Commonwealth v. Brown (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-086-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11671 COMMONWEALTH vs. MARQUISE BROWN. Middlesex. February 12, 2016. – June 17, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Botsford, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Homicide. Firearms. Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Waiver of constitutional rights, Confrontation of witnesses. Evidence, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Hearsay, Common criminal enterprise, Joint enterprise, Telephone conversation, Relevancy and materiality. Joint Enterprise. Telephone. Imprisonment, Inmate telephone calls. Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Motion to suppress, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Waiver, Confrontation of witnesses, Instructions to jury, Request for jury instructions. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on August 6, 2009. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by John T. Lu, J., and the cases were tried before Kimberly S. Budd, J. Gail S. Strassfeld for the defendant. Jamie Michael Charles, Assistant District Attorney (Christopher M. Tarrant, Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the Commonwealth. SPINA, J. The defendant, Marquise Brown, was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. He also was convicted of illegally carrying a firearm, illegal possession of a loaded firearm, and illegal possession of ammunition. On appeal the defendant asserts error in (1) the denial of his motion for a required finding of not guilty as to the theory of murder by extreme atrocity or cruelty; (2) the denial of his motion to suppress his statements to police; (3) the admission in evidence of accusations by police during the interrogations of the defendant; (4) the admission of a statement of the codefendant[1] under the joint venture exception to the hearsay rule; (5) the admission of recorded jailhouse telephone calls; (6) jury instructions on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty; and (7) jury instructions that precluded the jury from considering the defendant’s youth as to various issues. The defendant claims that the cumulative effect of the various errors requires a new trial, pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. We affirm the convictions and decline to exercise our powers under § 33E to reduce the degree of guilt or to order a new trial. 1. Background. The jury could have found the following facts. Other details are reserved for discussion of specific issues. On the evening of June […]
Rosenwasser v. Rosenwasser (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-071-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-1601 Appeals Court MARCI ROSENWASSER vs. RONALD ROSENWASSER. No. 14-P-1601. Middlesex. January 25, 2016. – June 17, 2016. Present: Cohen, Trainor, & Katzmann, JJ. Divorce and Separation, Child custody, Child support, Alimony, Modification of judgment, Separation agreement. Minor, Custody. Parent and Child, Custody, Child support. Complaint for divorce filed in the Middlesex Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on June 16, 2010. An amended complaint for modification, filed on August 28, 2012, was heard by Patricia A. Gorman, J. Susan E. Stenger for the father. Donald G. Tye (Michelle M. Rothman with him) for the mother. KATZMANN, J. Ronald Rosenwasser (father), the former husband of Marci Rosenwasser (mother), appeals from a modification judgment of the Probate and Family Court denying his request to remove the parties’ minor child to Boca Raton, Florida. As the father is the child’s primary custodial parent, his removal request is governed by the two-prong “real advantage” test set forth in Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 395 Mass. 704 (1985) (Yannas). Though we credit the judge’s efforts to deal with a complex situation involving two loving parents, we conclude that the judge erred in her application of the second prong of the Yannas test, by not adequately considering the best interests of the child and the interests of the father, while giving undue weight to the interests of the mother. We therefore vacate the portion of the modification judgment denying the father’s removal request and remand the matter to the Probate and Family Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The mother also cross-appeals from the portion of the modification judgment reducing the father’s support obligation. We vacate the portion of the modification judgment pertaining to support and remand the matter for additional findings consistent with this opinion. Background. “We summarize the proceedings, setting forth relevant background facts as determined by the judge, supplemented by the record where necessary, and reserving other facts for our later discussion of the issues.” Murray v. Super, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 146, 147 (2015) (Murray). The parties married in March, 1990, and lived together in Florida until 1997, when they relocated to Massachusetts. The father grew up in Florida, and much of his extended family still lives there. The mother’s parents, who are Canadian citizens, also live […]
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Picard v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Westminster, et al. (Lwyers Weekly No. 10-085-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11991 MAURICE PICARD, personal representative,[1] vs. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF WESTMINSTER & another.[2] Worcester. February 9, 2016. – June 17, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Zoning, Person aggrieved. Practice, Civil, Standing. Easement. Real Property, Easement, Beach. Beach. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on August 23, 2011. The case was heard by Robert B. Gordon, J. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. Thomas M. Bovenzi for 3333, Inc. Peter A. CampoBasso for the plaintiff. CORDY, J. Is a claimed injury to a private easement right sufficient to confer standing to challenge a zoning determination made by a zoning board of appeals? In the circumstances of this case, we conclude that it is not. Maurice Picard, as the personal representative of his wife’s estate, commenced this action in the Superior Court after the zoning board of appeals of Westminster (zoning board) upheld the building commissioner’s determination that property abutting his, owned by the defendant, 3333, Inc., enjoyed grandfathered status under the Westminster zoning by-law. After a bench trial, a judge in the Superior Court dismissed Picard’s complaint for lack of standing. The Appeals Court, in an unpublished decision pursuant to its rule 1:28, reversed the judgment as to standing and concluded that the property in question did not enjoy grandfathered status under the Westminster zoning by-law. Picard v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Westminster, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 1125 (2015). We granted further appellate review, limited to the standing issue. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. Background. The trial judge found the following facts, which we occasionally supplement with undisputed facts from the record. See Wendy’s Old Fashioned Hamburgers of N.Y., Inc. v. Board of Appeal of Billerica, 454 Mass. 374, 383 (2009) (on appellate review, judge’s factual findings will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous or unless there is no evidence to support them). Picard is the owner and occupant of certain property on Laurie Lane in Westminster (town). Picard’s property is identified as lots 34 and 43 on a plan referred to by the judge as the “Laurie Lane Plan.” The deed that conveyed the property to Picard’s late spouse also contained within it […]
Commonwealth v. Moore (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-084-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11582 COMMONWEALTH vs. DWAYNE MOORE. Suffolk. February 10, 2016. – June 16, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Rules of Professional Conduct. Jury and Jurors. Practice, Criminal, Jury and jurors, Investigation of jurors, Deliberation of jury. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on January 7, 2011. A postconviction emergency motion for judicial intervention to prohibit inquiry of the jury, filed on July 23, 2015, was heard by Jeffrey A. Locke, J., and questions of law were reported by him to the Appeals Court. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Teresa K. Anderson, Assistant District Attorney (Edmond J. Zabin, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the Commonwealth. Chauncey B. Wood for the defendant. K. Neil Austin, Caroline S. Donovan, & David A.F. Lewis, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. BOTSFORD, J. We consider here five questions reported by a Superior Court judge to the Appeals Court concerning the effect of an amendment to Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.5 (c), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1428 (2015) (rule 3.5 [c]), regarding an attorney’s ability to communicate, postverdict, with jurors who deliberated on, or were discharged from, the attorney’s client’s case. Rule 3.5 (c) became effective on July 1, 2015. 1. Background. From February 13 to March 22, 2012, the defendant was tried in the Superior Court in Suffolk County on charges of murder in the first degree (four counts), G. L. c. 265, § 1; home invasion, G. L. c. 265, § 18C; armed robbery, G. L. c. 265, § 17; armed assault with intent to murder, G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b); aggravated assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15A (c); carrying a firearm without a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); and trafficking in cocaine, G. L. c. 94C, § 32E (b). The jury were deadlocked on nine of the charges and found the defendant not guilty on the tenth (trafficking in cocaine). The trial judge declared a mistrial. On October 2, 2012, the defendant filed a motion for a change of venue on account of extensive media coverage, which […]
Bank of America, N.A. v. Casey (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-083-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11943 BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. vs. DEBORA A. CASEY, trustee.[1] February 11, 2016. – June 16, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Mortgage, Validity. Real Property, Mortgage. Certification of questions of law to the Supreme Judicial Court by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Adam C. Ponte for the defendant. Mark B. Johnson for the plaintiff. Lawrence P. Heffernan & Danielle Andrews Long, for The Abstract Club & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. BOTSFORD, J. We consider two questions certified to this court by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (First Circuit).[2] The questions, which arise in connection with a bankruptcy proceeding, concern the power and effect of an affidavit of an attorney executed pursuant to G. L. c. 183, § 5B, in relation to a mortgage containing a defective certificate of acknowledgment. The two questions ask: “1. May an affidavit executed and recorded pursuant to [G. L. c.] 183, § 5B, attesting to the proper acknowledgment of a recorded mortgage containing a Certificate of Acknowledgment that omits the name of the mortgagor, correct what the parties say is a material defect in the Certificate of Acknowledgment of that mortgage? “2. May an affidavit executed and recorded pursuant to [G. L. c.] 183, § 5B, attesting to the proper acknowledgment of a recorded mortgage containing a Certificate of Acknowledgment that omits the name of the mortgagor, provide constructive notice of the existence of the mortgage to a bona fide purchaser, either independently or in combination with the mortgage?” For the reasons that follow, we answer both questions yes, in certain circumstances.[3] 1. Background.[4] By quitclaim deed dated September 29, 1999, Alvaro and Lisa Pereira (collectively, Pereiras) acquired title to the property located at 107 Colonial Drive in New Bedford (property). On October 1, 1999, the deed was recorded with the Southern Bristol County registry of deeds (registry). On December 27, 2005, the Pereiras refinanced the property, granting to Bank of America, N.A. (bank), a mortgage in the principal amount of $ 240,000. The Pereiras individually initialed the bottom of each page of the mortgage agreement except the signature page, on which the full signature of each appears. Attorney Raymond J. Quintin also signed […]
Commonwealth v. Lopes (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-070-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 12-P-1829 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. NARDO LOPES. No. 12-P-1829. Suffolk. February 3, 2016. – June 15, 2016. Present: Kafker, C.J., Rubin, & Agnes, JJ. Constitutional Law, Public trial, Jury. Practice, Criminal, Public trial, Empanelment of jury. Jury and Jurors. Evidence, Prior violent conduct. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on June 1, 2001. The case was tried before Linda E. Giles, J., and motions for a new trial, filed on September 30, 2010, and September 3, 2013, respectively, were heard by her. Derege B. Demissie for the defendant. Teresa K. Anderson, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. RUBIN, J. This is the rare case in which a court room closure was ordered over the defendant’s objection during jury empanelment, subsequent to the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2007). That case and the subsequent cases from the Supreme Judicial Court, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 1), 456 Mass. 94 (2010), and from the United States Supreme Court, see Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209 (2010), confirm that a defendant’s right to a public trial under the Sixth Amendment includes a right to have the public present during jury empanelment. As our cases and those of the Supreme Judicial Court have now made clear, prior to Owens, and notwithstanding Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984), some court rooms around this Commonwealth routinely were closed during jury empanelment. See, e.g., Cohen (No. 1), supra at 102 (Superior Court in Norfolk County); Commonwealth v. Lavoie, 464 Mass. 83, 84-85 (2013) (Superior Court in Middlesex County); Commonwealth v. Morganti, 467 Mass. 96, 98 (2014) (Superior Court in Plymouth County); Commonwealth v. Alebord, 467 Mass. 106, 109 (2014) (Superior Court in Plymouth County). In many such cases, because of the longstanding culture of these court houses, no contemporaneous objection was made to these closures. In a wide range of circumstances, under subsequent Supreme Judicial Court case law, those objections have been held waived. See, e.g., Lavoie, supra at 88-89; Morganti, supra at 101-102; Alebord, supra at 112-113. In this case, however, the jury venire was brought into the court room and, over the defendant’s objections, the court room was closed. In this direct appeal from his […]
Commonwealth v. Trefry (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-069-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-87 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. LEANNE TREFRY. No. 15-P-87. Barnstable. May 23, 2016. – June 15, 2016. Present: Katzmann, Maldonado, & Blake, JJ. Dog. Statute, Construction. Complaint received and sworn to in the Orleans Division of the District Court Department on August 9, 2013. The case was heard by H. Gregory Williams, J. Roderick S. Oreste for the defendant. Elizabeth Anne Sweeney, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. KATZMANN, J. The defendant was convicted after a jury-waived trial in District Court of two counts of violating a 2012 statute, G. L. c. 140, § 174E(f), which protects dogs from cruel conditions and inhumane chaining or tethering.[1] She now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. In this case of first impression, which requires review of the reach of G. L. c. 140, § 174E, we conclude that subjecting a dog to cruel conditions suffices to establish a violation, and we reject the contention that outside confinement or confinement in general is an element required to convict under the statute. Accordingly, we affirm. Background. After the defendant’s house in Brewster (property) had been condemned in August, 2012, and she had moved into a nursing home, her two Shetland sheepdogs, Zach and Kenji, remained on the property, where they had access to the inside of the condemned house and a fenced-in yard. Although the defendant herself was present on the property at least intermittently even after the house had been condemned, and she had occasional assistance from friends, the dogs were effectively left alone on the property, which was clogged with trash inside and out, emitted odors of trash (inside) and dog feces (outside), and contained numerous items that would pose a danger to the dogs’ health and safety. Neighbors, animal control officers, and police officers observed the deplorable conditions to which Kenji and Zach were subjected. On July 25, 2013, an animal control officer who had been working with the defendant saw that Kenji was limping badly and appeared to be in pain. He was taken to a veterinarian, and both dogs were removed from the property three days later. Discussion. The defendant’s primary contention on appeal is that G. L. c. 140, § 174E, inserted by St. 2012, c. 193, § 48, is inapplicable where there is no evidence that the dogs were confined outside.[2] We agree […]
Duff-Kareores v. Kareores (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-082-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11975 ELLEN DUFF-KAREORES vs. CHRISTOPHER KAREORES. Essex. February 10, 2016. – June 15, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Divorce and Separation, Alimony, Division of property. Complaint for divorce filed in the Essex Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on June 19, 2013. The case was heard by Peter C. DiGangi, J. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. James P. Hall (Jaclyn Martin with him) for Christopher Kareores. John Foskett for Ellen Duff-Kareores. DUFFLY, J. Ellen Duff-Kareores and Christopher Kareores were first married to each other in May, 1995; two children were born of the marriage before the parties divorced in 2004. The parties’ divorce agreement, which was incorporated in the divorce judgment, obligated Christopher to, among other things, pay Ellen alimony in the amount of $ 7,600 per month. Beginning in 2007, Christopher resumed living with Ellen and the children in what had been the marital residence. In December, 2012, the parties remarried. In June, 2013, Ellen filed a complaint for divorce on the ground of an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage and served the complaint on Christopher the following month. Following trial on that complaint, a judge of the Probate and Family Court concluded that, under the Alimony Reform Act of 2011, St. 2011, c. 124 (alimony reform act or act), the length of the parties’ marriage for purposes of calculating the durational limits of a general term alimony award to Ellen was eighteen years, the period from the date of the parties’ first marriage through the date that Christopher was served with the complaint in the second divorce. Christopher appealed, and we transferred the case to this court on our own motion. This case requires us to decide whether the judge correctly construed G. L. c. 208, § 48, which provides that “the court may increase the length of the marriage if there is evidence that the parties’ economic marital partnership began during their cohabitation period prior to the marriage.” We conclude that the judge’s findings do not support a determination that the parties had an economic marital partnership, within the meaning of G. L. c. 208, § 48, during the period following the service on the husband of the […]
Winbrook Communications Services, Inc., et al. v. United States Liability Insurance Company (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-068-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-401 Appeals Court WINBROOK COMMUNICATION SERVICES, INC., & others[1] vs. UNITED STATES LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY. No. 15-P-401. Suffolk. March 8, 2016. – June 14, 2016. Present: Hanlon, Sullivan, & Massing, JJ. Practice, Civil, Default, Summary judgment. Insurance, Coverage, Insurer’s obligation to defend, Construction of policy. Contract, Insurance, Performance and breach. Damages, Negligent misrepresentation. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on December 20, 2011. The case was heard by Geraldine S. Hines, J., on a motion for summary judgment, and a motion for reconsideration and a second motion for summary judgment were heard by Bonnie H. MacLeod, J. Eric F. Eisenberg for the plaintiffs. John B. DiSciullo for the defendant. SULLIVAN, J. In this insurance coverage dispute we consider whether the factual record on cross motions for summary judgment is adequate to permit either party to establish entitlement to judgment as matter of law. Plaintiff Winbrook Communication Services, Inc. (Winbrook[2]), appeals from a summary judgment declaring that the defendant, United States Liability Insurance Company (USLIC), had no obligation under a directors and officers liability policy to pay a judgment obtained by Winbrook against USLIC’s insureds, DeSales Group, LLC (DSG), and William York (collectively, DSG). We conclude that it was error to grant USLIC’s motion for summary judgment because there remain genuine issues of material fact as to the applicability of the policy’s personal profit exclusion. More precisely, there is a genuine dispute of material fact whether DSG received any profit, benefit, remuneration, or advantage to which DSG was not legally entitled. Accordingly, we vacate and remand for further proceedings. Background. The procedural history of the litigation is both material and undisputed. Winbrook filed suit against DSG and York on August 24, 2010, alleging that York had made a series of negligent misrepresentations concerning DSG the entity’s financial condition that induced Winbrook to continue to work on the development of a children’s storybook series and associated promotional items. The series never went to market and Winbrook sued, seeking compensation for work performed. DSG gave notice to USLIC of Winbrook’s claims in advance of suit. USLIC replied that the policy would not cover the claims. After suit was filed, Winbrook notified USLIC of the suit and of a pending motion for entry of default. DSG reportedly told USLIC that it did not intend to […]
Duff, et al. v. McKay, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-067-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-634 Appeals Court DANIEL DUFF & another[1] vs. JOHN McKAY & others.[2] No. 15-P-634. Plymouth. January 19, 2016. – June 14, 2016. Present: Grainger, Rubin, & Milkey, JJ. Contract, Settlement agreement, What constitutes, Performance and breach. Judgment, Implementing settlement agreement. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on April 9, 2013. A motion to enforce settlement and to dismiss the complaint was heard by Beverly J. Cannone, J., and entry of separate and final judgment was ordered by her. Stephen W. Rider for the plaintiffs. Colin Black for the defendants. MILKEY, J. In 2010, plaintiffs Daniel and Lisa Duff hired the defendants to perform a renovation project at their home in Hingham. A dispute ensued regarding the defendants’ workmanship and their alleged failure to obtain a building permit in a timely manner. In May of 2012, the Duffs sought redress by initiating arbitration through the State program created in accordance with G. L. c. 142A.[3] The following year, on the eve of the assigned arbitrator’s scheduled view of the property, the parties reached an apparent settlement of their dispute. Nonetheless, a formal settlement document was never executed because of a disagreement regarding payment terms. When the parties reached an impasse in resolving that issue, the Duffs withdrew their request for arbitration and filed a multicount action in the Superior Court asserting their underlying claims. The defendants moved to dismiss the action and to enforce the settlement. A Superior Court judge allowed that motion and entered judgment requiring the defendants to pay the agreed-to amount within ten days. On the Duffs’ appeal, we affirm. Background. The parties’ key communications were memorialized in electronic mail messages (e-mails), copies of which were submitted to the motion judge.[4] As a result, the essential facts pertaining to the parties’ negotiations are uncontested. At the heart of this case is a March 21, 2013, e-mail exchange between counsel that followed extended and vigorous settlement discussions. Counsel for the Duffs wrote to “confirm what I believe our respective clients have agreed to.” He then listed six terms. Key among those terms were the requirements that the defendants pay the Duffs $ 27,500, and that the parties “exchange mutual general releases, subject only to the obligations in the settlement agreement.”[5] The list of terms did not specify […]