Posts tagged "Property"

Braintree Property Associates, LP v. Marzouki, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 09-038-17)

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
NORFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 15-00144
BRAINTREE PROPERTY ASSOCIATES, LP
vs.
FRANCO MARZOUKI, DR. WU, LLC, D.B.A EMACK & BOLIOS
AND ROBERT ROOK
and
FRANCO MARZOUKI, CROSS-CLAIM PLAINTIFF, vs. ROBERT ROOK, CROSS-CLAIM DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON
CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This action arises out of a lease agreement between the property owner, plaintiff, Braintree Property Associates, LP (“Braintree”), the lease holder, defendant Dr. Wu, LLC, d/b/a Emack & Bolios (“Wu”), for which Robert Rook is the sole owner and manager. Defendants Rook and Franco Marzouki guaranteed Wu’s obligations to Braintree. There is no dispute that Wu breached its lease by vacating the property it leased from Braintree before its lease was up. Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on its claims against Wu, Rook and Marzouki. All defendants oppose. Wu and Rook cross-move for summary judgment against Braintree, improbably claiming that Braintree is entitled to no lost rent at all under the terms of Braintree’s own Lease, which Braintree opposes. Marzouki moves for summary judgment on his cross-claim for indemnification from Rook, which Rook opposes.
The issue at the core of this case is a straight-forward dispute about the measure of damages arising from Wu’s undisputed breach of its lease with Braintree. Based on the lease
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and the undisputed facts, in consideration of the parties’ memoranda of law and oral arguments, and for the reasons that follow, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED. Wu’s cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
For other reasons, Marzuki’s motion for summary judgment on his cross-claim against Rook is DENIED.
FACTS
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in his favor. Jupin v. Kask, 447 Mass. 141, 143 (2006), citing Coveney v. President & Trustees of the College of the Holy Cross, 388 Mass. 16, 17 (1983).
Braintree operates the South Shore Plaza, a shopping mall in Braintree. Rook is the sole owner and manager of Wu, which does business as Emack & Bolios, an ice cream seller.
On or about July 25, 2011, Wu, as tenant, entered into a lease (“Lease”) with Braintree for commercial space at the South Shore Plaza. The lease had a five-year term and required Wu to pay rent and fees. The lease term was to commence May 1, 2011 and end May 1, 2016.
On or about July 25, 2011, defendants Marzouki and Rook each executed a joint and several guaranty of Wu’s lease obligations.
Beginning in June, 2014, Wu stopped paying rent, and did not pay any rent thereafter. Neither Rook nor Marzouki made good on the rent Wu failed to pay to Braintree. On October 22, 2014, Wu ceased business, and on October 30, 2014, vacated the premises.
Braintree sent a demand letter to Wu dated November 26, 2014, which was copied to Marzouki and Rook and guarantors. That letter did not terminate the Lease but demanded all rental payments due under it, discounted to present value as permitted under the Lease and as
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reflected in a spreadsheet enclosed with the letter. The alleged damages totaled $ 126,773.55. The letter stated that Braintree “will assume the debt is valid unless the undersigned receives notice from Tenant within thirty (30) days after its receipt of this letter that Tenant disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof,” in which event “the undersigned will obtain verification of the debt and mail a copy of such verification to the Tenant, upon request by the Tenant” but that “[i]f the total sum is not paid within thirty (30) days from the date of this letter, the undersigned will attempt to obtain a judgment” against Wu. In response, Wu did not pay the rent demanded. Instead, Wu wrote back by letter dated December 5, 2014 and claimed that the debt was disputed and demanded verification of it and noted that Braintree’s letter did not terminate the Lease. Braintree did not respond, but filed suit.
The Lease stated that Wu would be in default if it abandoned or vacated the Premises, as it did. Lease, §18.1(f). Among Braintree’s remedies were to collect the full rent due, terminate the Lease by giving such notice to Wu or re-enter and take possession of the Premises. If Braintree re-entered or took possession of the premises, Braintree could terminate the lease and demand that Wu pay all of the rent due under the Lease immediately or it could allow the Lease to continue and deduct from the rent owed any rent Braintree was able to collect on re-letting on an ongoing basis:
If Landlord re-enters the Premises … or if it takes possession pursuant to legal proceedings or otherwise, it may either terminate this Lease, but Tenant shall remain liable for all obligations arising during the balance of the original stated term as hereafter provided as if this Lease had remained in full force and effect, or it may, from time to time, without terminating this Lease, make such alternations and repairs as it deems advisable to relet the Premises, and relet the Premises … for such term … and at such rentals and upon other terms and conditions as Landlord in its sole discretion deems advisable; upon each such reletting all rental received by Landlord therefrom shall be applied, first, to any indebtedness other than rent due hereunder from Tenant to Landlord; second, to pay any costs and expenses of reletting, including broker’s and attorney’s fees and costs of
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alterations and repairs; third, to rent due hereunder, and the residue, if any, shall be held by Landlord and applied in payment of future rent as it becomes due hereunder.
If rental received from such reletting during any month are less than that to be paid during that month by Tenant hereunder, Tenant shall immediately pay any such deficiency to Landlord.
See §18.1.
Braintree eventually re-let the Premises on or about November, 2015, and the replacement tenant began paying rent in or about December 2015. Wu made no payments of any difference between the rent Wu owed and rent Braintree collected. Neither did Rook or Marzouki.
Under the Lease, a re-letting of the Premises was not a termination of the Lease in the absence of written notice. Id. (“No re-entry of taking possession of the Premises by landlord shall be construed as election to terminate this Lease unless a written notice of such termination is given by Landlord.”). Braintree gave no written notice of termination. Even where the Lease was not terminated but Braintree “takes action” because of Wu’s breach, Braintree could, as a remedy in addition to others it had, demand prospective damages according to a formula included in the Lease:
Notwithstanding any such reletting without termination, Landlord may at any time terminate this Lease for any prior breach or default. If Landlord terminates this Lease for any breach, or otherwise takes action on account of Tenant’s breach or default hereunder, in addition to any other remedies it may have, it may recover from Tenant all damages incurred by reason of such breach or default, including … an amount equal to the difference between the Minimum Rent1 and all items of additional rents reserved hereunder for the period which would otherwise would have constituted the balance of the Lease Term and the present rental value of the Premises for such period, both discounted in accordance with accepted financial practices to the then present worth … all of which shall immediately be due and payable from tenant to Landlord. In determining the rental value
1 Minimum Rent is defined in Sections 1.1(f) and 4.1 as the rent due under the lease for each year for the five-year period of the leasehold, with adjustments not relevant here.
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of the Premises, the rental realized by any reletting, if such reletting is accomplished by Landlord within a reasonable time after the termination of the Lease, shall be deemed prima facie to be the rental value, but if Landlord shall not undertake to relet or having undertaken to relet, has not accomplished reletting, then it will be conclusively presumed that the Minimum Rent and all items of additional rent reserved under this Lease represent the rental value of the Premises for the purposes herein (in which event the Landlord may recover from the Tenant, the full total of all Minimum Rent and all items of additional rent due hereunder, discounted to present value as hereinbefore provided). Landlord shall, however, account to Tenant for the Minimum Rent and additional rent received from persons using or occupying the Premises during the period representing that which would have constituted the balance of the Lease Term, but only at the end of said period, and only if Tenant shall have paid to Landlord its damages as provided herein, and only to the extent of sums received from Tenant as Landlord’s damages, Tenant waiving any claim to any surplus.
Section 18.2.
DISCUSSION
Under Mass. R. Civ. P. 56(c), either the plaintiffs or the defendants will be entitled to summary judgment if they can show that no dispute exists as to any material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Cassesso v. Commissioner of Corr., 390 Mass. 419, 422 (1983). Either party may satisfy its burden of demonstrating the absence of triable issues by submitting affirmative evidence demonstrating entitlement to relief (or the opposing party’s lack of entitlement), or by demonstrating that the opposing party has no reasonable expectation of proving an essential element of their case. Flesner v. Tech. Comm. Corp., 410 Mass. 805, 809 (1991). If one party establishes the absence of a triable issue, the other party must demonstrate, through admissible evidence, an issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment. Godbout v. Cousens, 396 Mass. 254, 261 (1985).
Braintree is correct that the undisputed facts show that each of the defendants breached their agreements – Wu by vacating the premises and not making good on the rent, and Marzouki
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and Rook for not stepping in and making Wu’s payments to Braintree on Wu’s behalf pursuant to their guaranty.
As to Braintree’s damages, Wu’s claim that there is a material dispute as to the extent of Braintree’s mitigation efforts is meritless. While a landlord is generally required to mitigate damages by taking reasonable steps to find another tenant, Krasne v. Tedeschi & Grasso, 436 Mass. 103, 109 (2002), commercial parties can agree otherwise, and here, the lease did not obligate Braintree to mitigate at all. The Lease says this in two places. In §18.1, the Lease states that “[i]n determining the rental value of the Premises, the rental realized by any reletting, if such reletting is accomplished by Landlord within a reasonable time after the termination of the Lease, shall be deemed prima facie to be the rental value, but if Landlord shall not undertake to relet or having undertaken to relet, has not accomplished reletting, then it will be conclusively presumed that the Minimum Rent and all items of additional rent reserved under this Lease represent the rental value of the Premises for the purposes herein (in which event the Landlord may recover from the Tenant, the full total of all Minimum Rent and all items of additional rent due hereunder, discounted to present value as hereinbefore provided”). Id. (emphasis added). It says it again in §18.2 – “Tenant waives and releases any claim arising out of or related to the payment of percentage of rent by any successor tenant in the Premises, to whom Landlord may relet the Premises, but nothing contained herein shall obligate Landlord to relet if Tenant shall default hereunder.” Id. (emphasis added). Since Wu expressly agreed that Braintree had no obligation to mitigate it damages arising from Wu’s breach, Wu cannot create a material issue about Braintree’s level of mitigation.
In the same vein, the argument advanced by Wu and Rook that under the Lease, the calculation set forth in Braintree’s own Lease means that Braintree is entitled to zero damages is
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nonsensical. While the Lease provides alternative methods of calculating damages, it consistently and clearly entitles Braintree to the full value of the rental payment due from Wu. The parties dispute how one of those methods was to work – the provision in §18.2 which is to be used to calculate the present value of future rent payments in the event Wu did not pay them as required – but the Court concludes that it need not consider this issue at all, as it is irrelevant to this dispute. The mechanism outlined in §18.2 was designed to reduce Braintree’s future expected damages to a present value, which Wu was required to pay immediately, prior to the expiration of the Lease in May, 2016. The undisputed facts show that Wu paid nothing after it vacated the premises, and the Lease terminated in May, 2016, under its terms. At this point, then, there is no need to calculate the present value of expected damages; Braintree’s damages are all historical, they can and should be calculated mathematically.
Since Braintree did not terminate the Lease, the Lease sets as the minimum rent Braintree is to recover each month as the amount Wu agreed to pay. Braintree’s damages can be calculated as a simple subtraction of the minimum rent the Lease required Wu to pay from any amount Braintree actually received, with any surplus going to Braintree, as per the terms of the Lease. In addition, the Lease permits Braintree to recover attorney’s fees and costs under §18.2. Braintree is also entitled to statutory interest.
Wu’s motion for summary judgment – that Braintree violated Chapter 93A by failing to validate its debt as suggested in the November 26, 2014 letter – is meritless. Wu waived any notice requirements in the Lease. See Lease, §18.1 (describing the landlord’s remedies in the event of default, “without grace period, demand or notice (the same being waived by Tenant”)); §18.2 (“Except as otherwise specifically required by this Lease, Tenant waives any and all
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statutory and legal notice requirements”). It thus cannot bring a Chapter 93A claim for Braintree’s failing to follow-up on a notice to which Wu was not entitled.
Marzouki’s claim for summary judgment against Rook for indemnity is denied, and emphatically so. No such claim is valid under the terms of Marzouki’s Guaranty. “The liability of the defendants as guarantors is to be ascertained from the terms of the written contract construed according to the usual rules of interpretation read in connection with the subject matter, the relations of the parties to the transaction, and the well understood usages of business.” Schneider v. Armour & Co., 323 Mass. 28, 30 (1948) (citation omitted). In the guaranty, Marzouki and Rook “jointly and severally, do hereby absolutely and unconditionally guarantee to Landlord, its successors and assigns, the full and prompt payment when due, of all rents, charges and additional sums coming due under said Lease” as well as all attorney’s fees and expenses incurred by Braintree. It added that “[t]his Guaranty shall be an absolute and unconditional guaranty and shall remain in full force and effect as to Guarantors during the demised term of said Lease, any renewal or extension thereof, and thereafter so long as any liability remains due and payable even though the demised term or any renewal or extension thereof shall have expired.” In short, Marzouki and Rook promised they would both stand behind Wu if Wu defaulted. Marzouki cannot escape that responsibility by asserting that Rook undertook to indemnify him, which would violate the guaranty he signed.
Accordingly, Wu, Marzouki and Rook are jointly and severally liable for the total damages incurred by Braintree. See 275 Washington St. Corp. v. Hudson River Int’l, LLC, 465 Mass. 16, 30 (2013) (“[w]hen one guarantees the contract of another, the guarantor is bound by the terms of the contract guaranteed. … [and] [h]is obligations are co-extensive of the principal obligor”) (citation omitted).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED. Wu’s cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Marzuki’s motion for summary judgment on his cross-claim against Rook is DENIED.
Plaintiff shall submit a calculation of damages, along with evidence of attorney’s fees and statutory interest, within ten days of this Order.
______________________________
Michael D. Ricciuti
Justice of the Superior Court
Date: September 26, 2017 read more

Posted by Stephen Sandberg - November 14, 2017 at 1:04 am

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G6 Hospitality Property LLC v. Town of Braintree Board of Health (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-107-17)

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

 

NORFOLK, ss.                                                                      SUPERIOR COURT

                                                                                                CIVIL ACTION

  1. 17-0882

 

 

G6 HOSPITALITY PROPERTY LLC

 

vs.

 

TOWN OF BRAINTREE BOARD OF HEALTH

 

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
ON PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

In its complaint in this action, Plaintiff G6 Hospitality Property LLC (“G6”), which operates a Motel 6 located at 125 Union Street, Braintree, Massachusetts (“the Motel”), seeks certiorari review under G.L. c. 249, § 4 of a decision made by the defendant, Town of Braintree Board of Health (“the Board”), to revoke G6’s license to operate the Motel under G.L. c. 140, §32B and c. 111, §122.[1]  At issue before the Court is G6’s application for a temporary restraining order and motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoining the Board from enforcing its July 13, 2017, decision to revoke G6’s license while this case is litigated. read more

Posted by Stephen Sandberg - August 18, 2017 at 5:46 am

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Bay Colony Property Development Company, et al. v. Headlands Realty Corporation, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-069-17)

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT.
1784CV00936-BLS2
____________________
BAY COLONY PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and WILLIAM E. LOCKE, JR.
v.
HEADLANDS REALTY CORPORATION; PROLOGIS LOGISTICS SERVICES INC.; AMB PROPERTY II, L.P.; AMB PROPERTY CORPORATION; and PROLOGIS, INC.
____________________
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ CROSS-MOTION TO STRIKE
Bay Colony Property Development Company and William E. Locke, Jr., claim that Defendants hired them to plan, coordinate, and supervise the development of two different properties in Pennsylvania. They allege that Defendants promised to pay Bay Colony two percent of the development costs (the “Base Fee”) plus ten percent of the profits (the “Incentive Fee”) for its work on one site, and promised to pay the same percentage amounts to Locke for his work on the other site. Plaintiffs allege they have not been paid and are owed part of the Base Fees and all of the Incentive Fees for the two projects. Plaintiffs assert claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and declaratory judgment as to enforceability of the alleged contracts.
Defendants have moved to dismiss on the ground that all claims are time barred. They argue that the statutory limitations period began to run on October 29, 2010, when AMB Property Corporation (“AMB”) sent a letter disputing whether it had any binding contract with Bay Colony. If that were correct, then all claims would be time barred—whether the Massachusetts six-year limitations period or the Pennsylvania four-year limitations period controlled—because this action was not filed in Middlesex Superior Court until November 14, 2016, more than six years later.
The Court concludes that it may consider the October 2010 letter in deciding the motion to dismiss, but that it must DENY the motion because that letter did not put Plaintiffs on notice of any actual or anticipated breach of contract.
1. Considering the 2010 Letter. Plaintiffs ask the Court to strike or at least disregard the October 29, 2010, letter that is attached to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. They argue that the Court may not consider this letter without converting
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the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment because Plaintiffs did not attach the letter to, reference the letter in, or rely on the letter in drafting the complaint. The Court disagrees.
The authenticity of this letter and the fact that it was sent to Plaintiffs are not in dispute, as Plaintiffs acknowledged at oral argument.
It is therefore permissible and appropriate for the Court to consider the letter in deciding Defendants’ motion to dismiss. When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may consider “documents the authenticity of which is not disputed by the parties” without converting the motion into one for summary judgment.1 Town of Barnstable v. O’Connor, 786 F.3d 130, 141 n.12 (1st Cir. 2015), quoting Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993); accord, e.g., SFM Holdings, Ltd. v. Banc of America Securities, LLC, 600 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2010); cf. Smaland Beach Ass’n, Inc. v. Genova, 461 Mass. 214, 228 (2012) (judicial construction of federal rules of civil procedure applies to parallel state rules). No affidavit authenticating the document is needed because the authenticity of the copy provided by Defendants has been conceded. See City of Boston v. Roxbury Action Program, Inc., 68 Mass. App. Ct. 468, 469 n.3, rev. denied, 449 Mass. 1101 (2007) (summary judgment record).
2. No Actual Breach or Unequivocal Repudiation. The October 29, 2010, did not trigger the statute of limitations, however, because it did not constitute a breach of the contractual terms alleged in the complaint, did not put Plaintiffs on notice of an actual breach of contract, and was not an unequivocal repudiation of any future contractual obligations.
This letter put Defendants on notice that “AMB disputes that there is any binding agreement between it and [Bay Colony] with respect to either project. But the letter does not assert that AMB was refusing to pay any amounts that Bay Colony
1 This makes perfect sense. If the rule were otherwise, a defendant could instead attach an undisputed document to their answer and seek judgment on the pleadings based on that document. Since a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is subject to the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, see Boston Med. Ctr. Corp. v. Secretary of the Exec. Office of Health and Human Svcs., 463 Mass. 447, 450 (2012), such a motion for judgment on the pleadings would be indistinguishable from Defendants’ motion to dismiss in this case.
– 3 –
claims it was owed for services rendered. Instead, AMB wrote that “[w]e will respond in writing to you shortly detailing AMB’s position.” The letter went on to direct Bay Colony and Locke not to do any further work on either project, and not to have any contact with AMB except through its legal counsel.
Defendants are not entitled to dismissal of this action on the ground that the termination of any contractual arrangement between AMB and Plaintiffs triggered the statute of limitations. The complaint does not allege that AMB had no right to terminate the alleged contract. As a result, nothing in the complaint suggests that contract termination was in and of itself a contract breach that would start the limitations period.
Nor are Defendants entitled to dismissal on the ground that the October 2010 letter constituted a repudiation of AMB’s future contractual obligations and thus gave rise to a claim for breach of contract.
It is not at all clear that Plaintiffs could have brought a claim under Massachusetts law for anticipatory breach of contract, even assuming that this letter was an unequivocal repudiation.2 “With few exceptions, … ‘Massachusetts has not generally recognized the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation, which permits a party to a contract to bring an action for damages prior to the time performance is due if the other party repudiates.’ ” KGM Custom Homes, Inc. v. Prosky, 468 Mass. 247, 253 (2014), quoting Cavanagh v. Cavanagh, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 240, 243 (1992), rev. denied, 413 Mass. 1107 (1992). One of the exceptions applies where there has been “an actual breach accompanied by an anticipatory breach.” Cavanagh, supra, at 243 n.5; accord Parker v. Russell, 133 Mass. 74 (1882) (where defendant promised to support plaintiff for his entire life, and stopped doing so, plaintiff could sue for past and future damages). For example, if a defendant has an alleged obligation to make period payments to the plaintiff, refuses to pay the amounts currently owed, and makes “a clear and unequivocal repudiation” of its obligation to make future payments, “the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the repudiation”
2 Plaintiffs raise this argument under Massachusetts law. Defendants have not, at those point, asserted or made any showing that the claims asserted in this action are instead governed by Pennsylvania law.
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with respect to both past and future damages. Callender v. Suffolk Cty., 57 Mass. App. Ct. 361, 364 (2003). But the complaint does not allege, and the letter proffered by Defendants does not reveal, any actual breach of contract as of October 2010.
On the other hand, if AMB had unequivocally repudiated its alleged future contractual obligations, Defendants could have sued immediately on a quantum meruit or unjust enrichment theory. See Cavanagh, supra, at 243 n.5. Where one party contracts to provide services in exchange for future compensation, and the other party refuses to make any further payments, the party that provided the services and is seeking payment is “entitled to treat the contract as rescinded” and bring an action in quantum meruit without waiting for the time when the compensation was supposed to be paid. Johnson v. Starr, 321 Mass. 566, 569-570 (1947).
In this case, however, none of Plaintiffs claims is time-barred (assuming, as Defendants do, that the Massachusetts six-year statute of limitations applies) because the October 29, 2010, letter was not a “clear and unequivocal repudiation” of Defendants’ alleged obligation to pay the Base Fees and Incentive Fees claimed by Plaintiffs. Cf. Callender, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 364.
AMB did not assert in the 2010 letter that it would not pay any part of the amounts that Plaintiffs claim they are owed. Instead, it merely stated that AMB “disputes that there is any binding agreement” and that AMB would explain its position in more detail later on.
This letter is not a repudiation of the alleged contract because it is not “a definite and unequivocal manifestation of intention [not to render performance]” (bracketed material in original). Coviello v. Richardson, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 603, 609 (2010), quoting Thermo Electron Corp. v. Schiavone Constr. Co., 958 F.2d 1158, 1164 (1st Cir. 1992); see also Nortek, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 65 Mass. App. Ct. 764, 766 & 769-770 (2006) (statute of limitations on contract claim did not begin to run when insurer responded to question about retrospective premiums by stating “that it would investigate the situation and get back to insured, because insurer took no “final or definitive position” as to whether insured must pay disputed amount).
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ORDER
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint is DENIED. Plaintiffs’ cross-motion to strike exhibit B to the motion to dismiss is also DENIED.
7 June 2017
___________________________
Kenneth W. Salinger
Justice of the Superior Court read more

Posted by Stephen Sandberg - June 15, 2017 at 2:03 pm

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Skawski, et al. v. Greenfield Investors Property Development LLC (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-017-16)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us

SJC-11926

MICHAEL SKAWSKI & others[1]  vs.  GREENFIELD INVESTORS PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT LLC.

Hampden.     January 7, 2016. – February 11, 2016.

Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.

Jurisdiction, Land Court, Housing Court.  Land Court, Jurisdiction.  Housing Court, Jurisdiction.  Statute, Construction, Repeal.

Civil action commenced in the Hampden Division of the Housing Court Department on June 7, 2011.

A motion to dismiss was heard by Dina E. Fein, J., and the ruling was reported by her. read more

Posted by Stephen Sandberg - February 11, 2016 at 5:29 pm

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Skawski, et al. v. Greenfield Investors Property Development, LLC (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-018-15)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us

13-P-1947                                       Appeals Court

MICHAEL SKAWSKI & others[1]  vs.  GREENFIELD INVESTORS PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT, LLC.[2]

No. 13-P-1947.     February 27, 2015.

Jurisdiction, Land Court, Housing Court.  Land Court, Jurisdiction.  Housing Court, Jurisdiction.

     Upon a joint motion by the defendant, Greenfield Investors Property Development, LLC (Property Development), and the plaintiffs (abutters), a judge of the Western Division of the Housing Court Department reported, for further review and determination pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 64(a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1403 (1996), her order denying Property Development’s motion to dismiss.  Property Development challenges the Housing Court’s jurisdiction over the abutters’ claim.  Relying on our holding in Buccaneer Dev., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Lenox, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 40 (2012) (Buccaneer), Property Development argues that with the enactment of G. L. c. 185, § 3A, establishing an expedited permit session in the Land Court for large-scale development projects and grant of concurrent jurisdiction to the Superior Court,[3] the Legislature divested the Housing Court of jurisdiction over such matters.  It asserts, therefore, that the judge erred in denying its motion to dismiss the abutters’ claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  We agree and reverse the order denying Property Development’s motion to dismiss. read more

Posted by Stephen Sandberg - February 27, 2015 at 9:30 pm

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Cahaly, et al. v. Benistar Property Exchange Trust Company, Inc., et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-062-14)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750;  (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us

12‑P‑956                                        Appeals Court

GAIL A. CAHALY & others[1]  vs.  BENISTAR PROPERTY EXCHANGE TRUST COMPANY, INC., & others.[2]

No. 12‑P‑956.

Suffolk.     December 2, 2013.  ‑  June 6, 2014.

Present:  Kantrowitz, Graham, & Meade, JJ.

Attorney at Law, Work product.  PenaltyPractice, Civil, New trial.

Civil actions commenced in the Superior Court Department on January 9, 16, 22, and 23, 2001; February 6, 2001; September 20, 2001; and April 30, 2002. read more

Posted by Stephen Sandberg - June 6, 2014 at 3:34 pm

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Police: Two Arrested on Trotter Court for Drugs, Trespassing, and Stolen Property

Credit: Boston Police Department

Two men who were believed to be dealing drugs in the area were also found with allegedly stolen property, say police.
South End Patch News

Posted by Stephen Sandberg - July 29, 2013 at 7:26 pm

Categories: Arrests   Tags: , , , , , , ,

City Readies Property Owners, Residents to Re-Enter Blast Zone

FBI investigators make another sweep of Boylston Street on Wednesday, April 17, 2013, as they search for evidence in the bombing of the Boston Marathon.

 

The blast zone along Boylston Street is still an active crime scene, but city officials are preparing a plan to let business owners and inspectors into the area on a “staggered schedule for limited access.”

The city emergency management team along with Mayor Thomas Menino met Sunday to devise a five-phase plan for re-entry to the Copley Square blast zone in the April 15 marathon bombings, according to a press statement April 21.

The phases include:

Phase 1:  Decontamination and Testing
Phase 2:  Structural Building Assessments and Utility Coordination
Phase 3:  Debris Removal
Phase 4:  Internal Building Assessments
Phase 5:  Re-Entry, Communications, and Counseling

The plan will be implemented once the FBI clears the zone, according to the statement.

Items at a memorial at the intersection of Boylston and Berkeley streets and other area memorials will be temporarily moved to Copley Square Park. Boston Police will return personal items left at the scene that has not been retained as evidence by the FBI, according to the statement. read more

Posted by Stephen Sandberg - April 22, 2013 at 12:03 am

Categories: Arrests   Tags: , , , , , , ,