Vilbon v. Board of Registration in Nursing (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-065-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12359 CARLINE VILBON vs. BOARD OF REGISTRATION IN NURSING. April 18, 2018. Board of Registration in Nursing. Nurse. License. Moot Question. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Carline Vilbon appeals from a judgment of the county court dismissing as moot her appeal under G. L. c. 112, § 64, from an order of the Board of Registration in Nursing (board) indefinitely suspending her nursing license. The grounds for the suspension were that Vilbon had not satisfied the educational requirements for licensure in Massachusetts and that she had engaged in deceptive conduct to obtain a license. While the matter was pending before the single justice, the board reconsidered and withdrew its finding that Vilbon had engaged in deceptive conduct, acknowledging that it had erred in making this finding. In addition, Vilbon remedied the deficiencies in her education. The board therefore reinstated her license. Vilbon now argues that, despite the reinstatement of her license, she has suffered further harm for which the board should compensate her and that sanctions should be imposed on the executive director of the board. However, under the “plain and unambiguous language of G. L. c. 112, § 64,” Hoffer v. Board of Reg. in Medicine, 461 Mass. 451, 456 (2012), our authority is limited to “revising or reversing the decision of the board” suspending her license. The statute does not provide for any further relief. As Vilbon has received all the relief that is available under G. L. c. 112, § 64, the single justice properly dismissed the matter as moot. See Padmanabhan v. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 476 Mass. 1018, 1019 (2017), citing Rasten v. Northeastern Univ., 432 Mass. 1003, 1003 (2000). Judgment affirmed. Carline Vilbon, pro se. Carrie Benedon, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant. Full-text Opinions
Padmanabhan v. Board of Registration in Medicine, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-111-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12119 BHARANIDHARAN PADMANABHAN vs. BOARD OF REGISTRATION IN MEDICINE & another.[1] June 27, 2017. Board of Registration in Medicine. Administrative Law, Decision. The petitioner, Bharanidharan Padmanabhan, appeals from a judgment of a single justice of the county court dismissing his petition for relief in the nature of certiorari pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4. On May 18, 2017, we issued an order affirming the single justice’s judgment and indicated that this opinion would follow. In 2010, Padmanabhan, a medical doctor, was terminated from his position at Cambridge Health Alliance, a termination that he alleges was based on false claims that he harmed patients and in retaliation for certain actions that he took, including reporting purported insurance fraud. Subsequent to his termination, the Board of Registration in Medicine (board) commenced disciplinary proceedings against him, and referred the matter to the Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA).[2] Following an evidentiary hearing that spanned eight days, the DALA magistrate issued his recommended decision in August, 2015. The board subsequently remanded the case to the magistrate, in January, 2016, asking the magistrate to elaborate on certain parts of his decision and, among other things, to include credibility determinations and clarify certain inconsistencies in the decision. In March, 2016, the magistrate issued an order indicating that he was preparing a revised recommended decision for the board in response to the remand order. Shortly thereafter, Padmanabhan filed a “Renewed Complaint in the Nature of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari” in the county court. In the petition he argued that his due process rights had been violated in various ways during the course of the board proceedings. He also argued that the recommended decision issued by the magistrate in August, 2015, became final in February, 2016, pursuant to 801 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.01(11)(c)(3) (1998), and that his petition thus did not stem from, or seek relief from, an interlocutory ruling but rather what was, in effect, a final decision of the board. The board moved to dismiss the petition on the basis that the proceedings before it had not yet concluded and that it had not yet issued a final decision. The single justice dismissed the petition without a hearing.[3] In his appeal, Padmanabhan continues to argue that the magistrate’s recommended decision became the board’s final decision pursuant to 801 […]
Categories: News Tags: 1011117, Board, Lawyers, Medicine, Padmanabhan, Registration, Weekly
Langan v. Board of Registration in Medicine (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-103-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12242 MICHAEL L. LANGAN vs. BOARD OF REGISTRATION IN MEDICINE. June 13, 2017. Board of Registration in Medicine. Doctor, License to practice medicine. Practice, Civil, Action in nature of certiorari. Michael L. Langan appeals from a judgment of the county court denying his petition for relief in the nature of certiorari from a decision of the Board of Registration in Medicine (board). We affirm. Background. Langan is a board-certified physician in geriatrics and internal medicine. In 2008, after he had tested positive for various controlled substances, he and the board entered into a letter of agreement, under which he agreed to certain conditions in order to continue practicing medicine, including refraining from the use of alcohol and controlled substances without a prescription and submitting to substance use monitoring by Massachusetts Physician Health Services (PHS). The letter of agreement provided that violating its terms would “constitute sufficient grounds for the immediate suspension of [Langan’s] license,” and that Langan had a right to an adjudicatory hearing as to any violation found by the board. After Langan entered into the letter of agreement, PHS reported three positive tests, at low levels, for ethyl glucuronide (EtG) and ethyl sulfate (EtS), two alcohol biomarkers. The board took no action at that time. In June and July, 2011, however, Langan tested positive for the same biomarkers, at higher levels.[1] As a result of these positive tests, PHS requested that Langan undergo an inpatient evaluation, and the board asked him to enter into a voluntary agreement not to practice pending completion of such an evaluation. Langan refused at first, causing the board to find him in violation of the letter of agreement. Langan then underwent the inpatient evaluation in September, 2011. On February 1, 2012, Langan, represented by counsel, signed an addendum to his letter of agreement requiring, in particular, that he “participate in a minimum of three (3) 12-step meetings per week” and “submit proof of said participation to PHS.” In October, 2012, PHS reported that Langan had misrepresented attending meetings. In November, 2012, Langan again tested positive for EtS and EtG. Langan entered into a voluntary agreement not to practice and was asked to produce documentation that he had attended all required meetings. He did not do so, and in February, 2013, the board determined, based […]
Galiastro, et al. v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-023-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11299 ANNE-MARIE GALIASTRO & another[1] vs. MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., & another.[2] Worcester. October 7, 2013. ‑ February 13, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss, Retroactivity of judicial holding. Retroactivity of Judicial Holding. Mortgage, Foreclosure, Real estate. Real Property, Mortgage. Consumer Protection Act, Unfair act or practice. Conspiracy. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on March 29, 2010. A motion to dismiss was heard by John S. McCann, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Glenn F. Russell, Jr., for the plaintiffs. Robert M. Brochin (Todd S. Holbrook with him) for Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. Nathalie K. Salomon for Harmon Law Offices, P.C. Grace C. Ross, pro se, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. Geoffry Walsh, for National Consumer Law Center, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. DUFFLY, J. We address in this case whether the plaintiffs and others who had appeals pending in the Appeals Court when we decided Eaton v. Federal Nat’l Mtge. Ass’n, 462 Mass. 569, 569 (2012) (Eaton), may pursue claims seeking to invalidate foreclosure proceedings based on our decision in that case.[3] We held in Eaton that a foreclosure by power of sale pursuant to G. L. c. 183, § 21, and G. L. c. 244, §§ 11-17C, is invalid unless a foreclosing party holds the mortgage and also either holds the underlying mortgage note or acts on behalf of the note holder. Id. at 571. We concluded also that the interpretation of “mortgagee” in statutes governing foreclosures under statutory power of sale provisions would have only prospective effect, although we applied our newly announced interpretation to the claims asserted by the plaintiffs in that case. Id. We now extend application of the holding in Eaton to cases such as this one, in which the issue was preserved and an appeal was pending in the Appeals Court on June 22, 2012, the date of the rescript in Eaton. Background.[4] The plaintiffs, Anne-Marie and Joseph Galiastro (Galiastros), obtained a home mortgage loan on July 26, 2006, from Fremont Investment & Loan (Fremont).[5] To secure the obligation, the Galiastros contemporaneously granted a mortgage on the home to defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), which was described in the mortgage as “a separate corporation that […]
Categories: News Tags: 1002314, Electronic, Galiastro, Inc., Lawyers, Mortgage, Registration, Systems, Weekly
Lawless v. Board of Registration in Pharmacy (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-180-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11366 LEO M. LAWLESS vs. BOARD OF REGISTRATION IN PHARMACY. October 7, 2013. Supreme Judicial Court, Appeal from order of single justice. Pharmacy. Board of Registration in Pharmacy. Administrative Law, Adjudicatory proceeding, Hearing. License. Practice, Civil, Default, Review of administrative action. After the Board of Registration in Pharmacy (board) revoked Leo M. Lawless’s license to practice pharmacy for a minimum of two years, Lawless sought judicial review, pursuant to G. L. c. 112, § 62, from a single justice of this court. The single justice denied the petition for review and a motion for reconsideration, and Lawless appeals. There was no error. Background. Lawless has held a license to engage in practice as a pharmacist in the Commonwealth since 1974. Following his termination from a pharmacist position at Hanscom Air Force Base (Hanscom) based on “multiple patient safety adverse events,” the board issued a temporary order summarily suspending his pharmacist license. The board thereafter issued an order that Lawless “appear and show cause” why it should not suspend, revoke, or otherwise take action against his license pursuant to G. L. c. 112, § 61, and 247 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 2.00 (2013). The order alleged that Lawless failed accurately to fill and verify prescriptions on multiple occasions and otherwise to maintain the pharmacy; made threatening comments about a member of the pharmacy staff; left the pharmacy while on duty; and failed to comply with the board’s continuing education requirements. Lawless answered the order to show cause, as well as an amended order. An adjudicatory hearing was scheduled for March 26, 27, and 28, 2012.[1] At Lawless’s request, a fourth day, March 30, 2012, was added to permit him to call an expert witness. In advance of the hearing, Lawless served subpoenas for the release of documents and to procure the attendance of witnesses from Hanscom to testify on his behalf. At a prehearing conference on March 21, 2012, he sought continuance of the hearing on the basis that a staff judge advocate at Hanscom had objected to the subpoenas and returned them without action. The hearing officer ruled that the first two days of hearing would proceed as scheduled, with prosecuting counsel for the board presenting her case, and the remaining hearing dates would be continued to give Lawless an opportunity to seek enforcement of the subpoenas. […]