A.L. Prime Energy Consultant, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-027-17)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss.SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION 1677CV01366 A.L. PRIME ENERGY CONSULTANT, INC. vs. MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS In July 2016, defendant Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) terminated its two-year fuel supply agreement with plaintiff A.L. Prime Energy Consultant, Inc. (Prime). The MBTA explained that thetermination was made pursuant to its exercise of a contractual right that permitted termination for convenience.The MBTA terminated the contract in order to take advantage of cost savings it believed it could achieve by purchasing fuel through the Commonwealth’s existing statewide fuel contract. Prime alleges that the MBTA abused its discretion when it invoked the termination for convenience provision and that therefore the MBTA is liable for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The matter is now before the Court on the MBTA’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons that follow, the motion is DENIED. BACKGROUND The following facts are drawnfrom the allegationsin Prime’s complaint, which are accepted as true for the purposes of this motion, the exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters of public record appropriate for judicial notice. SeeSchaer v. Brandeis Univ., 432 Mass. 2 474, 477 (2000); Waterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1stCir. 1993).1 1 At the hearing on the motion, the Court asked the parties to agree on a stipulated statement of facts regarding whether and to what extent the Commonwealth’s statewide fuel contract was in effect during the relevant periodand available to the MBTA. The parties were not able to do so. Nevertheless, in lieu of the joint statement, the MBTA submitted a Supplemental Statement of Facts in Support of its Motion to Dismiss. The Court accepts some of the facts set outin the statement in this background sectionbecause they are found either in the complaint, its exhibits, public records, or Massachusetts acts and regulations. 2 The ULSD delivery locations for the MBTA arewithin zone 1. 3 The MBTA initially awarded the contract to Sprague Oil but Prime successfully appealed the award. Because of the delay resulting from the appeal, Prime’s first delivery was made on September 1, 2015. The MBTA agreed that the two-year contract period originally scheduled to begin on July 1, 2015 would begin on September 1, 2015. On January 15, 2015, the MBTA’s Materials Management Department issued an Invitation for Bids (IFB) for the supply of Ultra Low SulfurDiesel Fuel (ULSD). The IFB provided that the contract would have a two-year term. A few months later, the Operation Services Division of the Commonwealth’s Executive Office of Administration and Finance (OSD), which is responsible for establishing […]
Categories: News Tags: 1202717, A.L., Authority, Consultant, Energy, Inc., Lawyers, massachusetts, Prime, Transportation, Weekly
CMJ Management Company v. Wilkerson (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-038-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-426 Appeals Court CMJ MANAGEMENT COMPANY[1] vs. PATRICIA WILKERSON. No. 16-P-426. Suffolk. December 1, 2016. – March 31, 2017. Present: Cypher, Maldonado, & Blake, JJ. Housing. Landlord and Tenant, Termination of lease. Summary Process. Practice, Civil, Summary process, Jury trial. Summary process. Complaint filed in the Boston Division of the Housing Court Department on September 15, 2014. The case was heard by MaryLou Muirhead, J. Stephanie Schuyler (Hoang Nguyen also present) for the tenant. John G. Hofmann for the landlord. CYPHER, J. Patricia Wilkerson appeals from a Housing Court judgment, entered following a bench trial, that awarded the plaintiff possession of an apartment in which Wilkerson resided with her three grandchildren. Wilkerson argues that the judge erred in concluding that the conduct of her juvenile grandson constituted criminal activity that materially breached her lease. In addition, Wilkerson argues that the judge erred by striking her request for a jury trial after she failed to comply with a Housing Court pretrial conference order requiring the submission of a pretrial conference memorandum. Background. We summarize the facts from the judge’s findings, reserving some facts for later discussion.[2] Wilkerson is a resident at the Harbor Point Apartments in the Dorchester section of Boston (Harbor Point). CMJ Management Company (CMJ) is Harbor Point’s managing agent. Harbor Point is a housing development combining market-rate and subsidized units. Of the 1,283 units, 400 are subsidized pursuant to the Section 8 Housing Assistance Program of the United States Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437 et seq. (Section 8 program). Wilkerson had custody of her fourteen year old grandson, who, along with his two adult brothers, were authorized occupants of her apartment. In July of 2014, while playing with other children in one of the common areas of the apartment complex, the juvenile grandson fired a BB gun multiple times, injuring two juvenile residents. Later that day, a Harbor Point security guard went to Wilkerson’s apartment, spoke with Wilkerson and the juvenile about the incident, and confiscated the BB gun. The parents of the injured children apparently did not pursue criminal charges. The following week Wilkerson received a notice to quit, terminating her lease. Pursuant to the Section 8 program, Wilkerson’s tenancy is subsidized by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). […]
Commonwealth v. Degnan (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-037-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-1955 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. LEONARD DEGNAN. No. 14-P-1955. Essex. December 1, 2016. – March 30, 2017. Present: Cypher, Maldonado, & Blake, JJ. Municipal Corporations, Officers and employees. Solicitation to Commit Felony. Bribery. Conspiracy. Fraud. Evidence, Bribe, Conspiracy, Fraud. Practice, Criminal, Duplicative convictions, Argument by prosecutor. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on September 11, 2012. The cases were tried before Douglas H. Wilkins, J. David A.F. Lewis for the defendant. Philip A. Mallard, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. BLAKE, J. Following the election of William Lantigua as mayor of Lawrence (city) in 2009, the defendant, Leonard Degnan, served as his chief of staff. During the defendant’s tenure in that position, he secured the donation of a trash truck from the city’s waste services provider to a city in the Dominican Republic. The donation request took place during a meeting in which the defendant told the provider that the mayor’s office “had the ability to rip up” the provider’s contract with the city. Following the donation, the city took no action to void or modify the contract. In 2012, a grand jury returned several indictments charging the defendant with bribery and other crimes related to the trash truck donation. A 2014 jury trial resulted in convictions of soliciting a bribe, soliciting a gratuity, conspiracy to solicit a bribe, and unlawful use of an official position with fraudulent intent.[1] On appeal, the defendant claims that the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence to support the convictions, and that errors in the prosecutor’s closing argument created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. With the exception of the conviction of soliciting a gratuity under G. L. c. 268A, § 3(b), which we vacate as duplicative of the bribery conviction, we affirm the defendant’s convictions. Background. In the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979), the jury could have found the following facts. City’s waste removal contract. Allied Waste (Allied) is a waste hauling company that holds multiple municipal contracts, private contracts, and commercial accounts. In 2009, Stanley Walczak was a general manager at Allied responsible for the negotiation of municipal contracts with the city, among other duties. In September, 2009, prior to Lantigua’s election, Walczak and the city renegotiated a […]
Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Casey, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-034-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-32 Appeals Court LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY vs. RYAN CASEY & another.[1] No. 16-P-32. Essex. November 7, 2016. – March 29, 2017. Present: Cypher, Massing, & Sacks, JJ. Insurance, Homeowner’s insurance, Insurer’s obligation to defend. Intentional Conduct. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on May 22, 2014. The case was heard by Robert A. Cornetta, J., on motions for summary judgment. Richard J. Fallon for Ryan Casey. Joseph M. Orlando, Jr., for Evan Williams. John P. Graceffa for the plaintiff. SACKS, J. Twice on the same evening, after consuming alcohol and marijuana, Ryan Casey attacked Evan Williams without warning, punching and kicking him in the face and causing him serious bodily injury. Casey later admitted that he “intend[ed] to touch” Williams, and that he understood, at least at the time of his deposition, that “[w]hen you hit somebody with a fist . . . you know you’re going to do some level of injury.” Williams subsequently made a claim under the homeowners insurance policy on Casey’s familial home. The insurer, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual), responded by commencing this action seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or to indemnify Casey, or to pay medical expenses for Williams, due to an exclusion in the policy for bodily injury “[w]hich is expected or intended by the insured.” On cross motions for summary judgment, a Superior Court judge ruled in favor of Liberty Mutual, concluding as a matter of law that Casey expected or intended to cause Williams bodily injury. Williams and Casey appeal, arguing that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding Casey’s intent to injure.[2] We affirm. Background. We recount certain undisputed material facts from the summary judgment record, reserving for later discussion the facts concerning Casey’s intent. On the evening of June 26, 2013, Casey, then seventeen years old, attended the St. Peter’s fiesta celebration (fiesta) in Gloucester with two friends, Dylan Chaney and Forrest Turner. Prior to arriving, Casey had consumed alcohol and smoked marijuana.[3] At some point while at the fiesta, Casey encountered Williams, also seventeen years old, and the two left on foot in the company of Chaney and Turner, allegedly to go smoke marijuana.[4] After the group arrived at a remote location nearby, Casey […]
Central Ceilings, Inc. v. Suffolk Construction Company, Inc., et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-036-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-1117 Appeals Court CENTRAL CEILINGS, INC. vs. SUFFOLK CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. & others.[1] No. 15-P-1117. Suffolk. October 7, 2016. – March 29, 2017. Present: Agnes, Maldonado, & Desmond, JJ. Contract, Construction contract, Subcontractor, Damages. Damages, Breach of contract, Attorney’s fees. Practice, Civil, Attorney’s fees, Discovery. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on October 3, 2006. The case was heard by S. Jane Haggerty, J.; an award of attorney’s fees was entered by her; and a motion for reconsideration was considered by Judith Fabricant, J. Joel Lewin (John P. Connelly also present) for the defendants. Paul R. Mordarski (Thomas J. Fullam also present) for the plaintiff. DESMOND, J. After a jury-waived trial, a Superior Court judge entered judgment awarding the plaintiff, Central Ceilings, Inc. (Central), $ 321,315 on its breach of contract claim for damages for loss of productivity incurred while acting as a subcontractor for defendant Suffolk Construction Company, Inc. (Suffolk), on a large construction project. This case is before us on cross appeals. Suffolk challenges the judgment,[2] claiming, inter alia, that Central’s claim was barred by the “no-damages-for-delay” clause in the subcontract between the parties, and that the judge erred in ruling that Central had established its claim for damages by the “total cost” method. Suffolk further challenges the judge’s award of $ 471,682 in attorney’s fees to Central, claiming that it was wrongfully denied discovery and a hearing prior to the entry of that award. On its cross appeal, Central challenges the judge’s holding that the “pay-if-paid” clause in the subcontract barred it from recovering $ 82,538 from Suffolk for unpaid change order requests (CORs). For the reasons set forth herein, the judgment on the merits entered on December 20, 2013, and the amended judgment for attorney’s fees entered on September 9, 2014, are affirmed. Background. First, we set forth the basic material facts, drawing extensively from the trial judge’s thoughtful and thorough findings of fact, rulings of law, and decision. The Massachusetts State College Building Authority (MSCBA) hired Suffolk to serve as general contractor on the construction of three interconnected dormitories at what is now known as Westfield State University (the project). As the dormitories were to be ready for occupancy by students arriving for the fall semester in 2005, the contract […]
Quarterman v. City of Springfield, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-035-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-223 Appeals Court WILL QUARTERMAN vs. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD & another.[1] No. 16-P-223. Hampden. November 9, 2016. – March 29, 2017. Present: Kafker, C.J., Kinder, & Lemire, JJ. Alcoholic Liquors, License, Local licensing authority. Anti-Discrimination Law, Race, Damages, Attorney’s fees. Practice, Civil, Judgment notwithstanding verdict, Motion to amend, Instructions to jury. Judgment, Amendment. Damages, Loss of profits, Attorney’s fees. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on August 14, 2008. The case was tried before Daniel A. Ford, J., an award of attorney’s fees was ordered by him, and motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and to alter or amend the judgment were heard by him. Leonard H. Kesten for the plaintiff. Edward M. Pikula, City Solicitor, for the defendants. KINDER, J. On April 13, 2006, the board of license commissioners (board) of the city of Springfield (city) denied plaintiff Will Quarterman’s application for a liquor license. Quarterman, an African American, brought this action against board chairman Peter Sygnator and the city, claiming that denial of the application was discriminatory and in retaliation for Quarterman’s earlier filing of a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD). Ultimately, a Superior Court jury rejected the claim of racial discrimination, but found that the city, through the actions of former Mayor Charles Ryan, had retaliated against Quarterman in violation of G. L. c. 151B, § 4(4).[2] The jury awarded damages of $ 250,000 in lost profits and $ 100,000 for emotional distress. The city challenged the verdict in posttrial motions for judgment nothwithstanding the verdict (judgment n.o.v.), to alter or amend the judgment, and for a new trial. Principally, the city argued that the evidence of retaliation and damages was insufficient. In a comprehensive written decision, the trial judge denied the motions as to liability for retaliation, but allowed them, in part, as to damages. The judge concluded that there was evidentiary support for the award of $ 100,000 for emotional distress. However, he found that the evidence of lost profits was “lacking in substance.” He also reasoned that Quarterman had failed to establish standing to claim lost profits because the profits were not direct and personal to him. Accordingly, the judge reduced the damages from $ 350,000 to $ 100,000. Quarterman challenges that ruling on appeal. On cross-appeal, the city […]
Categories: News Tags: 1103517, City, Lawyers, Quarterman, Springfield, Weekly
Commonwealth v. Squires; Commonwealth v. Angier (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-050-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12086 SJC-12087 COMMONWEALTH vs. JOHN F. SQUIRES, THIRD. COMMONWEALTH vs. STEVEN E. ANGIER. Norfolk. October 5, 2016. – March 27, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ.[1] Possession of Burglarious Instruments. Death. Practice, Criminal, Death of party. Complaints received and sworn to in the Dedham Division of the District Court Department on February 4, 2013. The cases were tried before James H. McGuiness, Jr., J. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. Kathleen J. Hill for Steven E. Angier. Carolyn L. Hely, Assistant District Attorney (Michael P.J. McGee, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth. Patrick A. Michaud for John F. Squires, III. HINES, J. After a joint[2] jury trial in District Court, the defendants, John F. Squires, III, and Steven E. Angier, were convicted of walking on a railroad track, G. L. c. 160, § 218, and possession of burglarious instruments, G. L. c. 266, § 49.[3] The complaints arose from Norwood police officers’ discovery of the defendants walking on the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) commuter rail train tracks near the Norwood central train station. After the officers searched the defendants and found tools, gloves, and two walkie-talkies tuned to the same channel, the defendants were arrested for walking on train tracks and possession of burglarious instruments. Squires moved for required findings of not guilty at the close of the Commonwealth’s case, and both defendants so moved at the close of all evidence; the motions were denied.[4] The judge sentenced each defendant to a term of imprisonment in a house of correction for two and one-half years and imposed on each defendant a fine of one hundred dollars.[5] The defendants separately appealed, claiming, among other things, that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions of possession of burglarious implements. The Appeals Court affirmed in separate unpublished opinions, Commonwealth v. Squires, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 1102 (2016); Commonwealth v. Angier, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 1117 (2015). We allowed the defendants’ applications for further appellate review. After the cases were entered in this court, but before oral argument, Angier’s counsel filed a suggestion of death and moved to vacate his convictions. The Commonwealth opposed the motion, arguing that under Commonwealth […]
Leon v. Cormier (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-032-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-61 Appeals Court NORBERTO A.Y. LEON vs. JESSICA S. CORMIER. No. 16-P-61. Suffolk. November 17, 2016. – March 24, 2017. Present: Hanlon, Sullivan, & Blake, JJ. Divorce and Separation, Parent coordinator. Contempt. Evidence, Refusal to comply with court order. Complaint for divorce filed in the Suffolk Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on September 7, 2011. Complaints for contempt, filed on January 2, 2015, were heard by Abbe L. Ross, J., and motions for relief from judgment were considered by her. Peter A. Kuperstein (Mary Donahue also present) for the mother. Norberto A.Y. Leon, pro se. HANLON, J. A judge of the Probate and Family Court held the mother, Jessica Cormier, in civil contempt for violations of a decision issued by an agreed-upon parent coordinator. Cormier appeals, arguing that the parent coordinator’s decision was not an order or judgment of the court and therefore cannot be enforced by a finding of contempt. After review, we conclude that, at least under the circumstances of this case, the parent coordinator’s decision was, in fact, an order of the court pursuant to the judgment of divorce nisi; we therefore affirm. Background. On November 20, 2012, the parties executed a separation agreement which was incorporated in the corrected judgment of divorce nisi on December 7, 2012, as of November 20, 2012. According to the judgment, the terms of the agreement were given the “full force and effect of an order of [the] [c]ourt.” The agreement provided, among other things, that “[t]he parties may modify the parenting plan by agreement” and, in so doing, agree to use the services of a mutually selected parent coordinator to assist them if they are “unable to agree on any matter related to the parenting plan[,] including educational changes.”[1] The parties also agreed in advance that the decisions of the parent coordinator “[would] be binding on the parties unless altered, modified or terminated by [c]ourt order.” Thereafter, following a series of disputes about several things, including the location where the children were to be picked up and dropped off during custody exchanges, the parties agreed to use the services of the mutually selected parent coordinator. On December 21, 2013, the parent coordinator sent an electronic mail (e-mail) message to the parties, clarifying a […]
Commonwealth v. Charley (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-033-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-501 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. JARRIS CHARLEY. No. 16-P-501. Suffolk. February 14, 2017. – March 24, 2017. Present: Green, Meade, & Agnes, JJ. Arrest. Probable Cause. Search and Seizure, Arrest, Probable cause. Constitutional Law, Arrest, Probable cause, Search and seizure. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on March 2, 2015. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Kenneth W. Salinger, J. An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal was allowed by Geraldine S. Hines, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by her to the Appeals Court. Zachary Hillman, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Anne Rousseve, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the defendant. GREEN, J. After hearing a police radio dispatch report of a robbery and shooting at a nearby convenience store, Boston police Officer Monica Quinonez observed the defendant walking toward her from the general direction of the convenience store, sweating profusely on a cool November evening. The defendant’s build and clothing fit the general description included in the dispatch. Suspecting that the defendant may have been involved in the convenience store incident, Quinonez watched the defendant’s movements for a few minutes, then went to the convenience store to view surveillance video of the robbery and shooting. Her observations of the video corroborated her suspicion that the defendant had committed the crime; as a result, several police units were dispatched to the address where Quinonez had last seen the defendant. When police officers approached that address, just under an hour after the robbery and shooting, the defendant came down from the front porch to meet them. Informed that there had been “an incident up the street,” the defendant said, “I had nothing to do with the shooting.” The officers took him into custody and transported him to the police station, where he was interviewed. After developing additional inculpatory evidence, the police placed him under arrest. A judge of the Superior Court allowed the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence[1] obtained after the police took him into custody, and the Commonwealth appealed.[2] We reverse. Background. We summarize the subsidiary findings of fact entered by the motion judge, which we accept absent clear error, reserving for independent review his […]
Massasoit Industrial Corporation v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-031-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-459 Appeals Court MASSASOIT INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION vs. MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION & another.[1] No. 16-P-459. Plymouth. December 7, 2016. – March 23, 2017. Present: Cypher, Maldonado, & Blake, JJ. Handicapped Persons. Anti-Discrimination Law, Handicap, Age, Employment, Termination of employment. Employment, Discrimination, Termination. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination. Emotional Distress. Damages, Emotional distress. Words, “Handicap.” Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on July 2, 2014. The case was heard by Thomas F. McGuire, Jr., J., on motions for judgment on the pleadings. Susanne Hafer for the plaintiff. Wendy A. Cassidy for Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination. Christopher Maffucci, for the intervener, was present but did not argue. BLAKE, J. The plaintiff, Massasoit Industrial Corporation (Massasoit), appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court denying its challenge to the decision and final order of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD). The MCAD decision affirmed a hearing officer’s order, arising from her finding that Massasoit had terminated the employment of William J. Glynn in violation of the handicap and age discrimination provisions of G. L. c. 151B. We affirm. Background. In 1986, Massasoit hired Glynn as a part-time custodian in its outside maintenance department. At the time, Glynn was fifty-four years old. For the ten years prior to his termination, he performed general custodial work at the registry of motor vehicles (RMV) in Brockton to the satisfaction of his supervisors. He had a spotless personnel record with Massasoit, and had never called in sick or missed work due to illness. On March 30, 2007, Glynn left work early because he was not feeling well. Glynn’s son took him to the hospital, where he stayed for three days to treat pneumonia. Glynn asked his daughter-in-law to notify his coworker of his absence from work due to his illness, which she did on the next day Glynn was scheduled to work. The coworker assured her that he would notify their supervisor. On April 6, 2007, less than one week after being discharged from the hospital, Glynn was readmitted with chest pains and diagnosed with a heart attack. The daughter-in-law again notified the coworker of Glynn’s situation, and he assured her that he would notify their supervisor. He also visited Glynn and assured him that the supervisor had been notified. From April 5, 2007, through […]
Categories: News Tags: 1103117, Against, Commission, Corporation, Discrimination, Industrial, Lawyers, massachusetts, Massasoit, Weekly