Galenski v. Town of Erving, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-067-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11772 CHARLENE GALENSKI vs. TOWN OF ERVING & others.[1] Franklin. January 6, 2015. – April 17, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, Hines, JJ. Public Employment, Retirement benefits. School and School Committee, Retirement benefits, Group insurance. Municipal Corporations, Group insurance, Allocation of insurance premiums. Insurance, Group, Premiums. Retirement. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 21, 2012. The case was heard by John A. Agostini, J., on motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Patricia M. Rapinchuk for the defendants. Eric Lucentini (Sandra Lucentini with him) for the plaintiff. DUFFLY, J. Charlene Galenski retired in 2012 after six years of service as a school principal in the town of Erving (town); she previously had been a long-time public school teacher in other municipalities in the Commonwealth. Galenski then sought continued health insurance coverage and contribution by the town to the cost of her group health insurance premiums. In 2001, the town had voted to adopt G. L. c. 32B, § 9E, which required it to contribute over fifty per cent of the health insurance premiums of all of its retirees. Before employing Galenski, however, the town had enacted a policy stating that it would contribute only to the group health insurance premiums of retired employees who had retired after a minimum of ten years of employment with the town. Although Galenski was permitted to remain a member of the town’s group health insurance plan after she retired, the town determined she was not eligible for any contribution by the town to her health insurance premiums. Galenski filed a complaint in the Superior Court contending that the town had violated her right to payment by the town of a portion of her group medical insurance premiums, as required under G. L. c. 32B, § 9E; she sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and also raised a claim of estoppel based on detrimental reliance. A judge of the Superior Court allowed Galenski’s motion for summary judgment on the first two claims, denied the town’s cross motion for summary judgment, and issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the town from enforcing its policy.[2] The town appealed, and we transferred the case to this court on our own motion. […]
Renaud v. Commonwealth (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-066-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11762 RONALD RENAUD vs. COMMONWEALTH. Suffolk. March 3, 2015. – April 17, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Erroneous Conviction. Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss. Evidence, Identity. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on May 16, 2013. A motion to dismiss was heard by Thomas A. Connors, J. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Jeffrey T. Collins, Assistant Attorney General, for the Commonwealth. Timothy St. Lawrence for the defendant. Stephanie Roberts Hartung & Drew Glassroth, for New England Innocence Project & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. HINES, J. After a jury-waived trial in the District Court, a judge found the plaintiff, Ronald Renaud, guilty of malicious destruction of property, breaking and entering in the daytime, and larceny over $ 250. On appeal, the Appeals Court overturned Renaud’s convictions, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support them.[1] See Commonwealth v. Renaud, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 261, 263, 265 (2012). Renaud thereafter filed a complaint in the Superior Court under G. L. c. 258D, the erroneous convictions statute, seeking compensation for his erroneous convictions. The Commonwealth moved to dismiss the complaint, which a judge denied,[2] and the Commonwealth appealed. See Irwin v. Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 834, 835 (2013) (“Because the erroneous convictions statute provides only a limited waiver on the Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity, we conclude that the doctrine of present execution applies to claims brought under that statute, and thus that interlocutory appeal is appropriate”). We transferred the case here on our own initiative to determine whether, under G. L. c. 258D, § 1 (B), the reversal of Renaud’s convictions due to insufficient evidence amounts to “grounds which tend to establish” his innocence, thus rendering him eligible to obtain relief under the statute. We conclude that it does. We therefore affirm the denial of the motion to dismiss. Background and prior proceedings.[3] The relevant facts, as introduced by the Commonwealth before it closed its case, are that a break-in occurred in a Falmouth home. Renaud, 81 Mass. App. Ct. at 262. Four television sets, a digital video disc player, and items of sports memorabilia were missing. Id. No one was seen perpetrating the break-in or stealing the property from the home. Id. While examining the living room […]
Reckis, et al. v. Johnson & Johnson, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-065-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11677 LISA RECKIS & another[1] vs. JOHNSON & JOHNSON & another.[2] Plymouth. December 1, 2014. – April 17, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Negligence, Pharmaceutical manufacturer, Defective product, Adequacy of warning, Causation, Causing loss of consortium. Consortium. Parent and Child, Consortium. Federal Preemption. Witness, Expert. Evidence, Expert opinion, Qualification of expert witness. Damages, Tort, Future damages, Future earning capacity, Conscious pain and suffering, Loss of consortium. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on January 12, 2007. The case was tried before Christopher J. Muse, J., a motion for remittitur was heard by him, and motions for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict were considered by him. The Supreme Judicial Court granted applications for direct appellate review. Joan A. Lukey (Charles C. Lifland, of California, & Justin J. Wolosz with her) for the defendants. Michael B. Bogdanow (Bradley M. Henry, Leo V. Boyle, & Victoria Santoro with him) for the plaintiffs. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: David C. Spangler, Richard F. Kingham, & Robert A. Long, Jr., of the District of Columbia, & Paul W. Schmidt & Colleen Kelly for Consumer Healthcare Products Association. Lisa Blue Baron, Andre M. Mura, & Jeffrey R. White, of the District of Columbia, & Anthony Tarricone for American Association for Justice. Hugh F. Young, Jr., of Virginia, & David R. Geiger & Catherine C. Deneke for Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. Martin Healy, Charles Alagero, Jeffrey N. Catalano, & Maria Davis for Massachusetts Bar Association & another. Charlotte E. Glinka, Elizabeth N. Mulvey, Thomas R. Murphy, & Jeffrey S. Beeler for Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys. Martha Coakley, Attorney General, & Eric Gold, Assistant Attorney General, for the Attorney General. BOTSFORD, J. Samantha T. Reckis was seven years old in late 2003, when she developed toxic epidermal necrolysis (TEN), a rare but life-threatening skin disorder, after receiving multiple doses of Children’s Motrin. Children’s Motrin is an over-the-counter (OTC) medication with ibuprofen as its active ingredient, and is manufactured and sold by the defendants McNeil-PPC, Inc. (doing business as McNeil Consumer & Specialty Pharmaceuticals [McNeil]), and its parent company, Johnson & Johnson. The plaintiffs, Lisa and Richard Reckis, and their child, Samantha,[3] claim that Samantha developed TEN as […]
Commonwealth v. Jackson (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-064-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-10398 COMMONWEALTH vs. MICHAEL JACKSON. Suffolk. January 9, 2015. – April 16, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, & Duffly, JJ. Homicide. Firearms. Jury and Jurors. Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury, Empanelment of jury, Public trial, Failure to object, Waiver, Capital case. Jury and Jurors. Duress. Constitutional Law, Jury, Public trial, Waiver of constitutional rights. Waiver. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on March 27, 2002. The cases were tried before Patrick F. Brady, J., and a motion for a new trial, filed on March 18, 2010, was heard by him. Emanuel Howard for the defendant. Helle Sachse, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Afton M. Templin, for Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. CORDY, J. After a jury trial, the defendant, Michael Jackson, was convicted of murdering Jose Lane, the unlawful possession of a firearm, and the unlawful possession of ammunition. At trial, the defendant had requested that the judge instruct the jury that duress was an available defense to intentional murder, which the judge declined to do. Prior to sentencing, the defendant orally moved for a new trial and for a mistrial when it was learned that one of the jurors was not a United States citizen. Both motions were denied. On March 16, 2006, the judge imposed a mandatory sentence of life in State prison on the defendant’s conviction of murder in the first degree, a concurrent sentence of four and one-half years in State prison for the unlawful possession of a firearm, and a concurrent sentence of one year in a house of correction for the unlawful possession of ammunition. On March 22, 2010, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), on three grounds, the first two of which were rejected without a hearing on December 2, 2010,[1] and the third denied on May 3, 2011, after an evidentiary hearing.[2] The denial of this motion was consolidated with the defendant’s direct appeal. In his appeal, the defendant contends that the judge erred in denying his request to instruct the jury on duress, that the inclusion of a noncitizen juror on the jury constituted structural error requiring a new trial, and that his […]
Commonwealth v. Perez (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-038-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 12-P-1378 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. CARLOS MANUEL PEREZ. No. 12-P-1378. Middlesex. December 8, 2014. – April 15, 2015. Present: Kafker, Grainger, & Agnes, JJ. Controlled Substances. Practice, Criminal, Required finding, Instructions to jury, Motion to suppress, Warrant, Affidavit, New trial. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure. Search and Seizure, Warrant, Affidavit, Probable cause. Complaint received and sworn to in the Lowell Division of the District Court Department on April 26, 2010. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Martine Carroll, J.; the case was tried before Laurence D. Pierce, J.; and motions for a new trial and for other postconviction relief were heard by him. Jeffrey G. Harris for the defendant. Matthew Bailey for the Commonwealth. GRAINGER, J. The defendant was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. He was convicted by a jury in the District Court of the lesser included offense of possession of a class B substance, G. L. c. 94C, § 34. He appeals, asserting insufficiency of the evidence, error in the jury instructions, and error in the denial of his motion to suppress evidence and his motion for a new trial or a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). His claims of reversible error are primarily dependent on the issuance and execution of a so-called “no-knock” warrant that produced the evidence resulting in his conviction. We address ancillary claims before considering the issuance of the warrant, referring to the undisputed facts as they are pertinent to the issues. Sufficiency. The defendant argues that the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate the requisite knowledge coupled with intent to exercise control that would support a conviction for constructive possession of the cocaine found in his bedroom. We disagree. The jury received evidence that the defendant was the only person in his bedroom when the police executed the search warrant. The police found cocaine in a glassine bag in the pocket of a man’s shirt hanging in the defendant’s bedroom closet. In the defendant’s bedroom the police found a bottle of boric acid, sandwich bags, a digital scale, $ 422 in cash, a Massachusetts identification card bearing the defendant’s name and picture, a Venezuelan passport bearing the defendant’s name and a picture closely resembling the defendant, and a billing receipt addressed to the defendant at that […]
Commonwealth v. Foster (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-063-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11596 COMMONWEALTH vs. STEPHEN FOSTER. Bristol. November 7, 2014. – April 15, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Cordy, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Homicide. Robbery. Felony-Murder Rule. Probable Cause. Search and Seizure, Probable cause, Warrant, Affidavit. Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Motion to suppress, Warrant, Affidavit, Duplicative convictions. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on December 11, 2009. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Renee P. Dupuis, J., and the cases were tried before Robert J. Kane, J. Dana Alan Curhan for the defendant. Sebastian Jose Pacheco, Assistant District Attorney (David B. Mark, Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the Commonwealth. DUFFLY, J. In December, 2009, the defendant was indicted on charges of murder in the first degree, armed robbery, receiving stolen property, and carrying a firearm without a license, in the shooting death of Hegazy Sayed. In May, 2012, the defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant from his room in a “sober house.” After an evidentiary hearing that took place in eight nonconsecutive days over the course of one year, the motion was denied, and the case proceeded to trial before a different judge of the Superior Court. The defendant’s motion for a required finding of not guilty was denied. Before submitting the case to the jury, the judge dismissed the charges of carrying a firearm without a license and of receiving stolen property. A Superior Court jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and felony-murder, and also found the defendant guilty of armed robbery. The armed robbery conviction was dismissed subject to being reviewed for sentencing if the murder conviction were reversed on appeal. On appeal, the defendant argues that the motion judge erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized from his residence pursuant to a search warrant, and all other evidence seized as a result of that initial search, because there was no probable cause that he was the perpetrator, and also because, even if there were evidence of his involvement in the robbery and killing, no nexus was established to show that evidence of the crimes would be found in his room. The defendant also requests that we exercise our authority to provide relief […]
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Fitchburg Capital, LLC, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-062-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11756 DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, trustee,[1] vs. FITCHBURG CAPITAL, LLC, & others.[2] Suffolk. January 5, 2015. – April 15, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Mortgage, Real estate, Discharge, Foreclosure, Dragnet clause. Real Property, Mortgage. Limitations, Statute of. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment, Statute of limitations. Statute, Retroactive application, Construction. Due Process of Law, Retroactive application of statute, Statute of limitations. Constitutional Law, Contract clause. Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on July 2, 2012. A motion for partial summary judgment was heard by Robert B. Foster, J., and entry of separate and final judgment was ordered by him. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Jeffrey T. Angley (Robert K. Hopkins with him) for Fitchburg Capital, LLC. Jeffrey B. Loeb for the plaintiff. Thomas O. Moriarty, for Real Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts, Inc., & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. Philip F. Coppinger, for Ry-Co International, Ltd., amicus curiae, submitted a brief. HINES, J. Under a 2006 amendment to the so-called “obsolete mortgage” statute, a mortgage becomes unenforceable after a certain number of years: a mortgage in which the term or maturity date is stated becomes unenforceable five years after the expiration of the term and a mortgage in which the term or maturity date is not stated becomes unenforceable thirty-five years after recording.[3] G. L. c. 260, § 33, as amended by St. 2006, c. 63, § 6. The defendant Fitchburg Capital, LLC (Fitchburg), foreclosed on two mortgages at a time when both mortgages would be unenforceable under the amended statute if the five-year statute of limitations was applicable. In this appeal, we interpret the amended statute to determine whether a mortgage stating only the term or maturity date of the underlying debt is a “mortgage in which the term or maturity date of the mortgage is stated” under G. L. c. 260, § 33, and whether the retroactive application of § 33 to mortgages recorded before the effective date of the amendment is constitutional. The plaintiff, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as trustee of Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc., Asset-backed Pass-through Certificates, Series 2004-R11 under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of December 1, 2004 (Deutsche Bank), filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking a declaration that the mortgages are […]
Commonwealth v. Newson (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-061-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11471 COMMONWEALTH vs. ELBERT NEWSON. Suffolk. December 5, 2014. – April 14, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Homicide. Firearms. Joint Enterprise. Constitutional Law, Voluntariness of statement, Waiver of constitutional rights, Fair trial. Evidence, Voluntariness of statement. Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Motion to suppress, Voluntariness of statement, Waiver, Instructions to jury. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on December 8, 2008. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Christine M. McEvoy, J., and the cases were tried before her Stephen Paul Maidman for the defendant. Elisabeth Martino, Assistant District Attorney (Julie Higgins & David J. Fredette, Assistant District Attorneys, with her) for the Commonwealth. LENK, J. Thomas Webb was fatally shot on September 15, 2008, while petting a neighbor’s dog on a sidewalk outside an apartment building in Boston. The defendant was arrested a short time later, after fleeing from police in a vehicle and then on foot. At trial, the Commonwealth did not offer evidence that the defendant fired the fatal shots. Instead, the Commonwealth proceeded against the defendant on a theory of joint venture with the individual who did fire the fatal shots, and who was in the vehicle with the defendant before the shooting and during the flight from police. The defendant, in turn, conceded his presence at the scene of the shooting and his involvement in the subsequent police chase. He asserted, however, that he did not know that the shooting was planned, and that his role was limited to aiding in the escape after the shooting occurred. In December, 2011, a Superior Court jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. The jury also found the defendant guilty of one count of possessing a firearm without a license, and not guilty of another count of possessing a firearm without a license. The defendant contends on appeal that the trial judge erred in (1) denying the defendant’s motion to suppress statements that he made to police following his arrest, which were used to challenge his credibility when he testified at trial; and (2) declining to instruct the jury on the uncharged offense of accessory after the fact, which he argues deprived him of a defense. […]
Commonwealth v. Hamilton (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-037-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-625 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. BRAD D. HAMILTON. No. 14-P-625. Worcester. December 12, 2014. – April 13, 2015. Present: Rubin, Milkey, & Carhart, JJ. Assault and Battery. Hypodermic Needle. Wanton or Reckless Conduct. Practice, Criminal, Required finding, Instructions to jury. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on December 13, 2012. The case was tried before Daniel M. Wrenn, J. Rebecca Kiley, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the defendant. Stephen J. Carley, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. CARHART, J. The defendant appeals from his conviction of assault and battery by means of a hypodermic syringe or needle (hypodermic needle, or needle) in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15C(b),[1] arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction and that the trial judge erroneously instructed the jury. We affirm. Background. “Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the jury could have found the following facts.” Commonwealth v. Angelo Todesca Corp., 446 Mass. 128, 129 (2006). On July 16, 2012, Worcester police Officer Ryan Stone responded to a call for a “wellness check” at a Price Chopper store and was directed to the bathroom. Officer Stone entered the bathroom and ordered the person inside the stall to come out. The defendant came out of the stall and put his hands on the wall. Officer Stone observed items used to clean or use a hypodermic needle on the back of the toilet in the stall, and also observed something in the defendant’s right hand. He asked the defendant to drop what he was holding, but the defendant did not do so. The officer asked the defendant “where the needle was,” and the defendant answered that the needle was in his pocket. Officer Stone told the defendant that he was going to be placed in handcuffs and asked him to put his hands behind his back. Receiving no response from the defendant, Officer Stone took the defendant’s left hand, placed it behind his back, and cuffed it. As the officer reached for the defendant’s right hand, he again ordered the defendant to drop whatever was in his right hand. Officer Stone felt the defendant tense up, and as the officer attempted to cuff his hand, the defendant jerked and thrust it at Officer Stone. Officer Stone “felt […]
Commonwealth v. Colondres (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-060-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11725 COMMONWEALTH vs. JOHNNY COLONDRES. Hampden. December 2, 2014. – April 13, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Controlled Substances. Search and Seizure, Warrant, Affidavit, Probable cause, Search incident to lawful arrest. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Probable cause. Probable Cause. Practice, Criminal, Warrant, Affidavit, Motion to suppress. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on March 7, 2012. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by C. Jeffrey Kinder, J., and the cases were heard by Tina S. Page, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Merritt Schnipper for the defendant. Bethany C. Lynch, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. GANTS, C.J. Before trial, the defendant, Johnny Colondres, moved to suppress evidence obtained from his apartment by Springfield police during the execution of an “anticipatory search warrant.” The defendant claimed that police had executed the search before the “triggering events” stated in the affidavit had occurred, and that therefore the search should be treated as warrantless and the evidence suppressed. The motion judge denied the defendant’s motion to suppress and, after a jury-waived trial before a different judge, the defendant was convicted of trafficking in heroin and cocaine, and of unlawful possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.[1] The defendant appealed, and we granted his application for direct appellate review. We conclude that where, as here, the Commonwealth applies for an anticipatory search warrant and the judicial authorization to execute the search is conditioned on the occurrence of a specific future event, the search is authorized by the warrant where there is equivalent compliance with that condition precedent. Because we conclude that, in this case, there was both equivalent compliance with the warrant’s condition precedent and probable cause to search the defendant’s residence once equivalent compliance was achieved, we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress and the resulting convictions. Background. The facts are not in dispute. The search of the defendant’s apartment at 250 Oakgrove Avenue in Springfield arose out of an investigation by the Springfield police department of the defendant’s nephew, Carlos Colondres.[2] As detailed in the affidavit by Officer John Wadlegger in support of the application for the warrant to search the defendant’s apartment, the police were investigating the […]