Shea v. Cameron (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-016-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-1479 Appeals Court SUSAN SHEA vs. MICHAEL CAMERON. No. 16-P-1479. Essex. October 4, 2017. – February 9, 2018. Present: Agnes, Sacks, & Lemire, JJ. Practice, Civil, Report, Summary judgment, Stipulation, Fraud. Divorce and Separation, Annulment, Jurisdiction. Probate Court, Divorce. Jurisdiction, Divorce proceedings. Fraud. Emotional Distress. Undue Influence. Unjust Enrichment. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on July 24, 2014. The case was heard by Timothy Q. Feeley, J., on a motion for summary judgment, and the case was reported by him to the Appeals Court. John Taylor for the plaintiff. Mikalen E. Howe (Alan K. Posner also present) for the defendant. LEMIRE, J. This appeal concerns whether a defendant’s alleged fraudulent inducement to marry constitutes a valid civil cause of action. The plaintiff, Susan Shea, and the defendant, Michael Cameron, were married before receiving a judgment of annulment which incorporated their joint stipulation of Cameron’s fraud. Following the annulment, Shea filed a civil action relating to Cameron’s marriage fraud in Superior Court. Cameron filed counterclaims alleging fraud by Shea regarding entry of the stipulation and annulment. Cameron moved for summary judgment on all of Shea’s claims. After granting Cameron’s motion for summary judgment, the judge reported his order to this court pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 64(a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1403 (1996), and stayed Cameron’s counterclaims. We affirm. Background. Shea began a consensual romantic relationship with Cameron in June, 2005. By October, 2005, Cameron had moved into Shea’s home, and soon thereafter, the two became engaged. Shea and Cameron married on September 22, 2007. In 2010, Shea transferred title to her home from herself individually to Shea and Cameron as joint tenants and Cameron was added to the mortgage. Over the course of their relationship, Shea and Cameron exchanged money, shared bank accounts, and worked together professionally. In 2011, Shea discovered that Cameron was having an affair and subsequently filed for divorce on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown. On April 30, 2012, Shea withdrew her complaint for divorce and filed a complaint for annulment. At a deposition related to the annulment proceeding, Cameron admitted to being “unable to love [Shea] very early in the marriage” and that he did not ever believe that Shea was his “one true love.” On June 7, 2013, Shea and […]
Commonwealth v. Cameron (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-177-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11835 COMMONWEALTH vs. RONJON CAMERON. Berkshire. September 10, 2015. – October 28, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, & Hines, JJ. Rape. Deoxyribonucleic Acid. Practice, Criminal, New trial. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on October 29, 1999. The cases were tried before Thomas J. Curley, Jr.; a motion for a new trial, filed on October 8, 2009, was considered by John A. Agostini, J., and a motion for reconsideration, filed on January 15, 2013, was also considered by him. After review by the Appeals Court, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 1113 (2014), the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. Laura Chrismer Edmonds for the defendant. Joseph A. Pieropan, Assistant District Attorney (Paul J. Caccaviello, Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the Commonwealth. Stephanie Roberts Hartung, for New England Innocence Project, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. CORDY, J. In April, 2003, a jury found the defendant, Ronjon Cameron, guilty on two indictments charging rape, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 22 (b). As part of its case against the defendant, the Commonwealth offered in evidence a laboratory report regarding the presence of seminal residue on the complainant’s underwear. The Commonwealth also offered testimony to suggest that there had been a transfer of semen from the defendant onto the complainant’s underwear during the rape. Forensic deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing performed before trial indicated the presence of two male sources of the seminal residue on the underwear. Testing as to the primary source excluded the defendant. An expert testified on behalf of the Commonwealth and described the secondary source as both “inconclusive” and as neither including nor excluding the defendant. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to a term of from twelve to sixteen years in State prison. In October, 2009, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. In January, 2013, he filed a motion to amend and reconsider his motion for a new trial, based primarily on DNA testing performed by an independent laboratory, Bode Technology (Bode). Bode’s analysis, using short tandem repeat (STR) testing on sixteen loci,[1] revealed that the secondary source, which the Commonwealth’s expert had, at trial, attributed to a male donor, was in fact female DNA to which the defendant was excluded as a possible […]
Cameron Painting, Inc. v. University of Massachusetts (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-034-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 12‑P‑968 Appeals Court CAMERON PAINTING, INC. vs. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS. No. 12‑P‑968. Hampshire. January 7, 2013. ‑ February 25, 2013. Present: Grasso, Kafker, & Meade, JJ. University of Massachusetts. Contract, Performance and breach, Under seal, Implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Limitations, Statute of. Practice, Civil, Statute of limitations. Governmental Immunity. Estoppel. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 21, 2011. A motion to dismiss was heard by Mary‑Lou Rup, J. Michael K. Callan for the plaintiff. Jean M. Kelley for the defendant. MEADE, J. Cameron Painting, Inc. (Cameron), appeals from a judgment dismissing its complaint for breach of contract[1] against the University of Massachusetts (University). On appeal, Cameron claims it was error to dismiss the complaint based on the three-year statute of limitations in G. L. c. 260, § 3A, when the twenty-year statute of limitations in G. L. c. 260, § 1, applied. Cameron also claims that even if the three-year period applied, the University should be estopped from asserting it. We affirm, and hold that any action in which the Commonwealth has consented to be sued must be brought within the three-year limitations period provided by G. L. c. 260, § 3A. 1. Background. The facts are not in dispute. On May 9, 2006, Cameron submitted a general bid to the University for a contract for painting services valued at $ 500,000. The State contract was for “campus painting services” and labor at the University’s Amherst campus. On May 26, 2006, Cameron and the University entered into a one-year contract for the same project. The contract estimated the volume of business would be $ 500,000, and guaranteed Cameron a minimum payment of $ 1,000 under the contract. All work pursuant to this contract was to be completed on or before May 31, 2007. The parties executed the contract as a sealed instrument. The terms of the contract required that prior to the commencement of a particular painting project, both Cameron and the University must reach an agreed-upon price for the particular project. Over the course of the contract period, the parties could not agree upon any quotes submitted by Cameron for any painting projects at the University. The University therefore authorized no work for Cameron under the contract terms, and notified Cameron on February 16, 2007, it would […]
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