Campatelli v. Chief Justice of the Trial Court, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-110-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11654 PATRICIA CAMPATELLI vs. CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE TRIAL COURT & others.[1] Suffolk. May 8, 2014. ‑ June 20, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Register of Probate. Chief Justice of the Probate and Family Court Department. Chief Justice of the Trial Court. Court Administrator. Statute, Construction. Practice, Civil, Waiver. Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on March 14, 2014. The case was reserved and reported by Duffly, J. Philip R. Boncore (Jeffrey Rosario Turco with him) for the plaintiff. Peter Haley for Association of Magistrates and Assistant Clerks of the Trial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, amicus curiae. Daniel P. Sullivan, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the defendants. BOTSFORD, J. The Register of Probate and Insolvency for Suffolk County, Patricia Campatelli, was placed on paid administrative leave — suspended with pay — by the Chief Justice of the Probate and Family Court Department, the Chief Justice of the Trial Court, and the Court Administrator, pending further investigation of allegations of inappropriate conduct and mismanagement in the performance of her duties. Campatelli commenced this action in the county court to challenge her suspension by the three named court officials; her claim is that only the justices of this court possess the authority to suspend her, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 4. We do not interpret c. 211, § 4, to vest sole authority in this court or its justices to suspend with pay a register of probate, and conclude that the Chief Justice of the Trial Court, the Court Administrator, and the Chief Justice of the Probate and Family Court Department possess the authority to do so pursuant to G. L. c. 211B, §§ 9, 9A, and 10, respectively. Background. Campatelli disputes the allegations and findings contained in the record regarding her conduct in office, but the facts relating to the legal issues before us are undisputed. In November, 2012, Campatelli was elected as the Register of Probate and Insolvency for Suffolk County (register of probate, or register); she took office on January 3, 2013. See G. L. c. 217, § 4. As register, Campatelli served in the Suffolk County Division of the Probate and Family Court Department of the Trial Court. On December 22, […]
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 346132 v. Sex Offender Registry Board (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-069-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13‑P‑548 Appeals Court JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 346132 vs. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. No. 13‑P‑548. Suffolk. March 5, 2014. ‑ June 18, 2014. Present: Kafker, Fecteau, & Agnes, JJ. Sex Offender. Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act. Jurisdiction, Sex offender. Kidnapping. Rape. Practice, Civil, Sex offender. Words, “Like violation.” Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on March 29, 2012. The case was heard by Elizabeth M. Fahey, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Eric Tennen for the plaintiff. David L. Chenail for the defendant. KAFKER, J. Based on a 1987 Federal kidnapping conviction, the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) notified John Doe of his duty to register and his preliminary classification as a level three sex offender. Doe unsuccessfully contested both the registration requirement and the level of classification at an evidentiary hearing and in Superior Court. On appeal, Doe argues that SORB lacks jurisdiction over him, obviating his need to register and rendering his classification void. As his conviction was not in a Massachusetts court, this argument depends on the proper interpretation and application of G. L. c. 6, § 178C, as amended by St. 1999, c. 74, § 2, which requires registration for individuals convicted in another jurisdiction of a “like violation” similar to a Massachusetts sex crime requiring registration. In Doe’s view, his Federal kidnapping conviction does not have an analogous “like violation” in Massachusetts that would compel registration. Conversely, SORB contends that in Doe’s particular case, “rape and assault” were proved to satisfy an element of his Federal kidnapping charge, and that this is sufficient to satisfy the elements of the Massachusetts offense of aggravated rape, which requires registration. It is SORB’s position that Doe was essentially convicted of a “like violation” and thus subject to SORB’s jurisdiction. Based on our understanding of the test set out in John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 151564 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 456 Mass. 612, 615-619 (2010) (Doe No. 151564), which requires that the elements of the two offenses be the same or nearly the same, and precludes registration based on the particular facts underlying a conviction, we must reject SORB’s conduct-based argument. Factual and procedural history. On February 2, 1987, a Federal jury found Doe guilty of kidnapping pursuant […]
Commonwealth v. Harris (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-109-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11191 COMMONWEALTH vs. LAURENCE BYNUM HARRIS.[1] Plymouth. March 12, 2014. ‑ June 18, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Cordy, Botsford, Gants, & Lenk, JJ. Homicide. Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Self-incrimination. Evidence, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Expert opinion, Rebuttal, Intent, Competency. Witness, Expert, Self-incrimination. Intent. Mental Impairment. Due Process of Law, Competency to stand trial. Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Motion to suppress, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of confession, Required finding, Competency to stand trial, Defendant’s competency, Argument by prosecutor. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on November 5, 2007. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Jeffrey A. Locke, J., and the case was tried before Barbara A. Dortch-Okara, J. Elizabeth Caddick for the defendant. Gail M. McKenna, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. IRELAND, C.J. In September, 2011, a jury convicted the defendant, Laurence Bynum Harris, of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. Represented by new counsel on appeal, the defendant argues error in (1) the denial of his motion to suppress statements; (2) the denial of his motions for required findings of not guilty; (3) the admission of expert rebuttal testimony; and (4) the prosecutor’s closing argument. We affirm the order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress and affirm his conviction. We discern no basis to exercise our authority pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 1. Motion to suppress statements. a. Background and standard of review. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress statements he made to police officers and “all fruits thereof,” claiming, as relevant here, that his Federal and State constitutional rights were violated because his statements had not been voluntarily made. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the motion judge denied the motion. In reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, “we accept the judge’s subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error ‘but conduct an independent review of his ultimate findings and conclusions of law.’” Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 646 (2004), quoting Commonwealth v. Jimenez, 438 Mass. 213, 218 (2002). We summarize the judge’s findings of fact, supplemented with uncontested testimony adduced at the evidentiary hearing. See Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 334, 337 (2007), S.C., 450 Mass. 818 […]
Commonwealth v. Mitchell (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-108-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11487 COMMONWEALTH vs. MARCUS MITCHELL. Bristol. February 3, 2014. ‑ June 18, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Eavesdropping. Evidence, Wiretap. Search and Seizure, Electronic surveillance, Warrant. Practice, Criminal, Interlocutory appeal, Motion to suppress, Warrant. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on May 6, 2011. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Thomas F. McGuire, Jr., J. An application for leave to file an interlocutory appeal was allowed by Spina, J. in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk. David B. Mark, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Richard B. Klibaner for the defendant. GANTS, J. Under the Massachusetts electronic surveillance statute, G. L. c. 272, § 99 F, the Commonwealth is required to obtain a warrant before it may conduct an “interception,” which is defined as the secret recording or transmitting of the contents of any wire or oral communication without the consent of all parties to the communication. G. L. c. 272, § 99 B 4. However, under the “one-party consent exception,” set forth in § 99 B 4, “it shall not constitute an interception for an investigative or law enforcement officer . . . to record or transmit a wire or oral communication if the officer is a party to such communication or has been given prior authorization to record or transmit the communication by such a party and if recorded or transmitted in the course of an investigation of a designated offense as defined [under § 99 B 7].” The primary issue presented on appeal is the scope of the one-party consent exception, that is, whether a telephone call recorded by the police between the defendant and a cooperating witness is an “interception” requiring a warrant under § 99 F, where the cooperating witness, despite being instructed by a law enforcement officer to elicit information regarding a “designated offense,” instead elicits information only about a subsequent unrelated crime that is not a “designated offense.” A Superior Court judge concluded that the recording was not made “in the course of an investigation of a designated offense,” and therefore allowed the defendant’s motion to suppress the recording, because the cooperating witness did not attempt to discuss the “designated offense” during the recorded telephone call. We reverse the allowance of […]
Lydon v. Coulter (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-068-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13‑P‑1272 Appeals Court JUNE M. LYDON, trustee,[1] vs. THOMAS COULTER. No. 13‑P‑1272. June 17, 2014. Judgment. Injunction. Contempt. Notice. Practice, Civil, Attorney’s fees, Contempt, Judgment, Injunctive relief. This action arises from a zoning dispute between abutting landowners in the town of Milton (town). A judge in the Land Court, as part of a contempt action, awarded the plaintiff partial attorney’s fees. The plaintiff appeals, claiming that the fees and costs awarded were erroneously low. The defendant cross-appeals, claiming that fees and costs should not have been awarded at all and that there was no contempt as the underlying Land Court judgment did not constitute an injunction. We affirm. Background. We need not tarry on the extended litigation between the parties over the right of the defendant to operate a landscaping business next to a vacant residential home owned by the plaintiff.[2] On August 1, 2011, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. On May 3, 2012, the Land Court judge issued a decision and judgment finding largely in favor of the plaintiff. In pertinent part, the judgment commanded that “[a] landscaping business may not be operated on [Coulter’s property].” On August 16, 2012, the plaintiff brought a complaint for civil contempt in the Land Court to enforce Coulter’s compliance with the May 3 judgment. On December 18 of the same year, an evidentiary hearing was held on the complaint for contempt. Before the hearing, the judge took a view of the property in question. On July 3, 2013, judgment entered, finding that Coulter was, indeed, in contempt. As part of the contempt judgment, the judge awarded the plaintiff attorney’s fees and costs. In determining the amount of the fees, the judge grouped the plaintiff’s actions to enforce the original judgment into four categories: (1) litigating Coulter’s appeal of the May 3 judgment; (2) pursuing administrative remedies with the town; (3) attempting to prevent, and then appealing, an amendment to the zoning by-law; and (4) prosecuting the contempt action in the Land Court. The judge declined to award the plaintiff any fees incurred relative to the first three items. As to the fourth, the judge concluded that the plaintiff could recover. In the end, the judge allowed fees in the amount of $ 9,575 out of the […]
Commonwealth v. Copney (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-107-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11077 COMMONWEALTH vs. JABRAI JORDAN COPNEY. Middlesex. February 7, 2014. ‑ June 17, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Botsford, Gants, & Lenk, JJ. Homicide. Felony-Murder Rule. Robbery. Firearms. Search and Seizure, Expectation of privacy, Emergency. Evidence, Prior misconduct. Abandoned Property. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Mistrial, Instructions to jury, Capital case. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on June 25, 2009. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Wendie I. Gershengorn, J., and the cases were tried before John T. Lu, J. Stephen Paul Maidman for the defendant. Michael A. Kaneb, Assistant District Attorney (David M. Solet, Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the Commonwealth. SPINA, J. The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder, the predicate felony being attempted armed robbery. He also was convicted of carrying a firearm without a license. On appeal the defendant contends that the judge erred (1) by denying his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrant that was based on observations made during an earlier warrantless entry of a college dormitory room where he had been staying; (2) by admitting evidence of his prior bad acts; (3) by denying his motion for a mistrial based on the Commonwealth’s response to his Bowden defense; and (4) by failing to instruct the jury that they could not convict him of felony-murder in the first degree based on the firearms conviction. We affirm the convictions and decline the request to grant relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 1. Background. The jury could have found the following facts. We reserve other details for discussion of the issues. During the fall of 2008 and spring of 2009, the defendant, who was from New York City, was a frequent overnight guest in the Lowell House dormitory room of his girl friend, Brittany Smith, a senior at Harvard University (Harvard). In May, 2009, he met the victim, a twenty-one year old Cambridge resident who regularly sold marijuana to Harvard students. On or about May 17 he devised a plan to rob the victim. He told the victim that he was a Harvard student and that he lived at Kirkland House. He said he wanted to buy three pounds of marijuana. The defendant arranged […]
Raffaele v. Commonwealth (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-105-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11606 ANTHONY RAFFAELE vs. COMMONWEALTH. June 16, 2014. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Anthony Raffaele appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying his petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. Raffaele pleaded guilty to certain offenses in the District Court. Allegedly, the Assistant District Attorney prosecuting him was, in 2003, a defendant in a Federal civil action commenced by Raffaele. Raffaele argues that the prosecutor should have disclosed this circumstance to the District Court judge and should have recused himself. He cites no authority for this proposition. He also claims that the prosecutor coerced him into accepting a plea offer. To the extent that Raffaele seeks to have his plea vacated, it is clear that any such request should be made in a motion for a new trial pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), subject to review in the ordinary appellate process. The single justice neither erred nor abused her discretion by denying relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3.[1] Judgment affirmed. The case was submitted on briefs. Anthony Raffaele, pro se. Jane A. Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. [1] Moreover, Raffaele failed to provide the single justice with a record substantiating his allegations. “In seeking relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, it was the petitioner[‘s] burden to create a record — not merely to allege but to demonstrate, i.e., to provide copies of the lower court docket entries and any relevant pleadings, motions, orders, recordings, transcripts, or other parts of the lower court record necessary to substantiate [his] allegations — showing both a substantial claim of violation of a substantive right and that the violation could not have been remedied in the normal course of a trial and appeal or by other available means.” Gorod v. Tabachnick, 428 Mass. 1001, 1001, cert. denied sub nom. Davis v. Tabachnick, 525 U.S. 1003 (1998), and cases cited. Full-text Opinions
Commonwealth v. Caswell (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-066-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 12‑P‑1301 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. DARREN CASWELL. No. 12‑P‑1301. Plymouth. January 16, 2014. ‑ June 16, 2014. Present: Graham, Brown, & Maldonado, JJ. Homicide. Evidence, Joint venturer. Joint Enterprise. Practice, Criminal, Argument by prosecutor, Instructions to jury. Accessory and Principal. Malice. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on October 2, 2009. The case was heard by Paul E. Troy, J. Cynthia Vincent Thomas for the defendant. Gail M. McKenna, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. GRAHAM, J. On August 13, 2003, Matthew Cote, the victim, was stabbed to death. His body was discovered several days later in the rear seat of his pickup truck in a remote area of the town of Carver. The truck had been set afire, and the victim’s body was severely burned and unrecognizable. More than six years later, Darren Caswell, the defendant, was indicted on a charge of murder in the first degree of the victim, and at trial, the Commonwealth proceeded against him on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity and cruelty, based on his knowing participation in the commission of the crime, either alone or with others, and with the requisite intent for murder. See Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 466-468 (2009). A Superior Court jury rejected the charge of murder in the first degree, but convicted the defendant of murder in the second degree. On appeal, the defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence that he participated in a joint venture to murder the victim; that portions of the prosecutor’s closing argument were improper; that the judge’s jury instruction pursuant to Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423, 440-449 (2004), was erroneous; that the judge’s instructions on malice were erroneous and incomplete; and that the cumulative impact of the errors denied him a fair trial. We affirm. The jury could have found the following facts. The victim, who lived in the town of Kingston with his girlfriend, Jessica Brunell, and her young daughter, broke his wrist in 2002 in a motorcycle accident. Thereafter, he became addicted to the drug Oxycontin, which he purchased from Russell Freitas, a resident of the nearby town of Middleboro. Freitas had been involved in an accident in 1998 while “off roading” in a pickup truck, and the […]
Younker v. Department of Transitional Assistance (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-067-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13‑P‑855 Appeals Court DIANE M. YOUNKER vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSITIONAL ASSISTANCE. No. 13‑P‑855. Suffolk. January 15, 2014. ‑ June 16, 2014. Present: Cypher, Rubin, & Hines, JJ. Anti-Discrimination Law, Age, Prima facie case. Employment, Discrimination, Demotion, Constructive discharge. Department of Transitional Assistance. Constitutional Law, Freedom of association. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment, Prima facie case. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on December 31, 2010. The case was heard by Bonnie H. MacLeod, J., on a motion for summary judgment. Paul L. Nevins for the plaintiff. Kenneth Y. Lee, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant. RUBIN, J. The plaintiff, Diane M. Younker, appeals from a summary judgment on her claims for violation of her constitutional right of association and for age discrimination under G. L. c. 151B, §§ 4(1C) & 9. We reverse in part. 1. Age discrimination. The plaintiff was employed by the Department of Transitional Assistance (DTA) for forty-two years. She was repeatedly promoted during her long tenure at the agency, rising from her initial post as a social worker to become the director of the Davis Square office in Somerville. In 2007, when the Davis Square and Revere offices were merged, she was thought sufficiently qualified to be appointed director of the newly combined office in Revere. The former director of the Revere office became her assistant director. In the spring of 2009, shortly after the appointment of Julia Kehoe as commissioner of the DTA, the plaintiff was informed in a telephone call from John Augeri, DTA assistant commissioner of field operations, that she was being demoted. The director of the Framingham office, Paul Sutliff, was made director of the Revere office, while the plaintiff would be made assistant director. Concluding that her demotion amounted to constructive termination, the plaintiff resigned the following month. At the time of the demotion, the plaintiff was seventy years old. Sutliff was fifty-three. The plaintiff stated in her affidavit, and the defendant does not dispute, that at the time of her demotion she was not told any reason for her removal from the directorship of the Revere office. She insisted upon being given notice of the demotion in writing and was sent a letter on April 7, 2009, which provided written confirmation of the reassignment but again failed to […]
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Commonwealth v. Tassone (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-106-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11446 COMMONWEALTH vs. WAYNE C. TASSONE. Berkshire. February 4, 2014. ‑ June 16, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Robbery. Assault and Battery. Deoxyribonucleic Acid. Evidence, Expert opinion. Witness, Expert. Constitutional Law, Confrontation of witnesses. Error, Harmless. Practice, Criminal, Confrontation of witnesses, Harmless error. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on July 24, 2009. The cases were tried before John A. Agostini, J. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. William W. Adams for the defendant. Joseph A. Pieropan, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Claudia Leis Bolgen, for Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. GANTS, J. A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant, Wayne C. Tassone, of unarmed robbery, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 19 (b); and assault and battery, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13A (a). The issue on appeal is whether an expert witness may offer an opinion that the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) profile generated from a known saliva sample of the defendant matched a DNA profile obtained from a swab taken from eyeglasses that were left at the scene of a robbery where the expert had no affiliation with the laboratory that conducted the DNA testing of the eyeglasses swab. We conclude that an opinion regarding the results of DNA testing is admissible only where the defendant has a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the expert witness about the reliability of the underlying data produced by such testing. Here, the defendant was deprived of a meaningful opportunity for such cross-examination because the analysts who generated the DNA profiles through DNA testing did not testify at trial, and the expert witness who offered the opinion of a match had no affiliation with the laboratory that tested the crime scene sample. Because the defendant preserved his objection to the admission of the expert opinion and its admission was prejudicial, we vacate the defendant’s convictions and remand for a new trial. Background. We summarize the evidence at trial. Robert Brodeur worked as an assistant manager at a small variety store in Pittsfield. On June 22, 2009, at approximately 5:30 P.M., the only customer in the store was a white male, with short blonde […]