Federal National Mortgage Association v. Gordon, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-060-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-441 Appeals Court FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION vs. HEATHER GORDON & another.[1] No. 15-P-441. Suffolk. March 8, 2016. – May 17, 2017. Present: Hanlon, Sullivan, & Massing, JJ. Trespass. Real Property, Trespass, Mortgage, Lease. Mortgage, Foreclosure. Landlord and Tenant, Control of premises. Housing Court, Jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, Housing Court. Summary Process. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment, Summary process. Civil action commenced in the City of Boston Division of the Housing Court Department on June 24, 2013. The case was heard by MaryLou Muirhead, J., on a motion for summary judgment. Thomas B. Vawter for the defendants. Danielle C. Gaudreau (Thomas J. Santolucito also present) for the plaintiff. HANLON, J. The defendants in this trespass action, Heather Gordon and her granddaughter, Kaire Holman, challenge the validity of a judgment for possession entered by the Housing Court in favor of the plaintiff, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), on its motion for summary judgment. Fannie Mae claims ownership, through foreclosure, of the residential condominium at issue, known as Unit 2 at 7 Valentine Street, in the Roxbury section of Boston (the property). Gordon claims that she and Holman occupy the property pursuant to a lease from Carolyn Grant, who held record title to the condominium as a joint tenant with Gilbert R. Emery prior to the foreclosure. The lease on which Gordon and Holman rely, however, is dated after both (i) the date of the foreclosure, and (ii) the date on which Fannie Mae began a summary process action against Emery, Grant, and another occupant[2] to obtain possession of the property. When Fannie Mae learned that Gordon and others had moved into the property as ostensible lessees, Fannie Mae brought a new action (separate from the summary process case) for common law trespass, which is the case now before us.[3] After review, we reverse the final judgment, holding as follows: (i) the Housing Court has jurisdiction pursuant to G. L. c. 185C, § 3, to hear trespass claims; (ii) the teaching of Attorney Gen. v. Dime Sav. Bank of N.Y., FSB, 413 Mass. 284, 288 (1992) (Dime Savings), with respect to whether G. L. c. 184, § 18, bars trespass actions by postforeclosure owners against tenants with actual possession, applies with equal force in the circumstances of this case; and (iii) the summary judgment record does […]
Commonwealth v. Gordon (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-045-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1626 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. JAMES A. GORDON. No. 13-P-1626. Essex. November 14, 2014. – May 5, 2015. Present: Trainor, Agnes, & Maldonado, JJ. Search and Seizure, Emergency. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Findings by judge. Complaint received and sworn to in the Peabody Division of the District Court Department on May 17, 2012. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Richard A. Mori, J. An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal was allowed by Barbara A. Lenk, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by her to the Appeals Court. Ronald DeRosa, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Jane D. Prince for the defendant. AGNES, J. In this case we consider whether the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement justified the conduct of Peabody police officers who responded to a 911 telephone call about a disturbance in a particular apartment on Washington Street and then, based on additional information gathered at the scene, entered the apartment without a warrant. We conclude that the police had an objectively reasonable basis to conclude that the person who requested police assistance might be inside the apartment and in need of emergency aid, and that the warrantless entry did not violate the defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Accordingly, we reverse the order allowing the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of the execution of a search warrant following the warrantless entry.[1] Background. We draw the facts from the judge’s findings of fact, and additional evidence from the two witnesses (Officer Coup and Sergeant Zampitella) who testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress, and who were credited by the judge.[2] At approximately 8:20 P.M. on May 9, 2012, an unidentified female telephoned the Peabody police department on its recorded 911 telephone line from Paddy Kelly’s bar (bar), located at 154 Washington Street. The bar is part of a building that contains three residential apartments.[3] The caller reported a disturbance in apartment number one. Peabody police Officers Coup and Cecil, as well as Sergeant Zampitella, were dispatched to the scene, arriving within minutes. […]