Cape Cod Collaborative v. Director of the Department of Unemployment Assistance, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-051-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-436 Appeals Court CAPE COD COLLABORATIVE vs. DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE & another.[1] No. 15-P-436. Barnstable. January 7, 2016. – May 4, 2017. Present: Hanlon, Sullivan, & Maldonado, JJ. Employment Security, Partial unemployment, Eligibility for benefits, School bus driver, Judicial review. Civil action commenced in the Barnstable Division of the District Court Department on April 29, 2013. The case was heard by W. James O’Neill, J. David A. Guberman, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant. Kevin F. Bresnahan for the plaintiff. MALDONADO, J. In this case, we consider whether Stephanie Hennis, a full-time bus driver for the Cape Cod Collaborative (collaborative),[2] is entitled to partial unemployment compensation benefits for the three days she did not work and was not paid during the week ending Saturday, November 24, 2012, which included the Thanksgiving recess. Because we conclude that G. L. c. 151A, § 28A(c), does not bar the payment of such benefits in the circumstances of this case, we reverse the judgment of the Barnstable Division of the District Court Department (District Court), which reached a contrary conclusion. Statutory framework. We begin with a brief overview of the Unemployment Insurance Law, G. L. c. 151A, so as to put the underlying facts in context. The fundamental purpose of the statute is to “afford benefits to [individuals] who are out of work and unable to secure work through no fault of their own.” Connolly v. Director of the Div. of Unemployment Assistance, 460 Mass. 24, 25 (2011), quoting from LeBeau v. Commissioner of the Dept. of Employment & Training, 422 Mass. 533, 538 (1996). We are required to construe G. L. c. 151A “liberally in aid of its purpose, which purpose is to lighten the burden which now falls on the unemployed worker and [her] family.” G. L. c. 151A, § 74, as appearing in St. 1990, c. 177, § 340. With respect to employees of educational organizations, however, the Legislature has carved out certain exceptions to the general availability of unemployment compensation benefits. As pertinent here, G. L. c. 151A, § 28A(c), as appearing in St. 1977, c. 720, § 29, provides that, with respect to services performed for an educational institution, “benefits shall not be paid to any individual on the basis of such services for any week commencing during an established and customary vacation […]
Categories: News Tags: 1105117, Assistance, Cape, Collaborative, department, Director, Lawyers, Unemployment, Weekly
Cape Cod Shellfish & Seafood Company, Inc., et al. v. City of Boston, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-148-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 11-P-1474 Appeals Court CAPE COD SHELLFISH & SEAFOOD COMPANY, INC., & others[1] vs. CITY OF BOSTON & another.[2] No. 11-P-1474. Suffolk. October 9, 2013. – November 12, 2014. Present: Cypher, Katzmann, & Maldonado, JJ. Taxation, Exemption, Leased property, Abatement, Real estate tax: exemption, abatement. Contract, Lease of real estate. Landlord and Tenant, Taxation, Tenancy at sufferance, Lease as contract. Real Property, Lease. Massachusetts Port Authority. Boston. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 9, 2004. After review by this court, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 1127 (2009), the case was heard by Elizabeth M. Fahey, J., on a motion for summary judgment. Marshall F. Newman for the plaintiffs. Adam Cederbaum, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for city of Boston. MALDONADO, J. The plaintiffs appeal from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the city of Boston (city) in its effort to tax the plaintiffs as lessees of property owned by the Massachusetts Port Authority (Massport), on Boston’s Fish Pier. Although, pursuant to G. L. c. 91 App., § 1-17 (§ 17), as appearing in St. 1978, c. 332, § 2, Massport and its lessees are not required to pay real estate taxes on Massport properties, an exception to the exemption applies to business lessees of property in the area known as the Commonwealth Flats. In an earlier decision pursuant to our rule 1:28, we determined that the plaintiffs are liable for taxes for their respective lease terms under that exception.[3] At issue now is whether the plaintiffs, all of whom remained on the property after the end of their lease terms, continue to be liable as lessees for the taxes assessed during the holdover period. Background. We recount the undisputed facts from the motion judge’s May 20, 2011, memorandum of decision and order on the city’s motion for summary judgment, supplemented also by the record on appeal as noted. The plaintiffs, Cape Cod Shellfish & Seafood Company, Inc.; John Mantia & Sons Co., Inc.; Atlantic Coast Seafood, Inc.; New England Marketers, Inc.; and Great Eastern Seafood, Inc., operated wholesale fish and seafood businesses on the Boston Fish Pier, which is owned by Massport and situated in the Commonwealth Flats area of South Boston. The plaintiffs originally occupied the property pursuant to written leases with Massport. The relevant leases of the plaintiffs covered the […]
New Train from Boston to Cape Cod For $35
For the first time in 25 years, you’ll be able to take a train from Boston to Cape Cod, thanks to the CapeFlyer train service. CapeFlyer connects Boston’s South Station to Middleborough, Buzzards Bay and Hyannis for $ 20 one way or $ 35 round trip. Train service begins at 5:12pm on Fridays and operates on Saturdays and Sundays beginning at 8 a.m. in Boston, adding Braintree to its route. Travel time is a little more than 2 hours and 15 minutes. Take along a deck of cards or a good book and some cheese and crackers – it’s better than cursing the traffic. And, for those of you who travel with your computer, the train has free WiFi. Will you be taking the CapeFlyer this season? Did you take the last train that served the Cape? Or will you travel by bus, car or plane? Let us know in the comments section. SOUTH END PATCH: Facebook | Twitter | E-mail Updates South End Patch
Residences at Cape Ann Heights Condominium Association v. Halupowski, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-032-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 12‑P‑1689 Appeals Court RESIDENCES AT CAPE ANN HEIGHTS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION vs. BRIAN HALUPOWSKI & others.[1] No. 12‑P‑1689. Essex. December 11, 2012. ‑ February 21, 2013. Present: Kafker, Milkey, & Agnes, JJ. Condominiums, Common expenses. Real Property, Condominium. Lien. Practice, Civil, Dismissal. Jurisdiction, Superior Court, In rem. Superior Court, Jurisdiction. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on August 12, 2011. An appeal from a judgment of dismissal was heard by Green, J., in the Appeals Court, and the case was reported by him to the Appeals Court. Gary M. Daddario for the plaintiff. MILKEY, J. The plaintiff is the owners’ association of a residential condominium located in Gloucester. It brought this action to enforce a statutory lien on one of the condominium’s units. The basis of the lien was $ 3,759.55 in unpaid common expenses. Concluding that the association was unlikely to recover more than $ 25,000, a judge of the Superior Court dismissed the action without prejudice. See G. L. c. 212, § 3A(b). The association appealed pursuant to G. L. c. 212, § 3A(c), and the single justice reserved and reported the matter without decision to a full panel of this court. We reverse. Discussion. Chapter 183A of the General Laws governs the creation and administration of condominiums. Pursuant to § 6 of that chapter, the condominium’s common expenses are to be assessed against all units in the condominium in proportion to the units’ interest in the condominium’s common areas, and “[t]he organization of unit owners shall have a lien on a unit for any common expense assessment levied against that unit from the time the assessment becomes due.” G. L. c. 183A, § 6(a)(i), as amended by St. 1992, c. 400, § 7. These assessments are levied against the units themselves, and constitute “covenants running with the land.” Trustees of the Prince Condominium Trust v. Prosser, 412 Mass. 723, 725 (1992). The lien is enforceable through “a civil action brought in the superior court for the county where [the condominium] lies or in the district court in the judicial district where [the condominium] lies.” G. L. c. 254, § 5, as amended by St. 2010, c. 350, § 7. See G. L. c. 183A, § 6(c). The outcome of such a suit, if successful, is an order for the sale of the unit, subject to the procedures outlined in G. L. c. 254, […]
Categories: News Tags: 1103213, Association, Cape, Condominium, Halupowski, Heights, Lawyers, Residences, Weekly