Town of Hanover v. New England Regional Council of Carpenters (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-057-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11396 TOWN OF HANOVER vs. NEW ENGLAND REGIONAL COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS. Plymouth. December 2, 2013. ‑ March 25, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. “Anti‑SLAPP” Statute. Constitutional Law, Right to petition government. Abuse of Process. Labor. Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss, Standing. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on October 6, 2011. A special motion to dismiss was heard by Robert C. Cosgrove, J. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Christopher N. Souris for the defendant. James A. Toomey for the plaintiff. Richard J. Yurko, Noemi A. Kawamoto, Sarah R. Wunsch, Audrey R. Richardson, & Susan Reid, for American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. IRELAND, C.J. This case presents an issue of first impression: whether an association that has provided support for litigation, without being a named party in that litigation, has engaged in protected petitioning activities for the purposes of G. L. c. 231, § 59H. The defendant, the New England Regional Council of Carpenters, appeals from a Superior Court judge’s denial of its special motion to dismiss a suit by the town of Hanover (town) claiming that the defendant engaged in abuse of process in prior legal proceedings.[1] Because we conclude that support of litigation constitutes protected petitioning activity within the meaning of G. L. c. 231, § 59H, and that here, the town did not demonstrate that the defendant’s right to petition was “devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law,” Office One, Inc. v. Lopez, 437 Mass. 113, 123 (2002), we allow the defendant’s special motion to dismiss. 1. Prior litigation. We begin by briefly discussing certain events relevant to the defendant’s special motion to dismiss. In May, 2009, the town engaged in an open bidding process for the construction of the town’s new high school. Fordyce v. Hanover, 457 Mass. 248, 251-252 (2010) (Fordyce). The town awarded the contract to the contractor with the lowest formal bid, following which a subcontractor who was not involved in the winning contract filed a bid protest with the Attorney General. Id. at 252. After an investigation of the town’s bidding process and award of the contract, the Attorney General found that the contractor who […]
There’s A New Patch in Town: Swallow Falls from Sony Picture Animation’s ‘Cloudy With a Chance of Meatballs 2’ (Sponsored)
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There’s A New Patch In Town: Disney’s Propwash Junction (Sponsored)
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Moore v. Town of Billerica (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-073-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 12‑P‑1294 Appeals Court CAROL MOORE[1] vs. TOWN OF BILLERICA. No. 12‑P‑1294. Middlesex. March 1, 2013. ‑ June 7, 2013. Present: Grasso, Trainor, & Carhart, JJ. Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. Governmental Immunity. Municipal Corporations, Governmental immunity. Negligence, Governmental immunity. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on July 14, 2009. The case was heard by Garry V. Inge, J., on a motion for summary judgment. John J. Cloherty, III, for the defendant. Sean T. Goguen (George N. Panas with him) for the plaintiff. TRAINOR, J. The defendant, the town of Billerica (town), appeals from the denial of its motion for summary judgment on this suit brought under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (MTCA). In its motion for summary judgment, the defendant argued that it is immune from suit under G. L. c. 258, § 10(b) and (j), as appearing in St. 1978, c. 512, § 15, and immune from liability under the recreational use statute, G. L. c. 21, § 17C(a), as appearing in St. 1998, c. 268.[2] The judge denied the motion, citing “[g]enuine issues of material fact as to, inter alia, causation and . . . degree of discretion, if any, on the part of those in charge of maintaining the public property in question.” For the reasons that follow, we reverse the order. Background. We begin with a summary of the undisputed facts. The Kids Konnection playground in the town abuts the outfield fence of a little league baseball field. The playground is protected from flying baseballs by a high net supported by telephone poles. The net did not extend far enough toward right field to protect an area of the playground that contained a stage and picnic tables.[3] Both the playground and the baseball field were town property and were open to the public for use free of charge. On August 23, 2007, Carol Moore (Carol) brought her four year old daughter Shannon to the Kids Konnection playground.[4] There, Carol met her friends Vickie Stagliola and Angela Sargent, who brought their children to the playground as well. At the same time, several teenage boys were playing “home run derby” on the baseball field. The goal of the game was to hit baseballs over the fence, and Stagliola had seen a baseball hit the netting earlier that day. Shannon […]
Plainville Asphalt Corp. v. Town of Plainville (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-072-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 12‑P‑1022 Appeals Court PLAINVILLE ASPHALT CORP. vs. TOWN OF PLAINVILLE. No. 12‑P‑1022. Suffolk. February 28, 2013. ‑ June 6, 2013. Present: Vuono, Rubin, & Sullivan, JJ. Zoning, By‑law, Nonconforming use or structure. Municipal Corporations, By‑laws and ordinances. Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on April 29, 2010. The case was heard by Gordon H. Piper, J., on motions for summary judgment. Brian M. Hurley for the plaintiff. Katharine I. Doyle for the defendant. SULLIVAN, J. This appeal calls upon us to decide the reach of a town bylaw amendment that expanded the reasons for discontinuation of nonconforming uses, and the relationship between that bylaw and the first and third paragraphs of G. L. c. 40A, § 6. Plainville Asphalt Corp. (Plainville Asphalt) brought an action pursuant to G. L. c. 240, § 14A, seeking a determination whether the use of its property as a bituminous concrete operation was permitted. It now appeals from the allowance of a motion for summary judgment in favor of the town of Plainville (town), in which a judge of the Land Court held that the plaintiff’s business was engaged in a nonconforming use and had lost its “grandfather” protection through nonuse. We affirm. Background. The essential facts are undisputed. As early as 1965, Plainville Asphalt’s predecessor manufactured bituminous concrete at the Plainville site. At that time, the town’s zoning bylaws allowed bituminous concrete facilities provided that the effects of this commercial use did not exceed certain dust, odor, and noise limitations outside the site. In 1967, the town amended the bylaw’s “use regulation” table (§ 2.8) to provide that certain uses were “excluded or prohibited use[s] in all districts in the town.” Specifically, § 2.8 was amended to provide that “Cement, Concrete and Bituminous Product Manufacture and Similar Operations Causing Dust, Noise and Odor” are “excluded or prohibited use[s].“ However, under § 3.1.1 of the bylaw then in effect, the existing use was “grandfathered” as a nonconforming use, subject to loss only by abandonment. In 1983, however, the bylaws were amended to provide that nonconforming uses were extinguished if a use was either abandoned or “cease[d] to be a nonconforming use.” In 2002, Plainville Asphalt sold certain assets and liabilities and agreed to noncompete provisions in the terms of sale. It is undisputed that Plainville Asphalt did not produce […]