Vitali v. Reit Management & Research, LLC (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-119-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-1304 Appeals Court DONNA VITALI vs. REIT MANAGEMENT & RESEARCH, LLC. No. 14-P-1304. Suffolk. May 8, 2015. – August 21, 2015. Present: Green, Milkey, & Maldonado, JJ. Labor, Overtime compensation, Wages. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on February 13, 2012. The case was heard by Mitchell H. Kaplan, J., on a motion for summary judgment. Stephen S. Churchill for the plaintiff. Jennifer B. Furey (Paul F. Beckwith with her) for the defendant. MILKEY, J. The plaintiff, Donna Vitali, worked as a bookkeeper for the defendant, Reit Management and Research, LLC (company), a property management firm. She was paid by the hour and, pursuant to both statute and company policy, she was to be paid overtime at one and one-half times the regular rate for any work done in excess of forty hours in a given week. See G. L. c. 151, § 1A. She brought the current action alleging that she accrued overtime that was not credited by the system the company had in place to keep track of employee hours. In a detailed and thoughtful decision, a Superior Court judge allowed the company’s motion for summary judgment. Because we conclude that there are material facts in dispute, we reverse. Standard of review. Our review of the allowance of a motion for summary judgment is de novo. Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Fitchburg Capital, LLC, 471 Mass. 248, 252-253 (2015). Disputed facts are to be read in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, in this case, Vitali. Id. at 250. “The moving party must affirmatively show that there is no real issue of fact, all doubts being resolved against the party moving for summary judgment.” Shawmut Worcester County Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 398 Mass. 273, 281 (1986) (quotation omitted). Evidence in the record is considered together with all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the record. Godfrey v. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 Mass. 113, 119 (2010). Background. The nature of the dispute. Vitali was scheduled to work from nine to five, five days per week, with a paid one-hour lunch break. Both sides agree that lunch breaks do not count toward overtime. They also agree that if an employee has to work during what otherwise would be a lunch break, the employee gets no […]
First Bostonview Management, LLC v. Bostonview Corporation, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-118-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1237 Appeals Court FIRST BOSTONVIEW MANAGEMENT, LLC vs. BOSTONVIEW CORPORATION & others.[1] No. 13-P-1237. Norfolk. October 1, 2014. – August 19, 2015. Present: Berry, Hanlon, & Carhart, JJ. Charity. Corporation, Charitable corporation, Religious, Sale of assets, Officers and agents, Board of directors. Sale, Of corporate property, Real estate. Contract, Sale of real estate, Ratification. Real Property, Purchase and sale agreement. Agency, Ratification. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 13, 2009. The case was heard by Kenneth J. Fishman, J., on a motion for summary judgment, and a separate and final judgment was ordered by him. David B. Summer (Elliot M. Sherman with him) for the plaintiff. Carole C. Cooke (Nicholas B. Carter with her) for Bostonview Corporation. BERRY, J. The plaintiff, First Bostonview Management, LLC (First Bostonview), appeals from the judgment entered pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 54(b), 365 Mass. 821 (1974), after the allowance of the summary judgment motion by the defendant, Bostonview Corporation (Bostonview), a charitable corporation, on First Bostonview’s claims stemming from its attempt to purchase substantially all of Bostonview’s real property. We affirm the judgment. As is further discussed herein in more particularized detail, the corporate board of directors of a charity and the powers of corporate officers in a charitable organization, such as Bostonview, are subject to strict fiduciary standards in the conduct of the charity’s business affairs. The Supreme Judicial Court has made clear that only specific authorization can bind a charitable corporation to an “extraordinary transaction” entered into by its corporate officers, and that authority to enter into a contract which would divest the charitable corporation “of the very essence” of its existence lies beyond the power of the charitable corporate board to delegate to corporate officers. Boston Athletic Assn. v. International Marathons, Inc., 392 Mass. 356, 364-367 (1984). In this case, the sale of substantially all of the Bostonview church property (consisting of a church sanctuary, a parish meeting hall, a large apartment complex, offices, and parking spaces on prime land on Beacon Hill near the Massachusetts State House) was indisputably an “extraordinary transaction,” and, if completed to the end would have stripped Bostonview of the very essence of its existence as a charitable corporation, organized “exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific and education purposes” subject to the holding of the church property and the […]
Categories: News Tags: 1111815, Bostonview, Corporation, First, Lawyers, Management, Weekly
Commonwealth v. Monroe (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-142-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11813 COMMONWEALTH vs. CHARLES MONROE. Worcester. March 5, 2015. – August 19, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Harmless error. Practice, Criminal, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Motion to suppress, Harmless error. Evidence, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement. Error, Harmless. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on November 2, 2010. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by James R. Lemire, J., and the cases were tried before David Ricciardone, J. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Nancy A. Dolberg, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the defendant. Donna-Marie Haran, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. HINES, J. After a jury trial in the Superior Court, the defendant, Charles Monroe, was convicted of four counts of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon (knife); two counts of armed robbery; two counts of indecent assault and battery on a person fourteen years of age or older; two counts of armed kidnapping with serious bodily injury; and one count each of kidnapping and assault and battery.[1] The convictions were based on three incidents that occurred in October, 2010, during which the defendant, then eighteen years old, accosted three different teenage victims as they walked to school. The defendant appealed, arguing that (1) admission of statements he made to police during a videotaped interview violated his right to due process, and (2) the trial judge erred in discharging two deliberating jurors. We transferred the case to this court on our own motion and now conclude that the motion judge erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress statements and that the statements were admitted at trial erroneously. On the record before us, we agree that the police engaged in impermissibly coercive tactics that rendered the defendant’s statements involuntary under the circumstances of the interrogation. Because the erroneous admission of those statements at trial was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse the convictions on that ground[2] and remand for a new trial. 1. Background. We summarize the facts the jury could have found, reserving for later discussion the details of the postarrest interview. The morning of October 19, 2010, […]
Doe No. 356011 v. Sex Offender Registry Board (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-117-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1842 Appeals Court JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 356011 vs. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. No. 13-P-1842. Suffolk. January 7, 2015. – August 18, 2015. Present: Kafker, Meade, & Maldonado, JJ. Sex Offender. Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act. Constitutional Law, Sex offender. Due Process of Law, Sex offender. Administrative Law, Hearing. Evidence, Expert opinion, Sex offender, Police report. Witness, Expert. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on February 1, 2013. The case was heard by Jeffrey A. Locke, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Eric Tennen for the plaintiff. David L. Chenail for the defendant. MALDONADO, J. Following Doe’s 2011 conviction for indecent assault and battery on a person fourteen years of age or older,[1] the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) notified Doe that he would be required to register as a level three sex offender. Doe obtained de novo administrative review pursuant to G. L. c. 6, § 178L. Neither party called any witnesses, and the de novo hearing proceeded on the basis of documentary evidence, which included, among other things, classification records containing a summary of Doe’s disciplinary reports and a police report that described sexual assault allegations of which Doe was acquitted. The hearing examiner (examiner) found this hearsay evidence probative of Doe’s repetitive and compulsive sexual history, and he classified Doe as a level three sex offender. Doe appeals from a Superior Court judgment affirming this classification. He asserts the examiner erred by considering both the disciplinary history set forth in his classification records and the police report of acquitted conduct. Doe also challenges the denial of his request for expert funds relative to his age as a mitigating factor. We affirm. Background. The examiner based Doe’s level three classification on multiple statutory factors, see G. L. c. 6, § 178K(1), including his sexual history and compulsive sexual behavior (803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.40[2] [2002]), his criminal history[2] — particularly as it related to a history of nonsexual violent offenses — (803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.40[9][b], [c][6] [2002]), his poor incarceration behavior (803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.40[19] [2002]),[3] and his noncompliance with conditions of probation (803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.40[20] [2002]).[4] The examiner also explicitly rejected Doe’s claim that his age of forty-nine years was a mitigating factor. In assessing Doe’s […]
Commonwealth v. Wright (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-116-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-2000 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. LOUANN WRIGHT. No. 13-P-2000. Suffolk. February 24, 2015. – August 18, 2015. Present: Rapoza, C.J., Berry, & Maldonado, JJ. Practice, Criminal, Venue, Dismissal. Larceny. Fraud. Public Welfare, Food stamp benefits. Department of Transitional Assistance. Transitional Aid for Families with Dependent Children. Statute, Construction. Complaint received and sworn in the Central Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department on June 28, 2012. A motion to dismiss was heard by Raymond G. Dougan, Jr., J. George Barker, Assistant District Attorney (Helle Sachse, Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the Commonwealth. Claudia Lagos (Dana Alan Curhan with her) for the defendant. MALDONADO, J. A complaint was brought against the defendant in the Central Division of the Boston Municipal Court (Central Division) for one count of larceny over $ 250 by a single scheme, G. L. c. 266, § 30, and four counts of public assistance fraud, G. L. c. 18, § 5B. These charge the defendant with attesting to false information on public benefits applications she submitted to the Department of Transitional Assistance (department), which resulted, according to the Commonwealth, in the department’s distribution to her of unwarranted benefits. The defendant resides in Somerville and applied for benefits at the department satellite office located in Revere. Neither the defendant’s Somerville residence nor the department’s Revere satellite office is in the city of Boston. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss in the Central Division for lack of venue and, following an evidentiary hearing, a judge allowed the defendant’s motion and dismissed the complaint. The Commonwealth’s appeal followed. Concluding that venue properly lies in Boston, where the department “used” the defendant’s purported false statements to calculate her public assistance award, we reverse. Background. We summarize the uncontroverted facts as alleged in the complaint and presented at the evidentiary hearing.[1] In the application for complaint, the Commonwealth’s investigator reported that the defendant applied for and recertified eligibility for public benefits on at least five separate occasions between 2006 and 2011.[2] She submitted these forms at a department satellite office located in Revere. The defendant listed between three and six household members on these forms but did not include her husband.[3] Nor did she account for his income. From 2006 to 2011 — the relevant time frame — the defendant also filed joint tax […]
Commonwealth v. Augustine (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-141-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11803 COMMONWEALTH vs. SHABAZZ AUGUSTINE. Suffolk. April 9, 2015. – August 18, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Cellular Telephone. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Probable cause. Search and Seizure, Probable cause, Warrant, Affidavit. Probable Cause. Practice, Criminal, Warrant, Affidavit. Indictment found and returned in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on July 29, 2011. After review by this court, 467 Mass. 230 (2014), a pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Peter B. Krupp, J. An application for leave to file an interlocutory appeal was allowed by Spina, J. in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk. Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney (Mark T. Lee, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the Commonwealth. Jessie J. Rossman (Matthew R. Segal with her) for the defendant. Matthew J. Tokson, of the District of Columbia, Elizabeth A. Lunt, Kevin S. Prussia, Kelly Halford, & Chauncey B. Wood, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. BOTSFORD, J. In Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 232 (2014) (Augustine I), S.C., 470 Mass. 837 (2015), this court held that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the historical cell site location information[1] (CSLI) relating to his cellular telephone, and that therefore, the warrant requirement of art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights applied to that information. We remanded the case to the Superior Court to determine whether, in the particular circumstances of this case, the Commonwealth is able to meet that warrant requirement through a demonstration of probable cause. Id. For the reasons to be discussed, we conclude that the Commonwealth has done so with respect to the defendant’s CSLI records for the period from August 24 to August 26, 2004.[2] 1. Background. a. Procedural history. We summarize the procedural background of this case that led to our decision in Augustine I, and to the present issue. On September 22, 2004, in connection with an investigation into the death of Julaine Jules, the Commonwealth filed in the Superior Court an application for an order to obtain from the defendant’s cellular service provider certain records, including CSLI, for the fourteen-day period beginning August 24, 2004, the last day that Jules was […]
Commonwealth v. Robertson (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-115-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 12-P-1084 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. KENVILLE ROBERTSON. No. 12-P-1084. Norfolk. March 4, 2015. – August 14, 2015. Present: Trainor, Wolohojian, & Carhart, JJ. Rape. Evidence, Prior misconduct, Pattern of conduct. Practice, Criminal, New trial, Assistance of counsel. Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel. Due Process of Law, Assistance of counsel. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on March 17, 2010. A motion in limine was heard by Mitchell H. Kaplan, J.; the cases were tried before Robert C. Cosgrove, J., and a motion for a new trial was heard by him. Bernard Grossberg for the defendant. Marguerite T. Grant, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. CARHART, J. The defendant appeals from his convictions of three counts of rape of a child with force, three counts of aggravated rape of a child, three counts of indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen, and assault with intent to rape a child, arguing that (1) the motion judge erred in allowing the Commonwealth’s motion in limine to present prior bad act evidence, (2) the trial judge erred in allowing prior bad act evidence as evidence at the trial and in his instructions to the jury in this regard, and (3) the trial judge erred in denying his motion for new trial. We affirm. Background. The jury were presented with the following evidence at trial. The defendant is the biological father of the younger brother of the victim, N.M. Although the defendant did not live with N.M., he had a key to her house and visited often. N.M. called the defendant, “Dad,” and he provided for her financially.[1] In 2004, when N.M. was eight years old, the defendant began sexually abusing her.[2] The abuse occurred while N.M. and the defendant slept in the same bed, along with N.M.’s mother and brother. N.M. testified that on numerous occasions the defendant performed oral sex on her, engaged in vaginal intercourse, forced her to touch his penis, and touched her breasts, vagina, and buttocks. The defendant warned N.M. that if she reported the abuse “the police would get involved,” and N.M. believed that meant she would be taken away from her family. The abuse continued until N.M. was thirteen years old. The defendant’s biological daughter, J.R., also testified at trial.[3] She stated that from around […]
Commonwealth v. Sousa (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-114-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-492 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. MANUEL W. SOUSA. No. 14-P-492. Middlesex. February 4, 2015. – August 14, 2015. Present: Katzmann, Meade, & Rubin, JJ. Controlled Substances. Motor Vehicle, Operating under the influence, Operation. Statute, Construction. Complaint received and sworn to in the Malden Division of the District Court Department on September 19, 2011. The case was heard by Dominic J. Paratore, J. Christopher L. Maclachlan for the defendant. Melissa Weisgold Johnsen, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. KATZMANN, J. After a bench trial, a District Court judge found the defendant guilty of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs and negligent operation of a motor vehicle. On appeal, the defendant argues insufficient evidence for both convictions. We reverse the conviction of operating while under the influence of drugs, concluding that that the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence that the defendant was under the influence of a prohibited substance, as defined under the relevant statute, G. L. c. 94C, § 1. We affirm the conviction of negligent operation. Facts. Under the familiar standard, see Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979), the judge could have found the following. On September 18, 2011, the defendant, Manuel Sousa, was driving a motor vehicle down a public street in the city of Malden. A bystander observed his vehicle roll past a stop sign without stopping and then stop suddenly in the middle of an intersection. The defendant, who appeared to be asleep or “passed out,” was leaning back in the driver’s seat. The bystander approached the vehicle, and the defendant sat up, placed a device to his mouth, and then sped off. The bystander then called the police and, while waiting for someone to arrive, observed the vehicle continuing to start and stop while traveling on a side street. When police Officer Philip Halloran arrived, he approached the vehicle, which was parked in the middle of a two-way street and had its engine running. Officer Halloran could see that the defendant was reclined in his seat behind the steering wheel. He saw the defendant reach down and place an aerosol canister to his mouth and spray. Officer Halloran ordered the defendant to turn off the engine and to get out of the vehicle. The defendant did not acknowledge the command and instead placed the […]
Commonwealth v. Curry (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-113-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-63 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. TRAVIS CURRY. No. 14-P-63. Suffolk. March 6, 2015. – August 14, 2015. Present: Grainger, Meade, & Fecteau, JJ. Controlled Substances. Constitutional Law, Conduct of government agents, Fair trial. Due Process of Law, Fair trial. Practice, Criminal, Conduct of government agents, Loss of evidence by prosecution, Instructions to jury. Fair Trial. Evidence, Certificate of drug analysis, Scientific test, Chain of custody. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on April 20, 2011. The cases were tried before Patrick F. Brady, J. Jacob B. Stone for the defendant. Vincent J. DeMore, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. GRAINGER, J. The defendant appeals from his convictions of unlawful distribution of heroin in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32, and possession with the intent to distribute heroin in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32A.[1] He asserts that misconduct at the William A. Hinton State Laboratory Institute forensic drug laboratory (Hinton drug lab) deprived him of his due process right to a fair trial and requests that we reverse his convictions and dismiss the indictments with prejudice. We affirm. Background. We recite the facts as the jury could have found them. On February 9, 2011, Boston police arrested the defendant after an undercover officer purchased two bags of heroin for sixty dollars from the defendant at his home. The defendant was arrested in shorts, a T-shirt, and sandals. A search of his person uncovered an additional bag of heroin. At the time of the defendant’s arrest, officers asked the defendant’s mother to bring him additional clothing. The mother complied, bringing the defendant a pair of jeans and a sweatshirt, which the defendant later identified as belonging to him. Before allowing the defendant to wear the clothes, officers searched the pockets for any potential weapons. The search of his pants revealed an additional fifteen bags of heroin, nine bags of “crack” cocaine, a knife, and six dollars. The defendant denied any knowledge of the drugs found in his pants. All of the drug evidence was marked, turned over to the evidence officer, and transmitted to the Hinton drug lab. The substances were tested in April, 2011, by Annie Dookhan,[2] serving as the primary chemist, and thereafter by a secondary chemist, identified as heroin and cocaine, and returned to the Boston police pending […]
Commonwealth v. Ramos (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-112-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-1469 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. GOVANNY RAMOS. No. 14-P-1469. Suffolk. March 16, 2015. – August 14, 2015. Present: Katzmann, Milkey, & Agnes, JJ. Search and Seizure, Motor vehicle, Reasonable suspicion. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Reasonable suspicion. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, Records. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Record. Motor Vehicle, Receiving stolen motor vehicle. Complaint received and sworn to in the Chelsea Division of the District Court Department on October 17, 2013. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by D. Dunbar Livingston, J. An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal was allowed by Robert J. Cordy, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by him to the Appeals Court. Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Megan Ruebsamen for the defendant. KATZMANN, J. This appeal by the Commonwealth poses the questions whether police officers may reasonably rely on information from the Registry of Motor Vehicles (RMV) database concerning reports of stolen vehicles and whether a District Court judge erred in employing the Aguilar–Spinelli test in allowing the defendant’s motion to suppress. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). See Commonwealth v. Lopes, 455 Mass. 147, 155-156 (2009) (Lopes). We reverse. Background. After an evidentiary hearing, a District Court judge found the following. On October 17, 2013, State Trooper Edmund Hartwell was assigned alone and in uniform to a cruiser patrol. That morning, Hartwell was parked on Everett Avenue, opposite Chelsea High School, observing traffic. While parked, Hartwell saw a red sport utility vehicle (SUV) go past. Hartwell noticed that the driver, who was later identified as the defendant, Govanny Ramos, was not wearing a seatbelt and appeared to have his hands in his lap. Hartwell “ran” the registration of the SUV using his mobile data terminal (MDT) to query the RMV database. The vehicle “came back stolen.” The description of the motor vehicle in the RMV database matched the SUV Hartwell observed. Hartwell followed the SUV and contacted the dispatch center at the State police headquarters in Danvers to get confirmation that the SUV was stolen. The dispatch center confirmed that the SUV with the particular registration plate and description was reported as stolen. Hartwell followed the […]