFF and the assessors filed applications for direct appellate review.  We granted the parties’ applications, and we reverse the board’s decision. 1.  Background.  The taxpayer, NEFF, is a Massachusetts nonprofit corporation organized under G. L. c. 180, and it has received tax-exempt status from the Federal government under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).  NEFF was incorporated in […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - May 15, 2014 at 5:39 pm

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Town of Hanover v. New England Regional Council of Carpenters (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-057-14)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750;  (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us     SJC‑11396   TOWN OF HANOVER  vs.  NEW ENGLAND REGIONAL COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS.     Plymouth.     December 2, 2013.  ‑  March 25, 2014. Present:  Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ.   “Anti‑SLAPP” Statute.  Constitutional Law, Right to petition government.  Abuse of Process.  Labor.  Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss, Standing.       Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on October 6, 2011.   A special motion to dismiss was heard by Robert C. Cosgrove, J.   The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court.     Christopher N. Souris for the defendant. James A. Toomey for the plaintiff. Richard J. Yurko, Noemi A. Kawamoto, Sarah R. Wunsch, Audrey R. Richardson, & Susan Reid, for American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.     IRELAND, C.J.  This case presents an issue of first impression:  whether an association that has provided support for litigation, without being a named party in that litigation, has engaged in protected petitioning activities for the purposes of G. L. c. 231, § 59H.  The defendant, the New England Regional Council of Carpenters, appeals from a Superior Court judge’s denial of its special motion to dismiss a suit by the town of Hanover (town) claiming that the defendant engaged in abuse of process in prior legal proceedings.[1]  Because we conclude that support of litigation constitutes protected petitioning activity within the meaning of G. L. c. 231, § 59H, and that here, the town did not demonstrate that the defendant’s right to petition was “devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law,” Office One, Inc. v. Lopez, 437 Mass. 113, 123 (2002), we allow the defendant’s special motion to dismiss. 1.  Prior litigation.  We begin by briefly discussing certain events relevant to the defendant’s special motion to dismiss.  In May, 2009, the town engaged in an open bidding process for the construction of the town’s new high school.  Fordyce v. Hanover, 457 Mass. 248, 251-252 (2010) (Fordyce).  The town awarded the contract to the contractor with the lowest formal bid, following which a subcontractor who was not involved in the winning contract filed a bid protest with the Attorney General.  Id. at 252.  After an investigation of the town’s bidding process and award of the contract, the Attorney General found that the contractor who […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - March 25, 2014 at 6:02 pm

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New England Insulation Company, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-064-13)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750;  (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us       11‑P‑1617                                       Appeals Court   NEW ENGLAND INSULATION COMPANY, INC.  vs.  LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.     No. 11‑P‑1617. Suffolk.     September 12, 2012.  ‑  May 22, 2013. Present:  Cohen, Rubin, & Carhart, JJ.     Insurance, Comprehensive liability insurance, Coverage, Construction of policy.  Contract, Insurance, Indemnity, Construction of contract.  Indemnity.  Asbestos.       Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on July 13, 2010.   A motion to dismiss was heard by Judith Fabricant, J.     Elizabeth J. Stewart (Susan J. Baronoff with her) for the plaintiff. Kim V. Marrkand (Alec Zadek with her) for the defendant.     COHEN, J.  The central issue in this appeal is whether the pro rata time-on-the-risk allocation method adopted by the Supreme Judicial Court in Boston Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 454 Mass. 337 (2009) (Boston Gas), should be applied to determine the extent of indemnity coverage owed by Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty) for claims brought against its insured, New England Insulation Company, Inc. (NEIC), for asbestos-related injuries.  Procedurally, the appeal arises from the dismissal of NEIC’s complaint against Liberty, which, as pertinent here, sought damages and declaratory relief on the premise that the Boston Gas allocation method was not applicable because of differences in wording between the Liberty policies and those construed in Boston Gas.  A judge of the Superior Court concluded that those differences were not significant and that Boston Gas was controlling.  Accordingly, she dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.  See Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). NEIC appeals from the ensuing judgment, but argues error only in the judge’s determination (see note 2, supra) that Liberty did not breach its contractual duty to indemnify by deciding, in June, 2010, that it would apply the Boston Gas allocation method to future indemnity payments and allocate shares of losses to NEIC for periods when it did not have coverage.  For the following reasons, we affirm. 1.  Standard of review.  Our review of the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is de novo. Dartmouth v. Greater New Bedford Regional Vocational Technical High Sch. Dist., 461 Mass. 366, 373 (2012).  “We accept as true the allegations in the complaint and draw every reasonable inference in favor of the plaintiff.  We consider whether the factual allegations in the […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - May 22, 2013 at 7:24 pm

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Allergies in New England

Allergies to tree pollen begin later in New England than in most other areas, but when it begins, it comes on fast, according to allergists familiar with this area. “When the tree season comes on, patients go from feeling normal to just being miserable,” said Dr. Don McNeil, who specializes in allergy and immunology.  The spring allergy season is short—just six to eight weeks—but it can make allergy sufferers highly uncomfortable. McNeil says this is heightened by the fact that many people with pollen allergies also have mold allergies. The moist, warm weather that marks spring also encourages mold growth, which means mold spores are on the rise at the same time as tree pollen. The tree pollen that causes related spring allergies can only arise from trees that pollinate: deciduous trees. These are the oaks, hickories, sycamores, cottonwoods, birches and other hardwoods that are prevalent in the Northeast. Although that makes spring allergies worse in New England, McNeil said moving to another region rarely brings longterm relief. “If you are prone to having allergies, you may move to a new area and be free of your symptoms initially,” he said. “After a year or two, you become sensitized to the allergens in the new place.” The actual cause of sniffling, sneezing, wheezing and worse are the tiny bits of pollen from tree buds that are floating about in the air. Pollen rises in the early morning, so McNeil advises patients to keep their windows closed overnight. “Some patients benefit from bathing before bed to remove any pollen that may have attached to their skin or hair during the day,” McNeil said. McNeil says it is important for people suffering from allergies to find a local allergist who is board certified in allergy and immunology. “Avoid people who are practicing allergy but don’t specialize in it,” said McNeil. Some practitioners profit from placing patients on a repeating regimen of allergy shots, he said. While shots are often effective for safely building up a tolerance to allergens, patients should be evaluated regularly and moved to a maintenance program when the effective dose has been reached, according to the American Academy of Allergy, Asthma and Immunology. South End Patch

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - April 29, 2013 at 12:55 pm

Categories: Arrests   Tags: ,

O’Brien v. New England Police Benevolent Association, Local 911 (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-038-13)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750;  (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us       12‑P‑155                                        Appeals Court   MICHAEL V. O’BRIEN[1]  vs.  NEW ENGLAND POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 911.     No. 12‑P‑155. Suffolk.     December 10, 2012.  ‑  March 1, 2013. Present:  Berry, Fecteau, & Carhart, JJ.   Arbitration, Police, Collective bargaining, Authority of arbitrator.  Public Policy.  Municipal Corporations, Police, Collective bargaining.  Police, Discharge, Collective bargaining.  Public Employment, Police, Termination, Collective bargaining.       Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on August 13, 2009.   The case was heard by Kimberly S. Budd, J.     Tim D. Norris for the plaintiff. Peter J. Perroni for the defendant.     FECTEAU, J.  The plaintiff, the city manager of the city of Worcester (city), appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court allowing the defendant’s motion to confirm an arbitration award.  After hearing, the arbitrator, having found that a police officer’s actions were reasonable and did not justify his termination “for cause,” ordered the city to reinstate and make whole the officer, who had been terminated for actions that the city alleged constituted gross misconduct.  The plaintiff contends that the arbitrator’s decision infringes on the city’s managerial prerogative and otherwise violates public policy by requiring the city to retain an officer who (i) violated three teenagers’ constitutional rights and (ii) engaged in felonious conduct by assaulting the teenagers without cause.  The plaintiff also argues that the arbitrator exceeded his authority under the applicable collective bargaining agreement (CBA) by improperly interpreting and applying various statutory, regulatory, and other administrative rules incorporated therein.  The judge was not persuaded that the arbitrator’s decision to reinstate the officer amounted to a violation of public policy and confirmed the arbitration award.  We affirm. Background.  From the arbitrator’s decision we draw the following facts, in summary fashion.  On the evening of April 7, 2007, Worcester police Officer David Rawlston, who was on injury leave and in his home on Tory Fort Lane in Worcester with his wife and child, received a telephone call from his neighbors informing him that they had seen three unidentified teenagers lurking about his house and his driveway, looking into his automobiles, and moving toward his backyard.  Rawlston retrieved his department-issued handgun and a flashlight.  After searching the interior of his house, Rawlston met his neighbors outside in his driveway, where they pointed out several teenagers a few houses up the street and […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - March 1, 2013 at 7:39 pm

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