Chiaraluce v. Zoning Board of Wareham (and a consolidated case) (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-040-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-328 Appeals Court JOSEPH H. CHIARALUCE, trustee,[1] vs. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF WAREHAM (and a consolidated case[2]). No. 15-P-328. Suffolk. January 7, 2016. – April 8, 2016. Present: Hanlon, Sullivan, & Maldonado, JJ. Zoning, Nonconforming use or structure, By-law. Civil actions commenced in the Land Court Department on July 21 and July 25, 2011. The cases were heard by Gordon H. Piper, J. Richard M. Serkey for Joseph H. Chiaraluce. Mark J. Lanza for Denise R. DePedro. SULLIVAN, J. Joseph H. Chiaraluce, trustee of the Chiaraluce Realty Trust (trust), appeals from a judgment of the Land Court in a consolidated action, which determined that the trust was not entitled to a building permit for its Wareham lot (locus). A judge of the Land Court concluded that the right to rebuild the nonconforming residential structure that once occupied the lot had been abandoned as a matter of law. We affirm. Background. We accept the facts as found by the trial judge, unless they are clearly erroneous, Colony of Wellfleet, Inc. v. Harris, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 522, 523 (2008), and “do not review questions of fact if any reasonable view of the evidence and the rational inferences to be drawn therefrom support the judge’s findings.” Martin v. Simmons Properties, LLC, 467 Mass. 1, 8 (2014). The locus, the subject of numerous efforts to build, is comprised of 7,012 square feet in a residential district that has a current minimum lot size requirement of 30,000 square feet. It has no street frontage and is accessible from the street over a twelve-foot-wide right of way. Olaf, Lorraine, and Laurence Olsen (the Olsens) purchased the locus in 1971 for $ 16,000, at which time it was improved with a residential cottage ten feet in height, twenty feet in length, and thirty feet in width, with a gross living area of 600 square feet. In August of 1991, Hurricane Bob damaged the cottage, forcing it off its cement block foundation and separating the porch from the cottage. Thereafter, in September, 1991, the Olsens dismantled and removed the cottage from the locus. Wareham’s zoning board of appeals (ZBA or board) granted a “blanket” special permit for reconstruction of residences damaged by Hurricane Bob. Although the Olsens obtained such a permit in March of 1992 […]
Categories: News Tags: 1104016, Board, case, Chiaraluce, consolidated, Lawyers, Wareham, Weekly, Zoning
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 203108 v. Sex Offender Registry Board
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-848 Appeals Court JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 203108 vs. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. No. 13-P-848. January 29, 2016. Sex Offender. Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act. Constitutional Law, Sex offender. Due Process of Law, Sex offender, Hearing, Standard of proof. Practice, Civil, Sex offender, Standard of proof. Administrative Law, Hearing, Standard of proof. Internet. In our decision dated May 5, 2015, we affirmed a judgment of the Superior Court issued under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, affirming the administrative decision of the Sex Offender Registry Board (board) designating Doe No. 203108 (Doe) as a level three sex offender. See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 203108 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 87 Mass. App. Ct. 313 (2015) (Doe No. 203108). Doe timely filed a petition for further appellate review (FAR) on May 18, 2015. On December 22, 2015, the Supreme Judicial Court denied Doe’s FAR application without prejudice and remanded the case to this court for further consideration in light of two recent decisions, Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 7083 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 472 Mass. 475 (2015) (Doe No. 7083), and Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 3839 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 472 Mass. 492 (2015) (Doe No. 3839). 473 Mass. 1106 (2015). Although we conclude that neither of those decisions requires us to alter our decision in Doe No. 203108, Doe is nonetheless entitled to a new classification hearing in light of Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 473 Mass. 297 (2015) (Doe No. 380316). In this case, Doe’s classification hearing was held twenty months before his eventual release date, but just seven months before his earliest possible release date. (He had recently been denied parole, but the parole board offered him an opportunity to request reconsideration ninety days after the denial). Unlike the plaintiff in Doe No. 7083, at the time of his classification hearing Doe was not also civilly committed as a sexually dangerous person (SDP), making release on parole unlikely because of the need to obtain a Superior Court order of discharge. See Doe No. 7083, supra at 487 & n.11. Moreover, unlike the plaintiff in Doe No. 7083, Doe did not request a further continuance of his classification hearing date or ask the board to keep his classification proceeding open […]
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 380316 v. Sex Offender Registry Board (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-198-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11823 JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 380316 vs. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. Middlesex. September 9, 2015. – December 11, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Sex Offender. Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act. Constitutional Law, Sex offender, Burden of proof. Due Process of Law, Sex offender, Hearing, Standard of proof. Practice, Civil, Sex offender, Standard of proof. Internet. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 21, 2013. The case was heard by Dennis J. Curran, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Brandon L. Campbell for the plaintiff. David L. Chenail (Elisha W. Willis with him) for the defendant. Beth L. Eisenberg & Larni S. Levy, Committee for Public Counsel Services, & Eric B. Tennen, for Committee for Public Counsel Services & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. Andrew S. Crouch, for Youth Advocacy Division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. LENK, J. We are asked in this case to consider anew the standard of proof that the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) must satisfy in order to classify a convicted sex offender under the provisions of the sex offender registry law, G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178Q. The plaintiff, John Doe No. 380316 (Doe), is a convicted sex offender who was classified by a preponderance of the evidence as having a moderate risk of reoffense. In Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 972 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 428 Mass. 90, 91 (1998) (Doe No. 972), we held that SORB need only prove the appropriateness of a sex offender’s risk classification by a preponderance of the evidence. In light of amendments to the sex offender registry law and other developments since our decision in that case, however, Doe contends that the preponderance standard no longer adequately protects his due process rights. We agree. For the reasons stated below, we hold that SORB is constitutionally required to prove the appropriateness of an offender’s risk classification by clear and convincing evidence.[1] 1. Background. When Doe was thirty-five years old, he reportedly “twisted” the penis of his six year old nephew through the child’s underwear while both were in the bathroom. […]
Russell Block Associates v. Board of Assessors of Worcester (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-145-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-283 Appeals Court RUSSELL BLOCK ASSOCIATES vs. BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF WORCESTER. No. 14-P-283. Suffolk. November 10, 2014. – September 16, 2015. Present: Rubin, Brown, & Maldonado, JJ. Taxation, Real estate tax: abatement, classification of property. Real Property, Tax. Appeal from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board. John F. O’Day, Jr., Assistant City Solicitor, for board of assessors of Worcester. Daniel I. Cotton for the taxpayer. BROWN, J. The board of assessors of Worcester (assessors) challenges a decision of the Appellate Tax Board (board) granting the taxpayer an abatement of the fiscal year (FY) 2012 tax on its parking garage. The issue for consideration is whether the board erred by finding and ruling that the subject property was a multiple-use property appropriately classified as part residential and part commercial.[1] See G. L. c. 59, § 2A(b). We conclude that the board’s classification determination was a reasonable interpretation of the statutory language. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the board. 1. Facts. We summarize the board’s findings.[2] In 1992, the taxpayer, Russell Block Associates, constructed a twenty-four story residential building (Tower) in the city of Worcester. The Tower development project was conditioned on the construction of a parking garage.[3] The five-story garage in issue contains 300 parking spaces and is located across a small side street from the Tower. There are no dwelling units in the garage. By contract entitled “Agreement to Provide Parking Spaces,” the taxpayer agreed to reserve a minimum of one hundred spaces and up to a maximum of 250 spaces for exclusive use by the tenants of the Tower. For the next nineteen years, the assessors classified the garage as a mixed-use property, taxing a large percentage of its value at the lower residential rate.[4] In classifying the property in this manner, the assessors followed the guidelines issued by the Commissioner of Revenue (commissioner).[5] See G. L. c. 58, § 3; McNeill v. Assessors of W. Springfield, 396 Mass. 603, 606 (1986). Beginning in FY 2012, however, the assessors classified the property as entirely commercial. 2. Standard of review. Our task is to embrace an interpretation “consistent with the purpose of the statute and in harmony with the statute as a whole.” Adams v. Assessors of Westport, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 180, 183-184 (2010), quoting from Sudbury v. Scott, 439 Mass. […]
Reynolds v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Stow, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-144-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-663 Appeals Court GREGORY REYNOLDS vs. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF STOW & another.[1] No. 14-P-663. Middlesex. January 13, 2015. – September 15, 2015. Present: Trainor, Vuono, Hanlon, JJ. Housing. Zoning, Board of appeals: decision; Low and moderate income housing; Comprehensive permit. Practice, Civil, Standing. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 23, 2010. The case was heard by Kenneth W. Salinger, J. Dennis A. Murphy (Daniel C. Hill with him) for the plaintiff. David S. Weiss (Elizabeth Levine with him) for Stow Elderly Housing Corporation. Barbara Huggins for zoning board of appeals of Stow. TRAINOR, J. The plaintiff appeals from a Superior Court judgment affirming a comprehensive permit issued pursuant to the Comprehensive Permit Act, G. L. c. 40B, §§ 20-23 (Act), by the zoning board of appeals (board) of Stow (town) to the Stow Elderly Housing Corporation (SEHC) for the construction of a low and moderate income elderly housing project. The plaintiff, a southeast abutter of the locus, contended, among other things, that the private wells on his and his neighbors’ properties will have elevated nitrogen levels due to the discharge into the waste disposal system designed for the locus and, therefore, it was unreasonable for the board to waive certain waste disposal limitations contained in the town bylaw. Stow, Mass., Zoning Bylaw (including amendments through May 3, 2010) (bylaw). For the reasons set forth below, we reverse. 1. Background. a. Stow Elderly Housing Corporation and Plantation I. SEHC is a nonprofit corporation founded in 1981 for the primary purpose of developing, owning, and operating affordable housing. In 1983, SEHC obtained a comprehensive permit under the Act to construct Plantation Apartments I (Plantation I), a fifty-unit low-income senior apartment complex on a lot that is adjacent to the locus. Plantation I is served by a private well and a private septic system on the property. Although SEHC was the original owner and developer of Plantation I, in 2004, it transferred ownership of the buildings and granted a long-term lease of the land to Plantation Apartments Limited Partnership, while retaining the fee in the land. SEHC owns and controls the limited partnership’s general partner, and was the initial limited partner.[2] b. Plan for the locus. SEHC is under agreement to purchase an approximately two and one-half acre lot (locus) […]
Doe No. 3839 v. Sex Offender Registry Board (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-144-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11604 JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 3839 vs. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. Plymouth. September 3, 2014. – August 21, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Sex Offender. Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act. Delinquent Child. Constitutional Law, Sex offender. Due Process of Law, Sex offender, Retroactive application of statute. Statute, Retroactive application. Practice, Civil, Sex offender. Administrative Law, Findings. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on February 18, 2011. The case was heard by Christopher J. Muse, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and a motion for relief from judgment and for reconsideration was also heard by him. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Matthew J. Koes for the plaintiff. William H. Burke for the defendant. DUFFLY, J. In 1990 and 1991, the plaintiff, John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 3839 (Doe), was adjudicated a delinquent juvenile by reason of sex offenses he committed in 1989 and 1990, when he was fourteen and fifteen years old. Following his adjudications, Doe was committed to the Department of Youth Services (DYS), where he remained for over nine years, pursuant to orders extending his commitment beyond his eighteenth birthday. In April, 2000, Doe was committed temporarily to the Massachusetts Treatment Center (treatment center) for evaluation on the Commonwealth’s petition that Doe be civilly committed as a sexually dangerous person (SDP); thereafter, he was found to be sexually dangerous and was civilly committed to the treatment center for a period of from one day to life. In January, 2011, twenty years after Doe committed the offenses, the defendant Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) classified him as a level three sex offender. In September, 2013, Doe was determined to be no longer sexually dangerous, and was discharged from the treatment center. Doe contends that the sex offender registration statute, G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178Q (registration statute), as applied to him, constitutes an ex post facto punishment, and violates his rights to due process and protection against double jeopardy, because the requirement that he register as a sex offender was triggered by juvenile adjudications that preceded the statute’s enactment. See St. 1996, c. 239, § 1. He maintains also that, even if the registration statute […]
Doe No. 7083 v. Sex Offender Registry Board (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-143-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11806 JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 7083 vs. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. Plymouth. March 5, 2015. – August 21, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Sex Offender. Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act. Constitutional Law, Sex offender. Due Process of Law, Sex offender. Practice, Civil, Sex offender. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on April 2, 2012. The case was heard by Paul E. Troy, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. Ethan C. Stiles for the plaintiff. David L. Chenail for the defendant. Matthew J. Koes for John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 3839, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. DUFFLY, J. The plaintiff, John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 7083 (Doe), was serving a criminal sentence at the Massachusetts Treatment Center (treatment center), and also had been civilly committed to the treatment center as a sexually dangerous person (SDP), when the defendant Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) notified him in September, 2009, of its recommendation that he be classified as a level three sex offender, pursuant to the sex offender registration statute, G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178Q.[1] Doe requested a hearing to challenge SORB’s recommendation. When that classification hearing took place, in February, 2012, Doe’s earliest parole eligibility date was ten months away, and a trial on Doe’s petition for discharge, pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 9, had been scheduled for a date eighteen months away.[2] Because each date was not only distant in time, but also only a potential date on which he might have become eligible for release, rather than a known release date, Doe requested that the classification hearing be continued to a date after, or shortly before, trial on his petition for discharge. In the alternative, Doe sought to have the classification proceeding left open after the hearing, so that his classification would not become final, and current evidence of his risk of reoffense would be available for the hearing officer to consider when his discharge was imminent. The hearing examiner denied the requests and classified Doe as a level three sex offender. Doe sought review in the Superior Court pursuant […]
Doe No. 356011 v. Sex Offender Registry Board (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-117-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1842 Appeals Court JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 356011 vs. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. No. 13-P-1842. Suffolk. January 7, 2015. – August 18, 2015. Present: Kafker, Meade, & Maldonado, JJ. Sex Offender. Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act. Constitutional Law, Sex offender. Due Process of Law, Sex offender. Administrative Law, Hearing. Evidence, Expert opinion, Sex offender, Police report. Witness, Expert. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on February 1, 2013. The case was heard by Jeffrey A. Locke, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Eric Tennen for the plaintiff. David L. Chenail for the defendant. MALDONADO, J. Following Doe’s 2011 conviction for indecent assault and battery on a person fourteen years of age or older,[1] the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) notified Doe that he would be required to register as a level three sex offender. Doe obtained de novo administrative review pursuant to G. L. c. 6, § 178L. Neither party called any witnesses, and the de novo hearing proceeded on the basis of documentary evidence, which included, among other things, classification records containing a summary of Doe’s disciplinary reports and a police report that described sexual assault allegations of which Doe was acquitted. The hearing examiner (examiner) found this hearsay evidence probative of Doe’s repetitive and compulsive sexual history, and he classified Doe as a level three sex offender. Doe appeals from a Superior Court judgment affirming this classification. He asserts the examiner erred by considering both the disciplinary history set forth in his classification records and the police report of acquitted conduct. Doe also challenges the denial of his request for expert funds relative to his age as a mitigating factor. We affirm. Background. The examiner based Doe’s level three classification on multiple statutory factors, see G. L. c. 6, § 178K(1), including his sexual history and compulsive sexual behavior (803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.40[2] [2002]), his criminal history[2] — particularly as it related to a history of nonsexual violent offenses — (803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.40[9][b], [c][6] [2002]), his poor incarceration behavior (803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.40[19] [2002]),[3] and his noncompliance with conditions of probation (803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.40[20] [2002]).[4] The examiner also explicitly rejected Doe’s claim that his age of forty-nine years was a mitigating factor. In assessing Doe’s […]
Buccaneer Development, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Review of Appeals of Lenox (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-105-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-855 Appeals Court BUCCANEER DEVELOPMENT, INC. vs. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF LENOX. No. 14-P-855. Suffolk. April 8, 2015. – August 11, 2015. Present: Berry, Milkey, & Massing, JJ. Zoning, Special permit, Board of appeals: decision. Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on January 9, 2008. After review by this court, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 40 (2012), the case was heard by Dina E. Fein, J., sitting by designation, on a case stated. Brett D. Lampiasi for the plaintiff. Jeremia A. Pollard for the defendant. MASSING, J. In denying the plaintiff developer’s request for a special permit to build a residential retirement community, the defendant zoning board of appeals of Lenox (board) was frank: “In general, Board members agreed that the proposed project was simply too dense and too out-of-character with its surroundings.” A judge of the Housing Court, sitting by designation in the permit session of the Land Court, reviewed the board’s decision under G. L. c. 40A, § 17, and after a bench trial, including a view of the project site, affirmed the denial of the special permit. We affirm. Background. The plaintiff, Buccaneer Development, Inc. (Buccaneer), seeks to build a residential retirement community for individuals fifty-five years of age and older, consisting of twenty-three single-family townhouses on twenty-three acres of land in the town of Lenox (town). The parcel, which is located on East Street in a residential zoning district, is adjacent to sixty-eight acres of protected open space to the north and northeast. It is situated between four single-family homes to the west, on lots ranging from .49 to 2.75 acres, and a 1950s era cul-de-sac development to the east, of seventeen modest single family homes on a total of 8.2 acres. To the south lies the Cranwell resort and associated properties, including a golf course, mansions, ten condominium units on one-acre lots, and a housing development of thirty-seven units on twenty-one acres. The public high school is located approximately eight-tenths mile north on East Street. On June 22, 2007, Buccaneer submitted an application for a special permit to the board.[1] After a series of public hearings, the board voted 5-0 to deny the application on December 12, 2007, and its decision was filed on December 28, 2007. The decision records the board members’ reasons […]
Tirado v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds (and two companion cases) (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-130-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11818 ALFREDO TIRADO vs. BOARD OF APPEAL ON MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY POLICIES AND BONDS (and two consolidated cases[1]). Norfolk. Worcester. Suffolk. May 5, 2015. – July 28, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds. Motor Vehicle, License to operate. License. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, Revocation of license to operate. Carrier, License. Practice, Criminal, Conviction, Admission to sufficient facts to warrant finding, Continuance without a finding. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on January 3, 2013. The case was heard by Kenneth J. Fishman, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on February 28, 2013. The case was heard by Robert B. Gordon, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on March 28, 2013. The case was heard by Judith Fabricant, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. After consolidation of the cases in the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. David R. Marks, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendants. Dana Alan Curhan for Scott Channing. Ryan E. Alekman, for Alfredo Tirado, was present but did not argue. Cornelius J. Madera, III, for John J. Kelly, was present but did not argue. William A. Quade, for United States Department of Transportation Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. SPINA, J. In these consolidated appeals, we are asked to determine if a defendant’s admission to sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilty and a judge’s continuance of the case without a finding (CWOF) constitute a “conviction” as that term is defined in G. L. c. 90F, § 1,[2] governing the licensure of commercial drivers. Judges in the Superior Court determined that it did not and vacated the decisions of the Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds (board) upholding the suspension of the commercial drivers’ licenses (CDLs) at issue by the registrar of motor vehicles (registrar). The board and the registrar appealed. The Appeals Court consolidated the three appeals, and we granted the parties’ joint application for direct appellate review. As we explain, we […]