Posts tagged "Management"

Garner, et al. v. Entertainment Management Complex LLC (Lawyers Weekly No. 09-018-18)

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT. 1884CV00469-BLS2 ____________________ RASHAUD GARNER & ENTERTAINMENT ONE STOP SHOP LLC v. ENTERTAINMENT MANAGEMENT COMPLEX LLC ____________________ MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION This dispute concerns the booking of private events at a public conference center in Brockton, Massachusetts. The facility is owned by Brockton 21st Century Corporation (“B21”), a non-profit organization that was created to help the City of Brockton with economic development activities, including the conference center and adjoining baseball stadium. B21 retained defendant Entertainment Management Complex LLC (“EMC”) to operate the conference center and stadium. EMC in turn retained plaintiffs Rashaud Garner and his company Entertainment One Stop Shop LLC (“EOSS”) to book events and provide event-related services at the conference center. The parties agree that EMC’s arrangement with Mr. Garner and EOSS was in effect at least until the end of 2017. Plaintiffs claim that in October 2017 EMC agreed to extend their contract through the end of 2018. They seek a preliminary injunction that would, in essence, require that EMC to adhere to that alleged contract extension. The Court will DENY the motion for a preliminary injunction because Plaintiffs have not yet proved that they have any likelihood of succeeding on the merits of their claims. Cf. Fordyce v. Town of Hanover, 457 Mass. 248, 266 (2010) (vacating preliminary injunction because plaintiffs were “unlikely to succeed on the merits”). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). To the contrary, “the significant remedy of a preliminary injunction should not be granted unless the plaintiffs had made a clear showing of entitlement thereto.” Student No. 9 v. Board of Educ., 440 Mass. 752, 762 (2004). Plaintiffs have not met that burden. Mr. Garner relies primarily on emails he claims he exchanged with Todd Marlin of EMC on September 20 and October 20, 2017. According to Mr. Garner, on – 2 – September 20 Mr. Marlin sent an email with the subject line “Q1, Q2 2018” and said “please go ahead and start booking events in the first quarter, second quarter of next year.” Mr. Gardner also asserts that on October 20, (i) Mr. Garner emailed Mr. Marlin at 1:49 p.m., stating that he wanted to book six bar mitzvahs at the conference center from April to June 2018, and (ii) Mr. Marlin replied at 5:55 p.m. by saying “Chris said it’s a go for 2018[.] Cool…see you then”. Mr. Gardner verified under the pains and penalties of perjury that “true and accurate” copies of these emails were attached to his complaint. He argues that the October 20 email constitutes an […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - March 1, 2018 at 11:23 pm

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City of Beverly v. Bass River Golf Management, Inc., et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-002-18)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   15-P-171                                        Appeals Court   CITY OF BEVERLY  vs.  BASS RIVER GOLF MANAGEMENT, INC., & another.[1]     No. 15-P-171.   Essex.     November 14, 2016. – January 5, 2018.   Present:  Sullivan, Maldonado, & Neyman, JJ.     Contract, Municipality, Performance and breach.  Municipal Corporations, Contracts.  Consumer Protection Act, Trade or commerce, Unfair or deceptive act.  Bankruptcy, Stay of other proceedings.  Practice, Civil, Directed verdict, Amendment, New trial, Instructions to jury.  Judgment, Amendment.       Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on March 11, 2011.   The case was tried before Robert A. Cornetta, J., and a motion to alter or amend the judgment, or for a new trial, was heard by him.     Denis J. Sullivan for the defendants. Eitan Y. Goldberg, Assistant City Solicitor (Stephanie M. Williams, City Solicitor, also present) for the plaintiff.     MALDONADO, J.  In this case, we consider the propriety of actions taken by the city of Beverly (city), which owns the Beverly Golf and Tennis Club (Golf Club), and by Bass River Golf Management, Inc. (Bass River), which operated the facility for almost two years pursuant to a management contract with the city.  On March 11, 2011, the city commenced an action in the Superior Court against Bass River and 31 Tozer Road, L.L.C. (Tozer), the guarantor of Bass River’s payment obligations to the city, asserting claims for breach of contract against each party and seeking damages.  Bass River filed counterclaims against the city (subsequently amended) which alleged violations of G. L. c. 93A, breach of contract, breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of warranty, and conversion. Following a trial, the jury, in response to special questions, found that Bass River had breached its management contract with the city, that Tozer had guaranteed Bass River’s payment obligations, and that the city was entitled to damages of $ 631,969.63.  The jury also found that the city had violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in its contractual relationship with Bass River, and that the city had converted Bass River’s property.  The jury awarded Bass River damages of $ 48,967.33.  Thereafter, the judge determined that Bass River had not proved that the city violated G. L. c. 93A. Bass River and Tozer filed a motion to amend the findings of facts and rulings of law, to amend the judgment, […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - January 5, 2018 at 4:01 pm

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Fortress, Inc. v. Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (Lawyers Weekly No. 09-025-17)

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION No. 2014-3904 BLS 1 FORTRESS, INC. vs. MASSACHUSETTS EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT The sole theory of defendant’s motion for summary judgment is that plaintiff, Fortress, Inc., did not qualify for special consideration of its bid for a contract because its principal place of business was not in Massachusetts. If Fortress did not qualify for special consideration, its claim for breach of contract against defendant, Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (“MEMA”), based on losing the bid, fails. Whether Fortress’s principal place of business was in Massachusetts is the subject of approximately 25 numbered paragraphs of the parties’ Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts (“JSUF”). Notwithstanding the title of the JSUF suggesting that the facts are undisputed, at least 15 of those paragraphs are expressly disputed, either by MEMA or by Fortress. Thus, the issues before the court are (a) whether the disputed paragraphs of the JSUF are properly supported as required under Superior Court Rule 9A, and (b) whether the existence of the dispute is material such that summary judgment must be denied. This case arises out of a dispute between Fortress and MEMA regarding a Request for Responses (“RFR”) issued by MEMA in May 2014. The RFR solicited bids to provide Standard 1 Operating Procedure manuals for the Commonwealth’s emergency operations centers. The RFR indicated that it was targeted to solicit bids from small businesses participating in the Commonwealth’s Small Business Purchasing Program (“SBPP”). The RFR stated that MEMA intended “to evaluate bid responses from and to award a contract to a SBPP-participating business(es) who submit a bid that meets or exceeds the solicitation criteria only.” If no SBPP qualified vendors submitted a responsive bid, MEMA reserved the right to award the contract to a non-SBPP business. Fortress submitted a bid to the RFR as a SBPP qualified vendor. Fortress had previously registered as a SBPP qualified vendor through an online form on the website of the Commonwealth’s Operational Services Division (“OSD”). MEMA, however, awarded the contract to a different vendor who was not qualified as a SBPP vendor. MEMA determined that Fortress was not qualified as a SBPP vendor because its principal place of business was not in Massachusetts. When Fortress’s bid was evaluated as a non-SBPP bid, it scored lower than the winning bid of a different non-SBPP vendor. MEMA moves for summary judgment on the single ground that Fortress did not qualify as a SBPP vendor. Absent such qualification, MEMA argues that Fortress’s claim fails. The reason Fortress does not qualify, according to MEMA, is because Fortress’s principal place of business was not in Massachusetts. The SBPP was established in 2010 by […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - November 3, 2017 at 11:02 am

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Phillips v. Equity Residential Management, L.L.C. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-169-17)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   SJC-12247   SCOTT PHILLIPS[1]  vs.  EQUITY RESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT, L.L.C.       Suffolk.     May 1, 2017. – October 25, 2017.   Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ.[2]     Landlord and Tenant, Security deposit, Multiple damages.  Statute, Construction.       Certification of a question of law to the Supreme Judicial Court by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.     Joshua N. Garick (David Pastor & Preston W. Leonard also present) for the plaintiff. Craig M. White, of Illinois (Thomas H. Wintner also present) for the defendant. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Catherine Dowie, & John Pierce Wilton for Accelerator-to-Practice Program of Suffolk University Law School & others. Lawrence J. Farber for Greater Boston Real Estate Board. Alex Mitchell-Munevar & Joseph Michalakes for City Life/Vida Urbana.      BUDD, J.  Where a landlord’s itemized list of deductions from a tenant’s security deposit does not comply with the requirements of the Security Deposit Act, G. L. c. 186, § 15B (act), the landlord forfeits the right to retain any part of that deposit.  See G. L. c. 186, § 15B (6).  In certain circumstances the landlord must pay the tenant treble damages, interest, costs, and attorney’s fees, pursuant to § 15B (7).  In a certified question, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit asks whether a tenant is entitled to treble the amount of the entire security deposit under § 15B (7) where a landlord fails to provide to the tenant a statement of damages that meets the statutory requirements, see § 15B (4) (iii), second sentence, thereby forfeiting the entire security deposit, see § 15B (6) (b), and also fails to return that forfeited deposit within thirty days after the termination of the tenancy.  See Phillips v. Equity Residential Mgt., L.L.C., 844 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 2016). We conclude that the Legislature did not intend for the treble damages provision in § 15B (7) to apply to a landlord’s violation of the requirements for an itemized list set out in § 15B (4) (iii), second sentence, or to the amount forfeited for violation of § 15B (6) (b), and accordingly answer the certified question no.[3] Background.  We recite relevant facts presented by the Court of Appeals in its opinion, see Phillips, 844 F.3d at 3-4, along with […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - October 25, 2017 at 11:07 pm

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Beacon Residential Management, LP v. R.P. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-148-17)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   SJC-12265   BEACON RESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT, LP  vs.  R.P.[1]       Suffolk.     April 6, 2017. – September 14, 2017.   Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ.[2]     Summary Process.  Practice, Civil, Summary process, Intervention.       Summary Process.  Complaint filed in the Boston Division of the Housing Court Department on July 27, 2015.   A motion to intervene was heard by Jeffrey M. Winik, J.   An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal was allowed in the Appeals Court by Gregory I. Massing, J.  After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review.     David Emer (Alison T. Holdway also present) for the mother. Therese Quijano for the plaintiff. Julia Devanthéry, for Casa Myrna & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. Dorothy Bourassa & Eileen M. Fava, for Women’s Bar Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.          BUDD, J.  In this case we consider whether a mother[3] has the right to intervene in an eviction action brought by a landlord against the mother’s husband and their young children as the named defendants where, although she is not a named tenant on the lease, she has lived with her family in the apartment throughout the tenancy and alleges domestic violence in the home.  We conclude that she may intervene both on her own behalf and on behalf of her children.[4] Background.  This case is before us on the mother’s appeal from the denial, by a judge of the Housing Court, of the her motion to intervene in a summary process action brought by Beacon Residential Management LP (Beacon), the agent of the apartment owner, Georgetowne Homes Two, L.L.C. (Georgetowne Homes) (collectively, landlord).  We recite relevant allegations from the mother’s motion to intervene and proposed answer, as supplemented by the testimony at the hearing before the motion judge.[5] In October, 2009, the mother, together with her husband, R.P., and their son, moved into a federally regulated and subsidized apartment in the Hyde Park section of Boston; the apartment was owned by Georgetowne Homes.[6]  Initially both the mother and R.P. signed the lease.  Soon thereafter the landlord informed them that the Federal government would not subsidize the rent due to the mother’s immigration status; thereafter, the couple removed the mother from the lease.[7]  At that […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - September 14, 2017 at 11:13 pm

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Therapy Resources Management LLC, et al. v. Whittier Health Network, Inc., et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-120-17)

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION No. 1784CV0942 BLS 1 THERAPY RESOURCES MANAGEMENT LLC, et al vs. WHITTIER HEALTH NETWORK, INC., et al ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Count IV of the Amended Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment to the effect that defendants (referred to collectively as “Whittier”) are barred from seeking indemnity from plaintiffs (referred to collectively as “Therapy”). Whittier has not yet answered the amended complaint or asserted a counterclaim, but the record is clear that Whittier believes it has the right to be indemnified by Therapy for litigation costs and a settlement payment incurred by Whittier in connection with an investigation and lawsuit under the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. §3729.1 There is an actual controversy between the parties regarding whether, as a matter of law, Whittier can obtain indemnification under its contracts with Therapy which state that “[Therapy] shall indemnify and hold [Whittier] harmless from and against all claims, demands, costs, expenses, liabilities and losses (including reasonable attorney’s fees) which may result against [Whittier] as a consequence of any malfeasance, negligence . . . caused . . . by [Therapy] . . . .” 1 Whittier has effectively obtained some indemnification by refusing to pay invoices for services rendered by Therapy. Thus, Therapy is the plaintiff in this action seeking recovery for non-payment of invoices. The claim for indemnification by Whittier is anticipated because such claim is the stated basis for Whittier’s refusal to pay the invoices. 1 Therapy’s argument for summary judgment on Count IV is based on the following undisputed facts. The losses that Whittier wants indemnification for arise from the fact that Whittier was sued, along with Therapy, for fraud under the FCA. The suit was brought by a former employee of Therapy. There was also another suit by a different former employee of Therapy against Therapy alone. The filing of the suits triggered an investigation by federal officials. The gist of the FCA claims was that Whittier and Therapy knowingly presented false claims for Medicare reimbursement. Both Whittier and Therapy denied the allegations. At some point, the claims against Therapy were dismissed. It is unclear from the record whether the dismissal was a result of a settlement or whether it was a dismissal without prejudice. Sometime later, Whittier entered into a settlement with the FCA plaintiffs, including the government, requiring, among other things, payment by Whittier of $ 2.5 million. Therapy was not a party to the settlement. FCA claims against Therapy were not released in the Whittier settlement. The settlement agreement alleges that Whittier failed “to take sufficient steps to prevent [Therapy] from engaging in a pattern and practice of fraudulently inflating the reported amounts […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - September 6, 2017 at 6:26 pm

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Tam, et al. v. Federal Management Co., Inc., et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-093-17)

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - August 4, 2017 at 12:36 pm

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Tam, et al. v. Federal Management Co., Inc., et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-093-17)

  COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION 13-02347-BLS1 SIEW-MEY TAM & another1 1 Mary Jane Raymond 2 d/b/a The Schochet Companies 3 Richard Henken, Peter Lewis, and David Flad 4 The individual defendants are alleged to be statutorily liable for FMC’sWage Act violations. 5 The defendants have also filed a separate motion for summary judgment on the claims asserted by Tam.  That motion remains pendingand is not addressed in this Memorandum of Decision. vs. FEDERAL MANAGEMENT CO., INC.2 & others3 MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFF MARY JANE RAYMOND Plaintiffs Siew-Mey Tam and Mary Jane Raymond were formerly employed by Federal Management Co., Inc. (FMC) as property managers.  Following the termination oftheiremployment, they brought this action against FMC, Richard Henken, David Flad, and Peter Lewis4alleging that they were misclassified as exempt employees under G.L. c. 151, § 1A and FMC failed to pay them for overtime hours worked.  The case is presently before the Court on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissingthe claims assertedagainst themby Raymond.5 For the following reasons, the motion is ALLOWED. BACKGROUND The following facts are undisputed. FMC is a professional management company located in Braintree, Massachusetts.  The 2   company manages commercial, retail, and residential properties, including low and moderate subsidized housing projects.  One of the properties FMC manages is Weldon House, a 105-unit, low income apartment building in Greenfield, Massachusetts. From February 14, 1990 to March 3, 2011, Raymond worked at Weldon House as a property manager.  FMC classifiedand paid Raymond as a salaried, exempt employee.  She received a fixed weekly salary regardless of the number of hours that she worked during any week.FMC terminated Raymond’s employment on March 3, 2011. In June 2013, Tam, anotherFMCproperty manager whoworked at a different property andhad also beenterminated, filed a complaint in Superior Court alleging violationsof G. L. c. 151, §1A, the statute governing overtimepay. She brought her claimon behalf of herself and all similarly situated FMC property managers.  More than a year later, the Court allowed a motion to substitute Tam’s complaintwith another complaint.  The substitute complaint added Raymond as anamedplaintiff. Itwaspledfifteen counts:seven counts asserted claims on behalf ofTam and a putative class of similarly situated plaintiffsand eight counts were individual claims asserted by Raymond. In response, the defendants fileda motion to dismiss the complaint, which wasallowed in part and denied in part,in June 2015.  The Court granted the motion as to Counts III-VIII and X-XIV but denied it as to Counts I, II, IX, and XV.  Following that order, Raymond’s remaining claimsare her individual claims for overtime and wages under G. L. c. 151, § 1A and G. L. c. 149, § 148 (Counts I […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - August 3, 2017 at 3:08 pm

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NTV Management, Inc. v. Lightship Global Ventures, LLC, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-080-17)

1 COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION NO. 2016-0327-BLS1 NTV MANAGEMENT, INC. vs. LIGHTSHIP GLOBAL VENTURES, LLC and KENT PLUNKETT MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND PLAINTIFF’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNT I OF ITS COMPLAINT This case arises out of a Consulting and Advisory Services Agreement (the Agreement) between the plaintiff, NTV Management, Inc. (NTV) and the defendant Lightship Global Ventures, LLC (Lightship). The defendant, Kent Plunkett, founded a company, Salary.Com, Inc., which, following a series of acquisitions, became a division of IBM. Plunkett and a colleague formed Lightship for the purpose of reacquiring Salary.Com from IBM. The Agreement, while containing some one-off terms, was in effect a non-exclusive brokerage agreement pursuant to which NTV would be due a commission if it found financing for the acquisition and a lesser fixed sum for introducing “at least ten qualified sources of capital.” Lightship did acquire Salary.com, but not with equity or debt partners introduced to the deal by NTV. NTV, nonetheless, alleges that it is due fees under the Agreement and damages for a variety of other wrongful conduct on the part of the defendants. It has pled its complaint in seven counts: breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, deceit, a violation of Chapter 93A, violations of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, and a count to reach and apply stock or assets of Salary.com (although curiously it has not 2 named Salary.com, or the entity that presently owns it, as a defendant). Apparently, concerned about matching NTV’s imaginative pleading measure for measure, the defendants have asserted five counterclaims against NTV: breach of a duty of confidentiality, breach of contract, defamation, misrepresentation, and tortious interference with contractual or business relations. These counterclaims are not the subject of a motion now before the court. The case is before the court on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing all the claims asserted against them, and NTV’s cross-motion for summary judgment on part of its breach of contract claim. For the reasons that follow, the defendants’ motion is Allowed, in part, and Denied, in part, and NTV’s motion is Denied. FACTS Based on the summary judgment record, the following facts are undisputed or viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Salary.com was founded by Plunkett in 1999. It became a public company in 2007, and then was acquired by a firm called Kenexa, Inc. in 2010. In 2012, Kenexa was acquired by IBM, after which Salary.com was operated as a division of that company or an IBM affiliate. In 2014, IBM informed Plunkett that it was […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - July 4, 2017 at 8:51 am

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CareOne Management, LLC, et al. v. NaviSite, Inc. (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-043-17)

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT. 1484CV00378-BLS2 1484CV00858-BLS2 ____________________ CAREONE MANAGEMENT, LLC and PARTNERS PHARMACY SERVICES, LLC v. NAVISITE, INC CONSOLIDATED WITH NAVISITE, INC v. CAREONE MANAGEMENT, LLC and PARTNERS PHARMACY SERVICES ____________________ MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT These consolidated lawsuits arise from the agreement by NaviSite, Inc., to develop and provide information technology services to CareOne Management, LLC and its affiliate Partners Pharmacy Services, LLC. NaviSite first contracted to provide an array of computerized services to CareOne. Several months later NaviSite contracted to provide a much more limited set of information technology services to Partners. After difficulties and disputes regarding implementation of its contract with CareOne, NaviSite threatened to and then did terminate both contracts. CareOne and Partners asserted various claims against NaviSite, which in turn sued CareOne. (NaviSite also sued Partners, but Judge Sanders dismissed those claims.) NaviSite and CareOne both move for summary judgment; NaviSite does so on all claims while CareOne’s motion is limited to NaviSite’s claims against it. The Court concludes that CareOne is entitled to summary judgment on the claims asserted against it by NaviSite, and that NaviSite is entitled to summary judgment on all claims asserted against it by CareOne and Partners. Final judgment will enter declaring the rights of the parties, with respect to the issues in controversy that CareOne and Partners identified in their claim for declaratory judgment, and dismissing all other claims with prejudice. 1. Background. 1.1. Undisputed Material Facts. The following are undisputed facts, as demonstrated in the evidentiary materials submitted by the parties or reasonable inferences that one could draw from those facts. The Court “must … draw all reasonable inferences” from the evidence presented “in favor of the nonmoving party,” as a jury or judicial fact finder would be free to do at trial. Godfrey v. Globe Newspaper Co., Inc., 457 Mass. 113, 119 (2010). It has done so. CareOne manages dozens of nursing homes. Partners operates commercial pharmacies that serve patients at more than 500 nursing homes, including those run by CareOne. These two companies are separate legal entities, though both were founded and are run by the same person. CareOne retained NaviSite in September 2012 to develop, implement, host, and operate new computing services to be used at all of CareOne’s nursing facilities. The system design was to include “virtual desktops” through which CareOne employees could access programs, applications, and data that NaviSite would host on servers located at its facilities. It also included other computer services that would be implemented and hosted by NaviSite. NaviSite agreed that it would transition CareOne from its current IT vendor and begin providing the agreed upon services using NaviSite’s servers no later than January […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - April 26, 2017 at 3:29 pm

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