Robert and Ardis James Foundation, et al. v. Meyers (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-011-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1169 Appeals Court ROBERT AND ARDIS JAMES FOUNDATION & another[1] vs. DANIEL MAXWELL MEYERS. No. 13-P-1169. Suffolk. March 14, 2014. – February 12, 2015. Present: Cohen, Graham, & Grainger, JJ. Contract, Implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Damages, Breach of contract, Sale of stock. Corporation, Stock. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 16, 2006. After transfer to the business litigation session, the case was heard by Christine M. Roach, J. Kevin P. Martin (Katherine Sadeck with him) for the defendant. Joseph L. Bierwirth (Thomas J. Carey, Jr. with him) for the plaintiffs. GRAHAM, J. This action arose out of two one-page letter agreements (letter agreements or agreements) between plaintiff Robert James and the defendant, Daniel Maxwell Meyers,[2] in which James agreed to provide Meyers with $ 653,340 for the purchase by Meyers of 31,107 shares of stock in the First Marblehead Corporation, a company cofounded by Meyers. In exchange for supplying Meyers with the funds, James would receive the right to participate in the proceeds of the sale of the 31,107 shares. However, notably absent from each letter agreement was any provision governing its termination or establishing conditions upon which Meyers would be required to sell their stock.[3] In the fall of 2004, James’s daughter, Catherine James Paglia (Catherine[4]), seemingly on behalf of the James family, inquired of Meyers, seeking termination of the agreements. Meyers declined and, on November 16, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a multicount complaint in Superior Court, later amended, asserting claims for division and distribution of the shares (count I), dissolution of a partnership or joint venture (count II), declaration of an agency relationship (count III), breach of an implied term of the contract (count IV), breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (count V), payment of a share of the dividends (count VI), and declaratory judgment (count VII). After a six-day bench trial in April, 2011, the trial judge found in favor of Meyers on counts I through IV and VI. She did, however, determine that on July 31, 2006, Meyers breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (count V). The judge awarded the plaintiffs damages based on the fair market value of the shares of the stock as of the time of the […]
Commonwealth v. Zhan Tang Huang (and 14 companion cases) (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-010-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1299 Appeals Court 13-P-1301 COMMONWEALTH vs. ZHAN TANG HUANG[1] (and fourteen companion cases[2]). Nos. 13-P-1299 & 13-P-1301. Norfolk. May 8, 2014. – February 11, 2015. Present: Rubin, Wolohojian, & Maldonado, JJ. Homicide. Wanton or Reckless Conduct. Fire. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure. Search and Seizure, Exigent circumstances. Practice, Criminal, Severance, Motion to suppress, Admissions and confessions. Joint Enterprise. Evidence, Joint venturer, Photograph. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on August 19, 2009. Pretrial motions to suppress evidence were heard by Wendie I. Gershengorn, J.; a motion to sever was heard by Kenneth J. Fishman, J., and the cases were tried before him. Amy M. Belger for Zhan Tang Huang. Patrick H. Reddington (Kevin J. Reddington with him) for Andy Zhan Ting Huang. Varsha Kukafka, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. WOLOHOJIAN, J. Terri Knight and her husband, Oudah Frawi, together with their sons Ali (one year old) and Hassan (two months old), lived in a one-bedroom basement apartment within a multi-unit residential building at 100 Robertson Street in Quincy. The family slept together in the bedroom. The apartment did not comply with numerous codes, including those requiring that there be a second exit from the bedroom, that windows be large enough to allow a person to escape through them, and that there be operational smoke and carbon monoxide detectors. As a result, when an accidental fire broke out in the living room in the predawn hours of March 25, 2009, while the family was asleep, no smoke alarms signaled the danger. By the time Frawi awoke and (carrying Ali in his car seat) attempted to escape through the living room, the several-hundred-degree fire was too intense for him to reach the only exit. He retreated to the bedroom where he and both his sons died from burns and smoke inhalation. Knight was severely injured by the time firefighters rescued her from the bedroom, but she survived. 100 Robertson Street is a four-unit residential building in which two additional “illegal” units had been added: one in the basement and one in the attic. The building was bought at auction in August, 2007, as an investment by defendant Andy Zhan Ting Huang (Andy) and his sister-in-law, Jinny Ma, who is married to Andy’s brother, Zhan Tang Huang […]
Commonwealth v. Brown (and a companion case) (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-020-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11570 COMMONWEALTH vs. ENFRID BROWN, JR. (and a companion case[1]).[2] Suffolk. October 9, 2014. – February 11, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Homicide. Practice, Criminal, Double jeopardy, Capital case, Verdict. Constitutional Law, Double jeopardy. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court on May 16, 1973. Following review by this court, 367 Mass. 24 (1975) and 378 Mass. 165 (1979), motions for a new trial, filed on September 23, 2009, and July 26, 2012, were considered by Frank M. Gaziano, J. A request for leave to appeal was allowed by Gants, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk. Ryan M. Schiff, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for William J. Johnson. Matthew Sears, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Robert L. Sheketoff, for Enfrid Brown, Jr., was present but did not argue. HINES, J. The defendants, Enfrid Brown, Jr., and William J. Johnson, were indicted on charges of murder and armed entry with the intent to commit a felony in connection with the 1973 death of the victim, Hakim A. Jamal.[3] The defendants were convicted by a jury of murder in the first degree at their first trial.[4] We reversed the first convictions on grounds not pertinent to this appeal and remanded for a new trial. Commonwealth v. Brown, 367 Mass. 24, 32 (1975) (Brown I). They were retried and again convicted. We affirmed the second convictions. Commonwealth v. Brown, 378 Mass. 165, 166 (1979) (Brown II). After various proceedings, which we detail below, the defendants filed a third[5] motion for a new trial in July, 2012, arguing that the jury’s initial report of not guilty verdicts in the first trial was in fact an acquittal of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation and the retrial on that same theory in the second trial violated their double jeopardy rights. In a thoughtful memorandum of decision, a Superior Court judge denied the motion. The defendants petitioned a single justice of this court, pursuant to the “gatekeeper” provision of G. L. c. 278, § 33E, for leave to appeal. The single justice allowed the appeal to proceed on the question whether the jury’s initial verdict has the double jeopardy consequence, under Federal constitutional law and the statutory and […]
Guardianship of V.V. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-019-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11739 GUARDIANSHIP OF V.V. Essex. January 5, 2015. – February 10, 2015. Present: Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Probate Court, Guardian. Due Process of Law, Assistance of counsel. Practice, Civil, Appointment of guardian, Relief from judgment, Assistance of counsel, Moot case. Moot Question. Petition for appointment of a guardian for a minor filed in the Essex Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on July 17, 2012. The case was heard by Susan D. Ricci, J., and a motion for relief from judgment was considered by her; a petition for removal of the guardian, filed on May 7, 2013, was heard by Randy J. Kaplan, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Glenna Goldis for the mother. Andrew L. Cohen, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. Susan R. Elsen, Jamie Ann Sabino, Julie Gallup, Russell Engler, Mary K. Ryan, Shaghayegh Tousi, & Alison Holdway, for Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, Inc., & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. SPINA, J. The mother of the minor child, V.V., appeals from the denial, in the Probate and Family Court, of her motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) (4), 365 Mass. 828 (1974). In the motion she alleged that a judgment appointing a permanent guardian for V.V. was void for lack of due process because she was not appointed counsel or afforded alternative procedural safeguards in the guardianship proceeding. We granted her application for direct appellate review. We dismiss the appeal as moot but also hold that a parent of a minor child has a right to counsel where, as here, someone other than the parent seeks to have himself or herself appointed as the child’s guardian pursuant to G. L. c. 190B, § 5-206.[1] Background. The details of the events leading up to the guardianship decree are set forth in Gianareles v. Zegarowski, 467 Mass. 1012 (2014). The essential facts are as follows. A judge in the Probate and Family Court appointed the mother’s grandmother, and V.V.’s great-grandmother, as V.V.’s permanent guardian in December, 2012. Id. at 1013. The mother was not represented by counsel in the guardianship proceeding. Id. In May, 2013, then represented by counsel, the mother filed […]
In the Matter of: Dwyer-Jones, Suzanne T. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-018-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11516 IN THE MATTER OF SUZANNE T. DWYER-JONES. Suffolk. October 6, 2014. – February 5, 2015. Present: Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Attorney at Law, Reciprocal discipline, Suspension, Disability, Inactive status. Information filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on May 16, 2012. A petition to transfer to disability inactive status was heard by Gants, J. Thomas R. Kiley for the respondent. John W. Marshall, Assistant Bar Counsel. SPINA, J. We consider in this case whether an attorney who has been suspended from the practice of law in another jurisdiction based on mental health conditions or substance abuse is subject to reciprocal transfer to disability inactive status in Massachusetts without a separate hearing in Massachusetts to determine her incapacity. See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 13 (1), as amended, 435 Mass. 1302 (2002). We conclude that she is. 1. Background. The respondent, Suzanne T. Dwyer-Jones, has been admitted to practice in both Maine and Massachusetts. On March 25, 2013, a final hearing was held before a single justice of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court on a petition filed by the Maine board of overseers of the bar for suspension of the respondent pursuant to Me. Bar R. 7.3(e)(2)(B). That rule permits the board to file a petition directly with the court where it is alleged that “the continued practice of [an] attorney poses a substantial threat of irreparable harm to the public,” id., because the attorney is “incapacitated from continuing practice by reason of mental infirmity or addiction to drugs or intoxicants.” Me. Bar R. 7.3(e)(2)(A). After the hearing, at which the respondent was both present and represented by counsel, the Maine single justice found that the respondent “is afflicted with a substantial proclivity for substance abuse and a very serious mental health condition.” He stated: “[T]he combined effects of these conditions clearly produced a substantial incapacity that adversely impacted [the respondent’s] ability to practice law and resulted in a substantial threat of irreparable harm to the public. Indeed, . . . she was essentially unable to manage her own affairs, let alone the complex matters involved in the representation of others. The court finds that the incapacitating symptoms of these conditions remain essentially as florid today as they were during […]
In the Matter of: Dwyer-Jones, Suzanne T. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-018-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11516 IN THE MATTER OF SUZANNE T. DWYER-JONES. Suffolk. October 6, 2014. – February 5, 2015. Present: Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Attorney at Law, Reciprocal discipline, Suspension, Disability, Inactive status. Information filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on May 16, 2012. A petition to transfer to disability inactive status was heard by Gants, J. Thomas R. Kiley for the respondent. John W. Marshall, Assistant Bar Counsel. SPINA, J. We consider in this case whether an attorney who has been suspended from the practice of law in another jurisdiction based on mental health conditions or substance abuse is subject to reciprocal transfer to disability inactive status in Massachusetts without a separate hearing in Massachusetts to determine her incapacity. See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 13 (1), as amended, 435 Mass. 1302 (2002). We conclude that she is. 1. Background. The respondent, Suzanne T. Dwyer-Jones, has been admitted to practice in both Maine and Massachusetts. On March 25, 2013, a final hearing was held before a single justice of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court on a petition filed by the Maine board of overseers of the bar for suspension of the respondent pursuant to Me. Bar R. 7.3(e)(2)(B). That rule permits the board to file a petition directly with the court where it is alleged that “the continued practice of [an] attorney poses a substantial threat of irreparable harm to the public,” id., because the attorney is “incapacitated from continuing practice by reason of mental infirmity or addiction to drugs or intoxicants.” Me. Bar R. 7.3(e)(2)(A). After the hearing, at which the respondent was both present and represented by counsel, the Maine single justice found that the respondent “is afflicted with a substantial proclivity for substance abuse and a very serious mental health condition.” He stated: “[T]he combined effects of these conditions clearly produced a substantial incapacity that adversely impacted [the respondent’s] ability to practice law and resulted in a substantial threat of irreparable harm to the public. Indeed, . . . she was essentially unable to manage her own affairs, let alone the complex matters involved in the representation of others. The court finds that the incapacitating symptoms of these conditions remain essentially as florid today as they were during […]
In the Matter of: Dwyer-Jones, Suzanne T. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-018-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11516 IN THE MATTER OF SUZANNE T. DWYER-JONES. Suffolk. October 6, 2014. – February 5, 2015. Present: Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Attorney at Law, Reciprocal discipline, Suspension, Disability, Inactive status. Information filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on May 16, 2012. A petition to transfer to disability inactive status was heard by Gants, J. Thomas R. Kiley for the respondent. John W. Marshall, Assistant Bar Counsel. SPINA, J. We consider in this case whether an attorney who has been suspended from the practice of law in another jurisdiction based on mental health conditions or substance abuse is subject to reciprocal transfer to disability inactive status in Massachusetts without a separate hearing in Massachusetts to determine her incapacity. See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 13 (1), as amended, 435 Mass. 1302 (2002). We conclude that she is. 1. Background. The respondent, Suzanne T. Dwyer-Jones, has been admitted to practice in both Maine and Massachusetts. On March 25, 2013, a final hearing was held before a single justice of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court on a petition filed by the Maine board of overseers of the bar for suspension of the respondent pursuant to Me. Bar R. 7.3(e)(2)(B). That rule permits the board to file a petition directly with the court where it is alleged that “the continued practice of [an] attorney poses a substantial threat of irreparable harm to the public,” id., because the attorney is “incapacitated from continuing practice by reason of mental infirmity or addiction to drugs or intoxicants.” Me. Bar R. 7.3(e)(2)(A). After the hearing, at which the respondent was both present and represented by counsel, the Maine single justice found that the respondent “is afflicted with a substantial proclivity for substance abuse and a very serious mental health condition.” He stated: “[T]he combined effects of these conditions clearly produced a substantial incapacity that adversely impacted [the respondent’s] ability to practice law and resulted in a substantial threat of irreparable harm to the public. Indeed, . . . she was essentially unable to manage her own affairs, let alone the complex matters involved in the representation of others. The court finds that the incapacitating symptoms of these conditions remain essentially as florid today as they were during […]
Commonwealth v. Santiago (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-017-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11619 COMMONWEALTH vs. ANGEL SANTIAGO. Hampden. October 7, 2014. – February 4, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Controlled Substances. Search and Seizure, Standing to object, Threshold police inquiry, Reasonable suspicion, Probable cause, Fruits of illegal search. Constitutional Law, Investigatory stop, Probable cause, Reasonable suspicion, Search and seizure. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Standing. Threshold Police Inquiry. Probable Cause. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on July 19, 2012. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by John S. Ferrara, J. An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal was allowed by Gants, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by him to the Appeals Court. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Katherine E. McMahon, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Frederic G. Bartmon for the defendant. Michael K. Fee, P. R. Goldstone, Alex G. Philipson, Matthew R. Segal, & Jessie J. Rossman, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. Murat Erkan, for Erkan & Associates, LLC, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. BOTSFORD, J. The defendant has been indicted on a charge of unlawful distribution of a class B controlled substance (cocaine), second or subsequent offense. See G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (c), (d). He was stopped and arrested by police officers at the same time and in the same location as another man, Edwin Ramos, to whom the Commonwealth alleges the defendant distributed the cocaine; Ramos was charged with possession of cocaine by complaint in the District Court. A judge in the Superior Court allowed the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of the alleged cocaine on a theory of “target standing.” We consider here the Commonwealth’s interlocutory appeal from the allowance of the motion. We conclude that this is not an appropriate case in which to consider the adoption of target standing. Accordingly, we reverse the order allowing the defendant’s motion to suppress. Background. We take the relevant facts from the motion judge’s findings: “On May 14, 2012, Springfield Police Officer William Catellier observed the defendant . . . riding a bicycle in the North End section of Springfield. This is an area […]
City of Somerville, et al. v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Board, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-016-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11620 CITY OF SOMERVILLE & another[1] vs. COMMONWEALTH EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD & others.[2] Suffolk. November 3, 2014. – February 3, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. School and School Committee, Retirement benefits, Group insurance, Collective bargaining. Municipal Corporations, Group insurance, Collective bargaining. Retirement. Public Employment, Retirement benefits, Collective bargaining. Insurance, Group. Appeal from a decision of the Division of Labor Relations. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Matthew J. Buckley, Assistant City Solicitor, for the plaintiffs. T. Jane Gabriel for the defendant. Laurie R. Houle, Ira Fader, Colin R. Confoey, & Jason Powalisz for the interveners, submitted a brief. SPINA, J. At issue in this case is whether the city of Somerville (city) and the school committee of Somerville (school committee) violated G. L. c. 150E, § 10 (a) (5), and, derivatively, G. L. c. 150E, § 10 (a) (1), when the city unilaterally reduced its percentage contribution to retired employees’ health insurance premiums without engaging in collective bargaining over the matter with current employees.[3] We conclude that the city and the school committee did not violate these statutory provisions. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Commonwealth Employment Relations Board (board), which reached a contrary conclusion. 1. Statutory framework. Our resolution of the present dispute is based on the interplay between G. L. c. 150E and G. L. c. 32B. General Laws c. 150E, § 2, protects the rights of public employees to self-organization and collective bargaining. Pursuant to G. L. c. 150E, § 6, “[t]he employer and the exclusive representative . . . shall negotiate in good faith with respect to wages, hours, standards [of] productivity and performance, and any other terms and conditions of employment . . . .” General Laws c. 150E, § 10, states, in relevant part: “(a) It shall be a prohibited practice for a public employer or its designated representative to: “(1) Interfere, restrain, or coerce any employee in the exercise of any right guaranteed under this chapter; “. . . “(5) Refuse to bargain collectively in good faith with the exclusive representative as required in section six . . . .” “Under the Home Rule Amendment, art. 89, § 6, of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, municipalities of the Commonwealth may choose to provide health insurance coverage to their […]
Categories: News Tags: 1001615, Board, City, Commonwealth, employment, Lawyers, Relations, Somerville, Weekly
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 34186 v. Sex Offender Registry Board (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-015-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11607 JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 34186 vs. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. Worcester. November 3, 2014. – February 2, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Sex Offender. Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act. Jurisdiction, Sex offender. Evidence, Sex offender. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on September 13, 2010. The case was heard by John S. McCann, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and a motion for reconsideration was considered by him. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Jennifer K. Zalnasky for the plaintiff. John R. Puricelli for the defendant. HINES, J. After the Sex Offender Registry Board (board) classified the plaintiff as a sex offender, a judge in the Superior Court concluded that the board lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiff because his conviction under art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1994), the “general” provision of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (code), was not a “like violation” sex offense requiring registration. See G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178P. The board appealed, and we transferred the case from the Appeals Court to this court. We conclude that art. 134, although general in scope, assimilates the elements of underlying offenses and that under the circumstances here, where the plaintiff was convicted on specifications detailing “like violation” offenses, the art. 134 conviction is a sex offense under G. L. c. 6, § 178C. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and reinstate the board’s classification of the plaintiff as a level two sex offender. 1. Factual background and procedural history. We summarize the facts found by hearing examiners after evidentiary hearings, supplemented by undisputed facts from the record. The plaintiff was convicted by general court martial of the following three specifications in violation of art. 134: (1) ”Did . . . knowingly transport or ship in interstate commerce visual depictions of one or more minors, under the age of [eighteen] years, engaging in sexually explicit conduct, in violation of [18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1)]“; (2) ”Did . . . knowingly receive visual depictions of one or more minors, under the age of [eighteen] years, engaged in sexually explicit conduct, which depictions had been shipped or transported in interstate commerce, in violation of [18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)]“; and (3) “Did . . . […]