Machado, et al. v. System4 LLC, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-059-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11681 EDSON TELES MACHADO & others[1] vs. SYSTEM4 LLC & another.[2] Norfolk. December 4, 2014. – April 13, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Massachusetts Wage Act. Contract, Franchise agreement, Arbitration. Arbitration, Damages, Arbitrable question. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on March 24, 2010. Following review by this court, 465 Mass. 508 and 466 Mass. 1004 (2013), a motion for a ruling that an arbitration clause did not apply to certain claims was heard by Patrick F. Brady, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Eric H. Karp for the defendants. Shannon Liss-Riordan for the plaintiffs. CORDY, J. This case was filed in 2010 by a franchisee janitorial worker, on behalf of himself and other similarly situated individuals, against System4 LLC (System4), a “master franchisor,” and NECCS, Inc., doing business as System4 of Boston, LLC (NECCS), a regional “subfranchisor,” originally alleging, in relevant part, breach of contract, rescission of contract, and misclassification as independent contractors in their franchise agreements.[3] The franchise agreements are signed only by the plaintiffs and NECCS; however, the complaint as originally filed, and as subsequently amended, does not differentiate NECCS from System4 and alleges that the former is “the agent of” and “exists solely to conduct [the] business” of the latter. The agreements govern a franchisee’s right to customer account referrals and the use of System4′s proprietary information in operating commercial janitorial cleaning businesses. They also require the franchisee plaintiffs to arbitrate virtually all disputes. While the plaintiffs raise a number of arguments on appeal, of central importance is the question whether System4, a nonsignatory, can compel the franchisee plaintiffs to arbitrate their substantive claims in accord with the arbitration provision in the plaintiffs’ franchise agreements. We conclude that by reason of equitable estoppel they can do so in the circumstances of this case. Background. System4, an Ohio limited liability company, contracts with a regional subfranchisor in the Boston area, NECCS, who subsequently enters into franchise agreements with franchisees, such as the plaintiffs.[4] Although System4 is not a signatory to these agreements, the agreements provide the franchisees with access to System4′s marketing expertise, business practices, training, and use of trademarks, by way of a separate agreement between System4 and NECCS. […]
Commonwealth v. Tran (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-058-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11571 COMMONWEALTH vs. THE NGOC TRAN. Middlesex. December 5, 2014. – April 10, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Homicide. Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon. Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement. Evidence, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement. Mental Impairment. Practice, Criminal, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Instructions to jury, Duplicative convictions, Jury and jurors, Conduct of juror, Capital case. Jury and Jurors. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on June 16, 2011. The cases were tried before David Ricciardone, J. Stephen Neyman for the defendant. Michael A. Kaneb, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. CORDY, J. On April 28, 2011, Son Ngoc Tran was found dead in her home. The cause of her death was multiple blunt-impact injuries to her head and brain inflicted by a rubber-headed mallet. Dispatched to the scene to investigate, Lowell police officers discovered the victim in a pool of blood in her bathroom and her husband, the defendant, sobbing in the living room. As one officer approached, the defendant raised his hands and said, “I killed my wife.” The defendant was charged with murder in the first degree and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon on a person sixty years of age or older. He filed a motion to suppress statements he made in an interview with police investigators shortly after his arrest, which was denied following an evidentiary hearing. At trial, the Commonwealth proceeded with respect to the murder charge on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity and cruelty. The defense was not lack of criminal responsibility, but the defendant’s lack of the mental capacity to specifically intend his actions or to act in a cruel or atrocious manner. A Middlesex County jury found the defendant guilty on both charges.[1] On appeal, the defendant claims several errors. We reject each contention and find no reversible error arising from the defendant’s various claims. Further, we conclude that there is no basis for exercising our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the verdict of murder to a lesser degree of guilt or order a new trial. Accordingly, we affirm the defendant’s convictions. Background. We recite the facts in the light most favorable to […]
Meshna, et al. v. Scrivanos, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-057-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11618 RON MESHNA & others[1] vs. CONSTANTINE SCRIVANOS & another.[2] Suffolk. December 1, 2014. – April 10, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Tips. Employment. Notice. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on May 18, 2011. The case was heard by Thomas P. Billings, J., on a motion for summary judgment, and questions of law were reported by him to the Appeals Court. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Shannon Liss-Riordan for the plaintiffs. Diane M. Saunders (Andrew E. Silvia with her) for the defendants. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Harris Freeman & Audrey R. Richardson for Labor Relations and Research Center, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, & another. Christopher J. Anasoulis for DD Independent Franchise Owners, Inc. Ben Robbins & Martin J. Newhouse for New England Legal Foundation. Richard L. Alfred, Ariel D. Cudkowicz, C.J. Eaton, & Jessica S. Lieberman for Seyfarth Shaw LLP. DUFFLY, J. The plaintiffs are current and former employees at Dunkin’ Donuts stores who brought suit in the Superior Court against Constantine Scrivanos, a Dunkin’ Donuts franchisee of stores that employed the plaintiffs, and NGP Management, LLC (NGP), which performs management functions for those stores. Among other claims, the plaintiffs maintained that the defendants had implemented a no-tipping policy at certain of their Dunkin’ Donuts stores,[3] and that the implementation of that policy, as well as the method of enforcing it, violated G. L. c. 149, § 152A (Tips Act).[4] The Tips Act provides that no employer “shall . . . accept . . . any . . . deduction from a tip” given to any wait staff, service, or bartender employee, or “retain . . . any tip” given to the employer directly. G. L. c. 149, § 152A (b). Concluding that the no-tipping policy was not a violation of the Tips Act, a Superior Court judge allowed the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on that claim. The judge denied the motion on the claims alleging that the defendants’ policy of placing money left as tips in the cash register, and a later policy of placing money left as tips in “abandoned change” cups, violated the Tips Act, because he determined that these claims raised triable issues of fact. At the plaintiffs’ request, the judge then reported two questions to the Appeals Court, pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 64 (a), as amended, […]
Walden Behavioral Care v. K.I. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-055-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11704 WALDEN BEHAVIORAL CARE vs. K.I. Middlesex. December 2, 2014. – April 9, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Mental Health. Practice, Civil, Commitment of mentally ill person, Waiver. Psychotherapist. Witness, Psychiatric examination, Privilege. Evidence, Privileged communication. Privileged Communication. Waiver. Petition for civil commitment filed in the Waltham Division of the District Court Department on August 13, 2012. The case was heard by Gregory C. Flynn, J. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Stan Goldman for the respondent. Diane M. Geraghty Hall for the petitioner. Jennifer Honig, Phillip Kassel, Robert Fleischner, & Stan Eichner, for Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. DUFFLY, J. Walden Behavioral Care, a facility for the treatment of mentally ill patients, brought a petition in the District Court pursuant to G. L. c. 123, §§ 7, 8, seeking to commit K.I. involuntarily and retain him in its facility. K.I. filed a motion in limine to exclude from the commitment hearing testimony concerning statements he had made to his treating psychiatrist at Walden Behavioral Care. K.I. claimed that his statements were protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege as defined in G. L. c. 233, § 20B, and that the psychiatrist was precluded from testifying to those statements or to his opinion of K.I.’s mental or emotional condition based on those statements. A District Court judge denied K.I.’s motion, concluding that the psychotherapist-patient privilege was overcome by an exception to the privilege set forth in G. L. c. 233, § 20B (a). At the commitment hearing, the psychiatrist was permitted to testify to statements made to him by K.I., and to his opinion that K.I. was suicidal. Based on this testimony, K.I. was committed to Walden Behavioral Care for six months. K.I. appealed the commitment order to the Appellate Division of the District Court; in a divided opinion, the court affirmed the commitment. K.I. appealed, and we transferred the case from the Appeals Court on our own motion. We conclude that the exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege established in G. L. c. 233, § 20B (a), applies in the circumstances presented. Notwithstanding the absence of a knowing and intelligent waiver of the privilege, there was no error in permitting the psychiatrist to testify at […]
Commonwealth v. Jones (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-054-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11717 COMMONWEALTH vs. ROBERT JONES. Middlesex. December 1, 2014. – April 9, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Indecent Assault and Battery. Obscenity, Dissemination of matter harmful to minor. Statute, Validity. Constitutional Law, Freedom of speech and press. Practice, Criminal, Argument by prosecutor. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on April 26, 2012. The cases were tried before Maureen B. Hogan, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Rebecca A. Jacobstein, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the defendant. Anne M. Paruti, Assistant District Attorney (Jessica L. Langsam, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the Commonwealth. GANTS, C.J. A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant on two indictments charging indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13B, and one indictment charging dissemination of matter harmful to minors, in violation of G. L. c. 272, § 28.[1] The defendant presents two claims on appeal. First, he contends that, during the time period alleged in the indictment, § 28 was facially overbroad because it did not explicitly require the Commonwealth to prove that the defendant knew that the person receiving the harmful matter was a minor. Second, he argues that the prosecutor’s closing argument created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice by suggesting that the defendant would have committed further sexual offenses against one of the child victims had the child not moved away. We conclude that, during the relevant time period, § 28 was not unconstitutionally overbroad because we interpret the statute to have implicitly required knowledge that the recipient was a minor as an element of the crime. We also conclude that the prosecutor’s suggestion that the defendant would have committed further sexual offenses against the victim was improper but, in the context of the entire closing argument, did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. We therefore affirm the convictions. Background. The two victims were the defendant’s nephews, sons of two different sisters of the defendant. In 2006, one victim, C.J., who was approximately eleven years old, moved with his mother and younger brother to Woburn, which is also where the defendant was living at C.J.’s grandmother’s house. A few days during each school week, and […]
Commonwealth v. Smith (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-056-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11624 COMMONWEALTH vs. RASHIDI J. SMITH. Plymouth. December 4, 2014. – April 9, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Homicide. Constitutional Law, Waiver of constitutional rights by juvenile, Admissions and confessions. Evidence, Admissions and confessions. Practice, Criminal, Admissions and confessions. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on August 17, 2007. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Jeffrey A. Locke, J., and the case was tried before him. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. Chauncey B. Wood for the defendant. Gail M. McKenna, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Rebecca Rose, for Committee for Public Counsel Services & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. LENK, J. The defendant appeals from his conviction of murder in the second degree in the death by shooting of fourteen year old Marvin Constant. At the time of his arrest for the shooting, the defendant was seventeen years and five months old. The Commonwealth’s evidence at trial included, among other things, incriminating statements that the defendant made to police after waiving his Miranda rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The defendant sought, unsuccessfully, to suppress these statements. He argues on appeal that their introduction at trial was error given our common-law rule that, ordinarily, a juvenile must be afforded a meaningful opportunity to consult with an “interested adult” before waiving his or her Miranda rights, since he did not have such an opportunity. The interested adult rule, as we have defined it to date, applies only to those who have not yet reached the age of seventeen. Several years after the defendant was convicted, however, the Legislature enacted St. 2013, c. 84 (2013 act), which amended an array of statutory provisions to treat seventeen year olds as juveniles. The 2013 act does not affect the current case, both because it is prospective in its application and because it does not itself modify the interested adult rule, which is a creature of our common law. We therefore affirm the defendant’s conviction. Nevertheless, we take this opportunity to expand the reach of our rule to encompass seventeen year olds, but do so on a prospective basis.[1] 1. Background. a. The […]
Commonwealth v. Luckern (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-036-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-43 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. JEFFREY LUCKERN. No. 14-P-43. Suffolk. December 8, 2014. – April 8, 2015. Present: Rubin, Milkey, & Carhart, JJ. Habitual Offender. Practice, Criminal, Sentence. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on May 7, 2013. A motion to dismiss was heard by Carol S. Ball, J. Zachary Hillman, Assistant District Attorney (Gretchen P. Sherwood, Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the Commonwealth. David M. Skeels, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the defendant. RUBIN, J. This case concerns the meaning of a provision of the habitual offender statute, G. L. c. 279, § 25(a), amended by St. 2012, c. 192, § 47. The question before us is whether a defendant given a sentence of three years or more in State prison that is suspended so that the defendant must serve less than three years has been “sentenced to state prison or state correctional facility or a federal corrections facility for a term not less than [three] years.” The prior version of the habitual offender statute applied to those who had “been twice convicted of crime and sentenced and committed to prison in this or another state . . . for terms of not less than three years each.” G. L. c. 279, § 25, amended by St. 1904, c. 303. The statute was amended in 2012 so that it now applies to anyone convicted of a felony who “has been previously twice convicted and sentenced to state prison or state correctional facility or a federal corrections facility for a term not less than [three] years by the commonwealth, another state or the United States.” G. L. c. 279, § 25(a). Although the wording has changed slightly, we agree with the parties that there is no material difference between the language in the new version of the statute, which refers to being sentenced for a term of not less than three years, and that in the old statute. Consequently, although the statute has been amended to remove the reference to “commitment,” the language of the current version with respect to being sentenced must be read in pari materia with that in the prior version. The question before us is whether the defendant has two prior convictions that may serve as predicate convictions for application of the habitual offender statute. The defendant pleaded guilty to larceny over $ […]
Commonwealth v. Nutter (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-035-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-918 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. WAYNE NUTTER. No. 13-P-918. Hampden. September 8, 2014. – April 8, 2015. Present: Berry, Kafker, & Maldonado, JJ. Rape. Child Abuse. Privileged Communication. Evidence, Privileged communication, Communication to clergyman, Polygraph test, Business record. Witness, Privilege, Polygraphic test. Constitutional Law, Polygraph test, Confrontation of witnesses. Due Process of Law, Polygraph test. Practice, Criminal, Mistrial, Conduct of prosecutor, New trial. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, Records. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on February 10, 2011. The cases were tried before Peter A. Velis, J., and a motion for a new trial was heard by him. William W. Adams for the defendant. Katherine A. Robertson, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. BERRY, J. A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of two counts of aggravated rape and abuse of a child, G. L. c. 265, § 23A. In this appeal, the defendant claims that the trial judge erred in: (1) admitting inculpatory statements the defendant made to his former pastor during a telephone conversation, because the statements were protected by the priest-penitent privilege, G. L. c. 233, § 20A; (2) failing to grant a mistrial after the defendant’s wife testified that she had asked the defendant to take a lie detector test; and (3) admitting a certified copy of a record from the Registry of Motor Vehicles in violation of the defendant’s confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The defendant also claims the judge abused his discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial. In his motion for a new trial, the defendant claimed that there was prosecutorial misconduct in deliberately eliciting inadmissible testimony — i.e., the defendant’s wife’s statement that she had asked him to take a lie detector test. We affirm. 1. Background. The following is taken from the trial record. There was trial evidence that in approximately 2000, the defendant began sexually abusing his then six year old stepdaughter (victim). According to the victim’s testimony, the abuse continued until approximately 2010, when she was almost sixteen years old. In early October, 2010, the defendant met his wife at a Dunkin’ Donuts in Westfield for several hours to discuss their pending divorce.[1] During that meeting, the defendant’s wife asked the defendant if he had done anything sexual to the […]
Commonwealth v. Jessup (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-053-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11376 COMMONWEALTH vs. ANTHONY EUGENE JESSUP. Hampden. December 5, 2014. – April 8, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Cordy, Botsford, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Homicide. Firearms. Felony-Murder Rule. Constitutional Law, Imprisonment, Freedom of speech and press. Wanton or Reckless Conduct. Robbery. Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Motion to suppress, Instructions to jury, Assistance of counsel. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on July 30, 2010. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Constance M. Sweeney, J., and the cases were tried before Richard J. Carey, J. Elaine Pourinski for the defendant. Deborah D. Ahlstrom, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. HINES, J. In the early morning hours of May 30, 2010, Jonathan Santiago was shot and killed as he sat in his vehicle parked near a Springfield sports bar. The defendant was indicted for the shooting, and a jury convicted him of murder in the first degree on the theory of felony-murder (with attempted armed robbery as the underlying felony), unlawful possession of a firearm, and unlawful possession of a loaded firearm.[1],[2] Represented by new counsel on appeal, he argues (1) error in the denial of his motion to suppress a letter he wrote to another detainee while he was detained awaiting trial; (2) that a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice arose from the trial judge’s failure to instruct on involuntary manslaughter; and (3) that his trial counsel was ineffective in not requesting an instruction on involuntary manslaughter based on wanton or reckless conduct. We affirm the order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress as well as the defendant’s convictions, and discern no basis to exercise our authority pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. Background. Based on the evidence adduced by the Commonwealth at trial, the jury could have found the following facts. On May 29, 2010, the victim met up with his friends, Andrew Cooke, Marquis Chase, Kasheef Sheppard, Timothy Henderson, and Alan Bamber, outside a sports bar in Springfield where Virgil Vargas was celebrating her twenty-first birthday.[3] Vargas previously had attended high school in Springfield with the victim, the defendant, and James Jamal Stovall, who was tried with the defendant. Stovall was her friend. She spoke with Stovall and the defendant outside the bar about fifteen to twenty minutes before the shooting.[4] According to […]
Commonwealth v. Ware (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-052-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11709 COMMONWEALTH vs. BRYANT WARE. Hampden. December 4, 2014. – April 8, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Controlled Substances. Practice, Criminal, Plea, Conduct of government agents, Discovery, Disclosure of evidence. Evidence, Guilty plea, Certificate of drug analysis, Exculpatory, Disclosure of evidence. Constitutional Law, Plea, Conduct of government agents. Due Process of Law, Plea, Disclosure of evidence. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on August 29, 2007; November 25, 2009; and March 9, 2010. A motion for leave to conduct postconviction discovery and for funds, filed on February 14, 2014, was considered by C. Jeffrey Kinder, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. James P. McKenna for the defendant. Katherine A. Robertson, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. SPINA, J. In this case, we consider whether a Superior Court judge abused his discretion in denying a motion for leave to conduct postconviction discovery and for funds, filed by the defendant, Bryant Ware. The defendant sought retesting of drug evidence maintained by the Springfield police department in countless cases brought by the Commonwealth between July, 2004, and January 18, 2013. During that time period, Sonja Farak was a chemist at the Department of Public Health’s State Laboratory Institute in Amherst (Amherst drug lab). Also during that time period, the defendant was indicted on drug charges in three separate cases. His motion for postconviction discovery was predicated on the fact that Farak pleaded guilty on January 6, 2014, to four counts of tampering with evidence, G. L. c. 268, § 13E; four counts of theft of a controlled substance (cocaine) from a dispensary, G. L. c. 94C, § 37; and two counts of unlawful possession of a class B substance (cocaine), G. L. c. 94C, § 34. In denying the motion, the judge concluded that the defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case for relief under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (4), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001). We conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion, and affirm his order. At the same time, based on what we learn from the record in this case about Farak’s misconduct at the Amherst drug lab and the Commonwealth’s failure to investigate the scope and timing of such misconduct, we further […]