Posts tagged "Industrial"

Massasoit Industrial Corporation v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-031-17)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   16-P-459                                        Appeals Court   MASSASOIT INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION  vs.  MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION & another.[1]     No. 16-P-459.   Plymouth.     December 7, 2016. – March 23, 2017.   Present:  Cypher, Maldonado, & Blake, JJ.     Handicapped Persons.  Anti-Discrimination Law, Handicap, Age, Employment, Termination of employment.  Employment, Discrimination, Termination.  Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination.  Emotional Distress.  Damages, Emotional distress.  Words, “Handicap.”     Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on July 2, 2014.   The case was heard by Thomas F. McGuire, Jr., J., on motions for judgment on the pleadings.     Susanne Hafer for the plaintiff. Wendy A. Cassidy for Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination. Christopher Maffucci, for the intervener, was present but did not argue.     BLAKE, J.  The plaintiff, Massasoit Industrial Corporation (Massasoit), appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court denying its challenge to the decision and final order of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD).  The MCAD decision affirmed a hearing officer’s order, arising from her finding that Massasoit had terminated the employment of William J. Glynn in violation of the handicap and age discrimination provisions of G. L. c. 151B.  We affirm. Background.  In 1986, Massasoit hired Glynn as a part-time custodian in its outside maintenance department.  At the time, Glynn was fifty-four years old.  For the ten years prior to his termination, he performed general custodial work at the registry of motor vehicles (RMV) in Brockton to the satisfaction of his supervisors.  He had a spotless personnel record with Massasoit, and had never called in sick or missed work due to illness. On March 30, 2007, Glynn left work early because he was not feeling well.  Glynn’s son took him to the hospital, where he stayed for three days to treat pneumonia.  Glynn asked his daughter-in-law to notify his coworker of his absence from work due to his illness, which she did on the next day Glynn was scheduled to work.  The coworker assured her that he would notify their supervisor.  On April 6, 2007, less than one week after being discharged from the hospital, Glynn was readmitted with chest pains and diagnosed with a heart attack.  The daughter-in-law again notified the coworker of Glynn’s situation, and he assured her that he would notify their supervisor.  He also visited Glynn and assured him that the supervisor had been notified. From April 5, 2007, through […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - March 23, 2017 at 3:45 pm

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New England Survey Systems, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Accidents (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-076-16)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   15-P-331                                        Appeals Court   NEW ENGLAND SURVEY SYSTEMS, INC.  vs.  DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS.     No. 15-P-331. Suffolk.     December 8, 2015. – June 30, 2016.   Present:  Grainger, Hanlon, & Agnes, JJ. Workers’ Compensation Act, Failure to obtain insurance, Cancellation of insurance.  Department of Industrial Accidents.  Statute, Construction.  Due Process of Law, Administrative hearing.  Administrative Law, Judicial review.       Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on April 26, 2013.   The case was heard by Frances A. McIntyre, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.     Timothy K. Cutler for the plaintiff. Douglas S. Martland, Assistant Attorney General, for Department of Industrial Accidents.        AGNES, J.  The Workers’ Compensation Act, G. L. c. 152 (act), provides that whenever the Commissioner of the Department of Industrial Accidents (the department) determines that an employer has not provided the insurance required by law,[1] “a stop work order shall be served on said employer, requiring the cessation of all business operations at the place of employment or job site.”  G. L. c. 152, § 25C(1), as amended through St. 1989, c. 341, § 82.  The stop work order takes effect upon service on the employer, and remains in effect until the employer satisfies the commissioner that it has obtained the required insurance and paid the $ 100 per day civil penalty for each day it was in violation of the law, beginning with the date of service of the order.  § 25C(1) of the act.  Section 25C also provides for additional civil and criminal penalties against employers who do not obtain the insurance required by law.  See G. L. c. 152, § 25C(5)-(6), (9)-(11).  Subsection (10) of § 25C sets forth one of the additional civil penalties that an employer who fails to obtain the insurance required by the act may face.  It reads as follows: “(10) In addition to being subject to the civil penalties herein provided, an employer who fails to provide for insurance or self insurance as required by this chapter or knowingly misclassifies employees, to avoid higher premium rates, will be immediately debarred from bidding or participating in any state or municipal funded contracts for a period of three years and shall when applicable be subject to penalties provided for in section fourteen”  (emphasis supplied).[2]   The issue before us, which is one of first impression, is […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - June 30, 2016 at 8:35 pm

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Ellis v. Commissioner of the Department of Industrial Accidents, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-148-15)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   13-P-402                                        Appeals Court   JAMES ELLIS[1]  vs.  COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS & another.[2] No. 13-P-402. Suffolk.     October 10, 2013. – September 18, 2015.   Present:  Berry, Green, & Trainor, JJ. Workers’ Compensation Act, Lump-sum settlement, Attorney’s fees.  Administrative Law, Judicial review.  Practice, Civil, Frivolous action.       Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on May 28, 2008.   The case was heard by Geraldine S. Hines, J., on a motion for summary judgment.     Teresa Brooks Benoit for the plaintiff. Timothy J. Casey, Assistant Attorney General, for Commissioner of the Department of Industrial Accidents. Michael K. Landman, for Landman, Akashian & White, P.C., was present but did not argue.      BERRY, J.  Reduced to essentials, in this latest appellate foray, the plaintiff, James Ellis, contends that, in considering whether to approve a lump sum agreement under § 48 of G. L. c. 152, the Workers’ Compensation Act (act), for injuries to a worker, an administrative judge of the Department of Industrial Accidents (department) or a law judge on the department’s reviewing board (reviewing board) (hereinafter collectively referred to as administrative judge) is absolutely foreclosed from reviewing the authenticity of the legal expenses and from adjusting those expenses downward, leaving more money for the injured worker under the lump sum settlement payment. We reject Ellis’s contentions regarding total unreviewability of the claimed legal expenses.  Ellis offers no precedent, i.e., no caselaw or statutory authority, for this proposition.  See note 8, infra.  We conclude that an administrative judge — in review of a proposed lump sum awarded and to be paid in settlement to an injured worker — does have the authority to review and adjust downward unsubstantiated or unreasonably excessive attorney’s fees and expenses.  Put another way, it is within the purview of an administrative judge to modify the amount allocated in the lump sum settlement to an employee’s attorney for attorney’s fees and necessary expenses where the fees and expenses, upon review, are insufficiently supported or deemed not necessary, and the administrative judge, by such an adjustment, neither increases the burden on the insurer nor decreases the net sum to be paid to the employee. In the past five years alone, Ellis or his legal assistants (collectively, Ellis) have filed over one hundred and fifty workers’ compensation appeals in this court.  In a substantial number […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - September 18, 2015 at 6:50 pm

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